Radical-Ontic Structural Realism and Moderate-Ontic Structural Realism are usually distinguished by the specific way of how they address the question of the primacy between objects and relations. However, I will argue that the difference between Radical-Ontic Structural Realism and Moderate-Ontic Structural Realism runs deeper; it rests on the different programmatic assessments of the relationship between science and metaphysics. In this sense, at least at its roots, the distinction between Radical-Ontic Structural Realism and Moderate-Ontic Structural Realism lies in the divergence between Radical Naturalistic Metaphysics and Esfeld’s account of Natural Philosophy (based on the Primitive Ontology approach). From the above distinctions, I will argue: i) even that Quantum Mechanics offers us good arguments in favor of Ontic Structural Realism, both main Ontic Structural Realism’s proposals seem to struggle with QM’s challenges; ii) Ontic Structural Realism’s failure is not due to itself but to this metametaphysics proposals. That is, maybe some assumptions made by both NM and PO, like micro-physicalism, monism or metaphysical fundamentalism, should be reviewed or even dismissed from Ontic Structural Realism proposals.
Radical-Ontic Structural Realism and Moderate-Ontic Structural Realism are usually distinguished by the specific way of how they address the question of the primacy between objects and relations. However, I will argue that the difference between Radical-Ontic Structural Realism and Moderate-Ontic Structural Realism runs deeper; it rests on the different programmatic assessments of the relationship between science and metaphysics. In this sense, at least at its roots, the distinction between Radical-Ontic Structural Realism and Moderate-Ontic Structural Realism lies in the divergence between Radical Naturalistic Metaphysics and Esfeld’s account of Natural Philosophy (based on the Primitive Ontology approach). From the above distinctions, I will argue: i) even that Quantum Mechanics offers us good arguments in favor of Ontic Structural Realism, both main Ontic Structural Realism’s proposals seem to struggle with QM’s challenges; ii) Ontic Structural Realism’s failure is not due to itself but to this metametaphysics proposals. That is, maybe some assumptions made by both NM and PO, like micro-physicalism, monism or metaphysical fundamentalism, should be reviewed or even dismissed from Ontic Structural Realism proposals.
Abstract Lam and Esfeld have argued that, within Bohmian mechanics, the wave function can be interpreted as a physical structure instantiated by the fundamental particles posited by the theory. Further, to characterize the nature of this structure, they appeal to the framework of Ontic Structural Realism (OSR), thereby proposing a structuralist interpretation of Bohmian mechanics. However, I shall point out that OSR denotes a family of distinct views, each of which maintains a different account about the relation between structures and objects, and entails a different kind of ontology. Thus, in this paper I will show how to articulate the structuralist approach to Bohmian Mechanics accordingly to the different standard versions of OSR, and I will evaluate these alternatives. Moreover, I will propose a novel and sui generis kind of structuralist interpretation of Bohmian Mechanics, based on the framework of metaphysical coherentism.
Three accounts of effective realism (ER) have been advanced to solve three problems for scientific realism: Fraser and Vickers (forthcoming) develop a version of ER about non-relativistic quantum mechanics that they argue is compatible with all the main realist versions (‘interpretations’) of quantum mechanics avoiding the problem of underdetermination among them; Williams (2019) and Fraser (2020b) propose ER about quantum field theory as a response to the problems facing realist interpretations; Robertson and Wilson (forthcoming) propose ER to deal with the dubious ontological status of the entities belonging to superseded theories. This paper argues for the unification of these proposals based on realism about modal structure and the idea of scale relativity of ontology developed by ontic structural realists. This solves problems some or all the accounts of ER face, especially that of making explicit in what way they are realist. Furthermore, we respond to a recent critique that has been raised against the ontic structural realist account of quantum mechanics that we employ.
Discussing the contemporary debate about the metaphysics of relations and structural realism, I analyse the philosophical significance of relational quantum mechanics (RQM). Relativising properties of objects (or systems) to other objects (or systems), RQM affirms that reality is inherently relational. My claim is that RQM can be seen as an instantiation of the ontology of ontic structural realism, for which relations are prior to objects, since it provides good reasons for the argument from the primacy of relation. In order to provide some evidence, RQM is interpreted focusing on its metametaphysics, in particular in relation to the very concept of relation, and to the meaning such concept assumes in the dispute between realism and antirealism.
Abstract Ontic structuralism or ontic structural realism in the philosophy of physics can be broadly considered as an interpretative strategy providing a set of conceptual and metaphysical tools—or, more ambitiously, an ontological framework—in order to account for central features of current fundamental physics. This article aims to review the main structuralist interpretative moves in the context of our two best fundamental physical theories of matter and spacetime, namely, quantum theory (quantum mechanics and quantum field theory) and general relativity. We highlight in particular the structuralist understanding of permutation invariance, entanglement and nonlocality in quantum theory, and of the dynamical features of spacetime, (gauge‐theoretic) diffeomorphism invariance and background independence in general relativity.
In correspondence with the modal interpretations of quantum mechanics, Lombardi and Castagnino (2008) and da Costa, Lombardi and Lastiri (2013) have proposed an ontology of bundles of possible intrinsic properties for quantum mechanics, focused mainly on the issues of quantum contextuality and indistinguishability. Corresponding to the interpretation known as "relational quantum mechanics" (Rovelli, 1996), two ontologies based on relations have been proposed. Laura Candiotto (2017) advocates for a radical metaphysics of relations, considered by the author as an instance of the so-called "ontic structural realism". Alternatively, Andrea Oldofredi (2021) proposes an ontology of bundles of relations, considered by the author as an instance of the so-called "moderate structural realism". Since the 1980s, the topic of quantum entanglement has led several authors (Teller, Healey, Howard, Esfeld) to defend that quantum mechanics involves a form of holism. It has been argued that the holism of quantum mechanics supports the metaphysical thesis known as "priority monism" (Schaffer, 2010a). In this article, an ontology of quantum mechanics is proposed in which the properties of quantum systems have both a modal and a relational character. As a result, a holistic ontology of quantum mechanics is obtained, which is an instance of priority monism and moderate structural realism.
Structural realism attempts to make a compromise between scientific realism and empiricism, by restricting our realist commitment to the relational structure of scientific theories. There are two main versions of the position: ontic, or epistemic. According to ontic structural realism, the nomological relations expressed by theories are the primitive entities of reality. This ontic version is motivated in particular by arguments to the effect that epistemic versions are not really distinct from mere empiricism. However according to some authors, it’s not clear that ontic structural realism can differentiate between physical and mathematical relations, and account for the relations between scientific theories and their experimental basis. These difficulties can be related to the measurement problem in quantum mechanics, which also concerns the link between theoretical models and experiments. It appears that epistemic structural realism is in a better position to respond to these difficulties. A compromise between both versions of structural realism could allow us to keep the advantages of both.