Sustainable infrastructure increasingly depends on cryptographic trust: distributed energy resources authenticate fleet commands, water utilities protect remote maintenance, transport systems rely on certificate ecosystems, and buildings participate in grid-edge energy services. These systems also have long physical and institutional lifecycles. Assets, supplier relationships, software signing chains, and archived evidence can remain in service for decades, while the public-key assumptions embedded in them may become unsafe once cryptanalytically relevant quantum computers arrive. This paper presents Q-CLAIM, a lifecycle exposure model and prioritization method for post-quantum migration in long-lived sustainable infrastructure. The model extends the usual harvest-now-decrypt-later test by adding the residence time of quantum-vulnerable trust dependencies, migration lead time, safety constraints, and a replaceability factor. We then evaluate the model on a reproducible 28-archetype decision dataset covering electricity, water, transport, buildings, and cross-cutting supplier trust services. The scenario analysis shows that a lifecycle-agility-first strategy reduces the weighted exposure score by 93.7% while avoiding premature replacement of otherwise serviceable assets; a replacement-first strategy reduces exposure slightly further but requires twelve early replacements. The contribution is not a survey or a speculative benchmark. It is a concrete engineering method, a reproducible dataset, and a migration pattern that links post-quantum security with sustainability goals by preserving useful asset life while retiring vulnerable cryptographic dependencies.
Sustainable infrastructure increasingly depends on cryptographic trust: distributed energy resources authenticate fleet commands, water utilities protect remote maintenance, transport systems rely on certificate ecosystems, and buildings participate in grid-edge energy services. These systems also have long physical and institutional lifecycles. Assets, supplier relationships, software signing chains, and archived evidence can remain in service for decades, while the public-key assumptions embedded in them may become unsafe once cryptanalytically relevant quantum computers arrive. This paper presents Q-CLAIM, a lifecycle exposure model and prioritization method for post-quantum migration in long-lived sustainable infrastructure. The model extends the usual harvest-now-decrypt-later test by adding the residence time of quantum-vulnerable trust dependencies, migration lead time, safety constraints, and a replaceability factor. We then evaluate the model on a reproducible 28-archetype decision dataset covering electricity, water, transport, buildings, and cross-cutting supplier trust services. The scenario analysis shows that a lifecycle-agility-first strategy reduces the weighted exposure score by 93.7% while avoiding premature replacement of otherwise serviceable assets; a replacement-first strategy reduces exposure slightly further but requires twelve early replacements. The contribution is not a survey or a speculative benchmark. It is a concrete engineering method, a reproducible dataset, and a migration pattern that links post-quantum security with sustainability goals by preserving useful asset life while retiring vulnerable cryptographic dependencies.
Quantum computing creates a governance problem before it creates a cryptanalytic event. Information collected today may remain sensitive after a cryptographically relevant quantum computer becomes available, while long-lived operational technology and spacecraft may be unable to adopt new cryptography within conventional replacement cycles.This paper examines how operators of long-lived cyber-physical systems should prioritize post-quantum migration under uncertainty. It distinguishes the present confidentiality risk of harvest-now, decrypt-later collection from the prospective integrity and authentication risks that could follow scalable attacks against public-key cryptography.Building on Mosca's migration inequality, the paper introduces the Quantum Migration Priority Score, a transparent decision framework combining timing pressure, consequence, adversary exposure, and cryptographic agility. Illustrative applications to municipal water systems and proliferated low-Earth-orbit architectures demonstrate how migration priority depends on mission consequences, protocol boundaries, key management, supply-chain dependencies, and compensating controls.The paper concludes with a staged governance strategy centered on cryptographic inventories, crypto-agile procurement, testable migration pathways, accountable risk ownership, and explicit management of residual risk.
Cryptographic services underpin trust across modern digital systems, from enterprise and industrial infrastructure to cloud platforms, embedded devices, critical communications, and public-sector services. As the computing landscape progressively moves toward the quantum era, this trust model must be re-evaluated in light of new cryptanalytic capabilities and long-term security requirements. The migration from classical public key infrastructure to post-quantum cryptography is therefore a broad systems challenge, although defence and military environments must act earliest because they combine long platform lifecycles, difficult upgrade paths, intermittent connectivity, and (confidential) information lifetime measured in decades. This paper argues that post-quantum migration should be treated as an architectural transformation rather than a simple algorithm replacement. Building on a solid baseline and extending it with recent standards and scientific literature, it identifies crypto agility, hybridisation, and interoperability with legacy infrastructure as the core transition requirements, explains why lattice-based algorithms presently offer the most practical deployment path, and highlights the remaining assurance gap between implementing countermeasures and proving that they work. The paper presents the SECURED approach as a three-pillar architecture composed of a hardware-augmented QRTrusted Computing Base, a deployable PQC SDK for commodity systems, and a cloud PQC-as-a-Service model for protecting the full computing continuum.
Nuclear power plants face a structural lifecycle asymmetry: their 60-80 year operational lifecycles exceed the anticipated arrival of Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computers (CRQCs), so cryptographic material harvested today becomes decryptable within the service life of the systems it protects. This paper introduces a forensics-first framework for quantum resilience that treats forensic integrity as operationally essential rather than merely evidentiary, analyzing the quantum threat landscape across the Purdue architecture (L0-L5) to show how Harvest-Now, Decrypt-Later (HNDL) campaigns enabled by Shor's algorithm can retroactively compromise cryptographic foundations and undermine forensic evidence. Through two case studies, Quantum Scar and Quantum Dawn, we model attack feasibility via a conditional-chain formulation over structured expert-judgment priors anchored to documented HNDL activity and published CRQC roadmaps, yielding success probabilities of 8-78% under current defenses, where the upper bound corresponds to high-value facilities exhibiting cryptographic monoculture. We propose a defense-in-depth migration to Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) integrating hybrid key exchange, code and log integrity with anti-rollback, authenticated time synchronization, and side-channel-resistant implementations aligned with ISA/IEC 62443 and NIST standards, and specify seven design-level conformance criteria for validating it; modeled residual feasibility falls to 1-8% at Security Level 4 and below 1% under full PQC migration. We further contribute six MITRE ATT&CK for ICS technique extensions (T1001-T1006) as a standardized vocabulary for quantum-enabled infrastructure attacks. Quantum threats thus extend beyond cybersecurity to system safety, operational reliability, and post-incident evidence admissibility across multi-decade nuclear asset lifecycles.
Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC) readiness is increasingly constrained not by algorithm availability, but by cryptographic visibility, dependency complexity, and fragmented governance. This paper presents an anonymised case study of a large European critical service provider that initiated PQC readiness through a discovery first strategy, utilizing tool supported cryptographic inventorying to establish an evidence based baseline prior to migration planning. The discovery phase revealed systemic challenges, including distributed cryptographic ownership, uneven evidence quality across legacy and modern environments, and high dependency on third party cryptographic roadmaps. To operationalise these findings, the organisation introduced a structured exposure register that enabled prioritisation based on asset criticality, confidentiality longevity, and migration feasibility. We argue that PQC discovery should be understood as a governance capability that stabilises organisational knowledge and converts cryptographic uncertainty into measurable accountability, supporting risk based decision making and ecosystem coordination. The results contribute actionable lessons for institutions pursuing crypto-agility and resilience under post quantum harvest now, decrypt later threat models.
Quantum computing is no longer a distant concern for cybersecurity planning. Its progress has raised serious questions about the long-term reliability of widely used public-key cryptographic systems, especially RSA, elliptic curve cryptography, and related key exchange mechanisms that currently protect digital communication, cloud services, financial transactions, government systems, and enterprise information assets. The main concern is that powerful quantum algorithms could weaken the mathematical assumptions on which these systems depend, creating future risks for encrypted data, digital signatures, identity systems, and secure network protocols (Shor, 1994; Mosca, 2018). Post-quantum cryptography has therefore become a major cybersecurity readiness priority, not only as a technical replacement for vulnerable algorithms, but as a broader organizational migration challenge. Effective preparation requires cryptographic asset inventory, risk classification, crypto-agility, vendor coordination, interoperability testing, and phased deployment across complex information systems (Kumar, 2022; Campbell, 2025). This article examines the cybersecurity implications of quantum computing and reviews the major post-quantum cryptographic algorithm families, current standardization efforts, enterprise migration barriers, and strategic readiness measures needed for the quantum computing era. It also discusses the importance of aligning post-quantum migration with existing cybersecurity governance, information systems management, and long-term digital resilience planning. By emphasizing early preparation, structured migration, and continuous cryptographic governance, the article argues that organizations can reduce future quantum-related exposure and strengthen the security of critical digital infrastructure before large-scale quantum attacks become practical (NIST, 2024; NCCoE, 2025).
Every piece of critical infrastructure that relies on public-key cryptography (the power grid’s control systems, the banking sector’s settlement networks, the certificate authorities underpinning the internet) shares a single point of mathematical failure: the assumption that factoring large integers and solving discrete logarithms remains computationally intractable. A sufficiently capable quantum computer would remove that assumption. This review examines the systems-engineering gap between the cryptographic community’s response to that threat and the operational reality of critical infrastructure. The U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology finalized its first three post-quantum cryptography standards in August 2024, and a dense web of national mandates has since converted a theoretical migration into a scheduled one. Yet the infrastructure most exposed to long-term harm from “harvest now, decrypt later” data collection is also the infrastructure least equipped to migrate quickly: operational technology with fifteen-to-thirty-year hardware lifecycles, constrained embedded devices with single-digit kilobytes of spare memory, and layered public-key infrastructures that took decades to build and cannot be swapped overnight. This paper synthesizes the standardization timeline, the harvest-now-decrypt-later threat model, sector-specific bottlenecks in energy, finance, and telecommunications, and the emerging consensus that cryptographic agility, not any single algorithm choice, is the actual deliverable that determines whether critical infrastructure is “quantum-safe” in any meaningful sense. It closes by identifying where the literature is thin: independent verification of vendor readiness claims, quantitative models of migration cost across heterogeneous OT fleets, and the absence of binding, rather than advisory, quantum-safe mandates for the private operators who run most of the world’s critical infrastructure.