Every piece of critical infrastructure that relies on public-key cryptography (the power grid’s control systems, the banking sector’s settlement networks, the certificate authorities underpinning the internet) shares a single point of mathematical failure: the assumption that factoring large integers and solving discrete logarithms remains computationally intractable. A sufficiently capable quantum computer would remove that assumption. This review examines the systems-engineering gap between the cryptographic community’s response to that threat and the operational reality of critical infrastructure. The U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology finalized its first three post-quantum cryptography standards in August 2024, and a dense web of national mandates has since converted a theoretical migration into a scheduled one. Yet the infrastructure most exposed to long-term harm from “harvest now, decrypt later” data collection is also the infrastructure least equipped to migrate quickly: operational technology with fifteen-to-thirty-year hardware lifecycles, constrained embedded devices with single-digit kilobytes of spare memory, and layered public-key infrastructures that took decades to build and cannot be swapped overnight. This paper synthesizes the standardization timeline, the harvest-now-decrypt-later threat model, sector-specific bottlenecks in energy, finance, and telecommunications, and the emerging consensus that cryptographic agility, not any single algorithm choice, is the actual deliverable that determines whether critical infrastructure is “quantum-safe” in any meaningful sense. It closes by identifying where the literature is thin: independent verification of vendor readiness claims, quantitative models of migration cost across heterogeneous OT fleets, and the absence of binding, rather than advisory, quantum-safe mandates for the private operators who run most of the world’s critical infrastructure.
Every piece of critical infrastructure that relies on public-key cryptography (the power grid’s control systems, the banking sector’s settlement networks, the certificate authorities underpinning the internet) shares a single point of mathematical failure: the assumption that factoring large integers and solving discrete logarithms remains computationally intractable. A sufficiently capable quantum computer would remove that assumption. This review examines the systems-engineering gap between the cryptographic community’s response to that threat and the operational reality of critical infrastructure. The U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology finalized its first three post-quantum cryptography standards in August 2024, and a dense web of national mandates has since converted a theoretical migration into a scheduled one. Yet the infrastructure most exposed to long-term harm from “harvest now, decrypt later” data collection is also the infrastructure least equipped to migrate quickly: operational technology with fifteen-to-thirty-year hardware lifecycles, constrained embedded devices with single-digit kilobytes of spare memory, and layered public-key infrastructures that took decades to build and cannot be swapped overnight. This paper synthesizes the standardization timeline, the harvest-now-decrypt-later threat model, sector-specific bottlenecks in energy, finance, and telecommunications, and the emerging consensus that cryptographic agility, not any single algorithm choice, is the actual deliverable that determines whether critical infrastructure is “quantum-safe” in any meaningful sense. It closes by identifying where the literature is thin: independent verification of vendor readiness claims, quantitative models of migration cost across heterogeneous OT fleets, and the absence of binding, rather than advisory, quantum-safe mandates for the private operators who run most of the world’s critical infrastructure.
Critical infrastructure operators face a cryptographic transition unlike any in the internet's history: the mathematical problems underlying RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography, which secure the vast majority of today's key exchange and digital signatures, are efficiently solvable by a sufficiently large quantum computer running Shor's algorithm. No such machine exists yet, but the transition to quantum-safe alternatives cannot wait for one to appear, because encrypted data intercepted and stored today can be decrypted retroactively the moment a capable quantum computer does exist-a risk the field calls “harvest now, decrypt later.” This paper reviews the technical and policy literature on building quantum-safe resilience into critical infrastructure specifically, where equipment lifespans of ten to twenty years and hard real-time performance constraints make this transition materially harder than in general-purpose computing. This review examines the NIST finalized post-quantum cryptography standards, published in August 2024, following an eight-year selection process; the considerable performance and overhead burden imposed by such algorithms, with measured throughput between 150 operations per second on embedded ARM devices to over 13 million operations per second on server-class GPUs for the same algorithm; the very uncertain expert opinion timeline for when a cryptographically relevant quantum computer could exist, currently estimated at a 28 to 49 percent likelihood of appearing within ten years according to a survey of twenty-six experts in 2025; and finally, the regulatory deadlines for migration to such algorithms established in five different jurisdictions, which fall anywhere between 2030 and 2035. The key finding of this review can perhaps be stated plainly: Estimates of the time period actually required for a large organization to migrate to post-quantum cryptography, which range from twelve to fifteen years or more, are uncomfortably close to, and sometimes exceed, both the regulatory deadline and even the lower end of the threat timeline itself. With regard to critical infrastructure, this is not merely a theoretical exercise, but potentially an already overdue one.
This paper provides a comprehensive review of quantum readiness as a critical, multidimensional framework for navigating the upcoming quantum computing era. It addresses the imminent threat posed by cryptographically relevant quantum computers (CRQCs), which will be capable of breaking the public-key cryptographic systems (like RSA and ECC) that currently secure digital communications and e-commerce. The concept of ”harvest now, decrypt later” (HNDL), where adversaries collect encrypted data today to decrypt it once quantum computers are available, highlights the urgency of this transition. The review is structured around three key dimensions: the theoretical foundations of post-quantum cryptography (PQC), global standardization efforts, and real-world sectoral implementations. It discusses how quantum algorithms, specifically Shor’s and Grover’s algorithms, can render classical cryptography obsolete, and it analyzes the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization Project, which has selected the first-generation PQC standards. The paper also examines strategies from the European Union and other nations, noting the geopolitical implications of standards fragmentation. Furthermore, the review explores the practical adoption of PQC in critical sectors like finance, telecommunications, and defense, emphasizing the importance of crypto-agility—the ability to rapidly switch cryptographic algorithms—for future-proofing systems. It also highlights open challenges, including performance overheads, legacy system migration, and the shortage of skilled professionals. The paper concludes by outlining future directions for a secure transition, advocating for continuous research, global collaboration, and sustained investment to build a quantum-resilient digital ecosystem.
Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to examine the emerging threat that large-scale quantum computing poses to classical public-key cryptographic systems, particularly RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), which form the backbone of contemporary digital security infrastructures. In response to this threat, the study aims to analyze post-quantum cryptography (PQC) as a viable long-term solution capable of resisting both classical and quantum adversaries. The paper further seeks to assess the urgency of PQC adoption in light of the “harvest now, decrypt later” threat model and to evaluate the practical readiness of quantum-safe cryptographic algorithms currently under consideration by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). Materials and Methods: This study employs a qualitative and analytical research methodology grounded in an extensive review of authoritative sources, including NIST’s post-quantum cryptography standardization documents, recent academic literature, industry white papers, and policy reports from organizations such as RAND Corporation and Cloudflare. The analysis systematically surveys major families of post-quantum cryptographic algorithms namely lattice-based, code-based, and hash-based schemes and evaluates them based on security assumptions, computational efficiency, implementation complexity, and standardization maturity. Findings: The analysis indicates that Lattice-based cryptographic schemes demonstrate the highest maturity and practical readiness, evidenced by their selection in NIST’s PQC process. Code- and hash-based methods provide strong security but face key size and performance challenges. The lack of scalable quantum computers does not reduce urgency, as data harvesting persists. Artificial intelligence emerges as a key enabler for accelerating PQC adoption. Unique Contribution to Theory, Practice and Policy: The paper recommends a proactive, phased post-quantum migration using hybrid cryptographic architectures. Organizations should conduct inventories, benchmarking, and pilot deployments aligned with NIST standards. AI-driven tools are advised to improve key management and reduce complexity. Continued interdisciplinary research and policy support are encouraged to ensure a secure, scalable transition to quantum-resistant security systems.
Abstract Quantum computing threatens the public-key cryptography on which contemporary digital infrastructure depends, and the practical question has shifted from whether that threat will materialise to how quickly organisations are obliged to respond. Two developments drove this shift: the United States National Institute of Standards and Technology published its first post-quantum cryptographic standards in August 2024, and in June 2026 an executive order attached binding dates to their adoption across federal systems and federal contractors. This review examines those developments through targeted retrieval of primary standards and policy documents, together with peer-reviewed cryptanalytic and resource-estimation literature, with bibliographic details verified against publisher records. Three principal findings emerge. First, the standardised portfolio is smaller than commonly reported: three Federal Information Processing Standards are published, a fourth remains in development, and a fifth algorithm has been selected but not yet standardised, a distinction that matters because procurement obligations attach only to published standards. Second, two candidates that reached advanced evaluation were defeated by classical rather than quantum cryptanalysis, one within a weekend on consumer hardware. Third, published estimates of the quantum resources required to break widely deployed key sizes have moved by more than an order of magnitude in a single dimension within six years, exchanging machine size for running time. The review concludes that cryptographic agility, not the selection of any particular algorithm, is the durable objective, and that migration should be prioritised by the confidentiality lifetime of data rather than by forecasts of adversary capability. Keywords: Standardization; Keywords: post-quantum cryptography; cryptographic migration; cryptographic agility; critical infrastructure
Abstract: This study develops a public policy evaluation framework for quantum-safe cyber-defence in financial infrastructure, with emphasis on post-quantum cryptography, quantum communications and the governance of critical-sector resilience. The research addresses a strategic problem now facing central banks, payment operators, market infrastructures, commercial banks, fintech platforms and regulators: the public-key cryptographic foundations used for authentication, key establishment and digital trust will become exposed if a cryptographically relevant quantum computer emerges before high-value financial systems complete migration. The paper treats quantum risk not as a narrow algorithm replacement problem, but as a multi-layered policy challenge involving standards, operational continuity, procurement, vendor coordination, legal accountability, cyber-insurance, institutional capability and cross-border interoperability. The framework is grounded in real public evidence from standards bodies, cyber agencies and financial-system reports, including NIST post-quantum standards, NIST migration guidance, NCSC system-owner guidance, NSA post-quantum resources, BIS financial-system quantum-readiness work, BIS Project Leap and national quantum strategy evidence (NIST, 2023; NIST, 2024; BIS, 2025; OECD, 2025). The methodological contribution is a structured evaluation model that links cryptographic exposure, data longevity, systemic criticality, migration complexity and mitigation maturity into a risk-priority index. The results identify wholesale settlement, central counterparty clearing, securities settlement, cross-border financial messaging, certificate trust anchors and key-management services as the most urgent layers for cryptographic inventory, hybrid testing and staged transition. The analysis finds that post-quantum cryptography is the practical near-term route to scalable resilience, while quantum key distribution remains appropriate only for carefully bounded pilots unless cost, authentication and infrastructure dependencies are resolved. The paper concludes that quantum-safe financial infrastructure requires an integrated policy architecture built around cryptographic agility, real-time asset discovery, supervisory milestones, interoperable implementation testing, mathematically auditable decision rules and coordinated public-private transition governance. Keywords: post-quantum cryptography; quantum-safe finance; cyber-defence; financial infrastructure; public policy evaluation; quantum communications; critical infrastructure resilience; cryptographic agility; ML-KEM; ML-DSA; quantum readiness; payment systems
Essentially, quantum computing will test many of the cryptographic principles that have been used for the past 40 years to build digital trust. Unlike classical bits, quantum qubits use superposition and entanglement to solve mathematical problems in polynomial time, such as integer factorization and discrete logarithms. As a result, the ability of RSA, Diffie-Hellman, and elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is already rendered redundant by Shor's algorithm. Grover's algorithm further cripples symmetric encryption, reducing AES-128's effective security to 64 bits. These are not hypothetical: the "harvest now, decrypt later" approach allows attackers to collect encrypted messages for later decryption using quantum technology, threatening confidentiality in the healthcare, defence, and finance sectors. The existing literature has documented these threats but lacks a practical tool for organizational migration planning. This review fills that gap by proposing the Quantum-Crypto Readiness Index (QCRI), a novel heuristic scoring framework across four dimensions: Cryptographic Inventory, Data Longevity Exposure, Algorithm Agility, and Hardware Dependency. Synthesizing 20 years of peer-reviewed research, we evaluate leading post-quantum cryptography candidates—latticebased (Kyber, Dilithium), hash-based (SPHINCS+), and code-based (McEliece)—against performance benchmarks. We conclude that hybrid cryptographic architectures and immediate migration planning are essential before large-scale quantum decryption becomes feasible.