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Oblivious Transfer: A Theoretical and Practical Study

José Ramon Ariza Pérez

Published Sep 1, 2026• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

This thesis presents a theoretical and practical study of Oblivious Transfer, a fundamental cryptographic primitive. It introduces the mathematical and cryptographic concepts needed to understand OT and reviews its main constructions, from Rabin’s original protocol to 1-out-of-n and k-out-of-n variants. The work also focuses on the implementation of a direct k-out-of-n OT protocol in Python, allowing its theoretical properties to be tested in practice. Finally, experimental evaluations are performed using different numbers of messages, requested messages, and cryptographic key sizes. The results show how these parameters affect the execution time and confirm the expected scalability and computational behaviour of the protocol.

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Abstract Oblivious Transfer ( $$\textsf{OT}$$ OT ) is a fundamental cryptographic primitive that becomes a crucial component of a practical secure protocol. $$\textsf{OT}$$ OT is typically implemented in software, and one way to accelerate its running time is by using hardware implementations. However, such implementations are vulnerable to side-channel attacks (SCAs). On the other hand, protecting interactive protocols against SCA is highly challenging due to their longer secrets (which include inputs and randomness), more complex design, and the need to run multiple instances. Consequently, there are no truly practical leakage-resistant $$\textsf{OT}$$ OT protocols yet. In this paper, we introduce two tailored indistinguishability-based security definitions for leakage-resilient $$\textsf{OT}$$ OT , focusing on protecting the sender’s state. Second, we propose a practical semi-honest secure $$\textsf{OT}$$ OT protocol that achieves these security levels while minimizing the assumptions on the protocol’s building blocks and the use of a secret state.

Cryptography and Communications•Jul 21, 2025•1 citation
This thesis presents a theoretical and practical study of Oblivious Transfer, a fundamental cryptographic primitive. It introduces the mathematical and cryptographic concepts needed to understand OT and reviews its main constructions, from Rabin’s original protocol to 1-out-of-n and k-out-of-n variants. The work also focuses on the implementation of a direct k-out-of-n OT protocol in Python, allowing its theoretical properties to be tested in practice. Finally, experimental evaluations are performed using different numbers of messages, requested messages, and cryptographic key sizes. The results show how these parameters affect the execution time and confirm the expected scalability and computational behaviour of the protocol.
Oblivious transfer (OT) protocol is an essential tool in cryptography that provides a wide range of applications such as secure multi-party computation, private information retrieval, private set intersection, contract signing, and privacy-preserving location-based services. The OT protocol has different variants such as one-out-of-2, one-out-of- n , k -out-of- n , and OT extension. In the OT (one-out-of-2, one-out-of- n , and OT extension) protocol, the sender has a set of messages, whereas the receiver has a key. The receiver sends that key to the sender in a secure way; the sender cannot get any information about the received key. The sender encrypts every message by operating on every message using the received key and sends all the encrypted messages to the receiver. The receiver is able to extract only the required message using his key. However, in the k -out-of- n OT protocol, the receiver sends a set of k keys to the sender, and in replay, the sender sends all the encrypted messages. The receiver uses his keys and extracts the required messages, but it cannot gain any information about the messages that it has not requested. Generally, the OT protocol requires high communication and computation cost if we transfer millions of oblivious messages. The OT extension protocol provides a solution for this, where the receiver transfers a set of keys to the sender by executing a few numbers of OT protocols. Then, the sender encrypts all the messages using cheap symmetric key cryptography with the help of a received set of keys and transfers millions of oblivious messages to the receiver. In this work, we present different variants of OT protocols such as one-out-of-2, one-out-of- n , k -out-of- n , and OT extension. Furthermore, we cover various aspects of theoretical security guarantees such as semi-honest and malicious adversaries, universally composable, used techniques, computation, and communication efficiency aspects. From the analysis, we found that the semi-honest adversary-based OT protocols required low communication and computation costs as compared to malicious adversary-based OT protocols.
Quantum cryptography is the field of cryptography that explores the quantum properties of matter. Generally, it aims to develop primitives beyond the reach of classical cryptography and to improve existing classical implementations. Although much of the work in this field covers quantum key distribution (QKD), there have been some crucial steps towards the understanding and development of quantum oblivious transfer (QOT). One can show the similarity between the application structure of both QKD and QOT primitives. Just as QKD protocols allow quantum-safe communication, QOT protocols allow quantum-safe computation. However, the conditions under which QOT is fully quantum-safe have been subject to intense scrutiny and study. In this review article, we survey the work developed around the concept of oblivious transfer within theoretical quantum cryptography. We focus on some proposed protocols and their security requirements. We review the impossibility results that daunt this primitive and discuss several quantum security models under which it is possible to prove QOT security.
Oblivious Transfer (OT) stands as a fundamental and indispensable cryptographic primitive. Conventional OT protocols typically operate under the assumption that adversaries can only observe the messages transmitted between parties, with no access to the internal state information of the participants.This paper delves into the security of OT protocols in scenarios where internal state information may be partially exposed. Informally, an adversary A\mathcal{A}A is able to obtain arbitrary bounded leakage. Specifically, in addition to corrupting parties, adversaries are permitted to obtain bounded leakage information from the internal states of uncorrupted parties in a limited manner during protocol execution. This paper first defines the functionality and security of leakage-resilient k-out-of-n oblivious transfer protocols. Subsequently, inspired by the idea from Green et al. (Asiacrypt '07), where they construct OT protocols based on identity-based encryption (IBE), we present the first non-adaptive and adaptive leakage-resilient k-out-of-n OT protocols based on leakage-resilient IBE satisfied the aforementioned definition.
Oblivious transfer (OT) is a fundamental cryptographic primitive that is useful for realizing any two-party computation. Since information-theoretically secure perfect OT is impossible classically and quantumly, research has focused on imperfect protocols, exploring how close to perfect one can get against unbounded dishonest parties. While current approaches often make use of pure quantum states, recent work suggests that mixed quantum states may improve performance. In this paper, we investigate the use of mixed quantum states in Rabin oblivious transfer, where a sender holds one bit and a receiver learns its value with a certain probability while the sender remains ignorant of whether the receiver learned it. We present three mixed-state protocols constructed with two distinct methods, extending an existing pure-state scheme and employing a probabilistic approach, and demonstrate improved performance compared to classical and quantum pure-state protocols across varying parameters.
This work examines the part of an asymmetric cryptography called an oblivious transfer. Our goal is to bring a comprehensive overwiew about particular variants of an oblivious transfer and to describe construcions of these variants. A component of the work is an introduction of definitions needed for proving the security of protocols which implements the schemes. We are examining the security of protocols in a semi-honest model. There is informatively explained Rabin's oblivious transfer, but we mainly focused on so-called 1-2, 1-n and m-n alternatives of an oblivious transfer. We mention at least one scheme for each alternative, which we have proven that it is secured. Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)
Abstract Oblivious Transfer ( OT\textsf{OT}OT OT ) is a fundamental cryptographic primitive that becomes a crucial component of a practical secure protocol. OT\textsf{OT}OT OT is typically implemented in software, and one way to accelerate its running time is by using hardware implementations. However, such implementations are vulnerable to side-channel attacks (SCAs). On the other hand, protecting interactive protocols against SCA is highly challenging due to their longer secrets (which include inputs and randomness), more complex design, and the need to run multiple instances. Consequently, there are no truly practical leakage-resistant OT\textsf{OT}OT OT protocols yet. In this paper, we introduce two tailored indistinguishability-based security definitions for leakage-resilient OT\textsf{OT}OT OT , focusing on protecting the sender’s state. Second, we propose a practical semi-honest secure OT\textsf{OT}OT OT protocol that achieves these security levels while minimizing the assumptions on the protocol’s building blocks and the use of a secret state.