Oblivious Transfer (OT) stands as a fundamental and indispensable cryptographic primitive. Conventional OT protocols typically operate under the assumption that adversaries can only observe the messages transmitted between parties, with no access to the internal state information of the participants.This paper delves into the security of OT protocols in scenarios where internal state information may be partially exposed. Informally, an adversary $\mathcal{A}$ is able to obtain arbitrary bounded leakage. Specifically, in addition to corrupting parties, adversaries are permitted to obtain bounded leakage information from the internal states of uncorrupted parties in a limited manner during protocol execution. This paper first defines the functionality and security of leakage-resilient k-out-of-n oblivious transfer protocols. Subsequently, inspired by the idea from Green et al. (Asiacrypt '07), where they construct OT protocols based on identity-based encryption (IBE), we present the first non-adaptive and adaptive leakage-resilient k-out-of-n OT protocols based on leakage-resilient IBE satisfied the aforementioned definition.
Oblivious Transfer (OT) stands as a fundamental and indispensable cryptographic primitive. Conventional OT protocols typically operate under the assumption that adversaries can only observe the messages transmitted between parties, with no access to the internal state information of the participants.This paper delves into the security of OT protocols in scenarios where internal state information may be partially exposed. Informally, an adversary A is able to obtain arbitrary bounded leakage. Specifically, in addition to corrupting parties, adversaries are permitted to obtain bounded leakage information from the internal states of uncorrupted parties in a limited manner during protocol execution. This paper first defines the functionality and security of leakage-resilient k-out-of-n oblivious transfer protocols. Subsequently, inspired by the idea from Green et al. (Asiacrypt '07), where they construct OT protocols based on identity-based encryption (IBE), we present the first non-adaptive and adaptive leakage-resilient k-out-of-n OT protocols based on leakage-resilient IBE satisfied the aforementioned definition.
Abstract Oblivious Transfer ( OT OT ) is a fundamental cryptographic primitive that becomes a crucial component of a practical secure protocol. OT OT is typically implemented in software, and one way to accelerate its running time is by using hardware implementations. However, such implementations are vulnerable to side-channel attacks (SCAs). On the other hand, protecting interactive protocols against SCA is highly challenging due to their longer secrets (which include inputs and randomness), more complex design, and the need to run multiple instances. Consequently, there are no truly practical leakage-resistant OT OT protocols yet. In this paper, we introduce two tailored indistinguishability-based security definitions for leakage-resilient OT OT , focusing on protecting the sender’s state. Second, we propose a practical semi-honest secure OT OT protocol that achieves these security levels while minimizing the assumptions on the protocol’s building blocks and the use of a secret state.
Oblivious transfer (OT) protocol is an essential tool in cryptography that provides a wide range of applications such as secure multi-party computation, private information retrieval, private set intersection, contract signing, and privacy-preserving location-based services. The OT protocol has different variants such as one-out-of-2, one-out-of- n , k -out-of- n , and OT extension. In the OT (one-out-of-2, one-out-of- n , and OT extension) protocol, the sender has a set of messages, whereas the receiver has a key. The receiver sends that key to the sender in a secure way; the sender cannot get any information about the received key. The sender encrypts every message by operating on every message using the received key and sends all the encrypted messages to the receiver. The receiver is able to extract only the required message using his key. However, in the k -out-of- n OT protocol, the receiver sends a set of k keys to the sender, and in replay, the sender sends all the encrypted messages. The receiver uses his keys and extracts the required messages, but it cannot gain any information about the messages that it has not requested. Generally, the OT protocol requires high communication and computation cost if we transfer millions of oblivious messages. The OT extension protocol provides a solution for this, where the receiver transfers a set of keys to the sender by executing a few numbers of OT protocols. Then, the sender encrypts all the messages using cheap symmetric key cryptography with the help of a received set of keys and transfers millions of oblivious messages to the receiver. In this work, we present different variants of OT protocols such as one-out-of-2, one-out-of- n , k -out-of- n , and OT extension. Furthermore, we cover various aspects of theoretical security guarantees such as semi-honest and malicious adversaries, universally composable, used techniques, computation, and communication efficiency aspects. From the analysis, we found that the semi-honest adversary-based OT protocols required low communication and computation costs as compared to malicious adversary-based OT protocols.
We revisit the context of leakage-tolerant interactive protocols as defined by Bitanski, Canetti and Halevi (TCC 2012). Our contributions can be summarized as follows: For the purpose of secure message transmission, any encryption protocol with message space M and secret key space SK tolerating poly-logarithmic leakage on the secret state of the receiver must satisfy ∣SK∣≥(1−ϵ)∣M∣ , for every 0 < ε ≤ 1, and if ∣SK∣=∣M∣ , then the scheme must use a fresh key pair to encrypt each message. More generally, we show that any n party protocol tolerates leakage of ≈ poly (log κ ) bits from one party at the end of the protocol execution, if and only if the protocol has passive adaptive security against an adaptive corruption of one party at the end of the protocol execution. This shows that as soon as a little leakage is tolerated, one needs full adaptive security. In case more than one party can be corrupted, we get that leakage tolerance is equivalent to a weaker form of adaptivity, which we call semi-adaptivity . Roughly, a protocol has semi-adaptive security if there exist a simulator which can simulate the internal state of corrupted parties, however, such a state is not required to be indistinguishable from a real state, only that it would have lead to the simulated communication. All our results can be based on the solely assumption that collision-resistant function ensembles exist.
Oblivious transfer (OT) is one of the most fundamental primitives in cryptography and is widely used in protocols for secure two-party and multi-party computation. As secure com-putation becomes more practical, the need for practical large scale oblivious transfer protocols is becoming more evident. Oblivious transfer extensions are protocols that enable a relatively small number of “base-OTs ” to be utilized to compute a very large number of OTs at low cost. In the semi-honest setting, Ishai et al. (CRYPTO 2003) presented an OT extension protocol for which the cost of each OT (beyond the base-OTs) is just a few hash function operations. In the malicious setting, Nielsen et al. (CRYPTO 2012) presented an efficient OT extension protocol for the setting of active adversaries, that is secure in the random oracle model. In this work, we present an OT extension protocol for the setting of malicious adversaries that is more efficient and uses less communication than previous works. In addition, our protocol can be proven secure in both the random oracle model, and in the standard model with a type of correlation robustness. Given the importance of OT in many secure computation protocols, increasing the efficiency of OT extensions is another important step forward to making secure
Abstract. We aim at constructing adaptive oblivious transfer protocols, enjoying fully simulatable security, from various well-known assumptions such as DDH, d-Linear, QR, DCR, and LWE. To this end, we present two generic constructions of adaptive OT, one of which utilizes verifiable shuffles together with threshold decryption schemes, while the other uses permutation networks together with what we call loosely-homomorphic key encapsulation schemes. We then show that specific choices of the building blocks lead to concrete adaptive OT protocols with fully simulatable security in the standard model under the targeted assumptions. Our generic methods can be extended to build universally composable (UC) secure, and leakage-resilient OT protocols.
Abstract. We revisit the context of leakage-tolerant interactive protocols as defined by Bitanski, Canetti and Halevi (TCC 2012). Our contributions can be summarized as follows: 1. For the purpose of secure message transmission, any encryption protocol with message space M and secret key space SK tolerating poly-logarithmic leakage on the secret state of the receiver must satisfy |SK | ≥ (1 − ɛ)|M|, for every 0 < ɛ ≤ 1, and if |SK | = |M|, then the scheme must use a fresh key pair to encrypt each message. 2. More generally, we show that any n party protocol tolerates leakage of ≈ poly(log κ) bits from one party at the end of the protocol execution, if and only if the protocol has passive adaptive security against an adaptive corruption of one party at the end of the protocol execution. This shows that as soon as a little leakage is tolerated, one needs full adaptive security. 3. In case more than one party can be corrupted, we get that leakage tolerance is equivalent to a weaker form of adaptivity, which we call semi-adaptivity. Roughly, a protocol has semi-adaptive security if there exist a simulator which can simulate the internal state of corrupted parties, however, such a state is not required to be indistinguishable from a real state, only that it would have lead to the simulated communication. All our results can be based on the solely assumption that collision-resistant function ensembles exist.