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ACM Conference on Post-Quantum and Quantum-based Security

Hybrid Quantum–Computational Key Distribution with Reduced Assumptions (Short Paper)

Jean Snyman, Ioana Boureanu, Daniel Gardham

Published Oct 26, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The HM-QCT protocol, presented by Mazzoncini et al. in 2025, uses a unique feature of quantum information to achieve quantum key distribution (QKD) with secret-key rates beyond standard constructions. The protocol has been designed in the hybrid quantum-computational time-lock (QCT) security model which imposes two independent (but related) restrictions on the attacker: (1) a computationally secure encryption scheme which a successful attacker must break within a narrow timeframe and (2) an assumption that the attacker can only store quantum information with low fidelity. We first review the protocol and its two-assumption model by presenting, in explicit form, the two natural "harvest now, decrypt later" strategies against it, one using quantum memory and one using classical memory. We show how each is excluded by exactly one of the two assumptions, so that harvesting resistance rests on their conjunction and on the presumed existence of a technological gap: the adversary's quantum memory must decohere much faster than the time it takes to break the short-term encryption. Finally, we introduce HM-PRF , a variant that replaces the short-term encryption with a pseudorandom function (PRF) , evaluated locally. By eliminating the transmission of enciphered classical information, the adversary does not need to race an impending expiry event. We compare the security of our construction against the original and argue that our PRF-based assumption yields a more realistic adversary. It simply requires the existence of one-way functions rather than a predicted lasting limitation of quantum computation and memory technology.

DOI
10.1145/3839338.3857249

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The HM-QCT protocol, presented by Mazzoncini et al. in 2025, uses a unique feature of quantum information to achieve quantum key distribution (QKD) with secret-key rates beyond standard constructions. The protocol has been designed in the hybrid quantum-computational time-lock (QCT) security model which imposes two independent (but related) restrictions on the attacker: (1) a computationally secure encryption scheme which a successful attacker must break within a narrow timeframe and (2) an assumption that the attacker can only store quantum information with low fidelity. We first review the protocol and its two-assumption model by presenting, in explicit form, the two natural "harvest now, decrypt later" strategies against it, one using quantum memory and one using classical memory. We show how each is excluded by exactly one of the two assumptions, so that harvesting resistance rests on their conjunction and on the presumed existence of a technological gap: the adversary's quantum memory must decohere much faster than the time it takes to break the short-term encryption. Finally, we introduce HM-PRF , a variant that replaces the short-term encryption with a pseudorandom function (PRF) , evaluated locally. By eliminating the transmission of enciphered classical information, the adversary does not need to race an impending expiry event. We compare the security of our construction against the original and argue that our PRF-based assumption yields a more realistic adversary. It simply requires the existence of one-way functions rather than a predicted lasting limitation of quantum computation and memory technology.
We introduce an explicit construction for a key distribution protocol in the Quantum Computational Timelock (QCT) security model, where one assumes that computationally secure encryption may only be broken after a time much longer than the coherence time of available quantum memories.Taking advantage of the QCT assumptions, we build a key distribution protocol called HM-QCT from the Hidden Matching problem for which there exists an exponential gap in one-way communication complexity between classical and quantum strategies.We establish that the security of HM-QCT against arbitrary i.i.d. attacks can be reduced to the difficulty of solving the underlying Hidden Matching problem with classical information. Legitimate users, on the other hand, can use quantum communication, which gives them the possibility of sending multiple copies of the same quantum state while retaining an information advantage. This leads to an everlasting secure key distribution scheme over n bosonic modes. Such a level of security is unattainable with purely classical techniques. Remarkably, the scheme remains secure with up to O ( n log ⁡ ( n ) ) input photons for each channel use, extending the functionalities and potentially outperforming QKD rates by several orders of magnitudes.
We introduce the Quantum Computational Timelock (QCT) model, combining time-lock encryption with a quantitative noisy-quantum-storage assumption. Time-lock encryption gives Bob immediate access to the encoding seed and gives Eve the same final information as access to that seed only after a protected interval. Eve may then process her retained information without computational restriction. We state this delayed-access encryption assumption explicitly and construct MUB-QCT from a complete set of mutually unbiased bases in dimension ddd and an affine pair-wise independent permutation family. For single-copy encoding, every seed-independent immediate measurement has trace-distance advantage at most 1/(2d+1)1/(2\sqrt{d+1})1/(2d+1​) and mutual information at most 1/(d+1)1/(d+1)1/(d+1). Effective residual storage at diamond distance at most δδδ from replacement adds at most δδδ to the individual-attack distinguishing bound. Under i.i.d. individual attacks and entropy-preserving acceptance, we obtain an asymptotic key-rate bound and formulate final-key secrecy in composable trace distance. For mmm independently randomized signals sharing one bit and seed, the optimal leakage under non-adaptive product measurements is min⁡{1,m/(d+1)}\min\{1,m/(d+1)\}min{1,m/(d+1)}, allowing a linear-in-ddd detection enhancement in that attack model. We also construct a seed-independent joint measurement that recovers the bit after disclosure with error at most ε\varepsilonε from O(log⁡d+log⁡(1/ε))O(\log d+\log(1/\varepsilon))O(logd+log(1/ε)) signals, retaining only classical information after measurement. This gives a quantitative separation between product and joint measurements. Bob uses two logical detection outcomes independently of ddd.
The rapid advancement of quantum computing, exemplified by Shor’s and Grover’s algorithms, poses an existential threat to the Rivest-Shamir-Adleman algorithm, elliptic curve cryptography, and symmetric encryption. This paper presents a critical and integrative review of two defensive paradigms, quantum key distribution and post-quantum cryptography, covering studies published from 2020 to 2026 and mapped to four objectives spanning quantum threats, quantum key distribution viability, standardization, and hybrid synergies. Quantum key distribution protocols offer information-theoretically secure key distribution, though twin-field quantum key distribution’s 833.8 kilometer distance record comes at secure key rates as low as 0.014 bits per second. Post-quantum cryptography algorithms spanning lattice-based, code-based, hash-based, multivariate, and isogeny-based schemes offer unlimited range but rest on unproven mathematical assumptions, illustrated by the 2022 classical break of the Supersingular Isogeny Diffie-Hellman scheme and a 2024 quantum attack on the Rainbow signature scheme. Following the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s 2024 finalization of its primary standards, with the Hamming Quasi-Cyclic scheme subsequently added as a backup key encapsulation mechanism, this review identifies five hybrid architectural patterns combining quantum key distribution and post-quantum cryptography, evaluates their maturity from proposed to experimentally validated, and quantifies their cost: hybrid throughput collapses by two orders of magnitude once quantum key distillation is incorporated. Comparative benchmarking, an architecture diagram, and a thematic analysis identify quantum repeater networks, long-term cryptanalysis, and security-performance trade-off frameworks as critical research gaps, positioning hybrid integration as the most promising pathway toward secure communications.
Quantum computers pose a long-term threat to many currently used cryptographic schemes as they are able to efficiently solve the computational problems those schemes are based on. This threat has lead to research into quantum-resistant cryptographic schemes to eventually replace those currently used, as well as research into how to ease the transition from classical schemes to quantum-resistant ones. One approach to address these issues is to use a combiner that creates hybrid schemes, that is schemes which are classically and quantum-resistant, to protect against quantum attacks and maintain current security guarantees. Such combiners are used as a way to provide trust from different schemes and their differing computational difficulty assumptions rather than a single scheme. which may later become vulnerable. An important type of scheme that must be secure against both classical and quantum attacks are key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs), as they are commonly used for constructing public-key encryption and key exchange protocols. We first define new security notions for KEMs modeling attackers of various levels of quantum power ranging from fully classical to fully quantum. We then construct a combiner that creates hybrid schemes for key encapsulation mechanisms which is secure against adversaries with varying levels of quantum power over time and can be implemented efficiently. Our construction provides an efficient method to combine KEMs using an additional scheme. This construction is also general enough that it can be implemented in settings such as key exchange protocols, like those used in the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol for web browsers, without affecting existing structure meaningfully.
The emergence of quantum computing has provided new paradigms for cryptography. On the one hand, it poses significant new threats to existing classically cryptographic systems, requiring the community to define new security models that capture what a quantum adversary can do. On the other hand, it gives us new tools to design cryptographic protocols, with weaker assumptions than in the classical world, or even protocols that are impossible classically. In this survey, we first give an overview of new security definitions for classical cryptography, considering quantum adversaries who can either only use local quantum computation (post-quantum security), or even send quantum messages and in particular have access to oracle in superposition (quantum security). We explore these new notions through the examples of commitments, zero-knowledge proofs, encryption, and signatures. Then, we present what is arguably the most famous application of quantum cryptography: quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols that take advantage of unique properties of quantum mechanics to provide secure communication unconditionally. We also explore cryptography beyond QKD, focusing on unclonable cryptography: a family of cryptographic functionalities, built with quantum states, and designed to be resistant to counterfeit by leveraging the “no-cloning” theorem. We examine in particular quantum money, but also the recent notions of unclonable encryption and copy-protection, including related variants. By presenting a comprehensive survey of these topics, this paper aims to provide a thorough understanding of the current landscape and future potential of quantum cryptography.
In contrast to classical public-key cryptosystems, where the security of encoded messages relies on on computational assumptions, Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) enables two distant parties to establish a shared secret key that, when combined with a one-time pad, provides information-theoretically secure encryption, provided that the QKD protocol is supported by a rigorous security proof. In the last decades, security proofs robust against a wide range of eavesdropping strategies have established the theoretical soundness of several QKD protocols. However, most proofs are based on idealized models of the physical systems involved in such protocols and often include assumptions that are not satisfied in practical implementations. This mismatch creates a gap between theoretical security guarantees and actual experimental realizations, making QKD protocols vulnerable to attacks. To ensure the security of real-world QKD systems, it is therefore essential to account for imperfections in security analyses. In this article, we present an overview of recent analytical and numerical developments in QKD security proofs, which provide a versatile approach for incorporating imperfections and re-establishing the security of quantum communication protocols under realistic conditions.