Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) swarms require secure and efficient protocols for communication in dynamic and adversarial environments. This paper presents a post-quantum authenticated key exchange protocol for UAV communications, inspired by recent post-quantum extensions of EDHOC. The protocol is modeled in SAPIC+ and verified in the Tamarin Prover under a Dolev–Yao adversary, establishing executability, mutual authentication, key secrecy, and forward secrecy properties. Communication overhead and handshake latency are estimated using standardized parameter sizes and benchmark data for ARM Cortex-M4 and x86 platforms, showing how the choice of post-quantum primitives affects the feasibility of authenticated key exchange in constrained UAV deployments.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) swarms require secure and efficient protocols for communication in dynamic and adversarial environments. This paper presents a post-quantum authenticated key exchange protocol for UAV communications, inspired by recent post-quantum extensions of EDHOC. The protocol is modeled in SAPIC+ and verified in the Tamarin Prover under a Dolev–Yao adversary, establishing executability, mutual authentication, key secrecy, and forward secrecy properties. Communication overhead and handshake latency are estimated using standardized parameter sizes and benchmark data for ARM Cortex-M4 and x86 platforms, showing how the choice of post-quantum primitives affects the feasibility of authenticated key exchange in constrained UAV deployments.
The integration of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) into vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) has emerged as a promising solution to overcome the limited coverage of conventional roadside unit (RSU)-based infrastructures. However, UAVs operate in open environments and cannot be fully trusted, while the rapid advancement of quantum computing threatens the long-term security of classical public-key cryptographic systems. As a result, many existing UAV-based VANET authentication schemes face fundamental limitations in future deployments. Most existing schemes either lack post-quantum security or incur excessive computational and communication overhead, making them unsuitable for real-time and high-mobility vehicular environments. In addition, the common assumptions of trusted UAVs do not align with realistic threat models. To address these issues, this paper proposes a lightweight post-quantum authentication and key exchange protocol based on the module learning with errors (MLWE) problem and physically unclonable functions (PUFs). The proposed scheme treats UAVs as untrusted relay nodes and excludes them from session key generation. Its security is evaluated using informal analysis, the real-or-random (RoR) model, BAN logic, and AVISPA, while performance evaluation indicates improved efficiency compared to existing schemes.
The unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) field is rapidly evolving, increasing the need for effective security mechanisms to protect data in transit in resource-constrained environments. Although many solutions have been proposed to achieve the required security objectives, these traditional solutions either suffer from high computational complexity or are vulnerable to quantum computing threats, an open challenge. However, this research presents a lightweight security scheme that uses the Kyber 512 algorithm for a quantum-resistant key-exchange algorithm, followed by a Wi-Fi Protected Access 2 (WPA2)-inspired mechanism for mutual authentication. Furthermore, an Ascon Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (ASCON-AEAD)-based lightweight algorithm is utilized for data encryption and verification. Additionally, the scheme is implemented in a simulation-based UAV environment to demonstrate its performance in protecting the confidentiality and integrity of MAVLink messages transferred between aircraft and the ground control station (CGS), as well as the communicated party's authenticity. Finally, the randomness of both authentication and encryption keys was evaluated using the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) tests across 50 independent sessions, with a significance level of 0.01. All tests showed average p -values higher than the accepted significance level, with pass rates ranging from 96 to 100%, indicating good statistical randomness for the generated keys and supporting their security quality within the proposed protocol. In contrast, it also demonstrated a successful transfer of encrypted Micro Air Vehicle Link (MAVLink) messages. It ensured their validity only after verification of the identities of both communicating parties (i.e., mutual authentication). Furthermore, the achieved processing time averaged approximately 1.45 ms, ranging from 0.91 to 1.89 ms, which was within acceptable limits for such an environment, making this proposed solution efficient and effective.
Resource-constrained unmanned aerial vehicle–ground control station (UAV–GCS) communications face substantial post-quantum authentication costs, expensive cryptographic operations triggered by invalid requests, and key-state desynchronization during rekeying. To address these problems, this paper proposes QUAD, a lightweight hybrid post-quantum authentication and key agreement protocol. QUAD combines request pre-authentication, hybrid key establishment, and mutual key confirmation to reject invalid requests before costly cryptographic operations. It also allows a bounded transition period for receiving records under the old and new keys to mitigate key-state inconsistencies caused by link disruptions. Confidentiality and authentication are analyzed using ProVerif, while cryptographic and communication overhead, denial-of-service scenarios, and key-update behavior are evaluated on a Raspberry Pi platform. Under the specified security model, QUAD satisfies the tested authentication and confidentiality properties, reduces the computational burden of invalid requests, and improves bidirectional communication continuity under selected packet-loss conditions. These findings support its feasibility for post-quantum security in resource-constrained UAV–GCS links.
The seamless integration of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) into public airspace necessitates a robust UAV Traffic Management (UTM) system. Information security in communications plays a pivotal role in ensuring the operational safety of the UTM. Maintaining the integrity and authentication of unicast communications, such as command and video information, is imperative to thwart tampering and impersonation. Encryption emerges as an optimal solution for safeguarding such data. Efficient utilization of symmetrical encryption mandates the imple-mentation of secure key exchange mechanisms. However, intro-ducingAuthenticated Key Exchange (AKE) standards on diminutive Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) encounters problems due to hardware limitations. To surmount this challenge, lightweight cryptographic algorithms tailored for resource-constrained hard-ware have been developed. Nonetheless, both lightweight and conventional cryptographic algorithms are susceptible to quantum computing threats. In response, post-quantum cryptographic primitives are undergoing standardization. This study assesses post-quantumKey Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) candidates, namely CRYSTALS-Kyber, Hamming Quasi-Cyclic (HQC), and BIKE, on hardware resembling small UAVs. The evaluation of these algorithms focuses on computation time, considering real-time tasks during flights. The findings affirm the viability of employing unmodified standards on resource-constrained hardware concurrently with other priority tasks. Furthermore, quantum-vulnerable standards are also investigated to compare their performance against their more secure counterparts. All three post-quantum KEM candidates demonstrate usability in this environment, with CRYSTALS-Kyber being recommended for its superior performance, even surpassing certain prevailing standards.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) increasingly operate in contested environments where command-and-control (C2) links face jamming, spoofing, and long-term cryptanalytic threats from future quantum adversaries. Open-source autopilot stacks such as ArduPilot rely on the MAVLink protocol, whose version~2 signing mechanism authenticates messages but leaves payloads unencrypted and does not provide post-quantum security. In this work we design and implement a post-quantum secure extension for MAVLink C2 traffic based on the HQC key encapsulation mechanism and a KEMTLS with pre-distributed keys (KEMTLS-PDK) handshake between Ground Control Stations (GCS) and flight controllers (FC). Our design derives per-link symmetric keys for lightweight payload encryption (AES--CTR and ChaCha20) while respecting the size, weight, and power (SWaP) constraints of small UAVs and the real-time requirements of 100~Hz control loops. We prototype the scheme in ArduPilot, apply implementation-level optimizations inspired by recent work on HQC for constrained hardware, and define a dedicated MAVLink dialect for the handshake. We then evaluate handshake latency, ciphertext throughput, and idle battery behaviour on a Parrot~Bebop~1 hardware testbed under indoor bench conditions. The results show that post-quantum authenticated key exchange can be integrated into MAVLink-based C2 links with typical session establishment around 0.6~s and no measurable additional idle battery penalty within the resolution of the onboard gauge.
Secure communication in unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) networks is critical for a wide range of civil and military applications, from precision agriculture and disaster response to critical infrastructure monitoring. These missions require lightweight, tamper-resistant, and quantum-secure authentication mechanisms. We examine the recently proposed Quantum-Resistant Identity Authentication and Key Agreement Scheme for UAV Networks Based on the Kyber Algorithm (LIGKYX) and demonstrate its critical weaknesses, including a lack of Perfect Forward/Backward Secrecy (PFS/PBS), and desynchronization vulnerabilities. To address these limitations, we propose a novel authentication and key agreement protocol that integrates SRAM-based Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) with the Kyber post-quantum key encapsulation mechanism, eliminating the reliance on Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) and stateful counters used in LIGKYX. The security of the proposed protocol is validated through both formal and informal analyses, demonstrating strong resistance to replay, impersonation, man-in-the-middle, desynchronization, and UAV capture attacks. Performance evaluation confirms its efficiency: the total communication overhead is reduced by 7.1% (from 1836 bytes in LIGKYX to 1705 bytes in the proposed scheme), and the total authentication time is reduced by more than 54%, from 87.84 ms in LIGKYX to 40.23 ms in the proposed scheme. These improvements demonstrate that the protocol not only strengthens security but also significantly reduces computation and communication costs. Overall, the proposed solution offers a lightweight, scalable, and quantum-resistant authentication framework tailored for resource-constrained UAV environments, representing a substantial advancement over existing schemes such as LIGKYX.