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IEEE/AIAA Digital Avionics Systems Conference (DASC)

Evaluating Post-Quantum Key Exchange Mechanisms for UAV Communication Security

Ridwane Aissaoui, Jean-Christophe Deneuville, Christophe Guerber, Alain Pirovano

Published Sep 29, 2024• 13 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The seamless integration of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) into public airspace necessitates a robust UAV Traffic Management (UTM) system. Information security in communications plays a pivotal role in ensuring the operational safety of the UTM. Maintaining the integrity and authentication of unicast communications, such as command and video information, is imperative to thwart tampering and impersonation. Encryption emerges as an optimal solution for safeguarding such data. Efficient utilization of symmetrical encryption mandates the imple-mentation of secure key exchange mechanisms. However, intro-ducingAuthenticated Key Exchange (AKE) standards on diminutive Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) encounters problems due to hardware limitations. To surmount this challenge, lightweight cryptographic algorithms tailored for resource-constrained hard-ware have been developed. Nonetheless, both lightweight and conventional cryptographic algorithms are susceptible to quantum computing threats. In response, post-quantum cryptographic primitives are undergoing standardization. This study assesses post-quantumKey Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) candidates, namely CRYSTALS-Kyber, Hamming Quasi-Cyclic (HQC), and BIKE, on hardware resembling small UAVs. The evaluation of these algorithms focuses on computation time, considering real-time tasks during flights. The findings affirm the viability of employing unmodified standards on resource-constrained hardware concurrently with other priority tasks. Furthermore, quantum-vulnerable standards are also investigated to compare their performance against their more secure counterparts. All three post-quantum KEM candidates demonstrate usability in this environment, with CRYSTALS-Kyber being recommended for its superior performance, even surpassing certain prevailing standards.

DOI
10.1109/dasc62030.2024.10749304

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ABSTRACT This paper presents a simulation- and model-based study — all results are derived from validated simulation frameworks rather than physical hardware measurements — of the post-quantum migration of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) command-and-control links. The advent of cryptographically relevant quantum computers (CRQCs) fundamentally threatens the security of unmanned aerial systems (UAS), particularly command and control links that rely on classical public-key cryptography. Compounded by "harvest now, decrypt later” strategies, this necessitates a proactive transition to post-quantum cryptography (PQC). We develop a quantum threat model for UAV communications and evaluates a migration pathway anchored by the NIST-standardized ML-KEM (Kyber) algorithm. We model and benchmark ML-KEM on a simulated ARM Cortex-M4-class flight controller plat-form, analysing computational performance, memory footprint, energy consumption, and real-time scheduling behaviour. Results demonstrate that ML-KEM-768 encapsulation reduces latency by approximately 39% compared to elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman, while a hybrid ECDH+ML-KEM-768 configuration introduces moderate computational and memory overhead. However, the substantial increase in ciphertext size creates critical fragmentation bottlenecks on low-bandwidth telemetry links such as LoRa, motivating a proposed symmetric key derivation architecture for bandwidth-efficient rekeying. Side-channel analysis under an idealised leakage model confirms susceptibility to correlation power analysis, highlighting the necessity for hardened implementations. Furthermore, real-time operating system scheduling simulations under a two-task discrete-event model reveal that naive task co-scheduling induces significant jitter, necessitating strict priority isolation to maintain flight controller determinism. These findings establish simulation-grounded guidance for integrating PQC into resource-constrained UAV platforms without compromising real-time performance or communication reliability.
The unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) field is rapidly evolving, increasing the need for effective security mechanisms to protect data in transit in resource-constrained environments. Although many solutions have been proposed to achieve the required security objectives, these traditional solutions either suffer from high computational complexity or are vulnerable to quantum computing threats, an open challenge. However, this research presents a lightweight security scheme that uses the Kyber 512 algorithm for a quantum-resistant key-exchange algorithm, followed by a Wi-Fi Protected Access 2 (WPA2)-inspired mechanism for mutual authentication. Furthermore, an Ascon Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (ASCON-AEAD)-based lightweight algorithm is utilized for data encryption and verification. Additionally, the scheme is implemented in a simulation-based UAV environment to demonstrate its performance in protecting the confidentiality and integrity of MAVLink messages transferred between aircraft and the ground control station (CGS), as well as the communicated party's authenticity. Finally, the randomness of both authentication and encryption keys was evaluated using the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) tests across 50 independent sessions, with a significance level of 0.01. All tests showed average p -values higher than the accepted significance level, with pass rates ranging from 96 to 100%, indicating good statistical randomness for the generated keys and supporting their security quality within the proposed protocol. In contrast, it also demonstrated a successful transfer of encrypted Micro Air Vehicle Link (MAVLink) messages. It ensured their validity only after verification of the identities of both communicating parties (i.e., mutual authentication). Furthermore, the achieved processing time averaged approximately 1.45 ms, ranging from 0.91 to 1.89 ms, which was within acceptable limits for such an environment, making this proposed solution efficient and effective.
Unencrypted communications between unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are susceptible to various security attacks, such as interception and spoofing. Both symmetric and asymmetric cryptography currently allow for secure communication between parties. However, industry and academia are working on implementing quantum computers, which will invalidate several of the most widely used cryptographic algorithms. As researchers develop novel quantum encryption methods, they will need standardized testing approaches to determine which are most optimal, especially for the unique characteristics of UAV systems. This paper describes a methodology to test and measure the efficiency of key exchange algorithms for a UAV communicating with a ground control station (GCS). The method requires a framework that models a UAV performing tasks while communicating in encrypted messages with the GCS. In addition, the calculations used for comparing algorithms require a purpose-built bandwidth equation for the quantum algorithm. The first test of this methodology is an experiment designed to compare classical key exchange with the 256-bit Advanced Encryption Standard (AES-256) and quantum key distribution (QKD) used with a variety of parameters in the framework. A comparison of the runtime of each model facilitates the evaluation of each key exchange algorithm for UAV systems. This methodology can be used to test the efficiency of other post-quantum cryptographic algorithms in the future.
The rapid advancement of quantum technology brings significant trouble to the public key encryption standards used presently. Traditional cryptographic algorithms rely on the complexity of a specific number of theoretical problems, but the computational capabilities of large-scale quantum computers would swiftly compromise these specific mathematics-based cryptographic algorithms. These quantum technology-based computers consist of millions of qubits which can enable them to damage nearly all modern public-key cryptographic systems. This security issue is particularly concerning Internet of Things (IoT) devices, which typically have limited resources and are thus more susceptible to emerging threats from quantum computing. To address this concern, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has started the process of standardizing Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC). In this paper, a detailed taxonomy of lightweight PQC algorithms are presented. The performance analysis of NIST Round 3 finalist (CRYSTALS-Kyber, SABER, NTRU and NTRU Encrypt) is done on a real Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) environment. The performance of these algorithms is analyzed with respect to the ten essential metrics such as throughput, latency, power consumption, energy consumption, memory usage, clock cycles, etc., for different payloads. The experimental results for each performance metrics is plotted individually for better analysis. The experimental result show that the SABER cipher outperforms other post-quantum ciphers.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), commonly known as drones, are increasingly being employed across a broad spectrum of applications, ranging from military operations to commercial purposes. However, as UAVs become more integrated into everyday life, security and privacy concerns are similarly escalating due to vulnerabilities arising from operating on open wireless channels and having limited onboard computational resources. Moreover, with the emergence of quantum computers, conventional cryptographic methods that ensure the security and privacy of UAV communications are at severe risk. These risks encompass the possibility of unauthorized access, breaches of data, and cyber-physical attacks that jeopardize the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of UAV operations. Quantum computers are expected to break the conventional cryptography methods, such as symmetric and asymmetric schemes, with the support of Grover’s and Shor’s algorithms, respectively. Consequently, traditional cryptographic algorithms must give way to quantum-resistant algorithms, referred to as Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) algorithms. Although researchers actively develop, test, and standardize new PQC algorithms, the threat persists despite the progress made through these consistent efforts. This review article first examines the security and privacy landscape, including threats and requirements of UAVs. This article also discusses PQC and various PQC families and the status of the NIST’s implementation and standardization process. Lastly, we explore challenges and future directions in implementing PQC for UAVs.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) increasingly operate in contested environments where command-and-control (C2) links face jamming, spoofing, and long-term cryptanalytic threats from future quantum adversaries. Open-source autopilot stacks such as ArduPilot rely on the MAVLink protocol, whose version~2 signing mechanism authenticates messages but leaves payloads unencrypted and does not provide post-quantum security. In this work we design and implement a post-quantum secure extension for MAVLink C2 traffic based on the HQC key encapsulation mechanism and a KEMTLS with pre-distributed keys (KEMTLS-PDK) handshake between Ground Control Stations (GCS) and flight controllers (FC). Our design derives per-link symmetric keys for lightweight payload encryption (AES--CTR and ChaCha20) while respecting the size, weight, and power (SWaP) constraints of small UAVs and the real-time requirements of 100~Hz control loops. We prototype the scheme in ArduPilot, apply implementation-level optimizations inspired by recent work on HQC for constrained hardware, and define a dedicated MAVLink dialect for the handshake. We then evaluate handshake latency, ciphertext throughput, and idle battery behaviour on a Parrot~Bebop~1 hardware testbed under indoor bench conditions. The results show that post-quantum authenticated key exchange can be integrated into MAVLink-based C2 links with typical session establishment around 0.6~s and no measurable additional idle battery penalty within the resolution of the onboard gauge.