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Ideas and Ideals

On the Nature of Probability in Mathematics and Physics

Kirill Mikhaylov

Published Sep 25, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The article discusses approaches to understanding the nature of probability in mathematics and physics with the consequences of these approaches, as well as the difficulties that arise. The ontological status of probability is discussed. It is shown that probability theory, contrary to R. Mises, should be classified as a mathematical science, using the definition formulated by A.N. Kolmogorov. The application of this definition in practice is provided within the framework of the classical approach, provided that the connection with physical reality is defined through the concept of equal opportunity. To do this, the concepts of simple and complex events are introduced, and the method of decomposing complex events into simple ones is explained. The point of view is substantiated, according to which a mathematical probability determined and related to physical reality in this way can be considered an objective probability, that is, existing independently of any tests. Various interpretations of quantum mechanics and approaches to understanding probability are also revealed. It is shown that in physics today the existing approaches to understanding the nature of probability contradict each other. In the Bohm interpretation, probability is an analogue of the classical approach – statistical objective probability, which has a mathematical formalization, and in quantum Bayesianism, probability quantifies the degree of reliability and depends on the subject conducting the experiment. The Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics tries to eliminate the difficulties associated with combining the wave and corpuscular properties of light and electron beams into a single picture by giving the ontological status of probability, which leads to the problem of understanding physical reality. The article argues for the need for a new connection between the mathematical description of probability and physical reality. The empirical (frequency) approach of R. Mises is analyzed, which causes a lot of criticism, as it does not have a clear consistent formalization. The article argues that this approach is inconsistent with quantum mechanics. The probability given by M. Born in the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics is also considered, which formulates a new definition of probability, which does not exclude the difficulties associated with the physical interpretation of probability. Born’s approach is based on the classical approach and is reduced to a formal axiomatic definition, which assumes the interpretation of probability as a mathematical construct. The connection of probability with physical reality and the consistency of the statistical method of finding probability values remain unresolved problems, which creates a dualism of understanding probability: in mathematics – one thing, in physics – another. If in the mathematical approach, the solution of these problems is carried out through the connection of probability with physical properties, then in quantum mechanics, in the Copenhagen interpretation, problems persist, which is caused by giving the wave function an ontological status.

DOI
10.17212/2075-0862-2026-18.3.2-476-492

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The article discusses approaches to understanding the nature of probability in mathematics and physics with the consequences of these approaches, as well as the difficulties that arise. The ontological status of probability is discussed. It is shown that probability theory, contrary to R. Mises, should be classified as a mathematical science, using the definition formulated by A.N. Kolmogorov. The application of this definition in practice is provided within the framework of the classical approach, provided that the connection with physical reality is defined through the concept of equal opportunity. To do this, the concepts of simple and complex events are introduced, and the method of decomposing complex events into simple ones is explained. The point of view is substantiated, according to which a mathematical probability determined and related to physical reality in this way can be considered an objective probability, that is, existing independently of any tests. Various interpretations of quantum mechanics and approaches to understanding probability are also revealed. It is shown that in physics today the existing approaches to understanding the nature of probability contradict each other. In the Bohm interpretation, probability is an analogue of the classical approach – statistical objective probability, which has a mathematical formalization, and in quantum Bayesianism, probability quantifies the degree of reliability and depends on the subject conducting the experiment. The Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics tries to eliminate the difficulties associated with combining the wave and corpuscular properties of light and electron beams into a single picture by giving the ontological status of probability, which leads to the problem of understanding physical reality. The article argues for the need for a new connection between the mathematical description of probability and physical reality. The empirical (frequency) approach of R. Mises is analyzed, which causes a lot of criticism, as it does not have a clear consistent formalization. The article argues that this approach is inconsistent with quantum mechanics. The probability given by M. Born in the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics is also considered, which formulates a new definition of probability, which does not exclude the difficulties associated with the physical interpretation of probability. Born’s approach is based on the classical approach and is reduced to a formal axiomatic definition, which assumes the interpretation of probability as a mathematical construct. The connection of probability with physical reality and the consistency of the statistical method of finding probability values remain unresolved problems, which creates a dualism of understanding probability: in mathematics – one thing, in physics – another. If in the mathematical approach, the solution of these problems is carried out through the connection of probability with physical properties, then in quantum mechanics, in the Copenhagen interpretation, problems persist, which is caused by giving the wave function an ontological status.
Quantum mechanics is basically a mathematical recipe on how to construct physical models. Historically its origin and main domain of application has been in the microscopic regime, although it strictly seen constitutes a general mathematical framework not limited to this regime. Since it is a statistical theory, the meaning and role of probabilities in it need to be defined and understood in order to gain an understanding of the predictions and validity of quantum mechanics. The interpretational problems of quantum mechanics are also connected with the interpretation of the concept of probability. In this thesis the use of probability theory as extended logic, in particular in the way it was presented by E. T. Jaynes, will be central. With this interpretation of probabilities they become a subjective notion, always dependent on one's state of knowledge or the context in which they are assigned, which has consequences on how things are to be viewed, understood and tackled in quantum mechanics. For instance, the statistical operator or density operator, is usually defined in terms of probabilities and therefore also needs to be updated when the probabilities are updated by acquisition of additional data. Furthermore, it is a context dependent notion, meaning, e.g., that two observers will in general assign different statistical operators to the same phenomenon, which is demonstrated in the papers of the thesis. It is also presented an alternative and conceptually clear approach to the problematic notion of "probabilities of probabilities", which is related to such things as probability distributions on statistical operators. In connection to this, we consider concrete numerical applications of Bayesian quantum state assignment methods to a three-level quantum system, where prior knowledge and various kinds of measurement data are encoded into a statistical operator, which can then be used for deriving probabilities of other measurements. The thesis also offers examples of an alternative quantum state assignment technique, using maximum entropy methods, which in some cases are compared with the Bayesian quantum state assignment methods. Finally, the interesting and important problem whether the statistical operator, or more generally quantum mechanics, gives a complete description of "objective physical reality" is considered. A related concern is here the possibility of finding a "local hidden-variable theory" underlying the quantum mechanical description. There have been attempts to prove that such a theory cannot be constructed, where the most well-known impossibility proof claiming to show this was given by J. S. Bell. In connection to this, the thesis presents an idea for an interpretation or alternative approach to quantum mechanics based on the concept of space-time.
Some relations between physics and finitary and infinitary mathematics are explored in the context of a many-minds interpretation of quantum theory. The analogy between mathematical ``existence'' and physical ``existence'' is considered from the point of view of philosophical idealism. Some of the ways in which infinitary mathematics arises in modern mathematical physics are discussed. Empirical science has led to the mathematics of quantum theory. This in turn can be taken to suggest a picture of reality involving possible minds and the physical laws which determine their probabilities. In this picture, finitary and infinitary mathematics play separate roles. It is argued that mind, language, and finitary mathematics have similar prerequisites, in that each depends on the possibility of possibilities. The infinite, on the other hand, can be described but never experienced, and yet it seems that sets of possibilities and the physical laws which define their probabilities can be described most simply in terms of infinitary mathematics.
In this article the problem of understanding in physics is considered. Until the early twentieth century world view is represented by purely mechanistic and an explanation of any phenomenon was solved to a visual image. But with the advent of quantum mechanics visual representations largely disappeared. Thus the problem of understanding become aggravated sharply. In this paper, we have separated the basic physical concepts of primary and secondary. Two aspects of the definition of primary concepts as the operational and the intuitive ones are considered. Particular attention is given to the physics of the microworld. It has been considered a combination of deterministic and probabilistic pattern at this level. The concept of probabilistic determinism was introduced. In this article there is an analysis of not material, not physical, but the pure mathematical nature for de Broglie wave and probability waves. Perhaps, this is a fundamentally new type object, on that so far little attention was paid. Interpretation of all these aspects is based on the fundamental experiment for diffraction of alternately flying electrons carried out by V.A. Fabrikant in 1949 year
The aim of the article is to analyze the ontological foundations of quantum mechanics and the relationship of various interpretations of quantum mechanics with the question of truth in scientific knowledge. The theoretical material (various interpretations of quantum mechanics) was analyzed. The research methods were analysis, comparative-historical and institutional approaches. On the basis of the study, it can be concluded that physicists are only able to predict the probabilities of physical phenomena or processes, without any knowledge of the structure of entity in itself. The study helps to complement the theoretical picture of the ontology of quantum mechanics and to get an idea about the development prospects of the methodology of physical sciences. We should not ascribe properties that are unobservable in experience to the entity because science can truly interpret only the representation of entity in itself in experience and the ways of dealing with it, not future events or possible states of the entity. Otherwise, science “slides” down to the level of dialectical (rhetorical) exercises based not on true premises, but on generally accepted or “authoritative” biases, which gives room to extreme forms of relativism and takes natural scientists away from studying nature to inventing empirically unsupported hypotheses. When, in accordance with the Cartesian ontology, the scientist assumes that the entity is as the “subject” observes it (that is, the “reflection” of the entity in consciousness is identified with entity in itself), this assumption leads the scientist to attempts to “scientifically” describe the future events or the possible states of the entity. The criterion for the truth of a scientific theory put forward by Einstein in his dispute with Bohr remains a fundamentally unattainable ideal. Cognition of nature is probabilistically and fundamentally incomplete since a person can consciously comprehend natural phenomena only within the framework of their representation in the existing being. The probabilistic nature of quantum mechanics is due to the impossibility of knowing things as they exist by themselves, that is, as they exist outside of representation in the mind of the observer. This does not mean that physical entities did not exist before their knowledge: they existed potentially, but were not valid for the observer, that is, conscious. Quantum physics is as incomplete as any other physical theory when compared with an unattainable ideal, but this fact does not negate its truth for modern scientists since quantum theory is based on the results of verified experiments.
In this expository paper we discuss the role of probability in statistical physics: it should be that of a general tool guiding induction and must not be restricted only to the empirical interpretation coming from its evaluation by an observed frequency. It is true that in many cases the value of a probability can be sensibly expressed by a suitable frequency, but this does not entails that the latter can be taken as definition of probability. Moreover, in each situation in which one thinks that probabilities are physically real things and believes that something which is only “very probable” can be regarded as being “practically certain”, some “small” probabilities are actually ignored: this attitude of mind may render illegitimate also the probabilistic interpretation of the relevant physical laws. A “law” which is based on a probabilistic interpretation cannot aim at explaining why a fact that we forecast will occur, but rather at explaining why we forecast that this fact will occur. Finally, we emphasize the role of conditional probability, and we show that looking at it from the right perspective allows to avoids also classic paradoxical aspects of quantum mechanics, without the need to resort to the interpretation based on the dualism “particle-wave”.
This article analyzes the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics with regard to its historical role, logical consistency, and ontological assumptions. It argues that the Copenhagen interpretation has been extraordinarily successful as a practical framework connecting the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics with experimental results, but that its positivist restriction to observable quantities does not provide a complete physical explanation of quantum wave behaviour. The analysis of other interpretations suggests that no interpretation of quantum mechanics, including the Copenhagen interpretation, can avoid some form of hidden entity. The central argument is based on the double-slit experiment: probability or mere possibility cannot by themselves physically cause interference, and therefore some real wave-like entity must exist whose effect is only probabilistically described by the wave function. The wave function is therefore not understood as a physical wave itself, but as an epistemic description of the interaction between a particle and a deeper hidden wave structure. The Copenhagen interpretation need not be simply rejected; rather, it can be understood as a successful simplification of a deeper interpretation. It accurately describes measurable results, but it does not explain the real mechanism that produces them. The article suggests that inspiration for such a deeper view can be found in quantum field theory: particles are perturbations of fields, and quantum entanglement may indicate the existence of a deeper nonlocal field of entanglement.