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An Opportunistic Physical-layer Approach to Secure Wireless Communications

Matthieu R. Bloch, João Barros, Miguel R. D. Rodrigues, S.W. McLaughlin

Published Sep 27, 2006• 0 citations
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Abstract

Recent theoretical and practical work has shown that physical layer security techniques have the potential to significantly strengthen the security of wireless networks.We propose a practical security scheme by which two terminals (say Alice and Bob) are able to exploit the randomness of wireless fading channels to exchange data in an informationtheoretically secure way.To ensure that a potential eavesdropper (say Eve) is unable to decode any useful information, Alice sends useful symbols to Bob only when the instantaneous secrecy capacity is strictly positive.In the remaining time, a specially designed class of LDPC codes is used for reconciliation, thus allowing the extraction of a secret key, which can be distilled using privacy amplification.We believe this opportunistic approach can be used effectively as a physical layer complement to existing cryptographic protocols.

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Recent theoretical and practical work has shown that physical layer security techniques have the potential to significantly strengthen the security of wireless networks.We propose a practical security scheme by which two terminals (say Alice and Bob) are able to exploit the randomness of wireless fading channels to exchange data in an informationtheoretically secure way.To ensure that a potential eavesdropper (say Eve) is unable to decode any useful information, Alice sends useful symbols to Bob only when the instantaneous secrecy capacity is strictly positive.In the remaining time, a specially designed class of LDPC codes is used for reconciliation, thus allowing the extraction of a secret key, which can be distilled using privacy amplification.We believe this opportunistic approach can be used effectively as a physical layer complement to existing cryptographic protocols.
We present a physical layer approach aimed at providing information-theoretic security in wireless communication systems. Our secret key agreement scheme, which uses state-of-the-art error correcting codes and borrows ideas from quantum key distribution such as Gaussian reconciliation and privacy amplification, is capable of exploiting the physical properties of wireless fading channels in order to generate secret encryption keys. Focusing on the case of imperfect channel knowledge, we provide a performance analysis of the proposed security sub-system - both In theory and in practice
This paper considers the transmission of confidential data over wireless channels. Based on an information-theoretic formulation of the problem, in which two legitimates partners communicate over a quasi-static fading channel and an eavesdropper observes their transmissions through a second independent quasi-static fading channel, the important role of fading is characterized in terms of average secure communication rates and outage probability. Based on the insights from this analysis, a practical secure communication protocol is developed, which uses a four-step procedure to ensure wireless information-theoretic security: (i) common randomness via opportunistic transmission, (ii) message reconciliation, (iii) common key generation via privacy amplification, and (iv) message protection with a secret key. A reconciliation procedure based on multilevel coding and optimized low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes is introduced, which allows to achieve communication rates close to the fundamental security limits in several relevant instances. Finally, a set of metrics for assessing average secure key generation rates is established, and it is shown that the protocol is effective in secure key renewal—even in the presence of imperfect channel state information.
In Part I of this two-part paper on confidential communication over wireless channels, we studied the fundamental security limits of quasi-static fading channels from the point of view of outage secrecy capacity with perfect and imperfect channel state information. In Part II, we develop a practical secret key agreement protocol for Gaussian and quasi-static fading wiretap channels. The protocol uses a four-step procedure to secure communications: establish common randomness via an opportunistic transmission, perform message reconciliation, establish a common key via privacy amplification, and use of the key. We introduce a new reconciliation procedure that uses multilevel coding and optimized low density parity check codes which in some cases comes close to achieving the secrecy capacity limits established in Part I. Finally, we develop new metrics for assessing average secure key generation rates and show that our protocol is effective in secure key renewal.
This paper provides a comprehensive review of the domain of physical layer security in multiuser wireless networks. The essential premise of physical layer security is to enable the exchange of confidential messages over a wireless medium in the presence of unauthorized eavesdroppers, without relying on higher-layer encryption. This can be achieved primarily in two ways: without the need for a secret key by intelligently designing transmit coding strategies, or by exploiting the wireless communication medium to develop secret keys over public channels. The survey begins with an overview of the foundations dating back to the pioneering work of Shannon and Wyner on information-theoretic security. We then describe the evolution of secure transmission strategies from point-to-point channels to multiple-antenna systems, followed by generalizations to multiuser broadcast, multiple-access, interference, and relay networks. Secret-key generation and establishment protocols based on physical layer mechanisms are subsequently covered. Approaches for secrecy based on channel coding design are then examined, along with a description of inter-disciplinary approaches based on game theory and stochastic geometry. The associated problem of physical layer message authentication is also briefly introduced. The survey concludes with observations on potential research directions in this area.
In this paper a physical layer security scheme is proposed for secret transmission of data between legitimate parties, Alice and Bob, in presence of an illegitimate receiver, Eve. It is assumed that there is no knowledge of Eve's channel state information, and Alice/Bob exploit common randomness of wireless environment to randomize data over independent subcarriers. Specifically, we consider concurrent transmission of secret/normal data over a set of independent subcarriers to meet the goal of achieving high uncertainty in information received by illegitimate party. It is first shown that this scheme provides perfect secrecy in information-theoretic sense. Next, a power allocation strategy is designed to maintain normal service with specified data rate requirement and minimum power. Alice and Bob then use the available power to opportunistically achieve the maximum possible secrecy rate. Satisfactory performance curves of this scheme is shown under different parameters (number of total subcarriers, data requirement of the normal service, and main channel average SNR level) using complementary cumulative distribution function of obtained secrecy rate. One goal in this work is to demonstrate how the price for secret communication is paid in terms of consumed power and occupied subcarriers when Alice/Bob has no knowledge of wiretap channel state information.
In this paper we propose a two-way protocol of physical layer security using the method of privacy amplification against eavesdroppers. First we justify our proposed protocol by analyzing the physical layer security provided by the classic wiretap channel model (i.e. one-way protocol). In the Gaussian channels, the classic one-way protocol requires Eve's channel to be degraded w.r.t. Bob's channel. However, this channel degradation condition depends on Eve's location and whether Eve's receiving antenna is more powerful than Bob's. To overcome this limitation, we introduce a two-way protocol inspired in IEEE TIT (1993) that eliminates the channel degradation condition. In the proposed two-way protocol, on a first phase, via Gaussian channel, Bob sends randomness to Alice, which is partially leaked to Eve. Then, on a second phase, Alice transmits information to Bob over a public noiseless channel. We derive the secrecy capacity of the two-way protocol when the channel to Eve is also Gaussian. We show that the capacity of the two-way protocol is always positive. We present numerical values of the capacities illustrating the gains obtained by our proposed protocol. We apply our result to simple yet realistic models of satellite communication channels.