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arXiv:1911.08150 · IEEE Transactions on Communications

Two-Way Physical Layer Security Protocol for Gaussian Channels

Masahito Hayashi, M. A. Vázquez‐Castro

Published Feb 13, 2020• 24 citations
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Abstract

In this paper we propose a two-way protocol of physical layer security using the method of privacy amplification against eavesdroppers. First we justify our proposed protocol by analyzing the physical layer security provided by the classic wiretap channel model (i.e. one-way protocol). In the Gaussian channels, the classic one-way protocol requires Eve's channel to be degraded w.r.t. Bob's channel. However, this channel degradation condition depends on Eve's location and whether Eve's receiving antenna is more powerful than Bob's. To overcome this limitation, we introduce a two-way protocol inspired in IEEE TIT (1993) that eliminates the channel degradation condition. In the proposed two-way protocol, on a first phase, via Gaussian channel, Bob sends randomness to Alice, which is partially leaked to Eve. Then, on a second phase, Alice transmits information to Bob over a public noiseless channel. We derive the secrecy capacity of the two-way protocol when the channel to Eve is also Gaussian. We show that the capacity of the two-way protocol is always positive. We present numerical values of the capacities illustrating the gains obtained by our proposed protocol. We apply our result to simple yet realistic models of satellite communication channels.

DOI
10.1109/tcomm.2020.2973618

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In this paper we propose a two-way protocol of physical layer security using the method of privacy amplification against eavesdroppers. First we justify our proposed protocol by analyzing the physical layer security provided by the classic wiretap channel model (i.e. one-way protocol). In the Gaussian channels, the classic one-way protocol requires Eve's channel to be degraded w.r.t. Bob's channel. However, this channel degradation condition depends on Eve's location and whether Eve's receiving antenna is more powerful than Bob's. To overcome this limitation, we introduce a two-way protocol inspired in IEEE TIT (1993) that eliminates the channel degradation condition. In the proposed two-way protocol, on a first phase, via Gaussian channel, Bob sends randomness to Alice, which is partially leaked to Eve. Then, on a second phase, Alice transmits information to Bob over a public noiseless channel. We derive the secrecy capacity of the two-way protocol when the channel to Eve is also Gaussian. We show that the capacity of the two-way protocol is always positive. We present numerical values of the capacities illustrating the gains obtained by our proposed protocol. We apply our result to simple yet realistic models of satellite communication channels.
We present the comparative modelling and analysis of one-way and two-way physical layer security protocols using privacy amplification for the Gaussian satellite channel. It is known that one-way protocols based on the classic Wyner?s wiretap channel require Eve's channel to be degraded w.r.t. Bob?s channel. Here, to overcome this limiting performance condition, we introduce a two-way protocol inspired in Maurer?s protocol in IEEE TIT (1993), which differently to other proposals of two-way protocols, fully eliminates the channel degradation condition (i.e. secrecy capacity is always guaranteed to be positive). We present the description of the two protocols and the comparison of secrecy capacity when Eve uses any type of orbit. We show their realistic performance taking into consideration orbital dynamics, i.e. the only assumption made on Eve is that she has to comply with orbit mechanics. Our numerical security analysis results confirm that the two-way protocol outperforms the one-way protocol in different degrees depending on the orbit and legitimate antenna radiation patterns.
This work considers the two way wiretap channel in which two legitimate users, Alice and Bob, wish to exchange messages securely in the presence of a passive eavesdropper Eve. In the full duplex scenario, where each node can transmit and receive simultaneously, we obtain new achievable secrecy rate regions based on the idea of allowing the two users to jointly optimize their channel prefixing distributions and binning codebooks; in addition to key sharing. The new regions are shown to be strictly larger than the known ones for a wide class of discrete memoryless and Gaussian channels. In the half duplex case, where a user can only transmit or receive on any given degree of freedom, we introduce the idea of randomized scheduling and establish the significant gain it offers in terms of the achievable secrecy sum-rate. We further develop an experimental setup based on a IEEE 802.15.4-enabled sensor boards to validate our theoretical analysis. Using this testbed, it is shown that one can exploit the two way nature of the communication, via appropriately randomizing the transmit power levels and transmission schedule, to introduce significant ambiguity at a noiseless Eve. To the best of our knowledge, this is one of the first attempts aiming towards building practical secrecy protocols inspired by information theoretic principles.
Recent theoretical and practical work has shown that physical layer security techniques have the potential to significantly strengthen the security of wireless networks.We propose a practical security scheme by which two terminals (say Alice and Bob) are able to exploit the randomness of wireless fading channels to exchange data in an informationtheoretically secure way.To ensure that a potential eavesdropper (say Eve) is unable to decode any useful information, Alice sends useful symbols to Bob only when the instantaneous secrecy capacity is strictly positive.In the remaining time, a specially designed class of LDPC codes is used for reconciliation, thus allowing the extraction of a secret key, which can be distilled using privacy amplification.We believe this opportunistic approach can be used effectively as a physical layer complement to existing cryptographic protocols.
This paper develops a new physical layer framework for secure two-way wireless communication in the presence of a passive eavesdropper, i.e., Eve. Our approach achieves perfect information theoretic secrecy via a novel randomized scheduling and power allocation scheme. The key idea is to allow Alice and Bob to send symbols at random time instants. While Alice will be able to determine the symbols transmitted by Bob, Eve will suffer from ambiguity regarding the source of any particular symbol. This desirable ambiguity is enhanced, in our approach, by randomizing the transmit power level. Our theoretical analysis, in a 2-D geometry, reveals the ability of the proposed approach to achieve relatively high secure data rates under mild conditions on the spatial location of Eve. These theoretical claims are then validated by experimental results using IEEE 802.15.4-enabled sensor boards in different configurations, motivated by the spatial characteristics of Wireless Body Area Networks (WBAN).
This work considers the two-way wiretap channel in which two legitimate users, Alice and Bob, wish to exchange messages securely in the presence of a passive eavesdropper Eve. In the full-duplex scenario, where each node can transmit and receive simultaneously, we obtain new achievable secrecy rate regions based on the idea of allowing the two users to jointly optimize their channel prefixing distributions and binning codebooks in addition to key sharing. The new regions are shown to be strictly larger than the known ones for a wide class of discrete memoryless and Gaussian channels. In the half-duplex case, where a user can only transmit or receive on any given degree of freedom, we introduce the idea of randomized scheduling and establish the significant gain it offers in terms of the achievable secrecy sum-rate. We further develop an experimental setup based on a IEEE 802.15.4-enabled sensor boards, and use this testbed to show that one can exploit the two-way nature of the communication, via appropriately randomizing the transmit power levels and transmission schedule, to introduce significant ambiguity at a noiseless Eve.
In this paper, we evaluate how much beamforming and noise injection can improve physical layer security by deriving the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity and the secrecy outage probability. Our model is a typical wiretap channel model, composed of three participants - the transmitter Alice, the legitimate receiver Bob and the eavesdropper Eve. A typical cellular scenario is considered where Alice has multiple antennas while Bob and Eve each have only one antenna (MISOSE). Beamforming and noise injection at Alice are applied to achieve a higher instantaneous signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at Bob and a lower SNR at Eve. The probability density functions (pdf) of Bob and Eve's SNR are figured out in both noise-injection condition and injection-free condition, and we derive the closed-form expressions for the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity and the secrecy outage probability. Numerical analysis is also addressed using the two probabilities introduced above.