The first part of this paper is a critical essay on the conceptual meaning of the so-called « Uncertainty principle ». It will be stressed that there is no independent principle underlying the Heisenberg’s inequalities as they derive from the fundamental theoretical structure of quantum theory. More to the point, it will be emphasized that the term « uncertainty » is a misnomer, leading to subjective interpretations about the limits of our knowledge. Recognizing at face value the conceptual nature of quantum physical quantities, as endowed with a spectrum of numerical values, one should rather call « dispersions », « extensions » or « spectrum widths » the magnitudes entering Heisenberg’s type inequalities. A historical inquiry about the origins of the conventional terminology, from German to other languages, will reveal the roots and extent of the confusion. The second part of the paper will review and assess many of the various formal definitions leading to Heisenberg’s type inequalities, well beyond the pairs of physical quantities, such as the position and velocity of a particle and the customary use of quadratic dispersions. Some still open issues, such as the time-energy inequality or the angle-phase inequality will be briefly discussed. A sobering conclusion will assess the concrete uses of Heisenberg’s inequalities and stress that their genuine relevance and indisputable importance lie mainly at the heuristic and qualitative level, thus somewhat reducing the interest of the continuous discussions concerning their mathematical validity and philosophical interpretation.
The first part of this paper is a critical essay on the conceptual meaning of the so-called « Uncertainty principle ». It will be stressed that there is no independent principle underlying the Heisenberg’s inequalities as they derive from the fundamental theoretical structure of quantum theory. More to the point, it will be emphasized that the term « uncertainty » is a misnomer, leading to subjective interpretations about the limits of our knowledge. Recognizing at face value the conceptual nature of quantum physical quantities, as endowed with a spectrum of numerical values, one should rather call « dispersions », « extensions » or « spectrum widths » the magnitudes entering Heisenberg’s type inequalities. A historical inquiry about the origins of the conventional terminology, from German to other languages, will reveal the roots and extent of the confusion. The second part of the paper will review and assess many of the various formal definitions leading to Heisenberg’s type inequalities, well beyond the pairs of physical quantities, such as the position and velocity of a particle and the customary use of quadratic dispersions. Some still open issues, such as the time-energy inequality or the angle-phase inequality will be briefly discussed. A sobering conclusion will assess the concrete uses of Heisenberg’s inequalities and stress that their genuine relevance and indisputable importance lie mainly at the heuristic and qualitative level, thus somewhat reducing the interest of the continuous discussions concerning their mathematical validity and philosophical interpretation.
The more precisely the position of a particle is determined, the less precisely its momentum can be known, and conversely. This is the content of Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle. First stated in 1927, the inequality Δ x Δ p ≥ ℏ /2 is not a limitation of measuring instruments but a fundamental feature of quantum mechanics: position and momentum are complementary observables whose simultaneous sharp values are excluded by the structure of the theory. Few relations have so thoroughly changed the meaning of physical knowledge at the microscopic scale.
A review is given of precise formulations of three conceptually distinct but related manifestations of Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle. This principle appears in the form of trade-off inequalities: for the widths of the position and momentum distributions in any quantum state; for the inaccuracies of any joint measurement of these quantities; and for the inaccuracy of a measurement of one of the quantities and the ensuing disturbance in the distribution of the other quantity. The uncertainty principle is often described as expressing a limitation of operational possibilities imposed by quantum mechanics. Here we demonstrate that apart from this negative role, the full content of the uncertainty principle also includes its positive role as a condition ensuring that mutually exclusive experimental options can indeed be reconciled if an appropriate trade-off is accepted. Finally, we survey models and experimental implementations of joint measurements of position and momentum and comment briefly on the status of experimental tests of the uncertainty principle.
This paper is a small discussion about the uncertainty principle. With the great discoveries and researches made by predecessors, I try to answer some questions within the uncertainty principle. Using the definition of momentum, the momentum in de Broglie wave, the property of cosine function, the Euler’s formula, the basic property of plane wave, the law of derivative, the energy of quantum discovered by Max Planck, the photon energy discovered by Albert Einstein, the energy equation of a system and the Hamiltonian operator, I figure out the Schrodinger equation successfully. With the help of Schrodinger equation, the possibility density of a wave function, the concept of normalization, the average value of position and momentum, the Fourier transform, the integration by parts and the limit of normalized wave functions, I find the position operator and the momentum operator. Then using some knowledge of the standard deviation and the variance, the concept of inner product of vectors, some property of Dirac symbol, the law of calculation of complex number and the law of operator calculation, I obtain the general uncertainty relationship of abstract mathematical quantities. According to the general relationship, I get the inequality of uncertainty principle, and discuss the specific relationship between the position and the momentum. After getting the inequality, I use Heisenberg’s experiment of measuring an electron by using the γ ray to hit the electron to explain why we cannot measure the position and the momentum simultaneously. Based on Heisenberg’s experiment, I give my own explanation by discussing the earth and a spacecraft. Transforming the perspective, we can easily see how the accuracies of position and momentum change. In addition, I attempt to figure out why the uncertainty exists. However, I can only explain it by discussing the time and frequency in mathematical method and have no idea to work it out in a pure physics approach.
THE conceptual problems raised by the discovery of quantum effects have not been fully resolved after half a century. Part of the reason for this is undoubtedly to be found in the mutual ignorance which prevails between physicists and philosophers. In his book Heisenberg brings together a philosophically inclined temperament with an unrivalled knowledge of physics. The result is a book of very great interest, however much one might disagree with his conclusions. The collection of essays of which the other book is made up is intended to bring crucial conceptual problems in physics especially to the notice of philosophers. The design and intention of the collection is admirable for this is the proper way to overcome the departmentalization of interest that has left the deep conceptual problems still unresolved. Men like Heisenberg who combine philosophical temperament with scientic knowledge of great distinction are rare, and yet the difficulties can only be cleared up by the application of philosophical techniques of analysis to problems which are an intimate and difficult part of physics. A great deal of the interest of Heisenberg's book lies in the very comprehensive account he gives of the origin and growth of the Copenhagen school, and the way the new phenomena forced a largely unwelcome picture of nature upon Bohr and his friends. The most important chapter from a philosophical point of view is that in which Heisenberg defends this interpretation against the attacks to which it has been subjected. The essence of his argument for the interpretation can be summed up in two propositions. (i) The Copenhagen interpretation of physical theory, which depends upon the acceptance of the so-called Principle of Complementarity, is an inevitable and final interpretation. The reason for this is that there are only two possible general models for understanding given physical phenomena; a particle model or a wave model. These are exhaustive and exclusive because the former depends upon discontinuous and the latter upon continuous (using substance here in the traditional philosophical sense). If we find, as we do, that the two fundamental constituents of the universe, matter and radiation, each exhibit two classes of phenomena, one explainable only on a particle model and one on a wave model, then we are compelled to adopt a complementarity hypothesis and give up the idea of finding a single and uniform model for the understanding of phenomena. There are only two kinds of models; they are mutually exclusive; both are required; hence we either despair before an insoluble problem or adopt the Copenhagen interpretation. (2) Any serious criticism of this interpretation must offer an alternative
We revisit the definitions of error and disturbance recently used in error-disturbance inequalities derived by Ozawa and others by expressing them in the reduced system space. The interpretation of the definitions as mean-squared deviations relies on an implicit assumption that is generally incompatible with the Bell-Kochen-Specker-Spekkens contextuality theorems, and which results in averaging the deviations over a non-positive-semidefinite joint quasiprobability distribution. For unbiased measurements, the error admits a concrete interpretation as the dispersion in the estimation of the mean induced by the measurement ambiguity. We demonstrate how to directly measure not only this dispersion but also every observable moment with the same experimental data, and thus demonstrate that perfect distributional estimations can have nonzero error according to this measure. We conclude that the inequalities using these definitions do not capture the spirit of Heisenberg's eponymous inequality, but do indicate a qualitatively different relationship between dispersion and disturbance that is appropriate for ensembles being probed by all outcomes of an apparatus. To reconnect with the discussion of Heisenberg, we suggest alternative definitions of error and disturbance that are intrinsic to a single apparatus outcome. These definitions naturally involve the retrodictive and interdictive states for that outcome, and produce complementarity and error-disturbance inequalities that have the same form as the traditional Heisenberg relation.
Heisenberg guessed, after he established the matrix quantum mechanics, that the non-commutativity of the matrices of position and momentum implied that the position and momentum of a particle could not be precisely simultaneously determined. He consequently conjectured that time and energy should also have a similar relationship. Soon after, Robertson derived an inequality concerning the space coordinate and momentum, which was thought to be the mathematical expression of the uncertainty relation guessed by Heisenberg. Since then, people have tried various devices to prove the correctness of these two relations. However, no one conducted a careful analysis of Heisenberg’s primary paper. In this work, we point out some serious problems in Heisenberg’s paper and the literature talking about the uncertainty relationships: the physical concepts involved in the uncertainty relations are not clear; one physical concept had more than one explanation, i.e., switching concepts; there has never been measurement experiment to support the relations. The conclusions are that the so-called coordinate–momentum uncertainty relation has never been related to actual measurement and there does not exist a time–energy uncertainty relation.