Abstract One influential argument for the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics is the idea that the Everettian view allows us to preserve locality. Evidently this argument assumes that preserving locality is something we should all aspire to—but what is the justification for treating locality as a theoretical desideratum? But there is no good reason for Everettians—or indeed anyone else—to aspire to “locality” as a general feature of their theory. It is true that certain specific ways in which nonlocality may be implemented have undesirable properties and should probably be avoided, but that does not mean that nonlocality itself is always undesirable—nonlocal theories should be assessed on their individual merits, rather than dismissed as a general class. Thus the “argument from locality” for the Everett interpretation is not compelling unless it is coupled with some justification for why the specific kind of locality instantiated by the Everettian picture is worth pursuing.
Abstract One influential argument for the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics is the idea that the Everettian view allows us to preserve locality. Evidently this argument assumes that preserving locality is something we should all aspire to—but what is the justification for treating locality as a theoretical desideratum? But there is no good reason for Everettians—or indeed anyone else—to aspire to “locality” as a general feature of their theory. It is true that certain specific ways in which nonlocality may be implemented have undesirable properties and should probably be avoided, but that does not mean that nonlocality itself is always undesirable—nonlocal theories should be assessed on their individual merits, rather than dismissed as a general class. Thus the “argument from locality” for the Everett interpretation is not compelling unless it is coupled with some justification for why the specific kind of locality instantiated by the Everettian picture is worth pursuing.
Abstract Initially proposed by Hugh Everett III as the “theory of the universal wave function,” the many worlds interpretation has since been developed and refined into one of the most influential ways of giving meaning to quantum mechanics. This volume explores the idea that if one adopts the many worlds interpretation, then one can avoid what Einstein called “spooky action at a distance,” the non-locality that is supposed to be a consequence of quantum entanglement according to other approaches. The essays in this volume articulate a clear and defensible formulation of the argument from locality for preferring the many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics over its rivals and evaluate it. They question in what sense those in quantum foundations should care about locality, in particular, whether and how an interpretation of quantum mechanics must avoid action at a distance in order to maintain consistency with special relativity. Finally, these essays assess whether the many worlds theory needs a particular metaphysical or mathematical interpretation in order to achieve the aim of providing a local interpretation of quantum mechanics.
The aim of this volume is to develop and evaluate the suggestion that if one adopts the interpretation of quantum mechanics initially proposed by Hugh Everett, today frequently referred to as the “many-worlds interpretation,” then one can avoid the kind of nonlocality that is often thought to be a consequence of quantum entanglement according to other approaches, and thus permit the compatibility of these two pillars of modern physics: quantum mechanics and special relativity. Although this is an idea that seems to have been recognized by Everett and is sometimes touted as a reason to prefer his approach to interpreting quantum mechanics over others, the precise way in which Everett’s interpretation achieves this locality, indeed whether it even does achieve locality, has been debated, including among the interpretation’s proponents. The aim of this introductory chapter is to provide readers with a background of this debate concerning the locality of Everettian quantum mechanics. We begin with a brief historical introduction to Everett’s proposed interpretation of quantum mechanics and its later development into the many-worlds interpretation. The following section discusses how the by now well-established phenomenon of quantum entanglement seems to imply what Albert Einstein, in a 1947 letter to Max Born, called “spooky action at a distance,” and a tension with special relativity. We then discuss why one might think that the many-worlds interpretation allows one to avoid nonlocality in this sense. The next sections bring the reader up to date with how the locality of Everettian quantum mechanics has been debated both by critics and proponents of the interpretation. As we will see, the desire to understand Everettian quantum mechanics as an interpretation that avoids nonlocality has opened up some interesting debates concerning both what it means to say an interpretation of quantum mechanics is local and over the metaphysical and mathematical interpretation of Everettian quantum mechanics itself. This introductory chapter concludes with a summary of the contributions to the present volume in the context of this ongoing debate.
It is sometimes said that a reason to prefer Everettian quantum mechanics is that it allows one to avoid the kind of spooky action at a distance that is a consequence of quantum entanglement according to other approaches. There is a straightforward argument to show EQM has this virtue, however some advocates argue that this requires we see branching as a local causal process. I explain this reasoning and then show why, given the way Everettians standardly conceive of worlds and branching as emergent phenomena, branching need not be viewed as a causal process for EQM to be relativistically local. Forthcoming in Local Quantum Mechanics, OUP 2026.
Abstract What does realism about the quantum state imply? What follows when quantum theory is applied without restriction, if need be, to the whole universe? These are the questions which are debated in this book. All the chapters start from the point of realism, and based on the need, or the aspiration, for a theory that unites micro- and macroworlds, at least in principle. But the further claim argued by some is that if you allow the Schrödinger equation unrestricted application, supposing the quantum state to be something physically real, then this universe is one of countlessly many others, constantly branching in time, all of which are real. The result is the many worlds theory, also known as the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics. The contrary claim sees this picture of many worlds as in no sense inherent in quantum mechanics, even when the latter is allowed unrestricted scope and even given that the quantum state itself is something physically real. For this picture of branching worlds fails to make physical sense, let alone common sense, even on its own terms. The status of these worlds, what they are made of, is never adequately explained. Ordinary ideas about time and identity over time become hopelessly compromised. The concept of probability itself is brought into question. This picture of many branching worlds is inchoate, it is a vision, an error. There are realist alternatives to many worlds, some even that preserve the Schrödinger equation unchanged. Twenty chapters, accompanied by commentaries and discussions, examine these claims and counterclaims in depth. They focus first on the question of ontology, the existence of worlds, second on the interpretation of probability, and third on alternatives or additions to many worlds. The introduction offers a helpful guide to the arguments for the Everett interpretation, particularly as they have been formulated in the last two decades.
Everett's relative-state construction in quantum theory has never been satisfactorily expressed in the Heisenberg picture. What one might have expected to be a straightforward process was impeded by conceptual and technical problems that we solve here. The result is a construction which, unlike Everett's one in the Schrödinger picture, makes manifest the locality of Everettian multiplicity, its inherently approximative nature and its origin in certain kinds of entanglement and locally inaccessible information. (By Everettian , we are referring not only to Everett's own work, but also to versions of quantum theory that elaborate and refine his. The notion of relative states first appeared in Everett (Everett 1973 In The many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics (eds BS DeWitt, N Graham)). We are proposing a formalism for relative states that is more detailed and more illuminating than Everett's.) Our construction also allows us to give a more precise definition of an Everett ‘universe’, under which it is fully quantum, not quasi-classical, and we compare the Everettian decomposition of a quantum state with the foliation of a space–time.
Abstract This chapter defends the idea that the Everett (many-worlds) interpretation is, given Hamiltonians with only local interactions, dynamically local at both the level of fundamental and emergent ontology. At the level of fundamental ontology because the complete state of a given spacetime region will be fixed by the complete state on a spacelike hypersurface that obstructs the past light cone of that first region. At the level of emergent ontology because the dynamics of the emergent ontology will be grounded in the dynamics of the fundamental ontology. If the world-notion in the many-worlds interpretation is understood in terms of emergent ontology, then it will follow that the dynamical locality holds also at the level of worlds. Our picture pairs dynamical locality with kinematical nonlocality (non-separability). The chapter articulates how the demands of Lorentz covariance are fully satisfied in this picture. In our view, failure of kinematical locality is a harmless, indeed beneficial (if nonclassical), feature and it coexists with dynamical locality and Lorentz covariance. It has sometimes been suggested that—along the lines indicated by Deutsch and Hayden—seeking a kinematically local theory is nonetheless to be preferred or is, perhaps, required. The chapter revisits and restates some of our previous arguments to the effect that reintroducing kinematical locality in this way is both unnecessary and undesirable: the benefits of the move, such as they are, are not worth the costs.