Abstract Initially proposed by Hugh Everett III as the “theory of the universal wave function,” the many worlds interpretation has since been developed and refined into one of the most influential ways of giving meaning to quantum mechanics. This volume explores the idea that if one adopts the many worlds interpretation, then one can avoid what Einstein called “spooky action at a distance,” the non-locality that is supposed to be a consequence of quantum entanglement according to other approaches. The essays in this volume articulate a clear and defensible formulation of the argument from locality for preferring the many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics over its rivals and evaluate it. They question in what sense those in quantum foundations should care about locality, in particular, whether and how an interpretation of quantum mechanics must avoid action at a distance in order to maintain consistency with special relativity. Finally, these essays assess whether the many worlds theory needs a particular metaphysical or mathematical interpretation in order to achieve the aim of providing a local interpretation of quantum mechanics.
Abstract Initially proposed by Hugh Everett III as the “theory of the universal wave function,” the many worlds interpretation has since been developed and refined into one of the most influential ways of giving meaning to quantum mechanics. This volume explores the idea that if one adopts the many worlds interpretation, then one can avoid what Einstein called “spooky action at a distance,” the non-locality that is supposed to be a consequence of quantum entanglement according to other approaches. The essays in this volume articulate a clear and defensible formulation of the argument from locality for preferring the many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics over its rivals and evaluate it. They question in what sense those in quantum foundations should care about locality, in particular, whether and how an interpretation of quantum mechanics must avoid action at a distance in order to maintain consistency with special relativity. Finally, these essays assess whether the many worlds theory needs a particular metaphysical or mathematical interpretation in order to achieve the aim of providing a local interpretation of quantum mechanics.
The aim of this volume is to develop and evaluate the suggestion that if one adopts the interpretation of quantum mechanics initially proposed by Hugh Everett, today frequently referred to as the “many-worlds interpretation,” then one can avoid the kind of nonlocality that is often thought to be a consequence of quantum entanglement according to other approaches, and thus permit the compatibility of these two pillars of modern physics: quantum mechanics and special relativity. Although this is an idea that seems to have been recognized by Everett and is sometimes touted as a reason to prefer his approach to interpreting quantum mechanics over others, the precise way in which Everett’s interpretation achieves this locality, indeed whether it even does achieve locality, has been debated, including among the interpretation’s proponents. The aim of this introductory chapter is to provide readers with a background of this debate concerning the locality of Everettian quantum mechanics. We begin with a brief historical introduction to Everett’s proposed interpretation of quantum mechanics and its later development into the many-worlds interpretation. The following section discusses how the by now well-established phenomenon of quantum entanglement seems to imply what Albert Einstein, in a 1947 letter to Max Born, called “spooky action at a distance,” and a tension with special relativity. We then discuss why one might think that the many-worlds interpretation allows one to avoid nonlocality in this sense. The next sections bring the reader up to date with how the locality of Everettian quantum mechanics has been debated both by critics and proponents of the interpretation. As we will see, the desire to understand Everettian quantum mechanics as an interpretation that avoids nonlocality has opened up some interesting debates concerning both what it means to say an interpretation of quantum mechanics is local and over the metaphysical and mathematical interpretation of Everettian quantum mechanics itself. This introductory chapter concludes with a summary of the contributions to the present volume in the context of this ongoing debate.
Recent years have seen a good deal of work done on one of the most mind blowing and conceptually radical views in quantum mechanics, namely the ‘many worlds’ interpretation of quantum mechanics. Many worlds was first proposed by Hugh Everett III in his long Ph.D. dissertation, which only some years later, and after significant shortening, came to be published as the ‘Relative State Formulation of Quantum Mechanics’ (Everett 1957). To commemorate the 50th anniversary of the first publication of Everett's ideas, two conferences were held at Oxford University and the Perimeter Institute, which brought together some of the most active researchers in the field. The works presented in these two conferences have now been compiled in the volume Many Worlds? Everett, Quantum Theory and Reality, edited by Simon Saunders, Jonathan Barrett, Adrian Kent and David Wallace.1 This is then a comprehensive collection of papers – 23 papers altogether – where the reader will find virtually anything that can be said about the many worlds interpretation today.
Abstract What does realism about the quantum state imply? What follows when quantum theory is applied without restriction, if need be, to the whole universe? These are the questions which are debated in this book. All the chapters start from the point of realism, and based on the need, or the aspiration, for a theory that unites micro- and macroworlds, at least in principle. But the further claim argued by some is that if you allow the Schrödinger equation unrestricted application, supposing the quantum state to be something physically real, then this universe is one of countlessly many others, constantly branching in time, all of which are real. The result is the many worlds theory, also known as the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics. The contrary claim sees this picture of many worlds as in no sense inherent in quantum mechanics, even when the latter is allowed unrestricted scope and even given that the quantum state itself is something physically real. For this picture of branching worlds fails to make physical sense, let alone common sense, even on its own terms. The status of these worlds, what they are made of, is never adequately explained. Ordinary ideas about time and identity over time become hopelessly compromised. The concept of probability itself is brought into question. This picture of many branching worlds is inchoate, it is a vision, an error. There are realist alternatives to many worlds, some even that preserve the Schrödinger equation unchanged. Twenty chapters, accompanied by commentaries and discussions, examine these claims and counterclaims in depth. They focus first on the question of ontology, the existence of worlds, second on the interpretation of probability, and third on alternatives or additions to many worlds. The introduction offers a helpful guide to the arguments for the Everett interpretation, particularly as they have been formulated in the last two decades.
The Many-worlds Interpretation (MWI) of quantum mechanics has captivated physicists and philosophers alike since its inception in the mid-20th century. This paper explores the historical roots, evolution, and implications of the MWI within the context of quantum theory. Beginning with an overview of early developments in quantum mechanics and the emergence of foundational interpretations, we delve into the origins of the MWI through the groundbreaking work of physicist Hugh Everett III. Everett's doctoral thesis proposed a radical solution to the measurement problem, positing the existence of multiple branching universes to account for quantum phenomenon. We trace the evolution of the MWI, examining its refinement and elaboration by subsequent physicists such as John Wheeler. Furthermore, we discuss the MWI's impact on contemporary physics, including its connections to quantum information theory and ongoing experimental tests. By providing a comprehensive analysis of the MWI's historical development and current relevance, this paper offers insights into one of the most provocative interpretations of quantum mechanics and its implications for our understanding of the universe.
It is sometimes said that a reason to prefer Everettian quantum mechanics is that it allows one to avoid the kind of spooky action at a distance that is a consequence of quantum entanglement according to other approaches. There is a straightforward argument to show EQM has this virtue, however some advocates argue that this requires we see branching as a local causal process. I explain this reasoning and then show why, given the way Everettians standardly conceive of worlds and branching as emergent phenomena, branching need not be viewed as a causal process for EQM to be relativistically local. Forthcoming in Local Quantum Mechanics, OUP 2026.