Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) allows the issuance, management, and validation of digital certificates to establish trust between entities in networked systems. The security of PKI relies on cryptography and the underlying hardness problems. Recent advances in quantum computing pose significant threats to the cryptographic algorithms currently used in digital networking, including PKI. NIST launched the Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) project and standardized three post-quantum digital signature algorithms (ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, and FALCON). To diversify the PQC portfolio, NIST is now evaluating 14 additional digital signature candidates. In this work, we present a comprehensive performance analysis of these 14 additional signature candidates, evaluating their integration and operational overhead within a functional X. 509 PKI environment. Our empirical results show that several additional candidates perform competitively with standardized schemes in PKI operations. Eight of the fourteen Round 2 candidates outperform SLH-DSA in signing efficiency, with schemes such as HAWK and CROSS achieving performance levels that approach those of ML-DSA and FALCON. These findings identify which of the candidate schemes are practical alternatives for securing PKI against quantum threats.
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) allows the issuance, management, and validation of digital certificates to establish trust between entities in networked systems. The security of PKI relies on cryptography and the underlying hardness problems. Recent advances in quantum computing pose significant threats to the cryptographic algorithms currently used in digital networking, including PKI. NIST launched the Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) project and standardized three post-quantum digital signature algorithms (ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, and FALCON). To diversify the PQC portfolio, NIST is now evaluating 14 additional digital signature candidates. In this work, we present a comprehensive performance analysis of these 14 additional signature candidates, evaluating their integration and operational overhead within a functional X. 509 PKI environment. Our empirical results show that several additional candidates perform competitively with standardized schemes in PKI operations. Eight of the fourteen Round 2 candidates outperform SLH-DSA in signing efficiency, with schemes such as HAWK and CROSS achieving performance levels that approach those of ML-DSA and FALCON. These findings identify which of the candidate schemes are practical alternatives for securing PKI against quantum threats.
Recent advancements in quantum computing threaten the cryptographic foundations of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). Although the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has standardized three post-quantum digital signature algorithms, namely ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, and FALCON, fourteen additional candidates are currently under evaluation, to diversify the collection of available post-quantum signature schemes. This work presents a comprehensive performance analysis of the fourteen ‘Round 2’ digital signature candidates within a functional X. 509 PKI environment. Unlike prior studies focused on isolated benchmarking, we evaluate the complete PKI life cycle, key generation, CSR creation, as well as certificate signing and verification. Our empirical results indicate that several candidates perform competitively with current standards; notably, eight schemes outperform SLH-DSA in signing efficiency, with HAWK and CROSS approaching the performance levels of ML-DSA and FALCON. However, memory analysis reveals critical trade-offs. While HAWK and CROSS maintain high efficiency, multivariate schemes like UOV and FAEST incur significantly higher memory overheads. These observed performance characteristics provide a stronger basis for selecting suitable post-quantum signatures in practical PKI environments.
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) generates and distributes digital certificates to provide the root of trust for securing digital networking systems. To continue securing digital networking in the quantum era, PKI should transition to use quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithms. The cryptography community is developing quantum-resistant primitives/algorithms, studying, and analyzing them for cryptanalysis and improvements. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) selected finalist algorithms for the post-quantum digital signature cipher standardization, which are Dilithium, Falcon, and Rainbow. We study and analyze the feasibility and the processing performance of these algorithms in memory/size and time/speed when used for PKI, including the key generation from the PKI end entities (e.g., a HTTPS/TLS server), the signing, and the certificate generation by the certificate authority within the PKI. The transition to post-quantum from the classical ciphers incur changes in the parameters in the PKI, for example, Rainbow I significantly increases the certificate size by 163 times when compared with RSA 3072. Nevertheless, we learn that the current X.509 supports the NIST post-quantum digital signature ciphers and that the ciphers can be modularly adapted for PKI. According to our empirical implementations-based study, the post-quantum ciphers can increase the certificate verification time cost compared to the current classical cipher and therefore the verification overheads require careful considerations when using the post-quantum-cipher-based certificates.
NIST post-quantum cryptography (PQC) project selected three digital signature algorithms (Dilithium, Falcon, and SPHINCS+) to standardize as PQC digital signature standards. In addition to the PQC digital signature standards, for diversity and to address the concerns on the overheads including key/signature sizes and computational performances, NIST is considering 14 additional digital signature algorithms for further standardization. One or more algorithms from these 14 algorithms can be selected for further standardization. However due to the dynamic nature of the NIST standardization process and cryptanalysis, all these candidate algorithms go through continuous changes and updates. The latest updates in Oct 2025 outdated the previous performance analyses of these algorithms. In this paper, we study the computational performance overheads of the NIST PQC additional signature candidates (round 2 - latest submission packages) in terms of key generation time, signing time, and verification time. Our results show that additional signature candidate algorithms including Hawk, CROSS, and SNOVA are competitive and computationally outperform the PQC standards on several occasions.
Quantum computing challenges the mathematical problems anchoring the security of the classical public key algorithms. For quantum-resistant public key algorithms, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has undergone a multi-year standardization process and selected the post-quantum cryptography (PQC) public key digital signatures of Dilithium, Falcon, and SPHINCS+. Finding common ground to compare these algorithms can be difficult because of their design differences, including the fundamental math problems (lattice-based vs. hash-based). We use a visualization model to show the key/signature size vs. security trade-offs for all PQC algorithms. Our performance analyses compare the algorithms’ computational loads in the execution time. Building on the individual algorithms’ analyses, we analyze the communication costs and implementation overheads when integrated with Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and with Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)/Internet Protocol (IP). Our results show that the lattice-based algorithms of Dilithium and Falcon induce lower computational overheads than the hash-based algorithms of SPHINCS+. In addition, the lattice-based PQC can outperform the classical algorithm with comparable security strength; for example, Dilithium 2 and Falcon 512 outperform RSA 4096 in the TLS handshake time duration.
The emergence of quantum computing introduces unprecedented risks to classical cryptographic schemes, particularly digital signatures that safeguard authentication, confidentiality, and data integrity across digital ecosystems. To address these concerns, this paper investigates the adoption of Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) within Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) frameworks, emphasizing its role in strengthening electronic signature (eSign) systems against quantum threats. Traditional PKI implementations rely on algorithms such as RSA and ECC in combination with Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) for secure key management; however, these methods are vulnerable to quantum algorithms like Shor's. We examine how quantum-resistant alternatives-including lattice-based, hash-based, and multivariate polynomial-based schemes standardized by NIST-can be integrated into PKI without compromising interoperability and compliance. A comparative evaluation highlights trade-offs in performance, storage, and computational complexity while demonstrating the feasibility of embedding PQC into existing eSign infrastructures. Our findings underscore the urgency of transitioning towards quantum-safe digital signatures to ensure resilience, regulatory alignment, and long-term trust in national-scale digital services.
The rapid advancement of quantum computing poses a significant threat to classical cryptographic systems, particularly to widely used public-key schemes that rely on integer factorisation and the discrete logarithm problem. To ensure long-term data security against potential quantum adversaries, post-quantum cryptography (PQC) is currently standardised by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). This paper goes beyond a theoretical overview by employing a systematic methodology to evaluate the empirical performance trade-offs of the newly standardised algorithms (ML-KEM, ML-DSA, and SLH-DSA) and key finalists (FN-DSA and HQC). Based on a comprehensive review of fragmented performance data, the work presents a comparative analysis focusing on data overhead, computational latency, and resource efficiency. As a primary contribution, this study proposes a deployment-oriented taxonomy that explicitly maps these PQC standards to optimal practical use cases, considering diverse constraints across Internet of Things, cloud environments, and blockchain networks. Furthermore, the paper addresses critical real-world deployment challenges, such as vulnerabilities to side-channel attacks and hardware-level implementation constraints. Ultimately, this work systematises current knowledge into a unified decision-making framework, guiding system architects in complex migration towards a quantum-resilient digital ecosystem.