Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Cryptography

Security and Performance Analyses of Post-Quantum Digital Signature Algorithms and Their TLS and PKI Integrations

Manohar Raavi, Qaiser Khan, Simeon Wuthier, Pranav Chandramouli, Yaroslav Balytskyi, Sang‐Yoon Chang

Published Jun 4, 2025• 25 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Quantum computing challenges the mathematical problems anchoring the security of the classical public key algorithms. For quantum-resistant public key algorithms, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has undergone a multi-year standardization process and selected the post-quantum cryptography (PQC) public key digital signatures of Dilithium, Falcon, and SPHINCS+. Finding common ground to compare these algorithms can be difficult because of their design differences, including the fundamental math problems (lattice-based vs. hash-based). We use a visualization model to show the key/signature size vs. security trade-offs for all PQC algorithms. Our performance analyses compare the algorithms’ computational loads in the execution time. Building on the individual algorithms’ analyses, we analyze the communication costs and implementation overheads when integrated with Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and with Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)/Internet Protocol (IP). Our results show that the lattice-based algorithms of Dilithium and Falcon induce lower computational overheads than the hash-based algorithms of SPHINCS+. In addition, the lattice-based PQC can outperform the classical algorithm with comparable security strength; for example, Dilithium 2 and Falcon 512 outperform RSA 4096 in the TLS handshake time duration.

DOI
10.3390/cryptography9020038

Related papers

Performance Characterization of Post-Quantum Digital Certificates

Manohar Raavi, Pranav Chandramouli, Simeon Wuthier +2 more

Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) generates and distributes digital certificates to provide the root of trust for securing digital networking systems. To continue securing digital networking in the quantum era, PKI should transition to use quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithms. The cryptography community is developing quantum-resistant primitives/algorithms, studying, and analyzing them for cryptanalysis and improvements. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) selected finalist algorithms for the post-quantum digital signature cipher standardization, which are Dilithium, Falcon, and Rainbow. We study and analyze the feasibility and the processing performance of these algorithms in memory/size and time/speed when used for PKI, including the key generation from the PKI end entities (e.g., a HTTPS/TLS server), the signing, and the certificate generation by the certificate authority within the PKI. The transition to post-quantum from the classical ciphers incur changes in the parameters in the PKI, for example, Rainbow I significantly increases the certificate size by 163 times when compared with RSA 3072. Nevertheless, we learn that the current X.509 supports the NIST post-quantum digital signature ciphers and that the ciphers can be modularly adapted for PKI. According to our empirical implementations-based study, the post-quantum ciphers can increase the certificate verification time cost compared to the current classical cipher and therefore the verification overheads require careful considerations when using the post-quantum-cipher-based certificates.

International Conference on Computer Communications and Networks (ICCCN)•Jul 1, 2021•33 citations

Performance of NIST Post-quantum Cryptography Additional Digital Signature Algorithms

Ryan Slovensky, Amrutvyasa Ramasamy, Ken Lew +2 more

NIST post-quantum cryptography (PQC) project selected three digital signature algorithms (Dilithium, Falcon, and SPHINCS+) to standardize as PQC digital signature standards. In addition to the PQC digital signature standards, for diversity and to address the concerns on the overheads including key/signature sizes and computational performances, NIST is considering 14 additional digital signature algorithms for further standardization. One or more algorithms from these 14 algorithms can be selected for further standardization. However due to the dynamic nature of the NIST standardization process and cryptanalysis, all these candidate algorithms go through continuous changes and updates. The latest updates in Oct 2025 outdated the previous performance analyses of these algorithms. In this paper, we study the computational performance overheads of the NIST PQC additional signature candidates (round 2 - latest submission packages) in terms of key generation time, signing time, and verification time. Our results show that additional signature candidate algorithms including Hawk, CROSS, and SNOVA are competitive and computationally outperform the PQC standards on several occasions.

International Conference on Communications•May 24, 2026•0 citations

Integration of NIST PQC Round 2 Additional Digital Signatures into PKI and X. 509

Amrutvyasa Ramasamy, Sanketh Chapaneri, Ryan Slovensky +3 more

Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) allows the issuance, management, and validation of digital certificates to establish trust between entities in networked systems. The security of PKI relies on cryptography and the underlying hardness problems. Recent advances in quantum computing pose significant threats to the cryptographic algorithms currently used in digital networking, including PKI. NIST launched the Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) project and standardized three post-quantum digital signature algorithms (ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, and FALCON). To diversify the PQC portfolio, NIST is now evaluating 14 additional digital signature candidates. In this work, we present a comprehensive performance analysis of these 14 additional signature candidates, evaluating their integration and operational overhead within a functional X. 509 PKI environment. Our empirical results show that several additional candidates perform competitively with standardized schemes in PKI operations. Eight of the fourteen Round 2 candidates outperform SLH-DSA in signing efficiency, with schemes such as HAWK and CROSS achieving performance levels that approach those of ML-DSA and FALCON. These findings identify which of the candidate schemes are practical alternatives for securing PKI against quantum threats.

International Conference on Intelligent Multimedia, Networking, and Security (IMNS)•Aug 1, 2026•0 citations

A Comparative Analysis of Security Margins and Practical Deployment Readiness of NIST Round 3 Finalist Post-Quantum Cryptographic Algorithms

Janaka Ishan Senarathna, Janaka Ishan Senarathna

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has recently concluded the third round of its Post Quantum Cryptography Standardization Process, selecting four finalist algorithms for standardization: CRYSTALS Kyber, CRYSTALS-Dilithium, FALCON, and SPHINCS+. These algorithms are designed to withstand attacks from both classical and quantum computers, ensuring the long-term security of digital communications. This paper presents a comprehensive comparative analysis of the security margins and practical deployment readiness of these finalist algorithms. CRYSTALS-Kyber, a key encapsulation mechanism based on the hardness of the Module Learning With Errors problem, offers strong security and efficient performance. CRYSTALS-Dilithium, a digital signature algorithm based on module lattices, provides robust security guarantees and relatively straightforward implementation. FALCON, a lattice-based digital signature algorithm utilizing the Fast Fourier Transform, offers compact signatures and fast verification but faces implementation challenges due to its reliance on floating-point arithmetic. SPHINCS+, a hash-based signature scheme, stands out as a conservative choice with security based solely on the well-established security of hash functions. The analysis reveals that while each algorithm has its strengths, they also face unique challenges in terms of side-channel vulnerabilities, formal security proofs, and performance trade-offs. The practical deployment of these algorithms requires careful consideration of specific security requirements, performance needs, and resource constraints. Ongoing research efforts aim to enhance the algorithms' resistance against advanced attacks, optimize their performance across diverse platforms, and develop standardized and secure hybrid cryptographic systems. The transition to post-quantum cryptography will involve challenges such as interoperability with legacy systems, the need for clear standards and regulatory guidance, and the costs associated with software and hardware updates. Continued engagement with the cryptographic community and monitoring of the evolving security landscape will be crucial for ensuring a secure and effective migration to post-quantum cryptography.

•May 12, 2025•0 citations

Performance Analysis and Comparison of Post-Quantum Cryptography Algorithms

Cristiano G. M., Salvatore D’Antonio, Jonah Giglio +1 more

The growing maturity of quantum computing is transforming theoretical cryptographic vulnerabilities into concrete security risks, threatening the foundations of modern public-key infrastructure. In response, the cryptographic community has developed a new generation of quantum-resistant algorithms, and NIST has finalized a portfolio of five Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) standards covering two fundamental primitives: key encapsulation and digital signatures. While the security properties of these algorithms are well understood, their practical performance on real hardware remains a critical open question for organizations planning the migration away from classical cryptography. This paper presents a performance evaluation of the five NIST-standardized PQC algorithms - CRYSTALS-Kyber, HQC, CRYSTALS-Dilithium, Falcon, and SPHINCS+ - on a general-purpose processor, across all supported security levels, and with RSA included as a classical baseline, providing practitioners with concrete and actionable data to guide algorithm selection in real deployment scenarios.

IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Resilience (CSR)•Aug 1, 2026•0 citations

Securing the Post-Quantum Internet: A Comparative Study of Quantum-Resistant Protocols and Migration Strategies

Esraa Saleh Alomari, Manar Bashar Mortatha, Kamal Alieyan

With classical cryptographic algorithms under threat from the development of quantum computing, the transition to quantum-resistant replacements is critical to network security worldwide. This paper presents a detailed comparative analysis of lattice-based post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) algorithms – specifically Kyber key encapsulation and Dilithium digital signatures – and puts forward a structured migration plan for critical infrastructure. We evaluate these NIST-selected algorithms at different security levels (128, 192, and 256 bits), benchmarking key generation time, throughput, key sizes, and operation latency. Our integration demonstrates transparent incorporation of these algorithms into TLS 1.3 and SSH protocols with 100% handshake success rates. Performance results indicate Kyber achieves 3-4× higher throughput (800-1150 ops/sec) and significantly smaller key sizes than Dilithium, with both offering similar security levels against quantum attacks. Furthermore, we provide an overall migration plan analysis, estimating an average implementation duration of 10.4 months per system type and total migration costs of approximately $724,122, in which databases require the largest amount of adjustment. Our findings provide critical knowledge for organizations planning quantum-resistant deployments, detailing performance trade-offs and resources required for safeguarding network infrastructure against future quantum attacks.

•Dec 1, 2025•0 citations
Quantum computing challenges the mathematical problems anchoring the security of the classical public key algorithms. For quantum-resistant public key algorithms, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has undergone a multi-year standardization process and selected the post-quantum cryptography (PQC) public key digital signatures of Dilithium, Falcon, and SPHINCS+. Finding common ground to compare these algorithms can be difficult because of their design differences, including the fundamental math problems (lattice-based vs. hash-based). We use a visualization model to show the key/signature size vs. security trade-offs for all PQC algorithms. Our performance analyses compare the algorithms’ computational loads in the execution time. Building on the individual algorithms’ analyses, we analyze the communication costs and implementation overheads when integrated with Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and with Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)/Internet Protocol (IP). Our results show that the lattice-based algorithms of Dilithium and Falcon induce lower computational overheads than the hash-based algorithms of SPHINCS+. In addition, the lattice-based PQC can outperform the classical algorithm with comparable security strength; for example, Dilithium 2 and Falcon 512 outperform RSA 4096 in the TLS handshake time duration.
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) generates and distributes digital certificates to provide the root of trust for securing digital networking systems. To continue securing digital networking in the quantum era, PKI should transition to use quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithms. The cryptography community is developing quantum-resistant primitives/algorithms, studying, and analyzing them for cryptanalysis and improvements. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) selected finalist algorithms for the post-quantum digital signature cipher standardization, which are Dilithium, Falcon, and Rainbow. We study and analyze the feasibility and the processing performance of these algorithms in memory/size and time/speed when used for PKI, including the key generation from the PKI end entities (e.g., a HTTPS/TLS server), the signing, and the certificate generation by the certificate authority within the PKI. The transition to post-quantum from the classical ciphers incur changes in the parameters in the PKI, for example, Rainbow I significantly increases the certificate size by 163 times when compared with RSA 3072. Nevertheless, we learn that the current X.509 supports the NIST post-quantum digital signature ciphers and that the ciphers can be modularly adapted for PKI. According to our empirical implementations-based study, the post-quantum ciphers can increase the certificate verification time cost compared to the current classical cipher and therefore the verification overheads require careful considerations when using the post-quantum-cipher-based certificates.
NIST post-quantum cryptography (PQC) project selected three digital signature algorithms (Dilithium, Falcon, and SPHINCS+) to standardize as PQC digital signature standards. In addition to the PQC digital signature standards, for diversity and to address the concerns on the overheads including key/signature sizes and computational performances, NIST is considering 14 additional digital signature algorithms for further standardization. One or more algorithms from these 14 algorithms can be selected for further standardization. However due to the dynamic nature of the NIST standardization process and cryptanalysis, all these candidate algorithms go through continuous changes and updates. The latest updates in Oct 2025 outdated the previous performance analyses of these algorithms. In this paper, we study the computational performance overheads of the NIST PQC additional signature candidates (round 2 - latest submission packages) in terms of key generation time, signing time, and verification time. Our results show that additional signature candidate algorithms including Hawk, CROSS, and SNOVA are competitive and computationally outperform the PQC standards on several occasions.
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) allows the issuance, management, and validation of digital certificates to establish trust between entities in networked systems. The security of PKI relies on cryptography and the underlying hardness problems. Recent advances in quantum computing pose significant threats to the cryptographic algorithms currently used in digital networking, including PKI. NIST launched the Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) project and standardized three post-quantum digital signature algorithms (ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, and FALCON). To diversify the PQC portfolio, NIST is now evaluating 14 additional digital signature candidates. In this work, we present a comprehensive performance analysis of these 14 additional signature candidates, evaluating their integration and operational overhead within a functional X. 509 PKI environment. Our empirical results show that several additional candidates perform competitively with standardized schemes in PKI operations. Eight of the fourteen Round 2 candidates outperform SLH-DSA in signing efficiency, with schemes such as HAWK and CROSS achieving performance levels that approach those of ML-DSA and FALCON. These findings identify which of the candidate schemes are practical alternatives for securing PKI against quantum threats.
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has recently concluded the third round of its Post Quantum Cryptography Standardization Process, selecting four finalist algorithms for standardization: CRYSTALS Kyber, CRYSTALS-Dilithium, FALCON, and SPHINCS+. These algorithms are designed to withstand attacks from both classical and quantum computers, ensuring the long-term security of digital communications. This paper presents a comprehensive comparative analysis of the security margins and practical deployment readiness of these finalist algorithms. CRYSTALS-Kyber, a key encapsulation mechanism based on the hardness of the Module Learning With Errors problem, offers strong security and efficient performance. CRYSTALS-Dilithium, a digital signature algorithm based on module lattices, provides robust security guarantees and relatively straightforward implementation. FALCON, a lattice-based digital signature algorithm utilizing the Fast Fourier Transform, offers compact signatures and fast verification but faces implementation challenges due to its reliance on floating-point arithmetic. SPHINCS+, a hash-based signature scheme, stands out as a conservative choice with security based solely on the well-established security of hash functions. The analysis reveals that while each algorithm has its strengths, they also face unique challenges in terms of side-channel vulnerabilities, formal security proofs, and performance trade-offs. The practical deployment of these algorithms requires careful consideration of specific security requirements, performance needs, and resource constraints. Ongoing research efforts aim to enhance the algorithms' resistance against advanced attacks, optimize their performance across diverse platforms, and develop standardized and secure hybrid cryptographic systems. The transition to post-quantum cryptography will involve challenges such as interoperability with legacy systems, the need for clear standards and regulatory guidance, and the costs associated with software and hardware updates. Continued engagement with the cryptographic community and monitoring of the evolving security landscape will be crucial for ensuring a secure and effective migration to post-quantum cryptography.
The growing maturity of quantum computing is transforming theoretical cryptographic vulnerabilities into concrete security risks, threatening the foundations of modern public-key infrastructure. In response, the cryptographic community has developed a new generation of quantum-resistant algorithms, and NIST has finalized a portfolio of five Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) standards covering two fundamental primitives: key encapsulation and digital signatures. While the security properties of these algorithms are well understood, their practical performance on real hardware remains a critical open question for organizations planning the migration away from classical cryptography. This paper presents a performance evaluation of the five NIST-standardized PQC algorithms - CRYSTALS-Kyber, HQC, CRYSTALS-Dilithium, Falcon, and SPHINCS+ - on a general-purpose processor, across all supported security levels, and with RSA included as a classical baseline, providing practitioners with concrete and actionable data to guide algorithm selection in real deployment scenarios.
With classical cryptographic algorithms under threat from the development of quantum computing, the transition to quantum-resistant replacements is critical to network security worldwide. This paper presents a detailed comparative analysis of lattice-based post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) algorithms – specifically Kyber key encapsulation and Dilithium digital signatures – and puts forward a structured migration plan for critical infrastructure. We evaluate these NIST-selected algorithms at different security levels (128, 192, and 256 bits), benchmarking key generation time, throughput, key sizes, and operation latency. Our integration demonstrates transparent incorporation of these algorithms into TLS 1.3 and SSH protocols with 100% handshake success rates. Performance results indicate Kyber achieves 3-4× higher throughput (800-1150 ops/sec) and significantly smaller key sizes than Dilithium, with both offering similar security levels against quantum attacks. Furthermore, we provide an overall migration plan analysis, estimating an average implementation duration of 10.4 months per system type and total migration costs of approximately $724,122, in which databases require the largest amount of adjustment. Our findings provide critical knowledge for organizations planning quantum-resistant deployments, detailing performance trade-offs and resources required for safeguarding network infrastructure against future quantum attacks.