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Springer eBooks

Advanced Quantum Mechanics of Spin

James K. Freericks

Published Jan 1, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

We have learned a lot about quantum mechanics already. We learned it is probabilistic and that it can have indeterminate behavior until measured. The Nobel Prize winner, Richard Feynman, summed this up the best with the following quote from his famous The Feynman Lectures in Physics: “We have implied that in our experimental arrangement (or even in the best possible one) it would be impossible to predict exactly what would happen. We can only predict the odds! This would mean, if it were true, that physics has given up on the problem of trying to predict exactly what will happen in a definite circumstance. Yes! Physics has given up. We do not know how to predict what would happen in a given circumstance, and we believe now that it is impossible-that the only thing that can be predicted is the probability of different events. It must be recognized that this is a retrenchment in our earlier ideal of understanding nature. It may be a backward step, but no one has seen a way to avoid it $$\cdots $$ So at the present time we must limit ourselves to computing probabilities. We say ‘at the present time,’ but we suspect very strongly that it is something that will be with us forever-that it is impossible to beat that puzzle-that this is the way nature really is.” Physicists are troubled that this is the way the real world is, but we have come to accept it so we can learn more about the mysteries of the real world. We examine advanced ideas surrounding the Stern-Gerlach experiment and its extensions including delayed-choice experiments, interaction-free experiments, and Bell experiments.

DOI
10.1007/978-3-031-87845-9_2

Related papers

Mind, Matter and Quantum Mechanics (2nd edition)

G. Mahler

Quantum mechanics is usually defined in terms of some loosely connected axioms and rules. Such a foundation is far from the beauty of, e.g., the `principles' underlying classical mechanics. Motivated, in addition, by notorious interpretation problems, there have been numerous attempts to modify or `complete' quantum mechanics. A first attempt was based on so-called hidden variables; its proponents essentially tried to expel the non-classical nature of quantum mechanics. More recent proposals intend to complete quantum mechanics not within mechanics proper but on a `higher (synthetic) level'; by means of a combination with gravitation theory (R Penrose), with quantum information theory (C M Caves, C A Fuchs) or with psychology and brain science (H P Stapp). I think it is fair to say that in each case the combination is with a subject that, per se , suffers from a very limited understanding that is even more severe than that of quantum mechanics. This was acceptable, though, if it could convincingly be argued that scientific progress desperately needs to join forces. Quantum mechanics of a closed system was a beautiful and well understood theory with its respective state being presented as a point on a deterministic trajectory in Liouville space---not unlike the motion of a classical N -particle system in its 6N -dimensional phase-space. Unfortunately, we need an inside and an outside view, we need an external reference frame, we need an observer. This unavoidable partition is the origin of most of the troubles we have with quantum mechanics. A pragmatic solution is introduced in the form of so-called measurement postulates: one of the various incompatible properties of the system under consideration is supposed to be realized (i.e. to become a fact, to be defined without fundamental dispersion) based on `instantaneous' projections within some externally selected measurement basis. As a result, the theory becomes essentially statistical rather than deterministic; furthermore there is an asymmetry between the observed and the observing. This is the point where consciousness may come in. Complemented by an introduction and several appendices, Henry Stapp's book consists essentially of three parts: theory, implications, and new developments. The theory part gives a very readable account of the Copenhagen interpretation, some aspects of a psychophysical theory, and, eventually, hints towards a quantum foundation of the brain--mind connection. The next part, `implications', summarizes some previous attempts to bridge the gap between the working rules of quantum mechanics and their possible consequences for our understanding of this world (Pauli, Everett, Bohm, Heisenberg). The last section, `new developments', dwells on some ideas about the conscious brain and its possible foundation on quantum mechanics. The book is an interesting and, in part, fascinating contribution to a field that continues to be a companion to `practical' quantum mechanics since its very beginning. It is doubtful whether such types of `quantum ontologies' will ever become (empirically) testable; right now one can hardly expect more than to be offered some consistent `grand picture', which the reader may find more or less acceptable or even rewarding. Many practicing quantum physicists, though, will remain unimpressed. The shift from synthetic ontology to analytic ontology is the foundation of the present work. This means that fundamental wholes are being partitioned into their ontologically subordinate components by means of `events'. The actual event, in turn, is an abrupt change in the Heisenberg state describing the quantum universe. The new state then defines the tendencies associated with the next actual event. To avoid infinite regression in terms of going from one state of tendencies to the next, consciousness is there to give these events a special `feel', to provide a status of `intrinsic actuality'. The brain of an alert human observer is similar in an important way to a quantum detection device: it can amplify small signals to large macroscopic effects. On the other hand, actual events are not postulated to occur exclusively in brains. They are more generally associated with the formation of records. Records are necessarily part of the total state of the universe: it is obvious that the state of the universe cannot undergo a Schrödinger dynamics and at the same time record its own history. `The full universe consists therefore of an exceedingly thin veneer of relatively sluggish, directly observable properties resting on a vast ocean or rapidly fluctuating unobservable ones.' The present ideas also bear on how the world should be seen to develop. While conventional cosmology encounters problems as to how to define the intial conditions, which would enter the governing equations of motion, here `the boundary conditions are set not at some initial time, but gradually by a sequence of acts that imposes a sequence of constraints. After any sequence of acts there remains a collection of possible worlds, some of which will be eliminated by the next act.' Connected with those acts is `meaning': there has always been some speculation about the special significance of local properties in our understanding of the world. One could argue that correlations (even the quantum correlations found, e.g., in the EPR-experiments) were as real as anything else. But also Stapp stresses the special role of locality: the `local observable properties, or properties similar to them are the natural, and perhaps exclusive, carriers of meaning in the quantum universe. From this point of view the quantum universe tends to create meaning.' This sounds like an absolute concept: meaning not with respect to something else, but defined intrinsically---not easy to digest. The role of consciousness in the developing quantum universe requires more attention. `The causal irrelevance of our thoughts within classical physics constitutes a serious deficiency of that theory, construed as a description of reality.' This is taken to be entirely different within quantum mechanics. `The core idea of quantum mechanics is to describe our activities as knowledge-seeking and knowledge-using agents.' `21st century science does not reduce human beings to mechanical automata. Rather it elevates human beings to agents whose free choices can, according to the known laws, actually influence their behaviour.' An example with respect to perception is discussed: `Why, when we look at a triangle, do we experience three lines joined at three points and not some pattern of neuron firings?' The brain `does not convert an actual whole triangle into some jumbled set of particle motions; rather it converts a concatenation of separate external events into the actualization of some single integrated pattern of neural activity that is congruent to the perceived whole triangle.' How convincing is this proposal? It is hard to tell. I think Henry Stapp did a good job, but there are tight limitations to any such endeavour. Quantum mechanics is often strange indeed, but it also gives rise to our classical world around us. For the emergence of classicality jumps and measurement projections (the basic phenomena connected with those fundamental events of choice) are not needed. Therefore, I doubt whether the explanation of the evolution of our world really allows (or requires) that much free choice. On the other hand, most scientist will agree that empirical science was not possible without free will: we could not ask independent questions if this asking was part of a deterministic trajectory. The fact that the result of a quantum measurement is indeterminate (within given probabilities) does certainly not explain free will. How about the type of measurment? The experimentalist will have to assume that he can select the pertinent observable within some limits. But given a certain design the so-called pointer basis (producing stable measurement results) is no longer a matter of free choice. `The main theme of classical physics is that we live in a clocklike universe.' Today it is often assumed that the universe was a big (quantum-) computer or a cellular automaton. Many would be all too happy to leave that rather restrictive picture behind. But where to go? Stapp suggests giving consciousness a prominent role: `The most profound alteration of the fundamental principles was to bring consciousness of human beings into the basic structure of the physical theory.' How far we are able to go in this direction will depend on the amount of concrete research results becoming available to support this view.

Journal of Physics A Mathematical and General•Jun 17, 2004•4 citations

A Pragmatist Understanding of Quantum Mechanics

Richard Healey

Applications of quantum mechanics have led to many successful predictions and explanations of puzzling phenomena, and we now apply quantum mechanics to gain, process, and communicate information in novel ways. We can understand quantum mechanics by understanding how we have applied it. We should not seek agreement on the nature of the world it represents, because this theory does not itself represent the physical world (though its applications do help us to represent it better). When applied to a quantum state, quantum mechanics yields probabilities for physical events: both state and probability are objective—not because they represent elements of physical reality, but because each exerts normative authority over the beliefs of anyone who accepts quantum mechanics and applies it relative to a physical situation they may (but need not) occupy. These events may be described by statements (about values of magnitudes) that are meaningful in an appropriate environmental context, and quantum mechanics can help one to say when that is. Measurement creates an appropriate context, so here the Born rule indirectly yields probabilities of measurement outcomes. The quantum state of a system does not “collapse” on measurement: a new state must be assigned relative to a physical situation in which information about the outcome is accessible. Understood this way, there is no measurement problem, and violation of Bell inequalities does not demonstrate “spooky” non-local action. Quantum field theories have no physical ontology of their own: a quantum field is a mathematical object in a model whose application helps to improve and extend our descriptions of the world in other terms. We cannot realise the scenario of Wigner’s friend and its recent extensions: but the data that provide overwhelming evidence for quantum mechanics are objective in the same sense as the relative measurement outcomes described in those scenarios.

•Dec 1, 2025•0 citations

A Pragmatist Understanding of Quantum Mechanics

Richard Healey

Applications of quantum mechanics have led to many successful predictions and explanations of puzzling phenomena, and we now apply quantum mechanics to gain, process, and communicate information in novel ways. We can understand quantum mechanics by understanding how we have applied it. We should not seek agreement on the nature of the world it represents, because this theory does not itself represent the physical world (though its applications do help us to represent it better). When applied to a quantum state, quantum mechanics yields probabiities for physical events: both state and probability are objective--not because they represent elements of phyiscal reality, but because each exerts norrmative authority over the beliefs of anyone who accepts quantum mechanics and applies it relative to a physical situation they may (but need not) occupy. These events may be described by statements that are meaningful in an appropriate environmental context, and quantum mechanics can help one to say when that is. Measurement creates an appropriate context, so here the Born rule indirectly yields probabilities of measurement outcomes. The quantum state of a system does not "collapse" on measurement: a new state must be assigned relative to a physical situation in which information about the outcome is accessible. Understood this way, there is no measurement problem, and violations of Bell inequalities does not demonstrate "spooky" non-local action. Quantum field theories have no physical ontology of their own: a quantum field is a mathematical object in a model whose application helps us to improve and extend our descriptions of the world in other terms. We cannot realise the scenario of Wigner's friend and its recent extensions: but the data that provide overwhelming evidence for quantum mechanics are objective in the same sense as the relative measurement outcomes described in those scenarios.

quant-pharXiv:2604.02197•Apr 3, 2026•0 citations

Quantum jumps

Tony Hey, Patrick Walters

We always have had a great deal of difficulty in understanding the world view that quantum mechanics represents. At least I do, because I'm an old enough man that I haven't got to the point that this stuff is obvious to me … It has not yet become obvious to me that there is no real problem. I cannot define the real problem, therefore I suspect there is no real problem, but I'm not sure there's no real problem. Richard Feynman Max Born and quantum probabilities In this chapter, we will take a short break from our survey of successful applications of quantum mechanics to take a closer look at the foundations of this great edifice of modern physics. In a sense, we are now disobeying Feynman's warning about the results of the double slit experiment of chapter 1. We shall now ask Feynman's ‘forbidden’ question ‘But how can it be like that?’ Nobody disputes that quantum mechanics has been magnificently successful, enabling us to make correct quantitative calculations of atomic and nuclear effects. But there is a great divergence of opinion about the implications of quantum mechanics for the nature of matter, and indeed, of reality itself. To avoid becoming embroiled in a purely philosophical mire, we will focus on two famous paradoxes. The first of these is the ‘Einstein–Podolsky-Rosen’ paradox, named after its originators Albert Einstein, Boris Podolsky and Nathan Rosen, and usually abbreviated by the initials ‘EPR’. The second paradox is named after ‘Schrödinger's cat’.

Cambridge University Press eBooks•Oct 23, 2003•0 citations

A Survivor’s Guide to Quantum Physics

Jean Louis Van Belle

As a pointer, and a service to other amateur physicists, I thought it would be useful to sum up the main pitfalls and discoveries I stumbled upon while working my way through Feynman’s Lectures. I call it a Survivor’s Guide to Quantum Physics because – at times – it did feel like going through a jungle, or wading through deep water, or climbing a mountain for which there is no map. Indeed, while there is a tendency to present quantum physics as a coherent set of principles and theory, it is not. At best, it is a toolbox with some novel mathematical techniques, approaches and models. At worst, it tries to present itself as an alternative to classical physics, which it is not. Quantum physics is, in essence, a combination of Maxwell’s equations and the Planck-Einstein relation. That is it. Nothing more. Nothing less. In the QED sector, at least. The one and only quantum is Planck’s quantum of (physical) action, and its physical dimension – a force times a distance times a period (cycle time) – is, unfortunately, not always well understood by those who are supposed to understand it – which is why there is a lot of nonsense around. In short, we hope this short paper might help you to avoid the mistakes I made, and that is to waste time on things you should not waste time on: stuff that is not useful, or plain wrong even. And then I will also try to highlight the little shortcuts or visualizations that may help you to get a much more intuitive grasp of things.

•Oct 1, 2020•0 citations

A Unifying Theory for Quantum Physics, Part 1: How to Motivate Students to Want to Study Quantum Technologies

Jeffrey H. Boyd

Is the quantum world as strange as they say? If this were an unsolved mathematics question, we might try a new angle of attack. We know quantum mechanics (QM) is the most accurate and productive science humans ever had, meaning its probability predictions are accurate. Every probability has two square roots. The Born rule says either would produce the same probability. Assume nature uses the negative of QM’s equations. What could that mean? We’d need to revise Feynman’s path-integrals and Schrödinger’s equation. If waves travel in the opposite direction as what QM believes, that could produce the negative equations. No wave-particle duality. Free particles would follow backwards zero-energy waves coming from detectors. This, surprisingly, gets rid of quantum weirdness. Our proposal is that nature uses the negative of QM’s equations because particles follow zero-energy waves backwards. Considerable evidence fits this model, including a neutron-interferometer and the Davisson-Germer experiments, a quantum-eraser experiment, Wheeler-gedanken and double-slit experiments, Bell-test experiments, Stern-Gerlach, and high-energy scattering experiments. Finally, we propose a plan for how to motivate students to want to study quantum technologies, thereby addressing the most prominent problem in QM today: the shortage of an educated workforce, the scarcity of aspiring students.

JOURNAL OF ADVANCES IN MATHEMATICS•Sep 17, 2022•1 citation
We have learned a lot about quantum mechanics already. We learned it is probabilistic and that it can have indeterminate behavior until measured. The Nobel Prize winner, Richard Feynman, summed this up the best with the following quote from his famous The Feynman Lectures in Physics: “We have implied that in our experimental arrangement (or even in the best possible one) it would be impossible to predict exactly what would happen. We can only predict the odds! This would mean, if it were true, that physics has given up on the problem of trying to predict exactly what will happen in a definite circumstance. Yes! Physics has given up. We do not know how to predict what would happen in a given circumstance, and we believe now that it is impossible-that the only thing that can be predicted is the probability of different events. It must be recognized that this is a retrenchment in our earlier ideal of understanding nature. It may be a backward step, but no one has seen a way to avoid it ⋯\cdots ⋯ So at the present time we must limit ourselves to computing probabilities. We say ‘at the present time,’ but we suspect very strongly that it is something that will be with us forever-that it is impossible to beat that puzzle-that this is the way nature really is.” Physicists are troubled that this is the way the real world is, but we have come to accept it so we can learn more about the mysteries of the real world. We examine advanced ideas surrounding the Stern-Gerlach experiment and its extensions including delayed-choice experiments, interaction-free experiments, and Bell experiments.
Quantum mechanics is usually defined in terms of some loosely connected axioms and rules. Such a foundation is far from the beauty of, e.g., the `principles' underlying classical mechanics. Motivated, in addition, by notorious interpretation problems, there have been numerous attempts to modify or `complete' quantum mechanics. A first attempt was based on so-called hidden variables; its proponents essentially tried to expel the non-classical nature of quantum mechanics. More recent proposals intend to complete quantum mechanics not within mechanics proper but on a `higher (synthetic) level'; by means of a combination with gravitation theory (R Penrose), with quantum information theory (C M Caves, C A Fuchs) or with psychology and brain science (H P Stapp). I think it is fair to say that in each case the combination is with a subject that, per se , suffers from a very limited understanding that is even more severe than that of quantum mechanics. This was acceptable, though, if it could convincingly be argued that scientific progress desperately needs to join forces. Quantum mechanics of a closed system was a beautiful and well understood theory with its respective state being presented as a point on a deterministic trajectory in Liouville space---not unlike the motion of a classical N -particle system in its 6N -dimensional phase-space. Unfortunately, we need an inside and an outside view, we need an external reference frame, we need an observer. This unavoidable partition is the origin of most of the troubles we have with quantum mechanics. A pragmatic solution is introduced in the form of so-called measurement postulates: one of the various incompatible properties of the system under consideration is supposed to be realized (i.e. to become a fact, to be defined without fundamental dispersion) based on `instantaneous' projections within some externally selected measurement basis. As a result, the theory becomes essentially statistical rather than deterministic; furthermore there is an asymmetry between the observed and the observing. This is the point where consciousness may come in. Complemented by an introduction and several appendices, Henry Stapp's book consists essentially of three parts: theory, implications, and new developments. The theory part gives a very readable account of the Copenhagen interpretation, some aspects of a psychophysical theory, and, eventually, hints towards a quantum foundation of the brain--mind connection. The next part, `implications', summarizes some previous attempts to bridge the gap between the working rules of quantum mechanics and their possible consequences for our understanding of this world (Pauli, Everett, Bohm, Heisenberg). The last section, `new developments', dwells on some ideas about the conscious brain and its possible foundation on quantum mechanics. The book is an interesting and, in part, fascinating contribution to a field that continues to be a companion to `practical' quantum mechanics since its very beginning. It is doubtful whether such types of `quantum ontologies' will ever become (empirically) testable; right now one can hardly expect more than to be offered some consistent `grand picture', which the reader may find more or less acceptable or even rewarding. Many practicing quantum physicists, though, will remain unimpressed. The shift from synthetic ontology to analytic ontology is the foundation of the present work. This means that fundamental wholes are being partitioned into their ontologically subordinate components by means of `events'. The actual event, in turn, is an abrupt change in the Heisenberg state describing the quantum universe. The new state then defines the tendencies associated with the next actual event. To avoid infinite regression in terms of going from one state of tendencies to the next, consciousness is there to give these events a special `feel', to provide a status of `intrinsic actuality'. The brain of an alert human observer is similar in an important way to a quantum detection device: it can amplify small signals to large macroscopic effects. On the other hand, actual events are not postulated to occur exclusively in brains. They are more generally associated with the formation of records. Records are necessarily part of the total state of the universe: it is obvious that the state of the universe cannot undergo a Schrödinger dynamics and at the same time record its own history. `The full universe consists therefore of an exceedingly thin veneer of relatively sluggish, directly observable properties resting on a vast ocean or rapidly fluctuating unobservable ones.' The present ideas also bear on how the world should be seen to develop. While conventional cosmology encounters problems as to how to define the intial conditions, which would enter the governing equations of motion, here `the boundary conditions are set not at some initial time, but gradually by a sequence of acts that imposes a sequence of constraints. After any sequence of acts there remains a collection of possible worlds, some of which will be eliminated by the next act.' Connected with those acts is `meaning': there has always been some speculation about the special significance of local properties in our understanding of the world. One could argue that correlations (even the quantum correlations found, e.g., in the EPR-experiments) were as real as anything else. But also Stapp stresses the special role of locality: the `local observable properties, or properties similar to them are the natural, and perhaps exclusive, carriers of meaning in the quantum universe. From this point of view the quantum universe tends to create meaning.' This sounds like an absolute concept: meaning not with respect to something else, but defined intrinsically---not easy to digest. The role of consciousness in the developing quantum universe requires more attention. `The causal irrelevance of our thoughts within classical physics constitutes a serious deficiency of that theory, construed as a description of reality.' This is taken to be entirely different within quantum mechanics. `The core idea of quantum mechanics is to describe our activities as knowledge-seeking and knowledge-using agents.' `21st century science does not reduce human beings to mechanical automata. Rather it elevates human beings to agents whose free choices can, according to the known laws, actually influence their behaviour.' An example with respect to perception is discussed: `Why, when we look at a triangle, do we experience three lines joined at three points and not some pattern of neuron firings?' The brain `does not convert an actual whole triangle into some jumbled set of particle motions; rather it converts a concatenation of separate external events into the actualization of some single integrated pattern of neural activity that is congruent to the perceived whole triangle.' How convincing is this proposal? It is hard to tell. I think Henry Stapp did a good job, but there are tight limitations to any such endeavour. Quantum mechanics is often strange indeed, but it also gives rise to our classical world around us. For the emergence of classicality jumps and measurement projections (the basic phenomena connected with those fundamental events of choice) are not needed. Therefore, I doubt whether the explanation of the evolution of our world really allows (or requires) that much free choice. On the other hand, most scientist will agree that empirical science was not possible without free will: we could not ask independent questions if this asking was part of a deterministic trajectory. The fact that the result of a quantum measurement is indeterminate (within given probabilities) does certainly not explain free will. How about the type of measurment? The experimentalist will have to assume that he can select the pertinent observable within some limits. But given a certain design the so-called pointer basis (producing stable measurement results) is no longer a matter of free choice. `The main theme of classical physics is that we live in a clocklike universe.' Today it is often assumed that the universe was a big (quantum-) computer or a cellular automaton. Many would be all too happy to leave that rather restrictive picture behind. But where to go? Stapp suggests giving consciousness a prominent role: `The most profound alteration of the fundamental principles was to bring consciousness of human beings into the basic structure of the physical theory.' How far we are able to go in this direction will depend on the amount of concrete research results becoming available to support this view.
Applications of quantum mechanics have led to many successful predictions and explanations of puzzling phenomena, and we now apply quantum mechanics to gain, process, and communicate information in novel ways. We can understand quantum mechanics by understanding how we have applied it. We should not seek agreement on the nature of the world it represents, because this theory does not itself represent the physical world (though its applications do help us to represent it better). When applied to a quantum state, quantum mechanics yields probabilities for physical events: both state and probability are objective—not because they represent elements of physical reality, but because each exerts normative authority over the beliefs of anyone who accepts quantum mechanics and applies it relative to a physical situation they may (but need not) occupy. These events may be described by statements (about values of magnitudes) that are meaningful in an appropriate environmental context, and quantum mechanics can help one to say when that is. Measurement creates an appropriate context, so here the Born rule indirectly yields probabilities of measurement outcomes. The quantum state of a system does not “collapse” on measurement: a new state must be assigned relative to a physical situation in which information about the outcome is accessible. Understood this way, there is no measurement problem, and violation of Bell inequalities does not demonstrate “spooky” non-local action. Quantum field theories have no physical ontology of their own: a quantum field is a mathematical object in a model whose application helps to improve and extend our descriptions of the world in other terms. We cannot realise the scenario of Wigner’s friend and its recent extensions: but the data that provide overwhelming evidence for quantum mechanics are objective in the same sense as the relative measurement outcomes described in those scenarios.
Applications of quantum mechanics have led to many successful predictions and explanations of puzzling phenomena, and we now apply quantum mechanics to gain, process, and communicate information in novel ways. We can understand quantum mechanics by understanding how we have applied it. We should not seek agreement on the nature of the world it represents, because this theory does not itself represent the physical world (though its applications do help us to represent it better). When applied to a quantum state, quantum mechanics yields probabiities for physical events: both state and probability are objective--not because they represent elements of phyiscal reality, but because each exerts norrmative authority over the beliefs of anyone who accepts quantum mechanics and applies it relative to a physical situation they may (but need not) occupy. These events may be described by statements that are meaningful in an appropriate environmental context, and quantum mechanics can help one to say when that is. Measurement creates an appropriate context, so here the Born rule indirectly yields probabilities of measurement outcomes. The quantum state of a system does not "collapse" on measurement: a new state must be assigned relative to a physical situation in which information about the outcome is accessible. Understood this way, there is no measurement problem, and violations of Bell inequalities does not demonstrate "spooky" non-local action. Quantum field theories have no physical ontology of their own: a quantum field is a mathematical object in a model whose application helps us to improve and extend our descriptions of the world in other terms. We cannot realise the scenario of Wigner's friend and its recent extensions: but the data that provide overwhelming evidence for quantum mechanics are objective in the same sense as the relative measurement outcomes described in those scenarios.
We always have had a great deal of difficulty in understanding the world view that quantum mechanics represents. At least I do, because I'm an old enough man that I haven't got to the point that this stuff is obvious to me … It has not yet become obvious to me that there is no real problem. I cannot define the real problem, therefore I suspect there is no real problem, but I'm not sure there's no real problem. Richard Feynman Max Born and quantum probabilities In this chapter, we will take a short break from our survey of successful applications of quantum mechanics to take a closer look at the foundations of this great edifice of modern physics. In a sense, we are now disobeying Feynman's warning about the results of the double slit experiment of chapter 1. We shall now ask Feynman's ‘forbidden’ question ‘But how can it be like that?’ Nobody disputes that quantum mechanics has been magnificently successful, enabling us to make correct quantitative calculations of atomic and nuclear effects. But there is a great divergence of opinion about the implications of quantum mechanics for the nature of matter, and indeed, of reality itself. To avoid becoming embroiled in a purely philosophical mire, we will focus on two famous paradoxes. The first of these is the ‘Einstein–Podolsky-Rosen’ paradox, named after its originators Albert Einstein, Boris Podolsky and Nathan Rosen, and usually abbreviated by the initials ‘EPR’. The second paradox is named after ‘Schrödinger's cat’.
As a pointer, and a service to other amateur physicists, I thought it would be useful to sum up the main pitfalls and discoveries I stumbled upon while working my way through Feynman’s Lectures. I call it a Survivor’s Guide to Quantum Physics because – at times – it did feel like going through a jungle, or wading through deep water, or climbing a mountain for which there is no map. Indeed, while there is a tendency to present quantum physics as a coherent set of principles and theory, it is not. At best, it is a toolbox with some novel mathematical techniques, approaches and models. At worst, it tries to present itself as an alternative to classical physics, which it is not. Quantum physics is, in essence, a combination of Maxwell’s equations and the Planck-Einstein relation. That is it. Nothing more. Nothing less. In the QED sector, at least. The one and only quantum is Planck’s quantum of (physical) action, and its physical dimension – a force times a distance times a period (cycle time) – is, unfortunately, not always well understood by those who are supposed to understand it – which is why there is a lot of nonsense around. In short, we hope this short paper might help you to avoid the mistakes I made, and that is to waste time on things you should not waste time on: stuff that is not useful, or plain wrong even. And then I will also try to highlight the little shortcuts or visualizations that may help you to get a much more intuitive grasp of things.
Is the quantum world as strange as they say? If this were an unsolved mathematics question, we might try a new angle of attack. We know quantum mechanics (QM) is the most accurate and productive science humans ever had, meaning its probability predictions are accurate. Every probability has two square roots. The Born rule says either would produce the same probability. Assume nature uses the negative of QM’s equations. What could that mean? We’d need to revise Feynman’s path-integrals and Schrödinger’s equation. If waves travel in the opposite direction as what QM believes, that could produce the negative equations. No wave-particle duality. Free particles would follow backwards zero-energy waves coming from detectors. This, surprisingly, gets rid of quantum weirdness. Our proposal is that nature uses the negative of QM’s equations because particles follow zero-energy waves backwards. Considerable evidence fits this model, including a neutron-interferometer and the Davisson-Germer experiments, a quantum-eraser experiment, Wheeler-gedanken and double-slit experiments, Bell-test experiments, Stern-Gerlach, and high-energy scattering experiments. Finally, we propose a plan for how to motivate students to want to study quantum technologies, thereby addressing the most prominent problem in QM today: the shortage of an educated workforce, the scarcity of aspiring students.