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A Survivor’s Guide to Quantum Physics

Jean Louis Van Belle

Published Oct 1, 2020• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

As a pointer, and a service to other amateur physicists, I thought it would be useful to sum up the main pitfalls and discoveries I stumbled upon while working my way through Feynman’s Lectures. I call it a Survivor’s Guide to Quantum Physics because – at times – it did feel like going through a jungle, or wading through deep water, or climbing a mountain for which there is no map. Indeed, while there is a tendency to present quantum physics as a coherent set of principles and theory, it is not. At best, it is a toolbox with some novel mathematical techniques, approaches and models. At worst, it tries to present itself as an alternative to classical physics, which it is not. Quantum physics is, in essence, a combination of Maxwell’s equations and the Planck-Einstein relation. That is it. Nothing more. Nothing less. In the QED sector, at least. The one and only quantum is Planck’s quantum of (physical) action, and its physical dimension – a force times a distance times a period (cycle time) – is, unfortunately, not always well understood by those who are supposed to understand it – which is why there is a lot of nonsense around. In short, we hope this short paper might help you to avoid the mistakes I made, and that is to waste time on things you should not waste time on: stuff that is not useful, or plain wrong even. And then I will also try to highlight the little shortcuts or visualizations that may help you to get a much more intuitive grasp of things.

Related papers

QUANTUM MECHANICS: A PLATONIC INTERPRETATION

James Robert Brown

For more than six decades quantum mechanics (QM) has been a philosophical nightmare. All sorts of good sense have been dashed on the rocks of this brilliantly bizarre bit of physics. So, I am not too sanguine about the prospects of the proposal I’m about to present. Nevertheless, in the spirit of ‘nothing ventured, nothing gained’ I shall outline the philosophical problem (or at least one of the main problems) then try to offer a solution. The proposal is a platonic one, linked to what has been done in earlier chapters. If it works it will support the earlier platonic account of laws and thought experiments. If it doesn’t, then I can only hope it is at least interesting.

Routledge eBooks•Sep 26, 2005•0 citations

The pursuit of locality in quantum mechanics

Malcolm Hodkin

The rampant success of quantum theory is the result of applications of the 'new' quantum \nmechanics of Schrödinger and Heisenberg (1926-7), the Feynman-Schwinger-Tomonaga Quantum \nElectrodynamics (1946-51), the electro-weak theory of Salaam, Weinberg, and Glashow (1967-9), \nand Quantum Chromodynamics (1973-); in fact, this success of `the' quantum theory has depended \non a continuous stream of brilliant and quite disparate mathematical formulations. In this carefully \nconcealed ferment there lie plenty of unresolved difficulties, simply because in churning out fabulously \naccurate calculational tools there has been no sensible explanation of all that is going on. It is even \nargued that such an understanding is nothing to do with physics. A long-standing and famous \nillustration of this is the paradoxical thought-experiment of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (1935). \nFundamental to all quantum theories, and also their paradoxes, is the location of sub-microscopic \nobjects; or, rather, that the specification of such a location is fraught with mathematical inconsistency. \nThis project encompasses a detailed, critical survey of the tangled history of Position \nwithin quantum theories. The first step is to show that, contrary to appearances, canonical quantum \nmechanics has only a vague notion of locality. After analysing a number of previous attempts at a \n`relativistic quantum mechanics', two lines of thought are considered in detail. The first is the work \nof Wan and students, which is shown to be no real improvement on the usual `nonrelativistic' theory. \nThe second is based on an idea of Dirac's - using backwards-in-time light-cones as the hypersurface \nin space-time. There remain considerable difficulties in the way of producing a consistent scheme here. \nTo keep things nicely stirred up, the author then proposes his own approach - an adaptation \nof Feynman's QED propagators. \nThis new approach is distinguished from Feynman's since the propagator or Green's function \nis not obtained by Feynman's rule. The type of equation solved is also different: instead of an \ninitial-value problem, a solution that obeys a time-symmetric causality criterion is found for an \ninhomogeneous partial differential equation with homogeneous boundary conditions. \nTo make the consideration of locality more precise, some results of Fourier transform theory are \npresented in a form that is directly applicable. \nSomewhat away from the main thrust of the thesis, there is also an attempt to explain the \nmanner in which quantum effects disappear as the number of particles increases in such things as \nexperimental realisations of the EPR and de Broglie thought experiments.

•Jan 1, 1990•0 citations

From Physics to Philosophy

Stig Stenholm

The relation between Physics and Philosophy brings to mind the proverbial marriage of high drama; the parties do not approve of each other, but separated they cannot live. Philosophers find physicists shallow, and many physicists claim that they find philosophic speculations useless or worse. Mostly both display a lack of knowledge and understanding of the methods and goals of the other. A few researchers have tried to bridge this gap and explore the worlds of both parties. Michael Redhead has worked in this borderland, and when he retired from his chair in Cambridge, a symposium was arranged to honour him. The talks presented on this occasion are now published in a volume presenting much food for thought to both philosophers and physicists. The essays in this publication do not offer easy reading; not too many readers will have the preparation to penetrate the technical arguments offered. The authors are well acquainted with both philosophical argumentation and mathematical formalism, and, following the lead of Professor Redhead, they combine these in intricate and suggestive ways. Only a close reading can offer understanding of the points of view taken by the various authors. Browsing and mere reading defines the scenery, exploring it demands much more. Many of the nine essays included investigate the meaning of terms used loosely in physics contexts: locality, beables, symmetries and time in relativity. All essays utilize the mathematical structures of physics, but the approach is mainly philosophical; concepts like reality and metaphysics are applied. Some writings are more physical in their treatment of technical questions relating to modern quantum theory. Bohmian mechanics, localized quantum states and gauge symmetries are discussed in detail. It is, however, found that these present interpretational problems that are usually glossed over in purely physical treatments. For an old sceptic like myself, it is quite refreshing to find that many assertions, taken for granted in our textbooks, are indeed doubtful and offer conceptual or technical difficulties. This insight is what a philosophical analysis can offer the working physicist; future progress may well arise from such realizations. However, the results offered by philosophical analysis are usually found unsatisfactory; the hope that philosophy can suggest novel directions for the theory remains unfounded. Philosophers can learn that modern physics rests on a very shaky conceptual foundation. The theory has evolved by a combination of serendipity and opportunism. The beast that finally has emerged is neither well founded nor internally consistent. Its only merit is that it works. That offers the ultimate philosophical problem of modern physics. If the present book can help the philosopher to behold this challenging but overwhelming wilderness, then it serves a useful purpose indeed. But the prospective researcher has to learn to master the difficult language used by the natives, who are not always friendly. I enjoyed reading the book immensely, but the technical difficulty of the text made my understanding remain mostly superficial. I hope to have the time to return some of the essays, and look into the references and issues involved. The work is genuinely what it promises: a guide From Physics to Philosophy .

European Journal of Physics•Mar 1, 2000•0 citations

A Glance at Quantum Mechanics

Since this book is closely connected to quantum mechanics, these introductory words will briefly and informally recall some postulates of this theory. Interested readers are urged to consult traditional books on quantum mechanics to complement the discussion ahead and for descriptions of experimental evidence that give rise to the postulates. In physics there are several “equivalent formulations” of quantum mechanics, and a catalogue of the most important appears in [StyO2]. The discussion here is restricted to the nonrelativistic case.

Birkhäuser Basel eBooks•Jan 1, 2009•0 citations

Introduction

Richard A. Healey

In this monograph I present the basic structure of an interpretation of quantum mechanics. Chapter 1 outlines the central ideas behind the interpretation and illustrates them by means of examples: Subsequent chapters fill in the details of the interpretation. But it is important to begin by explaining what I take an interpretation of quantum mechanics to be, and why any further interpretation needs to be offered. After all, quantum mechanics (in some form) is by now both a foundation for much of contemporary physics and a veteran of more than sixty years of intermittent but sometimes intense reflection on its content and meaning. What more can be, or should be, said about the interpretation of this theory? Many physicists believe that no more needs to be said: that there is basically only one way of understanding quantum mechanics, due to Bohr, Heisenberg, Pauli, and others, and that the only remaining interpretative task is that of the physics teacher, who seeks to perfect ways of conveying this understanding to new generations of students. Sir Rudolf Peierls, one of the more lucid and distinguished of these physicists, even objects to the use of the familiar term ‘Copenhagen interpretation’ to refer to the way of understanding quantum mechanics due to Bohr, Heisenberg, Pauli, and others. Because this sounds as if there were several interpretations of quantum mechanics. There is only one. There is only one way in which you can understand quantum mechanics.[…]

Cambridge University Press eBooks•Nov 24, 1989•0 citations

Could Feynman Have Said This?

N. David Mermin

Fifteen years ago, I mused in a Reference Frame column on how different generations of physicists differed in the degree to which they thought that the interpretation of quantum mechanics remains a serious problem (Physics Today, Physics Today 0031-9228 42 4 1989 9 https://doi.org/10.1063/1.2810963. April 1989, page 9 ). I declared myself to be among those who feel uncomfortable when asked to articulate what we really think about the quantum theory, adding that "If I were forced to sum up in one sentence what the Copenhagen interpretation says to me, it would be "Shut up and calculate!"In the intervening years, I've come to hold a milder and more nuanced opinion of the Copenhagen view, but that should be the subject of another column. The subject of this one is the habit of misquotation or misattribution that afflicts our profession, a rather different example of which I pointed out a few months ago (February 2004, page 10).Given my capacity for intellectual development ("inconsistency," in the terminology deployed in the current American political season), it's fortunate that I've now reached an age at which I tend to forget about things I've written more than a few years ago. Indeed, I find it downright irritating when somebody asks me questions about papers I wrote a mere half dozen years ago, naively identifying me with the author of those ancient texts. Until quite recently, I had no memory of ever having written such a childishly brusque dismissal of such an exquisitely subtle point of view, much less of having published it in so widely read a venue.This amnesia, combined with the evolution in my thinking that had distanced me from my long forgotten words, may explain why I was initially somewhat puzzled by the slight sensation of discomfort that passed over me when, browsing the e-print archive earlier this year, I read a characterization of Max Born's probability rule as "the favorite ingredient of what has been nicknamed, after Feynman's famous dictum, the shut up and calculate interpretation of quantum mechanics."I yield to nobody in my admiration for Richard Feynman's aphorisms on the nature of quantum mechanics. Indeed, long ago I published a poem (Physics Today, April 1985, page 47) consisting of nothing more than a resetting as verse of a paragraph Feynman had written about his own attitude toward the quantum theory, in his now (but not then) famous article that launched the whole field of quantum computation. I like to think I have devoured everything Feynman ever wrote on the character of quantum mechanics. But while "shut up and calculate" sounded dimly familiar to me as a characterization of a certain interpretive stance, I couldn't recall where Feynman had written it. Mulling this over, a terrible thought began to dawn on me. Could it be that I myself had once used the phrase? If so, then it would appear that I had picked it up from something by Feynman, forgotten the source, and presented it as my own. Devastating!It was devastating because I have a horror of writing or uttering any witticism that is not original with me, unless I make it absolutely clear where and (if known) from whom I got it. I don't even like to tell jokes unless I've made them up myself. (I digress to offer you my favorite:Question: What is the difference between theoretical physics and mathematical physics? Answer: Theoretical physics is done by physicists who lack the necessary skills to do real experiments; mathematical physics is done by mathematicians who lack the necessary skills to do real mathematics. Mathematical physicists tend not to like this joke, but other physicists seem to. Nonphysicists, of course, are entirely immune to its charms.)So with growing trepidation, I searched through my past writings on quantum mechanics. I was dismayed when I came upon my 1989 column, which confirmed my worst fears. Not only had I appropriated without proper attribution a Feynman quote, but it appeared to be a famous one. How humiliating! I was afflicted with visions of knowledgeable Physics Today readers shaking their heads 15 years ago at what must have struck them as my shameless attempt to ride to literary glory on the unacknowledged shoulders of Feynman.So I went to the Web to find the source, hoping I could then salvage my reputation by persuading Physics Today to print an addendum or erratum. Google gives more than 130 hits containing both "shut up and calculate" and "feynman." Most of these do not directly link the two, but about a dozen do. Here are a few: "Shut up and calculate" was a motto of Richard Feynman.For example, there's Feynman's "shut up and calculate."My personal philosophy is that of the famous physicist Richard Feynman, who said: "Shut up and calculate."When asked which interpretation of QM he favored, Feynman replied "Shut up and calculate."Richard Feynman foreslog ligefrem en "shut up and calculate" fortolkning af kvantemekanikken.Shut up and calculate—Richard Feynman.Just to make sure, I also searched for "shut up and calculate" and "mermin." I found only 10 hits, all of them mentioning me in ways that had nothing to do with their use, elsewhere, of "shut up and calculate." So it would have been clear to the world that I had indeed passed off Feynman's words as my own.Or had I …?I noticed that not a single one of the Web sites attributing the phrase to Feynman cited a source or hinted at the circumstances under which he had said it. A ray of hope flickered on: Could I once again have become a victim of the Matthew effect?The Matthew effect was enunciated by the great sociologist of science, Robert Merton. 1 1. R. K. Merton, Science 159, 56 (1968). https://doi.org/10.1126/science.159.3810.56 Merton worked in those innocent days when sociologists were interested only in the behavior of scientists and not in the content of their science. (To be fair to contemporary sociologists of science, I should modify that last phrase to "and not in the manifestations of that behavior in the content of their science.") I first learned of the Matthew effect more than 20 years ago, on the occasion of my first and, perhaps until now, only, victimization at the hands of the New York Times.I learned the name for what the Times had done to me when I received a very nice note from P. W. Anderson in which he expressed his regret that the newspaper had given him exclusive credit for a nomenclatural advance that was entirely due to me. "A depressingly typical example of the Matthew effect" was how he characterized the misattribution. (I reported the entire history of this contretemps in these pages back in those dark ages [April 1981, page 46] before there were Reference Frame columns.) When I wrote back asking him what the Matthew effect was, he referred me to Merton.It was Merton who identified and named the tendency always to assign exclusive scientific credit to the most eminent among all the plausible candidates. At least I hope it was he, though I'm sure Merton, who invented many wonderful jokes himself, would have been delighted if the credit for it turned out to be misattributed to him. Merton named the effect after the Gospel According to Matthew, because there it is written, For unto every one that hath shall be given, and he shall have abundance: but from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath.—Matthew 25:29.Could the widespread attribution of my wretched witticism to Feynman be another instance of this same deplorable practice? Had I once again been matthewed?Although I didn't say so in my old Reference-Frame article, what inspired this not so terribly bon mot were vivid memories of the responses my conceptual inquiries elicited from my professors—whom I viewed as agents of Copenhagen—when I was first learning quantum mechanics as a graduate student at Harvard, a mere 30 years after the birth of the subject. "You'll never get a PhD if you allow yourself to be distracted by such frivolities," they kept advising me, "so get back to serious business and produce some results." "Shut up," in other words, "and calculate." And so I did, and probably turned out much the better for it. At Harvard, they knew how to administer tough love in those olden days.This bit of history is relevant to the question of whether Feynman's abundance might have been augmented by a portion of the little that I had. Can you imagine the young Feynman ever having had a similar experience that seared "shut up and calculate" into his tender consciousness? No, of course you can't! Nobody could ever have had the slightest reason to direct the best human calculator that ever was to shut up and calculate.But perhaps Feynman was offering such advice to others who were searching for a better understanding of the quantum mechanical formalism. I can't believe that. He said that he "always had a great deal of difficulty understanding the world view that quantum mechanics represents," and added, "I still get nervous with it." 2 2. R. P. Feynman, Int. J. Theor. Phys. 21, 471 (1982). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02650179 Nobody who felt that way would ever respond with "shut up and calculate" to conceptual inquiries from the perplexed.Well maybe Feynman, like me, was merely dismissing an interpretive position of others by lampooning it as a "shut up and calculate interpretation." I find this unlikely. For one thing, his strong preference for working things out for himself and, of course, his well-known disdain for philosophy make me doubt that he ever paid much attention to the interpretive positions of others. For another, would one for whom calculation was so effortless and understanding so important be likely to translate anybody's admonition against fruitless speculation into such terms?In short, I suspect that it is only Feynman's habitual irreverence that has linked him in the minds of many to the phrase "shut up and calculate." Who else among the high and mighty—and Merton has taught us that it is only among the high and mighty that people tend to look—could have said it? Albert Einstein? Don't be silly. Erwin Schrödinger? Of course not. Niels Bohr? Don't make me laugh. None of them besides Feynman could have said it. Does that mean that Feynman said it? No!Broaden the search to embrace the low and powerless. Among them am I, who hereby put forth the hypothesis that I was the first to use "shut up and calculate" in the context of quantum foundations. I'm not proud of having said it. It's not a beautiful phrase. It's not very clever. It's snide and mindlessly dismissive. But, damn it, if I'm the one who said it first, then that means I did not, even unconsciously, appropriate the words of Richard Feynman and pass them off as my own. So I have nothing to be ashamed of other than having characterized the Copenhagen interpretation in such foolish terms—a lesser offense than unconscious plagiarism, in my moral bookkeeping.So, dear reader, if you have evidence that Feynman really did say "shut up and calculate," please send it to me. I will not be happy to receive it. I'd rather be a Matthew victim than a plagiarist. But I'd like to know the truth.REFERENCESSection:ChooseTop of pageREFERENCES <<CITING ARTICLES1. R. K. Merton, Science 159, 56 (1968). https://doi.org/10.1126/science.159.3810.56 , Google ScholarCrossref, ISI2. R. P. Feynman, Int. J. Theor. Phys. 21, 471 (1982). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02650179 , Google ScholarCrossref, ISI© 2004 American Institute of Physics.

Physics Today•May 1, 2004•138 citations
As a pointer, and a service to other amateur physicists, I thought it would be useful to sum up the main pitfalls and discoveries I stumbled upon while working my way through Feynman’s Lectures. I call it a Survivor’s Guide to Quantum Physics because – at times – it did feel like going through a jungle, or wading through deep water, or climbing a mountain for which there is no map. Indeed, while there is a tendency to present quantum physics as a coherent set of principles and theory, it is not. At best, it is a toolbox with some novel mathematical techniques, approaches and models. At worst, it tries to present itself as an alternative to classical physics, which it is not. Quantum physics is, in essence, a combination of Maxwell’s equations and the Planck-Einstein relation. That is it. Nothing more. Nothing less. In the QED sector, at least. The one and only quantum is Planck’s quantum of (physical) action, and its physical dimension – a force times a distance times a period (cycle time) – is, unfortunately, not always well understood by those who are supposed to understand it – which is why there is a lot of nonsense around. In short, we hope this short paper might help you to avoid the mistakes I made, and that is to waste time on things you should not waste time on: stuff that is not useful, or plain wrong even. And then I will also try to highlight the little shortcuts or visualizations that may help you to get a much more intuitive grasp of things.
For more than six decades quantum mechanics (QM) has been a philosophical nightmare. All sorts of good sense have been dashed on the rocks of this brilliantly bizarre bit of physics. So, I am not too sanguine about the prospects of the proposal I’m about to present. Nevertheless, in the spirit of ‘nothing ventured, nothing gained’ I shall outline the philosophical problem (or at least one of the main problems) then try to offer a solution. The proposal is a platonic one, linked to what has been done in earlier chapters. If it works it will support the earlier platonic account of laws and thought experiments. If it doesn’t, then I can only hope it is at least interesting.
The rampant success of quantum theory is the result of applications of the 'new' quantum \nmechanics of Schrödinger and Heisenberg (1926-7), the Feynman-Schwinger-Tomonaga Quantum \nElectrodynamics (1946-51), the electro-weak theory of Salaam, Weinberg, and Glashow (1967-9), \nand Quantum Chromodynamics (1973-); in fact, this success of `the' quantum theory has depended \non a continuous stream of brilliant and quite disparate mathematical formulations. In this carefully \nconcealed ferment there lie plenty of unresolved difficulties, simply because in churning out fabulously \naccurate calculational tools there has been no sensible explanation of all that is going on. It is even \nargued that such an understanding is nothing to do with physics. A long-standing and famous \nillustration of this is the paradoxical thought-experiment of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (1935). \nFundamental to all quantum theories, and also their paradoxes, is the location of sub-microscopic \nobjects; or, rather, that the specification of such a location is fraught with mathematical inconsistency. \nThis project encompasses a detailed, critical survey of the tangled history of Position \nwithin quantum theories. The first step is to show that, contrary to appearances, canonical quantum \nmechanics has only a vague notion of locality. After analysing a number of previous attempts at a \n`relativistic quantum mechanics', two lines of thought are considered in detail. The first is the work \nof Wan and students, which is shown to be no real improvement on the usual `nonrelativistic' theory. \nThe second is based on an idea of Dirac's - using backwards-in-time light-cones as the hypersurface \nin space-time. There remain considerable difficulties in the way of producing a consistent scheme here. \nTo keep things nicely stirred up, the author then proposes his own approach - an adaptation \nof Feynman's QED propagators. \nThis new approach is distinguished from Feynman's since the propagator or Green's function \nis not obtained by Feynman's rule. The type of equation solved is also different: instead of an \ninitial-value problem, a solution that obeys a time-symmetric causality criterion is found for an \ninhomogeneous partial differential equation with homogeneous boundary conditions. \nTo make the consideration of locality more precise, some results of Fourier transform theory are \npresented in a form that is directly applicable. \nSomewhat away from the main thrust of the thesis, there is also an attempt to explain the \nmanner in which quantum effects disappear as the number of particles increases in such things as \nexperimental realisations of the EPR and de Broglie thought experiments.
The relation between Physics and Philosophy brings to mind the proverbial marriage of high drama; the parties do not approve of each other, but separated they cannot live. Philosophers find physicists shallow, and many physicists claim that they find philosophic speculations useless or worse. Mostly both display a lack of knowledge and understanding of the methods and goals of the other. A few researchers have tried to bridge this gap and explore the worlds of both parties. Michael Redhead has worked in this borderland, and when he retired from his chair in Cambridge, a symposium was arranged to honour him. The talks presented on this occasion are now published in a volume presenting much food for thought to both philosophers and physicists. The essays in this publication do not offer easy reading; not too many readers will have the preparation to penetrate the technical arguments offered. The authors are well acquainted with both philosophical argumentation and mathematical formalism, and, following the lead of Professor Redhead, they combine these in intricate and suggestive ways. Only a close reading can offer understanding of the points of view taken by the various authors. Browsing and mere reading defines the scenery, exploring it demands much more. Many of the nine essays included investigate the meaning of terms used loosely in physics contexts: locality, beables, symmetries and time in relativity. All essays utilize the mathematical structures of physics, but the approach is mainly philosophical; concepts like reality and metaphysics are applied. Some writings are more physical in their treatment of technical questions relating to modern quantum theory. Bohmian mechanics, localized quantum states and gauge symmetries are discussed in detail. It is, however, found that these present interpretational problems that are usually glossed over in purely physical treatments. For an old sceptic like myself, it is quite refreshing to find that many assertions, taken for granted in our textbooks, are indeed doubtful and offer conceptual or technical difficulties. This insight is what a philosophical analysis can offer the working physicist; future progress may well arise from such realizations. However, the results offered by philosophical analysis are usually found unsatisfactory; the hope that philosophy can suggest novel directions for the theory remains unfounded. Philosophers can learn that modern physics rests on a very shaky conceptual foundation. The theory has evolved by a combination of serendipity and opportunism. The beast that finally has emerged is neither well founded nor internally consistent. Its only merit is that it works. That offers the ultimate philosophical problem of modern physics. If the present book can help the philosopher to behold this challenging but overwhelming wilderness, then it serves a useful purpose indeed. But the prospective researcher has to learn to master the difficult language used by the natives, who are not always friendly. I enjoyed reading the book immensely, but the technical difficulty of the text made my understanding remain mostly superficial. I hope to have the time to return some of the essays, and look into the references and issues involved. The work is genuinely what it promises: a guide From Physics to Philosophy .
Since this book is closely connected to quantum mechanics, these introductory words will briefly and informally recall some postulates of this theory. Interested readers are urged to consult traditional books on quantum mechanics to complement the discussion ahead and for descriptions of experimental evidence that give rise to the postulates. In physics there are several “equivalent formulations” of quantum mechanics, and a catalogue of the most important appears in [StyO2]. The discussion here is restricted to the nonrelativistic case.
In this monograph I present the basic structure of an interpretation of quantum mechanics. Chapter 1 outlines the central ideas behind the interpretation and illustrates them by means of examples: Subsequent chapters fill in the details of the interpretation. But it is important to begin by explaining what I take an interpretation of quantum mechanics to be, and why any further interpretation needs to be offered. After all, quantum mechanics (in some form) is by now both a foundation for much of contemporary physics and a veteran of more than sixty years of intermittent but sometimes intense reflection on its content and meaning. What more can be, or should be, said about the interpretation of this theory? Many physicists believe that no more needs to be said: that there is basically only one way of understanding quantum mechanics, due to Bohr, Heisenberg, Pauli, and others, and that the only remaining interpretative task is that of the physics teacher, who seeks to perfect ways of conveying this understanding to new generations of students. Sir Rudolf Peierls, one of the more lucid and distinguished of these physicists, even objects to the use of the familiar term ‘Copenhagen interpretation’ to refer to the way of understanding quantum mechanics due to Bohr, Heisenberg, Pauli, and others. Because this sounds as if there were several interpretations of quantum mechanics. There is only one. There is only one way in which you can understand quantum mechanics.[…]
Fifteen years ago, I mused in a Reference Frame column on how different generations of physicists differed in the degree to which they thought that the interpretation of quantum mechanics remains a serious problem (Physics Today, Physics Today 0031-9228 42 4 1989 9 https://doi.org/10.1063/1.2810963. April 1989, page 9 ). I declared myself to be among those who feel uncomfortable when asked to articulate what we really think about the quantum theory, adding that "If I were forced to sum up in one sentence what the Copenhagen interpretation says to me, it would be "Shut up and calculate!"In the intervening years, I've come to hold a milder and more nuanced opinion of the Copenhagen view, but that should be the subject of another column. The subject of this one is the habit of misquotation or misattribution that afflicts our profession, a rather different example of which I pointed out a few months ago (February 2004, page 10).Given my capacity for intellectual development ("inconsistency," in the terminology deployed in the current American political season), it's fortunate that I've now reached an age at which I tend to forget about things I've written more than a few years ago. Indeed, I find it downright irritating when somebody asks me questions about papers I wrote a mere half dozen years ago, naively identifying me with the author of those ancient texts. Until quite recently, I had no memory of ever having written such a childishly brusque dismissal of such an exquisitely subtle point of view, much less of having published it in so widely read a venue.This amnesia, combined with the evolution in my thinking that had distanced me from my long forgotten words, may explain why I was initially somewhat puzzled by the slight sensation of discomfort that passed over me when, browsing the e-print archive earlier this year, I read a characterization of Max Born's probability rule as "the favorite ingredient of what has been nicknamed, after Feynman's famous dictum, the shut up and calculate interpretation of quantum mechanics."I yield to nobody in my admiration for Richard Feynman's aphorisms on the nature of quantum mechanics. Indeed, long ago I published a poem (Physics Today, April 1985, page 47) consisting of nothing more than a resetting as verse of a paragraph Feynman had written about his own attitude toward the quantum theory, in his now (but not then) famous article that launched the whole field of quantum computation. I like to think I have devoured everything Feynman ever wrote on the character of quantum mechanics. But while "shut up and calculate" sounded dimly familiar to me as a characterization of a certain interpretive stance, I couldn't recall where Feynman had written it. Mulling this over, a terrible thought began to dawn on me. Could it be that I myself had once used the phrase? If so, then it would appear that I had picked it up from something by Feynman, forgotten the source, and presented it as my own. Devastating!It was devastating because I have a horror of writing or uttering any witticism that is not original with me, unless I make it absolutely clear where and (if known) from whom I got it. I don't even like to tell jokes unless I've made them up myself. (I digress to offer you my favorite:Question: What is the difference between theoretical physics and mathematical physics? Answer: Theoretical physics is done by physicists who lack the necessary skills to do real experiments; mathematical physics is done by mathematicians who lack the necessary skills to do real mathematics. Mathematical physicists tend not to like this joke, but other physicists seem to. Nonphysicists, of course, are entirely immune to its charms.)So with growing trepidation, I searched through my past writings on quantum mechanics. I was dismayed when I came upon my 1989 column, which confirmed my worst fears. Not only had I appropriated without proper attribution a Feynman quote, but it appeared to be a famous one. How humiliating! I was afflicted with visions of knowledgeable Physics Today readers shaking their heads 15 years ago at what must have struck them as my shameless attempt to ride to literary glory on the unacknowledged shoulders of Feynman.So I went to the Web to find the source, hoping I could then salvage my reputation by persuading Physics Today to print an addendum or erratum. Google gives more than 130 hits containing both "shut up and calculate" and "feynman." Most of these do not directly link the two, but about a dozen do. Here are a few: "Shut up and calculate" was a motto of Richard Feynman.For example, there's Feynman's "shut up and calculate."My personal philosophy is that of the famous physicist Richard Feynman, who said: "Shut up and calculate."When asked which interpretation of QM he favored, Feynman replied "Shut up and calculate."Richard Feynman foreslog ligefrem en "shut up and calculate" fortolkning af kvantemekanikken.Shut up and calculate—Richard Feynman.Just to make sure, I also searched for "shut up and calculate" and "mermin." I found only 10 hits, all of them mentioning me in ways that had nothing to do with their use, elsewhere, of "shut up and calculate." So it would have been clear to the world that I had indeed passed off Feynman's words as my own.Or had I …?I noticed that not a single one of the Web sites attributing the phrase to Feynman cited a source or hinted at the circumstances under which he had said it. A ray of hope flickered on: Could I once again have become a victim of the Matthew effect?The Matthew effect was enunciated by the great sociologist of science, Robert Merton. 1 1. R. K. Merton, Science 159, 56 (1968). https://doi.org/10.1126/science.159.3810.56 Merton worked in those innocent days when sociologists were interested only in the behavior of scientists and not in the content of their science. (To be fair to contemporary sociologists of science, I should modify that last phrase to "and not in the manifestations of that behavior in the content of their science.") I first learned of the Matthew effect more than 20 years ago, on the occasion of my first and, perhaps until now, only, victimization at the hands of the New York Times.I learned the name for what the Times had done to me when I received a very nice note from P. W. Anderson in which he expressed his regret that the newspaper had given him exclusive credit for a nomenclatural advance that was entirely due to me. "A depressingly typical example of the Matthew effect" was how he characterized the misattribution. (I reported the entire history of this contretemps in these pages back in those dark ages [April 1981, page 46] before there were Reference Frame columns.) When I wrote back asking him what the Matthew effect was, he referred me to Merton.It was Merton who identified and named the tendency always to assign exclusive scientific credit to the most eminent among all the plausible candidates. At least I hope it was he, though I'm sure Merton, who invented many wonderful jokes himself, would have been delighted if the credit for it turned out to be misattributed to him. Merton named the effect after the Gospel According to Matthew, because there it is written, For unto every one that hath shall be given, and he shall have abundance: but from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath.—Matthew 25:29.Could the widespread attribution of my wretched witticism to Feynman be another instance of this same deplorable practice? Had I once again been matthewed?Although I didn't say so in my old Reference-Frame article, what inspired this not so terribly bon mot were vivid memories of the responses my conceptual inquiries elicited from my professors—whom I viewed as agents of Copenhagen—when I was first learning quantum mechanics as a graduate student at Harvard, a mere 30 years after the birth of the subject. "You'll never get a PhD if you allow yourself to be distracted by such frivolities," they kept advising me, "so get back to serious business and produce some results." "Shut up," in other words, "and calculate." And so I did, and probably turned out much the better for it. At Harvard, they knew how to administer tough love in those olden days.This bit of history is relevant to the question of whether Feynman's abundance might have been augmented by a portion of the little that I had. Can you imagine the young Feynman ever having had a similar experience that seared "shut up and calculate" into his tender consciousness? No, of course you can't! Nobody could ever have had the slightest reason to direct the best human calculator that ever was to shut up and calculate.But perhaps Feynman was offering such advice to others who were searching for a better understanding of the quantum mechanical formalism. I can't believe that. He said that he "always had a great deal of difficulty understanding the world view that quantum mechanics represents," and added, "I still get nervous with it." 2 2. R. P. Feynman, Int. J. Theor. Phys. 21, 471 (1982). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02650179 Nobody who felt that way would ever respond with "shut up and calculate" to conceptual inquiries from the perplexed.Well maybe Feynman, like me, was merely dismissing an interpretive position of others by lampooning it as a "shut up and calculate interpretation." I find this unlikely. For one thing, his strong preference for working things out for himself and, of course, his well-known disdain for philosophy make me doubt that he ever paid much attention to the interpretive positions of others. For another, would one for whom calculation was so effortless and understanding so important be likely to translate anybody's admonition against fruitless speculation into such terms?In short, I suspect that it is only Feynman's habitual irreverence that has linked him in the minds of many to the phrase "shut up and calculate." Who else among the high and mighty—and Merton has taught us that it is only among the high and mighty that people tend to look—could have said it? Albert Einstein? Don't be silly. Erwin Schrödinger? Of course not. Niels Bohr? Don't make me laugh. None of them besides Feynman could have said it. Does that mean that Feynman said it? No!Broaden the search to embrace the low and powerless. Among them am I, who hereby put forth the hypothesis that I was the first to use "shut up and calculate" in the context of quantum foundations. I'm not proud of having said it. It's not a beautiful phrase. It's not very clever. It's snide and mindlessly dismissive. But, damn it, if I'm the one who said it first, then that means I did not, even unconsciously, appropriate the words of Richard Feynman and pass them off as my own. So I have nothing to be ashamed of other than having characterized the Copenhagen interpretation in such foolish terms—a lesser offense than unconscious plagiarism, in my moral bookkeeping.So, dear reader, if you have evidence that Feynman really did say "shut up and calculate," please send it to me. I will not be happy to receive it. I'd rather be a Matthew victim than a plagiarist. But I'd like to know the truth.REFERENCESSection:ChooseTop of pageREFERENCES <<CITING ARTICLES1. R. K. Merton, Science 159, 56 (1968). https://doi.org/10.1126/science.159.3810.56 , Google ScholarCrossref, ISI2. R. P. Feynman, Int. J. Theor. Phys. 21, 471 (1982). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02650179 , Google ScholarCrossref, ISI© 2004 American Institute of Physics.