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INTENSIF Jurnal Ilmiah Penelitian dan Penerapan Teknologi Sistem Informasi

System-Level Performance Evaluation of Dilithium2, Falcon-512, and SPHINCS+ for Post-Quantum Secure E-Government Document Signing

Rudolf Sinaga, Samsinar Samsinar, Mohd Shahizan Othman

Published Jun 21, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Background: The rapid advancement of quantum computing threatens the cryptographic foundations of e-Government infrastructure, particularly classical public-key algorithms susceptible to Shor's algorithm. Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) offers a viable pathway for securing digital signature systems against emerging quantum adversaries. Objective: This study conducts a system-level comparative evaluation of three NIST-standardized PQC digital signature schemes CRYSTALS-Dilithium2, Falcon-512, and SPHINCS+-128s to assess their suitability for secure e-Government document signing workflows. Methods: A simulation-based system-level evaluation is employed, wherein timing values are estimated from official NIST PQC parameter specifications and open-source benchmarks (PQClean, OQS), rather than measured from native cryptographic library executions. Experiments were conducted over 100 iterations, reporting mean ± standard deviation for key generation, signing, and verification times, alongside signature sizes and a RESTful API prototype demonstration. Results: Falcon-512 demonstrates the lowest estimated signing latency approximately five to six times faster than Dilithium2 and over fifty times faster than SPHINCS+-128s with the smallest signature size (666 bytes versus 2,420 and 7,856 bytes respectively). Dilithium2 provides a balanced trade-off between computational efficiency and signature robustness, while SPHINCS+-128s, despite its computational overhead, offers the strongest long-term security guarantees through its stateless hash-based construction. The RESTful API prototype confirms successful multi-scheme integration feasibility. Conclusion: This study recommends Falcon-512 for real-time mobile services, Dilithium2 for centralized server-side authentication, and SPHINCS+-128s for long-term archival security, providing evidence-based guidance for PQC adoption in national e-Government systems aligned with SPBE frameworks and NIST standards.

DOI
10.29407/intensif.v10i1.26424

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The 2024 NIST finalisation of post-quantum cryptography (PQC) standards -- CRYSTALS-Kyber (FIPS 203), CRYSTALS-Dilithium (FIPS 204), FALCON (FIPS 205), and SPHINCS+ -- marks the transition from research to deployment-ready quantum-resistant cryptography. This paper proposes the Post-Quantum Cryptography Algorithm Evaluation (PQCAE) framework, a systematic performance and security analysis of five NIST-standardised and candidate PQC algorithms across five deployment dimensions: key/signature size, computational performance, security level, implementation complexity, and hardware acceleration potential. PQCAE evaluates CRYSTALS-Kyber-768, CRYSTALS-Dilithium-3, FALCON-512, SPHINCS+-128s, and BIKE-L1 on three hardware platforms (x86-64 server, ARM Cortex-M4 embedded, and FPGA). CRYSTALS-Kyber achieves the best overall profile for key encapsulation -- fastest operations (KeyGen 0.06 ms, Encaps 0.08 ms, Decaps 0.09 ms on x86-64) with compact keys. FALCON-512 provides the smallest signature sizes (897 bytes) at moderate computational cost. SPHINCS+ offers the strongest conservative security (hash-based, no lattice assumptions) but largest signatures (8 KB). PQCAE provides migration guidance for organisations transitioning from classical to post-quantum cryptography.
Abstract The advent of quantum computing necessitates the integration of post-quantum cryptography (PQC) into high-speed optical networks to safeguard against emerging threats. This study rigorously evaluates NIST-standardized PQC digital signature algorithms – CRYSTALS-Dilithium, FALCON, and SPHINCS+ – in wavelength-division multiplexing (WDM) systems, addressing the critical interplay between cryptographic robustness, file size dynamics, and optical network performance. Through comprehensive OptiSystem simulations, we analyze transmission fidelity (BER, Q-factor), power efficiency, and channel spacing impacts across single- and multi-channel WDM architectures. Key findings reveal that compact lattice-based schemes like FALCON-512 achieve high Q-factor at optimum power (−2) dBm for small files (≤45 bits), making them ideal for latency-sensitive applications such as real-time financial transactions. Conversely, large files (>200 bits) demand adaptive power allocation (−12 dBm–−10 dBm) and hybrid error correction (LDPC + FEC) when using SPHINCS + , despite its 41 kB signature overhead. Optimal channel spacing (0.8 nm for metro networks, 1.6 nm for long-haul links) balances spectral efficiency and resilience to distortions. The results underscore the necessity of context-aware cryptographic frameworks: FALCON-512 excels in low-power, high-security metro-scale deployments (50–100 km), while SPHINCS + suits archival data with high throughput tolerance. This work provides actionable insights for designing quantum-safe optical networks, harmonizing PQC standards with the evolving demands of high-capacity, low-latency infrastructure.
Quantum computing challenges the mathematical problems anchoring the security of the classical public key algorithms. For quantum-resistant public key algorithms, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has undergone a multi-year standardization process and selected the post-quantum cryptography (PQC) public key digital signatures of Dilithium, Falcon, and SPHINCS+. Finding common ground to compare these algorithms can be difficult because of their design differences, including the fundamental math problems (lattice-based vs. hash-based). We use a visualization model to show the key/signature size vs. security trade-offs for all PQC algorithms. Our performance analyses compare the algorithms’ computational loads in the execution time. Building on the individual algorithms’ analyses, we analyze the communication costs and implementation overheads when integrated with Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and with Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)/Internet Protocol (IP). Our results show that the lattice-based algorithms of Dilithium and Falcon induce lower computational overheads than the hash-based algorithms of SPHINCS+. In addition, the lattice-based PQC can outperform the classical algorithm with comparable security strength; for example, Dilithium 2 and Falcon 512 outperform RSA 4096 in the TLS handshake time duration.
The growing maturity of quantum computing is transforming theoretical cryptographic vulnerabilities into concrete security risks, threatening the foundations of modern public-key infrastructure. In response, the cryptographic community has developed a new generation of quantum-resistant algorithms, and NIST has finalized a portfolio of five Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) standards covering two fundamental primitives: key encapsulation and digital signatures. While the security properties of these algorithms are well understood, their practical performance on real hardware remains a critical open question for organizations planning the migration away from classical cryptography. This paper presents a performance evaluation of the five NIST-standardized PQC algorithms - CRYSTALS-Kyber, HQC, CRYSTALS-Dilithium, Falcon, and SPHINCS+ - on a general-purpose processor, across all supported security levels, and with RSA included as a classical baseline, providing practitioners with concrete and actionable data to guide algorithm selection in real deployment scenarios.
The development of quantum computing technology is progressing very quickly, which poses a great threat to classical cryptographic algorithms like RSA and ECC, as they are based on mathematical problems that can be easily solved using quantum computing technology. To overcome the threat of quantum computing technology, the need for PQC algorithms like CRYSTALS Kyber, CRYSTALS Dilithium, Falcon, and SPHINCS+, which are standardized or recommended by NIST, has become essential in the era of cybersecurity. The feasibility of these algorithms in real time applications is the main focus of this thesis. A mixed approach is adopted for this purpose. Benchmark experiments were performed using the Open Quantum Safe library and PQC enabled OpenSSL for key generation, encryption, decryption, signature generation, signature verification, and TLS handshakes. Simulated environment and cloud environment were used for this purpose. Moreover, case studies were also conducted for cloud computing, financial sector, and IoT applications. Additionally, threat modeling is also performed for assessing the migration risks, i.e., “harvest now decrypt later.” The results indicate that the lattice-based methods, like Kyber and Dilithium, offer a robust trade off in terms of performance and security, albeit with increased key and signature sizes compared to classical methods. Hash based methods, like SPHINCS+, offer robust security, albeit with significant performance and size overheads, indicating that they are best used in specific circumstances. Hybrid approaches, using classical as well as quantum methods, were indicated as viable in the transition from classical to quantum methods, especially in circumstances that require backward compatibility. The paper concludes that NIST standardized PQC algorithms are technically viable for contemporary applications, especially in cloud computing and high-performance computing. However, for large-scale implementation, proper engineering and monitoring of developments in crypt analysis need to be performed. Future research should be directed towards implementation optimization, migration frameworks, and further studies in real-world implementations, especially for resource-constrained IoT and legacy system applications.
Recent advancements in quantum computing threaten the cryptographic foundations of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). Although the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has standardized three post-quantum digital signature algorithms, namely ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, and FALCON, fourteen additional candidates are currently under evaluation, to diversify the collection of available post-quantum signature schemes. This work presents a comprehensive performance analysis of the fourteen ‘Round 2’ digital signature candidates within a functional X. 509 PKI environment. Unlike prior studies focused on isolated benchmarking, we evaluate the complete PKI life cycle, key generation, CSR creation, as well as certificate signing and verification. Our empirical results indicate that several candidates perform competitively with current standards; notably, eight schemes outperform SLH-DSA in signing efficiency, with HAWK and CROSS approaching the performance levels of ML-DSA and FALCON. However, memory analysis reveals critical trade-offs. While HAWK and CROSS maintain high efficiency, multivariate schemes like UOV and FAEST incur significantly higher memory overheads. These observed performance characteristics provide a stronger basis for selecting suitable post-quantum signatures in practical PKI environments.