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IEEE Access

A Secure-by-Design Post-Quantum Architecture for Industrial Control Systems

Ankit Gupta, Shilpi Mittal

Published Jan 1, 2026• 4 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Industrial control systems rely on long-lived cryptographic trust anchors to protect safety-critical operations, remote maintenance, and software supply chains. Quantum-capable adversaries create a time-shifted risk: encrypted traffic captured today may be decrypted later, while classical public-key signatures that authenticate devices, software updates, and forensic records may eventually become forgeable. This paper presents a secure-by-design post-quantum architecture for industrial control systems that couples cryptographic agility with the timing, availability, and safety constraints of operational technology. The architecture combines a post-quantum-ready trust fabric, hybrid and post-quantum transport profiles, gateway-anchored protection for legacy field protocols, and lifecycle governance aligned with industrial cybersecurity practice. A reproducible sizing study uses standardized artifact sizes from current post-quantum standards and representative industrial link rates to estimate bandwidth, latency, credential-storage, packetization, and maintenance-window effects. The evaluation also separates communication occupancy from control-loop timing, clarifies the certificate-chain sizing assumptions, discusses retransmission and packet-loss implications, and relates the analytical model to published embedded post-quantum benchmarking. The results show that post-quantum and hybrid handshakes are practical on Ethernet-based plant networks but become operationally expensive on low-rate telemetry links, which motivates gateway termination, session resumption, and deterministic rekeying. The resulting blueprint offers a practical migration path that reduces harvest-now-decrypt-later exposure while preserving deterministic control behavior and operational resilience.

DOI
10.1109/access.2026.3692633

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This item contains a research article proposing a post-quantum cryptography (PQC) security architecture for IoT-enabled chemical process plants, where sensor connectivity and cloud analytics introduce safety-critical cyber-physical risks. The paper first surveys PQC and quantum-threat literature for SCADA/OT and industrial IoT systems, then applies Mosca’s Theorem to argue that long-lived chemical infrastructures are already in the “harvest now, decrypt later” risk window.A structured threat model is built using STRIDE and MITRE ATT&CK for ICS, distinguishing safety-critical consequences (e.g., false sensor readings and malicious actuator commands) from conventional confidentiality breaches. Based on this model, the paper proposes an ESP32-based three-tier architecture (field sensors, edge microcontrollers, and cloud analytics) that integrates NIST-standardized lattice-based algorithms: CRYSTALS-Kyber (ML-KEM) for session key establishment, CRYSTALS-Dilithium (ML-DSA) for data/command authentication, and SPHINCS+ or Dilithium for firmware-signing on resource-constrained devices.The design is explicitly mapped to IEC 62443 Foundational Requirements (FR1 Identification & Authentication, FR3 System Integrity, FR4 Data Confidentiality) and accompanied by a feasibility analysis that uses microcontroller-level benchmarks of Kyber and Dilithium on ESP32-class hardware, highlighting computation, memory, and communication trade-offs versus classical RSA/ECC. The paper also outlines a hardware-free validation methodology using liboqs (Open Quantum Safe) with TLS 1.3, device emulation, and Linux network emulation to measure protocol overhead under realistic industrial network conditions.Finally, it discusses migration challenges for brownfield plants, the evolving standards and regulatory landscape (NIST IR 8547, IEC 62443, CISA/NSA guidance), and future work on empirical benchmarking and multi-plant threat-model generalization, aiming to provide a roadmap for designing quantum-safe IoT architectures in safety-critical chemical production.

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Industrial control systems rely on long-lived cryptographic trust anchors to protect safety-critical operations, remote maintenance, and software supply chains. Quantum-capable adversaries create a time-shifted risk: encrypted traffic captured today may be decrypted later, while classical public-key signatures that authenticate devices, software updates, and forensic records may eventually become forgeable. This paper presents a secure-by-design post-quantum architecture for industrial control systems that couples cryptographic agility with the timing, availability, and safety constraints of operational technology. The architecture combines a post-quantum-ready trust fabric, hybrid and post-quantum transport profiles, gateway-anchored protection for legacy field protocols, and lifecycle governance aligned with industrial cybersecurity practice. A reproducible sizing study uses standardized artifact sizes from current post-quantum standards and representative industrial link rates to estimate bandwidth, latency, credential-storage, packetization, and maintenance-window effects. The evaluation also separates communication occupancy from control-loop timing, clarifies the certificate-chain sizing assumptions, discusses retransmission and packet-loss implications, and relates the analytical model to published embedded post-quantum benchmarking. The results show that post-quantum and hybrid handshakes are practical on Ethernet-based plant networks but become operationally expensive on low-rate telemetry links, which motivates gateway termination, session resumption, and deterministic rekeying. The resulting blueprint offers a practical migration path that reduces harvest-now-decrypt-later exposure while preserving deterministic control behavior and operational resilience.
Consumer Industrial Control Systems (ICS) - spanning smart homes, building automation, and consumer manufacturing equipment - continue to rely on RSA and ECC-based protocols despite decade-long deployment lifecycles that extend well into the post-quantum era. The harvest-now-decrypt-later (HNDL) threat, wherein adversaries archive ciphertext today for decryption once cryptographically relevant quantum computers (CRQC) emerge, demands near-term migration for devices with 10–20-year operational horizons. We present an adaptive hybrid protocol that combines ML-KEM (NIST FIPS 203) with classical ECDH, selecting parameter sets dynamically from per-device capability profiles. Over 5,000 TLS handshakes conducted on representative consumer IoT hardware - Raspberry Pi gateways and ESP-class microcontrollers - our adaptive negotiation reduces handshake overhead by 23–31% compared with static hybrid baselines while preserving full backward compatibility with classical-only peers. We further provide a practical migration roadmap comprising a device capability taxonomy, risk-prioritised deployment guidance, and vendor-actionable cost–benefit analysis. All experimental artefacts are released as open-source to facilitate community replication
Quantum computing is rapidly approaching a stage where classical cryptographic systems, particularly RSA, ECC, and Diffie–Hellman, will no longer provide adequate security for critical infrastructure. The emergence of Shor’s and Grover’s algorithms introduces unprecedented vulnerability to national cyber-defense ecosystems, underpinning power grids, transportation, military communications, and banking systems. This paper presents a unified post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) security framework integrating lattice-based primitives, hybrid key-exchange mechanisms, and secure orchestration for resource-constrained operational-technology environments. The proposed architecture leverages NIST-recommended schemes, including CRYSTALS-Kyber, CRYSTALS-Dilithium, and SPHINCS+, to ensure long-term confidentiality, integrity, and interoperability across legacy and modern control environments. A defense-in-depth trust-fabric is introduced to protect critical data flows across edge controllers, automation PLCs, substations, cloud-SCADA gateways, and defense communication systems. Performance evaluation demonstrates a 39.4% reduction in key-exchange latency, 46% faster authentication cycles, and zero-downtime cryptographic transition capability. Our findings position this framework as a practical migration blueprint supporting national PQC readiness and cyber-resilience mandates.
Sustainable infrastructure increasingly depends on cryptographic trust: distributed energy resources authenticate fleet commands, water utilities protect remote maintenance, transport systems rely on certificate ecosystems, and buildings participate in grid-edge energy services. These systems also have long physical and institutional lifecycles. Assets, supplier relationships, software signing chains, and archived evidence can remain in service for decades, while the public-key assumptions embedded in them may become unsafe once cryptanalytically relevant quantum computers arrive. This paper presents Q-CLAIM, a lifecycle exposure model and prioritization method for post-quantum migration in long-lived sustainable infrastructure. The model extends the usual harvest-now-decrypt-later test by adding the residence time of quantum-vulnerable trust dependencies, migration lead time, safety constraints, and a replaceability factor. We then evaluate the model on a reproducible 28-archetype decision dataset covering electricity, water, transport, buildings, and cross-cutting supplier trust services. The scenario analysis shows that a lifecycle-agility-first strategy reduces the weighted exposure score by 93.7% while avoiding premature replacement of otherwise serviceable assets; a replacement-first strategy reduces exposure slightly further but requires twelve early replacements. The contribution is not a survey or a speculative benchmark. It is a concrete engineering method, a reproducible dataset, and a migration pattern that links post-quantum security with sustainability goals by preserving useful asset life while retiring vulnerable cryptographic dependencies.
AbstractObjective. Public-key cryptography protects key establishment, authentication, software integrity and trust relationships across the optical transport and IP/MPLS networks that carry U.S. critical-infrastructure communications. A sufficiently capable quantum computer would break the widely deployed algorithms on which these protections rest. This study investigates how such networks can migrate to post-quantum cryptography (PQC) without disrupting operational communications, and how they can be made crypto-agile so that future algorithm changes are routine instead of exceptional.Method. The study follows a Design Science Research (DSR) approach and proposes the Crypto-Agile Post-Quantum Transition Architecture (CAPTA), a nine-layer architecture combining cryptographic inventory, quantum-risk prioritization, a crypto-agility abstraction, PKI and identity migration, optical-layer and IP/MPLS security, management and supply-chain security, staged migration orchestration, and governance. A mathematical model expresses confidentiality and trust exposure over time, handshake size and latency effects of PQC algorithms, hybrid-scheme security, the value of crypto-agility, and a multi-objective migration-scheduling problem with precedence, resource, performance, interoperability and rollback constraints. The evaluation is analytical and scenario-based; no measurements, lab results or numerical performance results are reported.Results. Six analytical propositions are derived: an exposure integral and its marginal cost of delay; an ordering rule for a single migration team and the complexity of the precedence-constrained case; a bound on the extra round trips caused by larger handshakes under TCP slow start; the probability that fragmented UDP-based key exchange completes without retransmission; a condition under which hybrid key establishment is preferable to PQ-only operation; and a break-even condition for investing in crypto-agility. Ten scenarios, six testable hypotheses, four baselines, an ablation plan and a reproducible simulation and laboratory protocol are specified.Significance. The work offers a design pattern, an analytical basis and an evaluation protocol for quantum-safe transition of critical communications infrastructure, and it treats transition as an engineering-risk problem in which operational continuity is a first-class constraint.
Brownfield supervisory control and data acquisition environments face a migration problem that is materially different from enterprise information technology. Post-quantum cryptography must be introduced into systems that privilege safety, deterministic communications, long asset lifetimes, staged outages, vendor-certified configurations, and protocol heterogeneity. At the same time, the public standards landscape changed rapidly between 2023 and March 2026, including finalization of the NIST ML-KEM, ML-DSA, and SLH-DSA standards, publication of NIST guidance for key-encapsulation mechanisms, growth of national migration roadmaps, and active standardization of hybrid and pure post-quantum handshakes for Transport Layer Security and Internet Key Exchange. This paper develops a framework for hybrid classical-post-quantum migration in brownfield SCADA settings that is evidence-based, implementation-oriented, and explicitly staged. We distinguish coexistence from true cryptographic hybridization, quantify control-plane overhead using official algorithm sizes and current protocol drafts, and propose a conduit-first migration sequence that prioritizes gateways, remote access, management planes, trust anchors, and software-signing services before intrusive field-device replacement. To support the applied-research claim, the framework is evaluated through standards-derived protocol-overhead analysis, a representative brownfield case demonstration, explicit scoring-model parameter rationale, sensitivity analysis, phase-gate validation criteria, and a pilot evidence package. The result is a practical path for operators who must begin quantum-safe preparation now, even where endpoint-native post-quantum support remains uneven.
This item contains a research article proposing a post-quantum cryptography (PQC) security architecture for IoT-enabled chemical process plants, where sensor connectivity and cloud analytics introduce safety-critical cyber-physical risks. The paper first surveys PQC and quantum-threat literature for SCADA/OT and industrial IoT systems, then applies Mosca’s Theorem to argue that long-lived chemical infrastructures are already in the “harvest now, decrypt later” risk window.A structured threat model is built using STRIDE and MITRE ATT&CK for ICS, distinguishing safety-critical consequences (e.g., false sensor readings and malicious actuator commands) from conventional confidentiality breaches. Based on this model, the paper proposes an ESP32-based three-tier architecture (field sensors, edge microcontrollers, and cloud analytics) that integrates NIST-standardized lattice-based algorithms: CRYSTALS-Kyber (ML-KEM) for session key establishment, CRYSTALS-Dilithium (ML-DSA) for data/command authentication, and SPHINCS+ or Dilithium for firmware-signing on resource-constrained devices.The design is explicitly mapped to IEC 62443 Foundational Requirements (FR1 Identification & Authentication, FR3 System Integrity, FR4 Data Confidentiality) and accompanied by a feasibility analysis that uses microcontroller-level benchmarks of Kyber and Dilithium on ESP32-class hardware, highlighting computation, memory, and communication trade-offs versus classical RSA/ECC. The paper also outlines a hardware-free validation methodology using liboqs (Open Quantum Safe) with TLS 1.3, device emulation, and Linux network emulation to measure protocol overhead under realistic industrial network conditions.Finally, it discusses migration challenges for brownfield plants, the evolving standards and regulatory landscape (NIST IR 8547, IEC 62443, CISA/NSA guidance), and future work on empirical benchmarking and multi-plant threat-model generalization, aiming to provide a roadmap for designing quantum-safe IoT architectures in safety-critical chemical production.