This paper proposes a novel covert communication paradigm in which covertness emerges from network-induced structural uncertainty, eliminating the traditional reliance on pre-shared secret pilots in multi-user cooperative networks. Unlike conventional schemes that create information asymmetry through secret training sequences, we show that structural uncertainty naturally arises from user selection in spatially dispersed networks. Specifically, we consider a public pilot aided system under a worst-case adversarial assumption where Willie possesses full knowledge of all individual channel state information (CSI) but remains uncertain about the active subset of cooperative users. We prove that this selection-induced structural uncertainty renders different transmission states statistically indistinguishable from Willie’s perspective, thereby forcing the optimal detector to reduce to an energy-based test. The proposed framework demonstrates that robust covertness can be achieved without secrecy-based coordination, providing a scalable and practically viable alternative to secret pilot management in future wireless networks.
This paper proposes a novel covert communication paradigm in which covertness emerges from network-induced structural uncertainty, eliminating the traditional reliance on pre-shared secret pilots in multi-user cooperative networks. Unlike conventional schemes that create information asymmetry through secret training sequences, we show that structural uncertainty naturally arises from user selection in spatially dispersed networks. Specifically, we consider a public pilot aided system under a worst-case adversarial assumption where Willie possesses full knowledge of all individual channel state information (CSI) but remains uncertain about the active subset of cooperative users. We prove that this selection-induced structural uncertainty renders different transmission states statistically indistinguishable from Willie’s perspective, thereby forcing the optimal detector to reduce to an energy-based test. The proposed framework demonstrates that robust covertness can be achieved without secrecy-based coordination, providing a scalable and practically viable alternative to secret pilot management in future wireless networks.
This paper investigates an uplink multi-user covert communication system with spatially distributed users. Unlike prior works that approximate channel statistics using averaged parameters and homogeneous assumptions, this study explicitly models each user's geometric position and corresponding user-to-Willie and user-to-Bob channel variances. This approach enables an accurate characterization of spatially heterogeneous covert environments. We mathematically prove that a generalized on-off power control scheme, which jointly accounts for both Bob's and Willie's channels, constitutes the optimal transmission strategy in heterogeneous user configurations. Leveraging the optimal strategy, we derive closed-form expressions for the minimum detection error probability and the minimum number of cooperative users required to satisfy a covert constraint. With the closed-form expressions, comprehensive theoretical analyses are conducted, which are validated by Monte-Carlo simulations. One important insight obtained from the analysis is that user spatial heterogeneity can enhance covert communication performance. Building on these findings, a piecewise search algorithm is proposed to achieve exact optimality with significantly reduced computational complexity. We demonstrate that optimization considering user's spatial heterogeneity achieves substantially improved covert communication performance than that based on the assumption of spatial homogeneity.
Covert wireless communication can prevent an adversary from knowing the existence of user's transmission, thus provide stronger security protection. In AWGN channels, a square root law was obtained and the result shows that Alice can reliably and covertly transmit O(n) bits to Bob in n channel uses in the presence of a passive eavesdropper (Willie). However, existing work presupposes that Willie is static and only samples the channels at a fixed place. If Willie can dynamically adjust the testing distance between him and Alice according to his sampling values, his detection probability of error can be reduced significantly via a trend test. We found that, if Alice has no prior knowledge about Willie, she cannot hide her transmission behavior in the presence of an active Willie, and the square root law does not hold in this situation. We then proposed a novel countermeasure to deal with the active Willie. Through randomized transmission scheduling, Willie cannot detect Alice's transmission attempts if Alice can set her transmission probability below a threshold. Additionally, we systematically evaluated the security properties of covert communications in a dense wireless network, and proposed a density-based routing scheme to deal with multi-hop covert communication in a wireless network. As the network grows denser, Willie's uncertainty increases, and finally resulting in a "shadow" network to Willie.
Covert transmission is investigated for a cooperative deception strategy, where a cooperative jammer (Jammer) tries to attract a multi-antenna adversary (Willie) and degrade the adversary’s reception ability for the signal from a transmitter (Alice). For this strategy, we formulate an optimization problem to maximize the covert rate when three different types of channel state information (CSI) are available. The total power is optimally allocated between Alice and Jammer subject to the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence constraint, which can be expressed analytically and be widely used as a covertness measurement. Different from the existing literature, in our proposed strategy, we also determine the optimal transmission power at the jammer when Alice is silent, while existing works always assume that the jammer’s power is fixed. Specifically, we apply the S-procedure to convert infinite constraints into linear-matrix-inequalities (LMI) constraints. When statistical CSI at Willie is available, we convert double integration to single integration using asymptotic approximation and substitution method. Finally, our simulation results show that for the proposed strategy, the covert rate is increased with the number of antennas at Willie. Moreover, compared to the benchmark, our proposed strategy is more robust in the presence of imperfect CSI.
Covert wireless communication aims to establish a reliable link while hiding the transmission from an adversary. In wireless settings, uncertainty plays a central role in this tradeoff: it can help mask the signal from a warden, but it also complicates robust system design. This raises a basic question: under bounded uncertainty, are reliability and covertness governed by the same adverse conditions? If not, robust covert design cannot be reduced to a single worst-case environment. In this paper, we study this question in a covert wireless model with quasi-static fading, outage-based reliability at Bob and radiometric detection at Willie. Uncertainty is represented through bounded intervals for Bob's average channel strength and Willie's noise power. To obtain a tractable characterization, we adopt a conditional large-N midpoint-threshold surrogate for Willie's detector, parameterized by a Willie-side fading realization. Within this framework, we show that the reliability constraint is governed by Bob's smallest admissible channel parameter, whereas the covertness constraint is governed by Willie's smallest admissible noise level. This establishes a conflict-aware robust-design principle: the adverse realizations for reliability and covertness differ. Based on this result, we derive closed-form expressions for the robustly feasible transmit power and the corresponding robust optimal rate. Numerical results show that bounded uncertainty contracts the feasible region, monotonically reduces the robust optimal rate, and can cause substantial loss relative to the nominal design. Monte Carlo results further show that the conditional surrogate closely tracks the midpoint-threshold radiometer in the intended low-effective-SNR regime. Overall, the paper shows that even in a streamlined wireless setting, robust covert design requires different adverse-case reasoning for reliability and covertness.
This letter addresses covert communication in multi-user wireless networks under cognitive adversarial reactive injection attacks. To protect the user links, a secret-key strategy is employed in which each user embeds its ON–OFF keying (OOK) symbols in an orthogonal mask and a frame-wise energy schedule drawn from a public dictionary. After key-aided demasking and energy normalization, the receiver Bob’s decision reduces to a variance test. We derive closed-form likelihood-ratio thresholds and error probabilities for Rayleigh slow and fast fading channel conditions, modeling the adversary Eve’s full-duplex injection as interference that changes the variance between ON state and OFF state transmissions. Asymptotically, error probabilities decay polynomially in the number of channel uses N under slow fading but exponentially under fast fading. Simulations validate these closed-form expressions, revealing clear gains in slow fading and fast fading conditions as N increases. The results show that key-assisted energy randomization and channel time variation jointly strengthen covertness against active injection attacks.
We consider the problem of covert communication over a state-dependent channel when the Channel State Information (CSI) is available either non-causally, causally, or strictly causally, either at the transmitter alone, or at both transmitter and receiver. Covert communication with respect to an adversary, called “warden,” is one in which, despite communication over the channel, the warden’s observation remains indistinguishable from an output induced by innocent channel-input symbols. Covert communication involves fooling an adversary in part by a proliferation of codebooks; for reliable decoding at the legitimate receiver, the codebook uncertainty is typically removed via a shared secret key that is unavailable to the warden. In contrast to previous work, we do not assume the availability of a large shared key at the transmitter and legitimate receiver. Instead, we only require a secret key with negligible rate to bootstrap the communication and our scheme extracts shared randomness from the CSI in a manner that keeps it secret from the warden, despite the influence of the CSI on the warden’s output. When CSI is available at the transmitter and receiver, we derive the covert capacity region. When CSI is only available at the transmitter, we derive inner and outer bounds on the covert capacity. We also provide examples for which the covert capacity is positive with knowledge of CSI but is zero without it.