This letter addresses covert communication in multi-user wireless networks under cognitive adversarial reactive injection attacks. To protect the user links, a secret-key strategy is employed in which each user embeds its ON–OFF keying (OOK) symbols in an orthogonal mask and a frame-wise energy schedule drawn from a public dictionary. After key-aided demasking and energy normalization, the receiver Bob’s decision reduces to a variance test. We derive closed-form likelihood-ratio thresholds and error probabilities for Rayleigh slow and fast fading channel conditions, modeling the adversary Eve’s full-duplex injection as interference that changes the variance between ON state and OFF state transmissions. Asymptotically, error probabilities decay polynomially in the number of channel uses N under slow fading but exponentially under fast fading. Simulations validate these closed-form expressions, revealing clear gains in slow fading and fast fading conditions as N increases. The results show that key-assisted energy randomization and channel time variation jointly strengthen covertness against active injection attacks.
This letter addresses covert communication in multi-user wireless networks under cognitive adversarial reactive injection attacks. To protect the user links, a secret-key strategy is employed in which each user embeds its ON–OFF keying (OOK) symbols in an orthogonal mask and a frame-wise energy schedule drawn from a public dictionary. After key-aided demasking and energy normalization, the receiver Bob’s decision reduces to a variance test. We derive closed-form likelihood-ratio thresholds and error probabilities for Rayleigh slow and fast fading channel conditions, modeling the adversary Eve’s full-duplex injection as interference that changes the variance between ON state and OFF state transmissions. Asymptotically, error probabilities decay polynomially in the number of channel uses N under slow fading but exponentially under fast fading. Simulations validate these closed-form expressions, revealing clear gains in slow fading and fast fading conditions as N increases. The results show that key-assisted energy randomization and channel time variation jointly strengthen covertness against active injection attacks.
Covert wireless communication can prevent an adversary from knowing the existence of user's transmission, thus provide stronger security protection. In AWGN channels, a square root law was obtained and the result shows that Alice can reliably and covertly transmit O(n) bits to Bob in n channel uses in the presence of a passive eavesdropper (Willie). However, existing work presupposes that Willie is static and only samples the channels at a fixed place. If Willie can dynamically adjust the testing distance between him and Alice according to his sampling values, his detection probability of error can be reduced significantly via a trend test. We found that, if Alice has no prior knowledge about Willie, she cannot hide her transmission behavior in the presence of an active Willie, and the square root law does not hold in this situation. We then proposed a novel countermeasure to deal with the active Willie. Through randomized transmission scheduling, Willie cannot detect Alice's transmission attempts if Alice can set her transmission probability below a threshold. Additionally, we systematically evaluated the security properties of covert communications in a dense wireless network, and proposed a density-based routing scheme to deal with multi-hop covert communication in a wireless network. As the network grows denser, Willie's uncertainty increases, and finally resulting in a "shadow" network to Willie.
This paper investigates an uplink multi-user covert communication system with spatially distributed users. Unlike prior works that approximate channel statistics using averaged parameters and homogeneous assumptions, this study explicitly models each user's geometric position and corresponding user-to-Willie and user-to-Bob channel variances. This approach enables an accurate characterization of spatially heterogeneous covert environments. We mathematically prove that a generalized on-off power control scheme, which jointly accounts for both Bob's and Willie's channels, constitutes the optimal transmission strategy in heterogeneous user configurations. Leveraging the optimal strategy, we derive closed-form expressions for the minimum detection error probability and the minimum number of cooperative users required to satisfy a covert constraint. With the closed-form expressions, comprehensive theoretical analyses are conducted, which are validated by Monte-Carlo simulations. One important insight obtained from the analysis is that user spatial heterogeneity can enhance covert communication performance. Building on these findings, a piecewise search algorithm is proposed to achieve exact optimality with significantly reduced computational complexity. We demonstrate that optimization considering user's spatial heterogeneity achieves substantially improved covert communication performance than that based on the assumption of spatial homogeneity.
The motivation of this thesis is to contribute to the improvement of the physical-layer secrecy and privacy of wireless communication. Firstly, the rate and power adaptation technique is investigated to improve the energy efficiency of the physical-layer secrecy. We present the optimum rate and power adaptation rule that maximizes the average secrecy energy efficiency(SEE) subject to an average transmission power constraint. The SEE is defined as the outage secrecy capacity, the largest secrecy rate, such that the outage probability is less than a certain value, divided by the total power consumption (bits per joule). We also characterize the SEE gain provided by varying the rate and/or the power, and discuss the impact of the number of antennas on the optimum adaptation rule. Secondly, the joint impact of imperfect knowledge of the channel gain (channel uncertainty) and noise power (noise uncertainty) at the adversary is investigated to improve the physical-layer privacy. We characterize the covert throughput gain provided by the channel uncertainty as well as the covert throughput loss caused by the channel fading as a function of the noise uncertainty. We also show the impact the channel uncertainty on the total detection error probability and the covert throughput. Our result shows that the channel fading is crucial to hiding the signal transmission, particularly when the noise uncertainty is low and/or the receive SNR is high. The impact of the channel uncertainty on the total detection error probability and the covert throughput is more significant when the noise uncertainty is larger. Finally, hiding a covert (private) message in non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) systems by superimposing (embedding) it under other messages is proposed.We determine the total detection error probability (sum of false alarm and missed detection probability), the adversary's optimum detection strategy that minimizes the total detection error probability, and the communicator's optimum message hiding strategy that maximizes the total detection error probability. Additionally, we explore exploiting the channel variations to further increase the total detection error probability. We show that the total detection error probability increases and converges to 1 as the number of users increases and that the total detection error probability, hence the covert rate, can be increased by increasing the transmission power when the channel variation is exploited.
It is challenging to covert communication under channel distribution information (CDI) uncertainty caused by limited feedback and rapid-changing channels. This letter investigates covert communication in uplink non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) systems under CDI uncertainty, where a covert user (CU) and reliable user (RU) transmit messages to a legitimate receiver (Bob) threatened by a warden (Willie). RU not only transmits its public messages but also helps CU to send private messages against Willie’s detection. To protect CU’s transmission with imperfect CDI, we first study the worst case for NOMA users and obtain a lower bound of the worst-case detection error probability (DEP). In addition, both closed-form expressions for RU and CU’s connection outage probabilities are derived. Constrained by the DEP and connection outage probability, we maximize the expected covert rate (ECR) and derive the optimal power settings for RU and CU under imperfect CDI. Numerical results show that the proposed robust power setting scheme achieves a positive maximum ECR despite CDI uncertainty causing the reduction of covertness performance.
Lightweight session key agreement schemes are expected to play a central role in building Internet of things (IoT) security in sixth-generation (6G) networks. A well-established approach deriving from the physical layer is a secret key generation (SKG) from shared randomness (in the form of wireless fading coefficients). However, although practical, SKG schemes have been shown to be vulnerable to active attacks over the initial "advantage distillation" phase, throughout which estimates of the fading coefficients are obtained at the legitimate users. In fact, by injecting carefully designed signals during this phase, a man-in-the-middle (MiM) attack could manipulate and control part of the reconciled bits and thus render SKG vulnerable to brute force attacks. Alternatively, a denial of service attack can be mounted by a reactive jammer. In this paper, we investigate the impact of injection and jamming attacks during the advantage distillation in a multiple-input-multiple-output (MIMO) system. First, we show that a MiM attack can be mounted as long as the attacker has one extra antenna with respect to the legitimate users, and we propose a pilot randomization scheme that allows the legitimate users to successfully reduce the injection attack to a less harmful jamming attack. Secondly, by taking a game-theoretic approach we evaluate the optimal strategies available to the legitimate users in the presence of reactive jammers.
Wireless secret key generation (W-SKG) from shared randomness (e.g., from the wireless channel fading realizations), is a well established scheme that can be used for session key agreement. W-SKG approaches can be of particular interest in delay constrained wireless networks and notably in the context of ultra reliable low latency communications (URLLC) in beyond fifth generation (B5G) systems. However W- SKG schemes are known to be malleable over the so called "advantage distillation" phase, during which observations of the shared randomness are obtained at the legitimate parties. As an example, an active attacker can act as a man-in- the-middle (MiM) by injecting pilot signals and/or can mount denial of service attacks (DoS) in the form of jamming. This paper investigates the impact of injection and reactive jamming attacks in W-SKG. First, it is demonstrated that injection attacks can be reduced to - potentially less harmful - jamming attacks by pilot randomization; a novel system design with randomized QPSK pilots is presented. Subsequently, the optimal jamming strategy is identified in a block fading additive white Gaussian noise (BF-AWGN) channel in the presence of a reactive jammer, using a game theoretic formulation. It is shown that the impact of a reactive jammer is far more severe than that of a simple proactive jammer.