Abstract Quantum cloud users access remote processors through classical measurement transcripts. The repeated shots that are operationally required for reliable quantum readout can systematically resolve microscopic, quasi-static hardware variations into stable statistical fingerprints. On IBM superconducting processors, we show that a transcript-only adversary can identify the backend with up to $89.3\%$ attack success rate at $T = 20$ repetition rounds under multi-interface aggregation. This exposes a privacy locus mismatch: many channel-centric quantum privacy formulations regulate distinguishability at the level of quantum states or channels, whereas the operational attack in Quantum-Computing-as-a-Service (QCaaS) targets repeated classical transcripts and the latent service provenance they reveal after measurement. We therefore formulate privacy for repeated quantum workloads as a cross-layer provenance-protection problem. We protect the latent service provenance behind a released transcript, namely the service provenance that jointly reflects backend realization and serving context in QCaaS settings where this provenance is not fully disclosed to the observing party. At the measurement interface, we formulate Measurement-Agnostic Quantum Differential Privacy (MA-QDP) as an operational transcript-level privacy criterion for repeated quantum workloads, uniform over physically admissible POVMs and arbitrary classical post-processing. MA-QDP specifies the privacy locus and protected secret appropriate to QCaaS transcript release, and is instantiated via atomic outcome randomization before aggregation. At the orchestration layer, we incorporate context decorrelation to suppress persistent linkage of repeated sessions to a stable service provenance. In controlled simulations, the integrated framework suppresses provenance inference under realistic shot budgets while preserving task-relevant information, yielding a favorable privacy-utility frontier compared to channel-level and classical-level perturbations. Together, our results identify repetition as an intrinsic fingerprint amplifier in QCaaS and motivate a cross-layer provenance-protection architecture for secure, repeated quantum workloads.
Abstract Quantum cloud users access remote processors through classical measurement transcripts. The repeated shots that are operationally required for reliable quantum readout can systematically resolve microscopic, quasi-static hardware variations into stable statistical fingerprints. On IBM superconducting processors, we show that a transcript-only adversary can identify the backend with up to 89.3% attack success rate at T=20 repetition rounds under multi-interface aggregation. This exposes a privacy locus mismatch: many channel-centric quantum privacy formulations regulate distinguishability at the level of quantum states or channels, whereas the operational attack in Quantum-Computing-as-a-Service (QCaaS) targets repeated classical transcripts and the latent service provenance they reveal after measurement. We therefore formulate privacy for repeated quantum workloads as a cross-layer provenance-protection problem. We protect the latent service provenance behind a released transcript, namely the service provenance that jointly reflects backend realization and serving context in QCaaS settings where this provenance is not fully disclosed to the observing party. At the measurement interface, we formulate Measurement-Agnostic Quantum Differential Privacy (MA-QDP) as an operational transcript-level privacy criterion for repeated quantum workloads, uniform over physically admissible POVMs and arbitrary classical post-processing. MA-QDP specifies the privacy locus and protected secret appropriate to QCaaS transcript release, and is instantiated via atomic outcome randomization before aggregation. At the orchestration layer, we incorporate context decorrelation to suppress persistent linkage of repeated sessions to a stable service provenance. In controlled simulations, the integrated framework suppresses provenance inference under realistic shot budgets while preserving task-relevant information, yielding a favorable privacy-utility frontier compared to channel-level and classical-level perturbations. Together, our results identify repetition as an intrinsic fingerprint amplifier in QCaaS and motivate a cross-layer provenance-protection architecture for secure, repeated quantum workloads.
Present-day quantum computing is cloud-based, where a user submits a circuit to a service provider's proprietary backend hardware. While providers may wish to hide implementation details, scheduling choices, or even which physical device was used, noisy finite-shot outputs can carry backend-specific fingerprints: information imprinted in the classical output distribution that can reveal the backend identity. So far, such fingerprints have mostly been studied from a benchmarking perspective, with limited attention to privacy considerations for users and providers. This work develops the first formal framework for backend identifiability and its privacy implications. We introduce a backend-identifiability game and use it to formalise routing anonymity as a security notion for quantum cloud services. We show that backend identifiability is a hypothesis-testing problem and prove that, under passive i.i.d. access to a single backend, routing anonymity decays exponentially at the Chernoff rate. We also establish a utility-anonymity trade-off, imposing fundamental limits on how much backend-specific information can be removed from classical outputs without degrading their usefulness. In addition, we observe that, for noisy quantum hardware, identifying fingerprints are inherently an intermediate-depth phenomenon, and establish a depth principle using Pauli-transfer-matrix tools. We complement the theory with experiments on Amazon Braket on AWS, using ion-trap and superconducting quantum processors. We observe 87-90% classification between superconducting backends and 96-100% classification across physical platforms, and find that identifiability can survive natural forms of post-processing. Overall, these results establish routing anonymity as a distinct security requirement for quantum cloud computing, and provide a framework for quantifying and controlling the utility-anonymity trade-off.
Quantum computing has gained widespread interest due to its exponential computational capabilities. In practical scenarios, users often access real quantum computers indirectly through cloud-based platforms (e.g., IBM Quantum), which requires transmitting data to third-party servers. Quantum-specific attacks, such as crosstalk attacks, have demonstrated high success rates in inferring the output of legitimate users. These issues raise serious privacy concerns. To protect client-side privacy, quantum local differential privacy (QLDP) has been proposed, where legitimate users perturbed their true output by adding quantum noise to the circuits. However, we observe that the classical local differential privacy (LDP) properties have not been fully adapted to the quantum domain, and the information can still be inferred from the perturbed output if attackers access the noise type added by legitimate users. To fill this gap, we propose a novel QLDP-based approach to protect the true output of legitimate users. We find that QLDP can be achieved using only simple quantum noise, but not all types of quantum noise can effectively perturb the output under different quantum measurements. In addition, to prevent advanced attackers who have partial user information, we introduce a probabilistic noise addition mechanism. To allow legitimate users to accurately estimate the true output of a quantum circuit, we also propose a new quantum frequency estimation. Our approach is validated using real quantum computers and quantum simulators, achieving 94% accuracy and 90% utility to estimate the true output from the perturbed output.
Quantum cloud providers can identify a user's algorithm and secret problem structure without ever seeing actual quantum data, simply by analyzing routine metadata collected for billing and system management. Existing confidentiality tools such as blind quantum computation and quantum homomorphic encryption protect the quantum payload itself, but they do not protect this classical orchestration metadata. This leaves an unexplored security risk in the logs generated when a large quantum program is split into smaller pieces to fit onto limited hardware, a process known as circuit cutting. These fragments leak sensitive information through what we term the topological transpilation penalty: the unavoidable depth and gate inflation added when a compiler reorganizes a program for a restricted hardware topology. Tests on a 156-qubit production Quantum Processing Unit (QPU) show that traditional timing side-channels fail in this setting, since hardware control-plane delays mask actual quantum execution time. The unique shape of the transpilation penalty acts instead as a persistent structural fingerprint for the hidden workload. Using 12,000 circuit fragments across eight algorithm families, our attack recovers algorithm family and Hamiltonian k-locality with near-perfect accuracy, achieving instance-disjoint AUC = 1.000 for both. This leakage persists under size-holdout evaluation on unseen circuit scales, with AUC = 0.987 and 0.986 respectively. The cutting mechanism is inferred with AUC = 0.991, and hardware topology is recovered well above chance with AUC = 0.818. These results show that circuit cutting exposes algorithmic intent, and potentially proprietary problem structure, through metadata alone, without any need to observe quantum data.
Shared quantum-cloud runtimes expose service outcomes shaped by compilation, backend conditions, and scheduling. We study whether workload-dependent information remains in tenant-visible outputs after scheduler mediation, while separating such evidence from provider-side boundary traces and internal diagnostics. Experiments use a provider-inspired prototype with synthetic IBM-style backend abstractions rather than IBM’s proprietary scheduler. Across 16 independent workload seeds, leave-one-seed-out evaluation using provider-reported waiting time yields a mean accuracy of 0.6010 and a classification-based signed advantage of 0.1010 over the majority-class baseline. Monotone padding and delayed release reduce the estimated advantage to 0.0324 and 0.0418, with mean added delays of 0.185 and 0.131 in normalized simulator-time units. Controlled workload pairs and compilation- and backend-level diagnostics show configuration-dependent, nonmonotonic variation across internal observability channels, but do not attribute the external signal to a uniquely quantum mechanism. A six-run experiment on one public backend provides only weak and variable in-sample timing separability. These results demonstrate preliminary scheduler-boundary separability in the controlled prototype, but do not establish a practical public-cloud attack.
Quantum Computing is advancing from isolated prototypes toward heterogeneous, cloud-accessed quantum processors that are noisy, capacity-limited, and operationally diverse. In this landscape, the prevalent device-centric execution model (i.e., compiling a circuit for a single backend and running all shots monolithically) constrains scale, reliability, and cost-effectiveness. This thesis argues for and instantiates a system-centric paradigm of distributed execution, which treats execution as an engineered process that orchestrates spatial and temporal distribution across multiple devices and time scales, guided by explicit Quality-of-Service (QoS) objectives. Spatial distribution aggregates multiple, heterogeneous Quantum Processing Units and supporting classical services into a shared resource pool, placing circuits, subcircuits, and workloads where their algorithmic needs best align with hardware characteristics and availability. Temporal distribution adapts execution over time, modulating sampling depth, pacing, and scheduling in response to drift, queue dynamics, and evidence of statistical convergence. Together, these dimensions are governed by policy-driven orchestrations that reconciles fidelity, latency, and cost, and that elevates user intent above device idiosyncrasies. This thesis delivers five main contributions: (1) a shot-wise execution methodology that distributes measurement shots across heterogeneous QPUs under policy control, reducing output variance and matching or surpassing single-device averages; (2) Quantum Broker, a QoS-aware orchestration framework with the Quantum QoS Specification Language (QQSpec) that consistently finds feasible, high-quality allocations and outperforms single-backend and uniform-shot baselines under competing fidelity/latency/cost goals; (3) Cut&Shoot, an integrated circuit-cutting + shot-wise pipeline that executes large circuits across multiple devices with significantly lower error than monolithic, cutting-only, or shot-wise-only baselines, at negligible time overhead relative to standard cutting; (4) a hybrid orchestration architecture, QCRAFT Scheduler–Shotwise, which combines high-level circuit scheduling with shot-wise distribution to achieve up to 95% cost reduction and 92% fewer job submissions while improving robustness to hardware variability; and (5) IncrementalExecution, an adaptive, evidence-seeking shot manager that approximates optimal allocations with minimal overhead and high fidelity across unseen circuits and backends. Evaluations on simulated and real cloud backends demonstrate practicality across heterogeneous providers. Situated within Quantum Software Engineering, this thesis promotes abstractions and runtime mechanisms that make distribution a first-class program property rather than a backend option. The resulting perspective embraces hardware diversity as an optimization opportunity, improves portability across providers, and lays a path from today’s Noisy Intermediate-Scale Quantum (NISQ) platforms to future networked and fault-tolerant regimes. The overarching vision is that, by engineering execution as a principled, evidence-seeking process, heterogeneous quantum resources become the substrate for scalable, reliable, and efficient Quantum Computing.
Composition is a cornerstone of classical differential privacy, enabling strong end-to-end guarantees for complex algorithms through composition theorems (e.g., basic and advanced). In the quantum setting, however, privacy is defined operationally against arbitrary measurements, and classical composition arguments based on scalar privacy-loss random variables no longer apply. As a result, it has remained unclear when meaningful composition guarantees can be obtained for quantum differential privacy (QDP).
In this work, we clarify both the limitations and possibilities of composition in the quantum setting. We first show that classical-style composition fails in full generality for POVM-based approximate QDP: even quantum channels that are individually perfectly private can completely lose privacy when combined through correlated joint implementations. We then identify a setting in which clean composition guarantees can be restored. For tensor-product channels acting on product neighboring inputs, we introduce a quantum moments accountant based on an operator-valued notion of privacy loss and a matrix moment-generating function. Although the resulting Rényi-type divergence does not satisfy a data-processing inequality, we prove that controlling its moments suffices to bound measured Rényi divergence, yielding operational privacy guarantees against arbitrary measurements. This leads to advanced-composition-style bounds with the same leading-order behavior as in the classical theory.
Our results demonstrate that meaningful composition theorems for quantum differential privacy require carefully articulated structural assumptions on channels, inputs, and adversarial measurements, and provide a principled framework for understanding which classical ideas do and do not extend to the quantum setting.