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arXiv:2607.05281

Routing Anonymity and Identifiability of Noisy Quantum Hardware

Ben Priestley, Mina Doosti

quant-phcs.LGSubmitted Jul 6, 2026• Announced Jul 7, 2026• 1 citation
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Abstract

Present-day quantum computing is cloud-based, where a user submits a circuit to a service provider's proprietary backend hardware. While providers may wish to hide implementation details, scheduling choices, or even which physical device was used, noisy finite-shot outputs can carry backend-specific fingerprints: information imprinted in the classical output distribution that can reveal the backend identity. So far, such fingerprints have mostly been studied from a benchmarking perspective, with limited attention to privacy considerations for users and providers. This work develops the first formal framework for backend identifiability and its privacy implications. We introduce a backend-identifiability game and use it to formalise routing anonymity as a security notion for quantum cloud services. We show that backend identifiability is a hypothesis-testing problem and prove that, under passive i.i.d. access to a single backend, routing anonymity decays exponentially at the Chernoff rate. We also establish a utility-anonymity trade-off, imposing fundamental limits on how much backend-specific information can be removed from classical outputs without degrading their usefulness. In addition, we observe that, for noisy quantum hardware, identifying fingerprints are inherently an intermediate-depth phenomenon, and establish a depth principle using Pauli-transfer-matrix tools. We complement the theory with experiments on Amazon Braket on AWS, using ion-trap and superconducting quantum processors. We observe 87-90% classification between superconducting backends and 96-100% classification across physical platforms, and find that identifiability can survive natural forms of post-processing. Overall, these results establish routing anonymity as a distinct security requirement for quantum cloud computing, and provide a framework for quantifying and controlling the utility-anonymity trade-off.

Comments
22+30 pages, 6 figures

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Present-day quantum computing is cloud-based, where a user submits a circuit to a service provider's proprietary backend hardware. While providers may wish to hide implementation details, scheduling choices, or even which physical device was used, noisy finite-shot outputs can carry backend-specific fingerprints: information imprinted in the classical output distribution that can reveal the backend identity. So far, such fingerprints have mostly been studied from a benchmarking perspective, with limited attention to privacy considerations for users and providers. This work develops the first formal framework for backend identifiability and its privacy implications. We introduce a backend-identifiability game and use it to formalise routing anonymity as a security notion for quantum cloud services. We show that backend identifiability is a hypothesis-testing problem and prove that, under passive i.i.d. access to a single backend, routing anonymity decays exponentially at the Chernoff rate. We also establish a utility-anonymity trade-off, imposing fundamental limits on how much backend-specific information can be removed from classical outputs without degrading their usefulness. In addition, we observe that, for noisy quantum hardware, identifying fingerprints are inherently an intermediate-depth phenomenon, and establish a depth principle using Pauli-transfer-matrix tools. We complement the theory with experiments on Amazon Braket on AWS, using ion-trap and superconducting quantum processors. We observe 87-90% classification between superconducting backends and 96-100% classification across physical platforms, and find that identifiability can survive natural forms of post-processing. Overall, these results establish routing anonymity as a distinct security requirement for quantum cloud computing, and provide a framework for quantifying and controlling the utility-anonymity trade-off.
Quantum Computing (QC) has recently achieved significant technological progress, attracting growing interest from both academia and industry. As most users currently access QC resources through cloud platforms, concerns around the security and accountability of quantum services have become increasingly prominent. In particular, quantum noise, typically considered a source of error, can also reveal device-specific signatures that enable Quantum Device Fingerprinting (QDF). While QDF has legitimate applications such as anomaly detection and device accountability, it also carries dual-use risks, including potential misuse for unauthorized device tracking or targeted attacks. In this paper, we propose a novel Task-Driven Quantum Device Fingerprinting (TD-QDF) identification method based on quantum task outputs; we extract the fingerprint features of quantum devices from noisy quantum computing results. Unlike previous research, our method does not require any additional information (e.g., hardware details or noise information), thereby enhancing its practical applicability and accessibility. We conducted large-scale experiments using six QNN circuits on 10 IBM quantum computers, extended four classical quantum algorithms to validate generality, and demonstrated scalability on three 127-qubit processors. Specifically, the highest accuracy can reach up to 94.32% in the 3-classification device fingerprint recognition task and up to 82.4% and 61.6% in the 7-classification and 10-classification tasks, respectively. This research contributes to advancing quantum fingerprinting technologies and holds promising implications for enhancing the security and accountability of quantum computing systems and quantum cloud services.
Abstract Quantum cloud users access remote processors through classical measurement transcripts. The repeated shots that are operationally required for reliable quantum readout can systematically resolve microscopic, quasi-static hardware variations into stable statistical fingerprints. On IBM superconducting processors, we show that a transcript-only adversary can identify the backend with up to 89.3%89.3\%89.3% attack success rate at T=20T = 20T=20 repetition rounds under multi-interface aggregation. This exposes a privacy locus mismatch: many channel-centric quantum privacy formulations regulate distinguishability at the level of quantum states or channels, whereas the operational attack in Quantum-Computing-as-a-Service (QCaaS) targets repeated classical transcripts and the latent service provenance they reveal after measurement. We therefore formulate privacy for repeated quantum workloads as a cross-layer provenance-protection problem. We protect the latent service provenance behind a released transcript, namely the service provenance that jointly reflects backend realization and serving context in QCaaS settings where this provenance is not fully disclosed to the observing party. At the measurement interface, we formulate Measurement-Agnostic Quantum Differential Privacy (MA-QDP) as an operational transcript-level privacy criterion for repeated quantum workloads, uniform over physically admissible POVMs and arbitrary classical post-processing. MA-QDP specifies the privacy locus and protected secret appropriate to QCaaS transcript release, and is instantiated via atomic outcome randomization before aggregation. At the orchestration layer, we incorporate context decorrelation to suppress persistent linkage of repeated sessions to a stable service provenance. In controlled simulations, the integrated framework suppresses provenance inference under realistic shot budgets while preserving task-relevant information, yielding a favorable privacy-utility frontier compared to channel-level and classical-level perturbations. Together, our results identify repetition as an intrinsic fingerprint amplifier in QCaaS and motivate a cross-layer provenance-protection architecture for secure, repeated quantum workloads.
Third-party cloud providers offer quantum hardware as a service enabling flexibility to the customers to opt from varied quantum hardware, qubit technologies and topologies. However, the actual execution of the program on the desired target hardware remains opaque to the user. On one hand, the program performance, along with various other metadata such as cost, performance, & number of iterations to converge, is dependent on the quality of the backend chosen. on the other hand, the third-party provider and/or tools (e.g., hardware schedulers) may maximize profit by running the quantum circuits on poor quality backend while charging for the high quality backend. Existing approaches to mitigate this opaqueness rely on forensics of error rates and coupling topology from transpiled circuit. We note that program queue depth and execution time are well correlated with the backend and therefore, can reveal vital information about the hardware and aid in forensic analysis to address the opaqueness. Our experiments on real backends available through IBM Quantum’s open plan show that the the latency from submission of program to the retrieval of outputs is directly correlated to the queue depth of the QPUs.
Cloud quantum platforms give users access to many backends with different qubit technologies, coupling layouts, and noise levels. The execution of a circuit, however, depends on internal allocation and routing policies that are not observable to the user. A provider may redirect jobs to more error-prone regions to conserve resources, balance load or for other opaque reasons, causing degradation in fidelity while still presenting stale or averaged calibration data. This lack of transparency creates a security gap: users cannot verify whether their circuits were executed on the hardware for which they were charged. Forensic methods that infer backend behavior from user-visible artifacts are therefore becoming essential. In this work, we introduce a Graph Neural Network (GNN)-based forensic framework that predicts per-qubit and per-qubit link error rates of an unseen backend using only topology information and aggregated features extracted from transpiled circuits. We construct a dataset from several IBM 27-qubit devices, merge static calibration features with dynamic transpilation features and train separate GNN regressors for one- and two-qubit errors. At inference time, the model operates without access to calibration data from the target backend and reconstructs a complete error map from the features available to the user. Our results on the target backend show accurate recovery of backend error rate, with an average mismatch of approximately 22% for single-qubit errors and 18% for qubit-link errors. The model also exhibits strong ranking agreement, with the ordering induced by predicted error values closely matching that of the actual calibration errors, as reflected by high Spearman correlation. The framework consistently identifies weak links and high-noise qubits and remains robust under realistic temporal noise drift.
There is a steady growth in research and demand for real quan- tum hardware in the Noisy Intermediate-Scale Quantum (NISQ) era of quantum computing. This prompts many third-party cloud providers to set up quantum hardware as a service that includes a wide range of qubit technologies and architectures to maximize performance at minimal cost. Quantum circuits submitted to these services are the fruits of the efforts invested by the designers. But these third-party cloud compilers (who offer more efficient alter- natives to established compilers) can make user circuits/programs vulnerable to various security breaches. Communication channels for transmitting quantum information also need to be developed such that there is end to end encryption. There is little to no visibil- ity on where the execution of the circuit is actually taking place. The success of the user program is highly reliant on the backend that was used for execution. Besides, the third-party provider and/or tools (e.g., hardware mapper and allocator) may be untrustworthy and execute the quantum circuits on less efficient and more error- prone hardware to conserve resources and maximize profit. These vulnerabilities in the quantum system could leak confidential data, cause loss of intellectual property rights of designers, cause loss of access control, corrupt user programs et cetera. Thus, it is imper- ative to identify these security vulnerabilities and create defense strategies to protect quantum programs, thus helping to maintain the integrity of quantum information across the software stack. My thesis aims to help address these vulnerabilities and opacities and address them.
Remote quantum computing exposes a confidentiality gap. Standard privacy mechanisms protect quantum states and outputs, but not the scientific structure of a workload. This work reveals that hardware-aware compilation leaves observable signatures, such as routing overhead, circuit depth, and gate composition, that correlate with hidden modelling choices like partial differential equation boundary conditions, discretisation scale, and molecular geometry. The leakage arises from the mismatch between logical topology and fixed hardware connectivity, forcing problem-dependent SWAP insertion. We formalise this threat as Scientific-Intent Indistinguishability and prove that passive security is asymptotically unachievable under routing-optimal compilation. Experiments on a 156-qubit IBM Heron processor achieve near-perfect classification of boundary regimes and molecular geometries, with leakage generalising across solver families via routing-scaling exponents. Conventional gate-padding fails as a defence, causing fidelity drops without reducing adversarial advantage. Our results show that protecting quantum data alone is insufficient; execution-level confidentiality must become a first-class design requirement.