Anonymous credential schemes are a key application in modern cryptography. Recent research has advanced these schemes by incorporating issuer-hiding capabilities, which prevent the disclosure of the credential issuer’s identity. While several issuer-hiding anonymous credential schemes exist, none offer resilience against quantum computing adversaries. To address this gap, we propose a post-quantum issuer-hiding anonymous credential scheme, building on the recent work known as ring referral (S&P ’25), which allows anonymous signatures from third-party signers. Ring referral is an integration of ring signature and anonymous credential schemes, enabling issuer-hiding anonymous credentials. In this paper, we present an efficient lattice-based ring referral scheme, which supports quantum-resistant security. Our scheme extends a recent lattice-based credential scheme (CCS ’24) via LNP proof system (CRYPTO ’22).
Anonymous credential schemes are a key application in modern cryptography. Recent research has advanced these schemes by incorporating issuer-hiding capabilities, which prevent the disclosure of the credential issuer’s identity. While several issuer-hiding anonymous credential schemes exist, none offer resilience against quantum computing adversaries. To address this gap, we propose a post-quantum issuer-hiding anonymous credential scheme, building on the recent work known as ring referral (S&P ’25), which allows anonymous signatures from third-party signers. Ring referral is an integration of ring signature and anonymous credential schemes, enabling issuer-hiding anonymous credentials. In this paper, we present an efficient lattice-based ring referral scheme, which supports quantum-resistant security. Our scheme extends a recent lattice-based credential scheme (CCS ’24) via LNP proof system (CRYPTO ’22).
In cryptography, a ring signature is anonymous as it hides the signer’s identity among other users. When generating the signature, the users are arranged as a ring. Compared with group signatures, a ring signature scheme needs no group manager or special setup and supports flexibility of group choice. However, the anonymity provided by ring signatures can be used to conceal a malicious signer and put other ring members under suspicion. At the other extreme, it does not allow the actual signer to prove their identity and gain recognition for their actions. A deniable ring signature is designed to overcome these disadvantages. It can initially protect the signer, but if necessary, it enables other ring members to deny their involvement, and allows the real signer to prove who made the signed action. Many real-world applications can benefit from such signatures. Inspired by the requirement for them to remain viable in the post-quantum age, this work proposes a new non-interactive deniable ring signature scheme based on lattice assumptions. Our scheme is proved to be anonymous, traceable and non-frameable under quantum attacks.
Threshold ring signatures allow a quorum of eligible users to jointly authenticate a message while hiding the identities of the participating signers. Although this combines threshold authenticity with signer-set anonymity, a general T -out-of- N construction may require an expensive zero-knowledge proof to show that any undisclosed T -subset participated. This research investigates whether public structure can be used to reduce the cost of this anonymity statement and whether the resulting construction principle can be generalised across different multi-signature schemes. The first completed contribution introduces structured threshold ring signatures (sTRS), in which the admissible signing sets are defined by a public structure. By representing each complete valid quorum as one candidate set, the anonymity problem is reduced from proving knowledge of an arbitrary hidden T -subset to proving selection of one admissible set among N candidates. This idea is instantiated in LoTRS (CCS'26), our post-quantum sTRS that carefully combines a lattice-based multi-signature derived from DualMS (Crypto'23) with an Esgin et al.-style one-out-of-many proof (IEEE S&P'22). The current research builds on this idea by developing a generic sTRS compiler in which a suitable multi-signature authenticates a hidden admissible signer set, while an extractable one-out-of-many proof hides which set was selected. The subsequent objective investigates a non-interactive sTRS for settings in which additional communication rounds are undesirable.
With the development of quantum computers and quantum algorithms, many of our classical public-key cryptographic systems will be compromised. To circumvent this, one approach is to take our classical cryptographic systems and design them on mathematically hard problems for which no known quantum algorithms can provide a speedup. Our work revolves around one such cryptographic system, the anonymous credential protocol. In this thesis, we implement a post-quantum anonymous credential scheme, and extend it to include additional features like the disclosure of properties of attributes. We implement the protocol in Python, run a series of correctness tests, and then compare our work with implementations from the literature. We also outline a more complete picture of what adversarial models are needed for post-quantum security. The motivation behind our work is to build more usable, feature-intensive anonymous credential systems that are resistant to adversaries with quantum computing capabilities. We present our work as a step towards providing more easily accessiblesoftware for a larger audience to extend.
Ring signatures, a novel cryptographic primitive, were introduced by Rivest, Shamir, and Tauman at ASIACRYPT 2001. It allows a member of a group to sign a message on behalf of an ad-hoc group of users, known as a ring, without revealing its identity. Ring signatures, initially introduced for applications such as whistle-blowing and confidential disclosures, have since gained significant relevance and widespread adoption across various domains, including blockchain technologies, ad-hoc networks, anonymous transactions, location-based services, cloud computing platforms, and outsourced computation. However, traditional ring signatures are vulnerable if the signers’ keys are compromised. To resolve this vulnerability, Liu and Wong introduced the notion of forward-secure ring signatures at IJNS 2008. Forward-security ensures that even if a signer’s secret key is compromised, signatures generated in prior time periods remain secure. It significantly reduces the damage caused by secret key exposure, making it crucial for long-term security in applications such as whistle-blowing or anonymous authentication. However, most existing forward-secure ring signature schemes are based on number-theoretic assumptions, making them vulnerable to quantum adversaries. Yu and Wang proposed a quantum-safe forward-secure ring signature scheme at ICICS 2023, and Yu et al. further extended this work in Computer Networks (2025), retaining the same ring signature scheme with forward security. But the scheme suffers from large signatures that grow linearly with the ring size. In this paper, we propose a lattice-based forward-secure ring signature scheme in the quantum random oracle model ( QROM ) that simultaneously achieves security against quantum adversaries and compact signature size. Notably, the signature size is logarithmic in the number of members in the ring, enabling significantly better scalability compared to prior constructions.
Anonymous credential (AC) systems are privacy-preserving authentication mech-anisms that allow users to prove that they have valid credentials anonymously. These systems provide a powerful tool for several practical applications, such as anonymous pay-ment systems in e-commerce, preserving robust privacy protection for users. Most existing AC systems are constructed using traditional number-theoretic approaches, making them insecure under quantum attacks. With four decades of research in anonymous credential systems, there is a need for a comprehensive review that identifies the design structures of AC systems, organizes the research trends, and highlights unaddressed gaps for the future development of AC, especially bringing AC to post-quantum cryptography. This work is a complete study describing AC systems, as well as their architecture, components, security, and performance. Additionally, real-world implementations of various applications are identified, analyzed, and compared according to the design structure. Lastly, the challenges hindering the shift toward the quantumly secure lattice-based AC designs are discussed.
Communication and networked systems rely heavily on cryptographic digital signatures to ensure message authenticity, integrity, and non-repudiation. However, rapid advancements in quantum computing and artificial intelligence (AI) have expanded the attack surface, posing significant threats to conventional public-key schemes such as RSA, DSA, and ECDSA. Quantum algorithms undermine their underlying hardness assumptions, while AI-driven techniques enable traffic analysis, side-channel inference, and behavioral pattern recognition. This review presents a structured analytical assessment of post-quantum signature schemes and privacy-preserving authentication mechanisms to address these dual threats. It evaluates lattice-based, hash-based, and zero-knowledge proof-based signatures, as well as anonymity-enhancing schemes such as ring and group signatures. A unified analytical framework is introduced to map cryptographic schemes to quantum and AI-assisted threat models, based on parameters such as security strength, anonymity, efficiency, and applicability. The analysis shows that lattice- and hash-based schemes provide strong quantum resistance, while privacy-preserving mechanisms enhance anonymity but introduce performance trade-offs. It also identifies a gap in integrating post-quantum cryptography with AI-resilient privacy mechanisms. The findings highlight the need for unified, future-ready cryptographic designs.