Communication and networked systems rely heavily on cryptographic digital signatures to ensure message authenticity, integrity, and non-repudiation. However, rapid advancements in quantum computing and artificial intelligence (AI) have expanded the attack surface, posing significant threats to conventional public-key schemes such as RSA, DSA, and ECDSA. Quantum algorithms undermine their underlying hardness assumptions, while AI-driven techniques enable traffic analysis, side-channel inference, and behavioral pattern recognition. This review presents a structured analytical assessment of post-quantum signature schemes and privacy-preserving authentication mechanisms to address these dual threats. It evaluates lattice-based, hash-based, and zero-knowledge proof-based signatures, as well as anonymity-enhancing schemes such as ring and group signatures. A unified analytical framework is introduced to map cryptographic schemes to quantum and AI-assisted threat models, based on parameters such as security strength, anonymity, efficiency, and applicability. The analysis shows that lattice- and hash-based schemes provide strong quantum resistance, while privacy-preserving mechanisms enhance anonymity but introduce performance trade-offs. It also identifies a gap in integrating post-quantum cryptography with AI-resilient privacy mechanisms. The findings highlight the need for unified, future-ready cryptographic designs.
Communication and networked systems rely heavily on cryptographic digital signatures to ensure message authenticity, integrity, and non-repudiation. However, rapid advancements in quantum computing and artificial intelligence (AI) have expanded the attack surface, posing significant threats to conventional public-key schemes such as RSA, DSA, and ECDSA. Quantum algorithms undermine their underlying hardness assumptions, while AI-driven techniques enable traffic analysis, side-channel inference, and behavioral pattern recognition. This review presents a structured analytical assessment of post-quantum signature schemes and privacy-preserving authentication mechanisms to address these dual threats. It evaluates lattice-based, hash-based, and zero-knowledge proof-based signatures, as well as anonymity-enhancing schemes such as ring and group signatures. A unified analytical framework is introduced to map cryptographic schemes to quantum and AI-assisted threat models, based on parameters such as security strength, anonymity, efficiency, and applicability. The analysis shows that lattice- and hash-based schemes provide strong quantum resistance, while privacy-preserving mechanisms enhance anonymity but introduce performance trade-offs. It also identifies a gap in integrating post-quantum cryptography with AI-resilient privacy mechanisms. The findings highlight the need for unified, future-ready cryptographic designs.
As artificial intelligence (AI) systems increasingly underpin critical applications in healthcare, finance, defense, and infrastructure, ensuring their security has become paramount. However, the rapid advancement of quantum computing poses a significant threat to classical cryptographic schemes that currently safeguard these systems. Quantum algorithms such as Shor’s and Grover’s threaten to undermine the confidentiality, integrity, and authentication of data and models that AI systems depend on. In this context, Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) has emerged as a crucial area of research aimed at developing cryptographic algorithms that are secure against both classical and quantum adversaries. This paper investigates the intersection of quantum computing threats and AI system vulnerabilities, highlighting how current security mechanisms may fail in a post-quantum era. We explore various categories of PQC—including lattice-based, hash-based, and multivariate polynomial cryptography—and evaluate their applicability to securing AI systems, particularly in scenarios such as model distribution, federated learning, data encryption, and communication in AI-enabled edge and IoT environments. Through analysis of emerging use cases and proposed architectures, the paper outlines how PQC can be integrated into the AI lifecycle to mitigate quantum-era threats. It also identifies key challenges such as computational overhead, integration complexity, and standardization gaps. The study concludes by outlining future research opportunities, including the development of efficient PQC protocols tailored to AI workloads, the creation of quantum-resilient AI pipelines, and the importance of interdisciplinary collaboration to secure AI’s future.
The emergence of quantum computing poses an existential threat to conventional cryptographic systems, prompting the development of Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) based on quantum-resistant mathematical problems. However, the long-term security of these primitives remains uncertain, especially under realistic quantum and artificial intelligence (AI)-driven attack scenarios. This paper presents a comprehensive evaluation of the security of PQC primitives with a dual focus: (i) analyzing advances in quantum algorithms that target the underlying hardness assumptions of lattice-based, code-based, and other post-quantum schemes; and (ii) leveraging AI-based methodologies for identifying cryptographic vulnerabilities. We survey the current state of quantum cryptanalysis, propose a unified insights for evaluations. Our findings offer updated parameter recommendations and highlight both strengths and potential fragilities in leading PQC candidates. The results contribute actionable insights toward the design and standardization of resilient cryptographic systems for the post-quantum era.
The emergence of cryptographically relevant quantum computers (CRQCs) would compromise today’s dominant public-key primitives (RSA, DiffieHellman, ECDSA), threatening long-lived confidentiality, authentication, and integrity guarantees across AI pipelines and blockchain networks. This manuscript proposes a unified, quantum-resilient architecture that blends NISTstandardized post-quantum cryptography (PQC)—MLKEM for key establishment and ML-DSA or SLH-DSA for digital signatures—with defense-in-depth controls for AI model protection, data privacy, and blockchain protocol evolution. We first motivate the need for migration by outlining quantum attacks (Shor for factoring and discrete logarithms; Grover for quadratic search speedups) and summarize PQC standardization milestones and transition guidance. We then review the literature on lattice-based and hash-based cryptography, homomorphic encryption for privacy-preserving AI, and secure aggregation/differential privacy as complementary privacy technologies. Building on this foundation, we present a methodology for designing and evaluating quantum-resistant AI and blockchain systems, including key-lifecycle hardening, protocol-level hybrids, and crypto-agility. A simulated deployment (1,000 clients; 16 validator nodes; TLS 1.3 with ML-KEM and hybrid handshakes; blockchain transactions signed with ML-DSA and SLH-DSA) measures handshake and signing overheads, throughput, and model-training privacy-utility trade-offs. Results indicate that: (i) PQC-only handshakes add modest latency yet remain acceptable for online APIs; (ii) hybrid ECDHE+ML-KEM offers near-term defense against “store-now-decrypt-later,” with predictable cost; (iii) ML-DSA is practical for blockchain validation at common block sizes, while SLH-DSA suits firmware/codesigning and archival integrity; and (iv) combining PQC with secure aggregation and differentially private training preserves model utility with bounded overhead.
Quantum computing represents one of the most disruptive technological advancements of the 21st century, with profound implications for modern cryptographic systems. Traditional digital signature algorithms—such as RSA, DSA, and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)—derive their security from mathematical problems like integer factorization and discrete logarithms, which are computationally infeasible for classical computers. However, the advent of quantum algorithms, particularly Shor’s and Grover’s algorithms, poses a direct threat to these cryptographic assumptions by drastically reducing the time required to solve such problems. This development renders existing Digital Signature infrastructures potentially obsolete once large-scale quantum computers become operational. To counter this threat, researchers have proposed a range of post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) algorithms, including lattice-based, hash-based, and multivariate polynomial-based signature schemes, which are designed to resist quantum attacks. This paper critically examines the extent of quantum vulnerability in current Digital Signature systems and evaluates the comparative performance, efficiency, and security trade-offs of post-quantum alternatives. The study aims to provide a structured understanding of the ongoing transition toward quantum-resistant digital authentication and to propose a roadmap for secure implementation in future cryptographic environments.
The emergence of quantum computing introduces unprecedented risks to classical cryptographic schemes, particularly digital signatures that safeguard authentication, confidentiality, and data integrity across digital ecosystems. To address these concerns, this paper investigates the adoption of Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) within Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) frameworks, emphasizing its role in strengthening electronic signature (eSign) systems against quantum threats. Traditional PKI implementations rely on algorithms such as RSA and ECC in combination with Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) for secure key management; however, these methods are vulnerable to quantum algorithms like Shor's. We examine how quantum-resistant alternatives-including lattice-based, hash-based, and multivariate polynomial-based schemes standardized by NIST-can be integrated into PKI without compromising interoperability and compliance. A comparative evaluation highlights trade-offs in performance, storage, and computational complexity while demonstrating the feasibility of embedding PQC into existing eSign infrastructures. Our findings underscore the urgency of transitioning towards quantum-safe digital signatures to ensure resilience, regulatory alignment, and long-term trust in national-scale digital services.
The rapid development of quantum computing poses a threat to traditional public-key systems. The existing Internet security framework relies heavily on public-key cryptography and hash functions, with classical algorithms such as RSA and ECC widely used for digital signatures and identity authentication. Meanwhile, quantum algorithms, represented by Shor’s algorithm and Grover’s algorithm, which can solve the integer factorization and discrete logarithm problems in polynomial time or significantly accelerate brute-force attacks on symmetric ciphers, posing a fundamental threat to traditional public-key cryptographic systems. To address the security threats posed by quantum computing, post-quantum cryptography has emerged. Transition schemes, such as the NIST post-quantum standards, have been proposed; however, new post-quantum algorithms require significantly more computational time for verification than traditional algorithms, and their migration into practical network protocols and blockchain systems presents considerable challenges. Among these, post-quantum digital signature technology is a key branch. This paper systematically reviews research progress in post-quantum digital signatures, summarizes NIST-standardized algorithms and cutting-edge non-standard schemes, and compares the performance of typical algorithms.