Abstract It is a tenet of Copenhagen faith that it is meaningless to say that an electron or other microscopic entity has a position, velocity, or other similar magnitude in the absence of an experimental arrangement capable of measuring its value. Many philosophers will regard this tenet as mistaken, locating the error in a crude operationalism or verificationism. But related constraints on quantum meaning follow naturally from a more promising inferentialist account of content like that of Brandom. Respecting these constraints enables one to purify quantum theory of talk of “measurement,” resolve puzzlement over the ontology of a quantum field theory, and answer Einstein’s question “Do you really believe the moon exists only when you look at it?”
Abstract It is a tenet of Copenhagen faith that it is meaningless to say that an electron or other microscopic entity has a position, velocity, or other similar magnitude in the absence of an experimental arrangement capable of measuring its value. Many philosophers will regard this tenet as mistaken, locating the error in a crude operationalism or verificationism. But related constraints on quantum meaning follow naturally from a more promising inferentialist account of content like that of Brandom. Respecting these constraints enables one to purify quantum theory of talk of “measurement,” resolve puzzlement over the ontology of a quantum field theory, and answer Einstein’s question “Do you really believe the moon exists only when you look at it?”
Ever since its birth following the introduction of Planck's constant h in 1900, quantum theory has been legitimated only by the amazing capacity it has exhibited in accounting quantitatively for a huge variety of physical phenomena. The so-called Copenhagen interpretation has allowed to accomodate in a coherent frame the tenets of quantum mechanics, but at the cost of bringing in the demand of abandoning, at the microscopic level, causality, determinism, and physical reality. The results of Aspect and coworkers' ingenious experiments, however, can give further support to the belief in the unlimited validity of the quantum theory. But, for all its successes, the theory remains basically incomprehensible.
The basic thesis of this book is that there is no quantum measurement problem. I do not mean by this that the apparent paradoxes of quantum mechanics arise because we fail to recognize ‘that quantum theory does not describe physical reality’ (Fuchs and Peres 2000a). Quantum theory describes reality just fine, like any other scientific theory worth taking seriously: describing (and explaining) reality is what the scientific enterprise is about. Nor do I mean that we have found solutions to the problem, ways to modify or supplement quantum mechanics so that the paradoxes are removed. I don’t actually think that we have found any very satisfactory solutions in this sense (at least not in the relativistic domain) but that isn’t my theme: even if we did have these modifications, they would be ways of changing from quantum physics, which supposedly does have a measurement problem, to some other theory, which supposedly doesn’t.
Quantum theory launched a revolution in twentieth-century physics. But we have yet to appreciate the revolution’s significance for philosophy. Most studies of the conceptual foundations of quantum theory first try to interpret the theory—to say how the world could possibly be the way the theory says it is. But, though fundamental, quantum theory is enormously successful without describing the world in its own terms. When properly applied, models of quantum theory offer good advice on the significance and credibility of claims about the world expressed in other terms. This first of several philosophical lessons of the quantum revolution dissolves the quantum measurement problem. Pragmatist treatments of probability and causation show how quantum theory may be used to explain the non-localized correlations that have been thought to involve ‘spooky’ instantaneous action at a distance. Given environmental decoherence, a pragmatist inferentialist approach to content shows when talk of quantum probabilities is licensed, resolves any residual worries about whether a quantum measurement has a determinate outcome, and solves a dilemma about the ontology of a quantum field theory. This approach to meaning and reference also reveals the nature and limits of objective description in the light of quantum theory. While these pragmatist approaches to probability, causation, explanation, and content may be independently motivated by philosophical argument, their successful application here illustrates their practical importance in helping philosophers come to terms with the quantum revolution.
Abstract It must have been around 1950. I was accompanying Einstein on a walk from The Institute for Advanced Study to his home, when he suddenly stopped, turned to me, and asked me if I really believed that the moon exists only if I look at it. The nature of our conversation was not particularly metaphysical. Rather, we were discussing the quantum theory, in particular what is doable and knowable in the sense of physical observation. The twentieth century physicist does not, of course, claim to have the definitive answer to this question. He does know, however, that the answer given by his nineteenth century ancestors will no longer do. They were almost exactly right, to be sure, as far as conditions of everyday life are concerned, but their answer cannot be extrapolated to things moving nearly as fast as light, or to things that are as small as atoms, or—in some respects—to things that are as heavy as stars.
Abstract Models in quantum theory have non-representational uses through which content accrues to claims involved in their application. A promising approach to understanding how is provided not by a referential semantics but by inferentialist pragmatism. In use, a quantum model is applied to physical systems, but not to represent them or their behavior. It is used to issue probabilistic claims about phenomena involving these systems by the Born Rule. Instances of the Born Rule, statements assigning quantum states, and claims about the values of magnitudes all derive their content through their inferential relations, to one another and to other claims.
The forty-nine papers collected here illuminate the meaning of quantum theory as it is disclosed in the measurement process. Together with an introduction and a supplemental annotated bibliography, they discuss issues that make quantum theory, overarching principle of twentieth-century physics, appear to many to prefigure a new revolution in science. Originally published in 1983. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.