The basic thesis of this book is that there is no quantum measurement problem. I do not mean by this that the apparent paradoxes of quantum mechanics arise because we fail to recognize ‘that quantum theory does not describe physical reality’ (Fuchs and Peres 2000a). Quantum theory describes reality just fine, like any other scientific theory worth taking seriously: describing (and explaining) reality is what the scientific enterprise is about. Nor do I mean that we have found solutions to the problem, ways to modify or supplement quantum mechanics so that the paradoxes are removed. I don’t actually think that we have found any very satisfactory solutions in this sense (at least not in the relativistic domain) but that isn’t my theme: even if we did have these modifications, they would be ways of changing from quantum physics, which supposedly does have a measurement problem, to some other theory, which supposedly doesn’t.
The basic thesis of this book is that there is no quantum measurement problem. I do not mean by this that the apparent paradoxes of quantum mechanics arise because we fail to recognize ‘that quantum theory does not describe physical reality’ (Fuchs and Peres 2000a). Quantum theory describes reality just fine, like any other scientific theory worth taking seriously: describing (and explaining) reality is what the scientific enterprise is about. Nor do I mean that we have found solutions to the problem, ways to modify or supplement quantum mechanics so that the paradoxes are removed. I don’t actually think that we have found any very satisfactory solutions in this sense (at least not in the relativistic domain) but that isn’t my theme: even if we did have these modifications, they would be ways of changing from quantum physics, which supposedly does have a measurement problem, to some other theory, which supposedly doesn’t.
Quantum paradoxes The next few chapters are devoted to resolving a number of quantum paradoxes in the sense of giving a reasonable explanation of a seemingly paradoxical result in terms of the principles of quantum theory discussed earlier in this book. None of these paradoxes indicates a defect in quantum theory. Instead, when they have been properly understood, they show us that the quantum world is rather different from the world of our everyday experience and of classical physics, in a way somewhat analogous to that in which relativity theory has shown us that the laws appropriate for describing the behavior of objects moving at high speed differ in significant ways from those of pre-relativistic physics. An inadequate theory of quantum measurements is at the root of several quantum paradoxes. In particular, the notion that wave function collapse is a physical effect produced by a measurement, rather than a method of calculation, see Sec. 18.2, has given rise to a certain amount of confusion. Smuggling rules for classical reasoning into the quantum domain where they do not belong and where they give rise to logical inconsistencies is another common source of confusion. In particular, many paradoxes involve mixing the results from incompatible quantum frameworks. Certain quantum paradoxes have given rise to the idea that the quantum world is permeated by mysterious influences that propagate faster than the speed of light, in conflict with the theory of relativity. They are mysterious in that they cannot be used to transmit signals, which means that they are, at least in any direct sense, experimentally unobservable.
In the Preface to this book, we started with Alice and Bob having very different views of their observations. Alice used an optical telescope and reported nothing unusual about a distant galaxy that she could see. Bob, on the other hand, detected intense radio activity in that galaxy. Our question was: who has the true view of that galaxy? We advised the reader that the answer is not Alice . Neither is it Bob . The answer is not both of them , nor is it neither of them . It is not a trick question either. So what is the answer that this book would supply? Our answer will come presently. While this book has set forth a definite mathematical perspective on empirical physics, it has contained quite a lot of commentary that might be disparaged as metaphysics or philosophy. Such commentary is generally frowned on in science, because it has no empirical content. It is vacuous. In our defense, we point out the obvious: science is not a robotic activity; it is carried out by humans and these are driven by their metaphysical, philosophical, and emotional imperatives. For instance, the hard-core scientific view that quantum theory needs no interpretation but only application is itself a philosophy. It is no more than a conditioned response, based on opinion and subscription to current scientific norms. It is, indeed, a philosophy of how to do quantum mechanics. So we all do it, in one way or another. Our concern in this book is that the way that we do it should be based soundly on scientific principles. The quantized detector approach that we describe and use in this book is our attempt to do just that. There is an excellent paper on all of this that has the provocative title “Quantum Theory Needs No Interpretation,” by Fuchs and Peres (2000). It seems on the face of it to dismiss any sort of “interpretation” of quantum mechanics. In fact, close reading of it confirms (to us at least) the agenda that we have set out in this book. Yes, quantum mechanics needs no interpretation, when it is being applied to processes that take place in the information void .
Quantum mechanics is a difficult subject, and this book is intended to help the reader overcome the main difficulties in the way to understanding it. The first part of the book, Chs. 2–16, contains a systematic presentation of the basic principles of quantum theory, along with a number of examples which illustrate how these principles apply to particular quantum systems. The applications are, for the most part, limited to toy models whose simple structure allows one to see what is going on without using complicated mathematics or lengthy formulas. The principles themselves, however, are formulated in such a way that they can be applied to (almost) any nonrelativistic quantum system. In the second part of the book, Chs. 17–25, these principles are applied to quantum measurements and various quantum paradoxes, subjects which give rise to serious conceptual problems when they are not treated in a fully consistent manner.
The main theme of this book is the idea that quantum mechanics is valid not only for microscopic objects but also for the macroscopic apparatus used for quantum mechanical measurements. The author demonstrates the intimate relations that exist between quantum mechanics and its interpretation which are induced by the quantum mechanical measurement process. Consequently, the book is concerned both with the philosophical, metatheoretical problems of interpretations and with the more formal problems of quantum object theory. The consequences of this approach turn out to be partly very promising and partly rather disappointing. On the one hand, it is possible to give a rigorous justification of some important parts of interpretation, such as probability, by means of object theory. On the other hand, the problem of the objectification of measurement results leads to inconsistencies which cannot be resolved in an obvious way. This open problem has far-reaching consequences for the possibility of recognising an objective reality in physics.
Surely, after 62 years, we should have an exact formulation of some serious part of quantum mechanics? By ‘exact’ I do not of course mean ‘exactly true’. I mean only that the theory should be fully formulated in mathematical terms, with nothing left to the discretion of the theoretical physicist...until workable approximations are needed in applications. By ‘serious’ I mean that some substantial fragment of physics should be covered. Nonrelativistic ‘particle’ quantum mechanics, perhaps with the inclusion of the electromagnetic field and cut-off interaction, is serious enough. For it covers ‘a large part of physics and the whole of chemistry’ (P A M Dirac 1929 Proc. R. Soc.A 123 714). I mean too, by ‘serious’, that ‘apparatus’ should not be separated off from the rest of the world into black boxes, as if it were not made of atoms and not ruled by quantum mechanics.