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Oxford University Press eBooks

Quantum Theory and the Limits of Objectivity

Richard Healey

Published Jan 25, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Abstract Three recent arguments seek to show that the universal applicability of unitary quantum theory is inconsistent with the assumption that a well-conducted measurement always has a definite physical outcome. This essay restates and analyzes these arguments. The import of the first two is diminished by their dependence on assumptions about the outcomes of counterfactual measurements. But the third argument establishes its intended conclusion. Even if every well-conducted quantum measurement one ever makes will have a definite physical outcome, this argument should make them reconsider the objectivity of that outcome.

DOI
10.1093/9780198911586.003.0013

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Abstract Three recent arguments seek to show that the universal applicability of unitary quantum theory is inconsistent with the assumption that a well-conducted measurement always has a definite physical outcome. This essay restates and analyzes these arguments. The import of the first two is diminished by their dependence on assumptions about the outcomes of counterfactual measurements. But the third argument establishes its intended conclusion. Even if every well-conducted quantum measurement one ever makes will have a definite physical outcome, this argument should make them reconsider the objectivity of that outcome.
Measurement outcomes provide data for a physical theory. Unless they are objective they support no objective scientific knowledge. So the outcome of a quantum measurement must be an objective physical fact. But recent arguments purport to show that if quantum theory is universally applicable then there is no such fact. This calls for a reappraisal of the notions of fact and objectivity. If quantum theory is universally applicable the facts about the physical world include a fact about each quantum measurement outcome. These physical facts lack an ideal kind of objectivity but their more modest objectivity is all that science needs.
A recent argument, attributed to Masanes, is claimed to show that the assumption that quantum measurements have definite, objective outcomes, is incompatible with quantum predictions. In this work, a detailed examination of the argument shows that it has a much narrower field of application than previously recognized. In particular, it is found: i) that the argument only applies to hidden-variable models with a particular feature; and ii) that such a feature is not present in most hidden-variable models, including pilot-wave theory. It is concluded that the argument does not succeed in calling into question the objectivity of quantum measurements.
Recent arguments, involving entangled systems shared by sets of Wigner's friend arrangements, allegedly show that the assumption that the experiments performed by the friends yield definite outcomes, is incompatible with quantum predictions. From this, it is concluded that the results of measurements cannot be thought of as being actual or objective. Here, I show that these arguments depend upon a mistaken assumption, regarding the ("mixed") correlations between the results of the friends and those of "the Wigners", which leads to invalid predictions. It is not, then, that the assumption of definite outcomes leads to trouble, but that the results derived with such an assumption are contrasted with faulty predictions. Next, I explore the more famous no-go theorems by Frauchiger and Renner and by Brukner, on which these recent arguments are motivated. Regarding the first, I show that, although it is cast in a different form, it also rests on the mistaken assumption regarding "mixed" correlations--rendering it invalid. Regarding Brukner's theorem, I point out that it depends on the quite unattractive assumption of locality, a fact that fully diminishes its force. Throughout, I illustrate my claims with explicit calculations within pilot-wave theory.
I take a pragmatist perspective on quantum theory. This is not a view of the world described by quantum theory. In this view quantum theory itself does not describe the physical world, nor our observatons, experiences or opinions of it. Instead, the theory offers reliable advice on when to expect an event of one kind or another, and on how strongly to expect each possible outcome of that event. The actual outcome is a perspectival fact: a fact relative to a physical context of assessment. Measurement outcomes and quantum states are both perspectival. By noticing that each must be relativized to an appropriate physical context one can resolve the measurement problem and the problem of nonlocal action. But if the outcome of a quantum measurement is not an absolute fact, then why shoud the statistics of such outcomes give us any objective reason to accept quantum theory? One can describe extensions of the scenario of Wigner's friend in which a statement expressing the outcome of a quantum measurement would be true relative to one such context but not relative to another. However, physical conditions in our world prevent us from realizing such scenarios. Since the outcome of every actual quantum measurement is certified at what is essentially a single context of assessment, the outcome relative to that context is an objective fact in the only sense that matters for science. We should accept quantum theory because the statistics these outcomes display are just those it leads us to expect.
Abstract The measurement problem in quantum mechanics is commonly framed as a conflict between unitary dynamics and the appearance of definite outcomes. This paper argues that the conflict arises from a misplaced assumption about what outcomes must be. In experimental practice, outcomes are not arbitrarily precise microscopic states or instantaneous events, but stable physical records produced in measurement interactions. Treating outcomes as such records allows them to be formalized as coarse-grained equivalence classes of physical states that persist in time and support consistent interaction across systems. On this basis, decoherence explains the stability of outcomes without selecting a unique global result or modifying quantum dynamics. Objectivity is recovered through the robustness of records rather than through absolute, observer-independent outcome facts. The measurement problem is thereby dissolved without invoking collapse mechanisms, branching universes, or observer-dependent postulates, while preserving all standard empirical predictions of quantum mechanics.