Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

IACR Communications in Cryptology

Simulatability versus Indistinguishability SOA: CCA Relations are Sampler-Dependent

Hans Heum

Published Jan 8, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Contrary to expectation, we show that there is no general reduction from simulation-based selective opening security (SSO) to indistinguishability-based selective opening security (ISO) in the CCA setting. In particular, we show that when restricted to certain message distributions, SSO-CCA is incomparable with ISO-CCA. This contrasts the CPA case, where SSO-CPA is known to be strictly stronger than ISO-CPA relative to any message sampler. Any sampler with high enough min-entropy suffices for this “semi-separation” to appear. On the other hand, we show that restricting to distributions with very low min-entropy gives rise to an implication. Our main result does not rely on the presence of selective openings, but rather follow from subtleties in the game structures. At a glance, this may seem to contradict known equivalences between indistinguishability, semantic security, and selective opening security under trivial openings. We reconcile the apparent contradiction by showing that the CCA landscape splits into a “high-entropy” and a “low-entropy” world, which for notions of SOA must be treated separately.

DOI
10.62056/abbngyl7s

Related papers

Simulation-Based Selective Opening Security for Receivers under Chosen-Ciphertext Attacks.

Zhengan Huang, Junzuo Lai, Wenbin Chen +3 more

Security against selective opening attack (SOA) for receivers requires that in a multi-user setting, even if an adversary has access to all ciphertexts, and adaptively corrupts some fraction of the users to obtain the decryption keys corresponding to some of the ciphertexts, the remaining (potentially related) ciphertexts retain their privacy. In this paper, we study simulation-based selective opening security for receivers of public key encryption (PKE) schemes under chosen-ciphertext attacks (RSIM-SO-CCA). Concretely, we first show that some known PKE schemes meet RSIM-SO-CCA security. Then, we introduce the notion of master-key SOA security for identity-based encryption (IBE), and extend the Canetti–Halevi–Katz transformation to show generic PKE constructions achieving RSIM-SO-CCA security. Finally, we show how to construct an IBE scheme achieving master-key SOA security.

•Jan 1, 2018•0 citations

Public-Key Encryption with Tight Simulation-Based Selective-Opening Security

Lin Lyu, Shengli Liu, Shuai Han

In a selective-opening, chosen-ciphertext attack (SO-CCA) against a public key encryption scheme (PKE scheme), a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary obtains a vector of challenge ciphertexts, has access to a decryption oracle, adaptively selects to open some of the challenge ciphertexts and sees the corresponding messages together with the random coins. The simulation-based, selective-opening security against chosen-ciphertext attacks (SIM-SO-CCA security) protects the security of the unopened messages in a semantic way, i.e. it requires that the output of the adversary can be simulated by a simulator who sees only the opened messages. In particular, all information that the adversary can get from the unopened messages can also be simulated from the opened messages alone by the simulator. All security proofs of the available PKEs achieving SIM-SO-CCA security are not tight, and the security loss depends either on the number of challenge ciphertexts or on the number of decryption queries. In this work, we present the first PKE scheme which achieves SIM-SO-CCA security with a tight reduction to standard assumptions. This partially solves the open problem proposed by Hofheinz in EuroCrypt 2012.

The Computer Journal•Aug 16, 2017•2 citations

Selective Opening Security for Receivers.

Carmit Hazay, Arpita Patra, Bogdan Warinschi

In a selective opening (SO) attack an adversary breaks into a subset of honestly created ciphertexts and tries to learn information on the plaintexts of some untouched (but potentially related) ciphertexts. Contrary to intuition, standard security notions do not always imply security against this type of adver-sary, making SO security an important standalone goal. In this paper we study receiver security, where the attacker is allowed to obtain the decryption keys corresponding to some of the ciphertexts. First we study the relation between two existing security definitions, one based on simulation and the other based on indistinguishability, and show that the former is strictly stronger. We continue with feasibility results for both notions which we show can be achieved from (variants of) non-committing encryption schemes. In particular, we show that indistinguishability-based SO security can be achieved from a tweaked variant of non-committing encryption which, in turn, can be instantiated from a variety of basic, well-established, assumptions. We conclude our study by showing that SO security is however strictly weaker than all variants of non-committing encryption that we consider, leaving potentially more efficient constructions as an interesting open problem.

•Jan 1, 2015•0 citations

Hierarchical identity-based encryption with receiver selective opening security in the multi-challenge setting

Zi-Yuan Liu, Masahiro Mambo, Raylin Tso +1 more

Receiver selective opening (RSO) security considers the security of encryption schemes under the scenario of a single sender and multiple receivers, where an adversary is allowed to adaptively corrupt some receivers’ secret keys. RSO security has been proven to be more secure than indistinguishability-based security notions. A lot of research has focused on RSO security in terms of public-key encryption and identity-based encryption (IBE); however, hierarchical IBE (HIBE), which is a generalization of IBE, is still lacking in the study, and how to obtain such a construction remains an open problem. To address this gap, we initiate a study of RSO security on HIBE in this work. Precisely, we first formalize the definition of simulation-based RSO against identity-chosen-plaintext/ciphertext attacks in the k-challenge setting (SIM-ID-RSO $$_k$$ -CPA/CCA) for HIBE. We then present generic SIM-ID-RSO $$_k$$ -CCA secure HIBE constructions by introducing the double secret key paradigm. Specifically, we show that a SIM-ID-RSO $$_k$$ -CCA secure HIBE scheme can be obtained from an IND-ID-CPA secure HIBE scheme as well as a one-time signature scheme that satisfies strong unforgeability. Through our general construction, we can derive various concrete schemes based on different hard assumptions (e.g., lattice-based and pairing-based SIM-ID-RSO $$_k$$ -CCA secure HIBE schemes) according to usage requirements.

Designs Codes and Cryptography•Jul 1, 2026•0 citations

Selective Opening Secure Functional Encryption

Yuanyuan Ji, Haixia Xu, Peili Li

Functional encryption (FE) has more fine-grained control to encrypted data than traditional encryption schemes. The well-accepted security of FE is indistinguishability-based security (IND-FE) and simulation-based security (SIMFE), but the security is not sufficient.For example, if an adversary has the ability to access a vector of ciphertexts and can ask to open some information of the messages, such as coins used in the encryption or secret key in multikey setting, whether the privacy of the unopened messages is guaranteed.This is called selective opening attack (SOA).In this paper, we propose a stronger security of FE which is secure against SOA (we call SO-FE) and propose a concrete construction of SO-FE scheme in the standard model.Our scheme is a non-adaptive IND-FE which satisfies selective opening secure in the simulation sense.In addition, the scheme can encrypt messages of any bit length other than bitwise and it is secure against SOA-C and SOAK simultaneously while the two attacks were appeared in different model before.According to the different functionality f, our scheme can specialize as IBE, ABE and even PE schemes secure against SOA.

•Dec 28, 2015•0 citations

Standard Security Does Imply Security Against Selective Opening for Markov Distributions.

Felix Heuer, Eike Kiltz, Krzysztof Pietrzak

About three decades ago it was realized that implementing private channels between parties which can be adaptively corrupted requires an encryption scheme that is secure against selective opening attacks. Whether standard (IND-CPA) security implies security against selective opening attacks has been a major open question since. The only known reduction from selective opening to IND-CPA security loses an exponential factor. A polynomial reduction is only known for the very special case where the distribution considered in the selective opening security experiment is a product distribution, i.e., the messages are sampled independently from each other. In this paper we give a reduction whose loss is quantified via the dependence graph (where message dependencies correspond to edges) of the underlying message distribution. In particular, for some concrete distributions including Markov distributions, our reduction is polynomial.

•Jan 1, 2015•0 citations
Contrary to expectation, we show that there is no general reduction from simulation-based selective opening security (SSO) to indistinguishability-based selective opening security (ISO) in the CCA setting. In particular, we show that when restricted to certain message distributions, SSO-CCA is incomparable with ISO-CCA. This contrasts the CPA case, where SSO-CPA is known to be strictly stronger than ISO-CPA relative to any message sampler. Any sampler with high enough min-entropy suffices for this “semi-separation” to appear. On the other hand, we show that restricting to distributions with very low min-entropy gives rise to an implication. Our main result does not rely on the presence of selective openings, but rather follow from subtleties in the game structures. At a glance, this may seem to contradict known equivalences between indistinguishability, semantic security, and selective opening security under trivial openings. We reconcile the apparent contradiction by showing that the CCA landscape splits into a “high-entropy” and a “low-entropy” world, which for notions of SOA must be treated separately.
Security against selective opening attack (SOA) for receivers requires that in a multi-user setting, even if an adversary has access to all ciphertexts, and adaptively corrupts some fraction of the users to obtain the decryption keys corresponding to some of the ciphertexts, the remaining (potentially related) ciphertexts retain their privacy. In this paper, we study simulation-based selective opening security for receivers of public key encryption (PKE) schemes under chosen-ciphertext attacks (RSIM-SO-CCA). Concretely, we first show that some known PKE schemes meet RSIM-SO-CCA security. Then, we introduce the notion of master-key SOA security for identity-based encryption (IBE), and extend the Canetti–Halevi–Katz transformation to show generic PKE constructions achieving RSIM-SO-CCA security. Finally, we show how to construct an IBE scheme achieving master-key SOA security.
In a selective-opening, chosen-ciphertext attack (SO-CCA) against a public key encryption scheme (PKE scheme), a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary obtains a vector of challenge ciphertexts, has access to a decryption oracle, adaptively selects to open some of the challenge ciphertexts and sees the corresponding messages together with the random coins. The simulation-based, selective-opening security against chosen-ciphertext attacks (SIM-SO-CCA security) protects the security of the unopened messages in a semantic way, i.e. it requires that the output of the adversary can be simulated by a simulator who sees only the opened messages. In particular, all information that the adversary can get from the unopened messages can also be simulated from the opened messages alone by the simulator. All security proofs of the available PKEs achieving SIM-SO-CCA security are not tight, and the security loss depends either on the number of challenge ciphertexts or on the number of decryption queries. In this work, we present the first PKE scheme which achieves SIM-SO-CCA security with a tight reduction to standard assumptions. This partially solves the open problem proposed by Hofheinz in EuroCrypt 2012.
In a selective opening (SO) attack an adversary breaks into a subset of honestly created ciphertexts and tries to learn information on the plaintexts of some untouched (but potentially related) ciphertexts. Contrary to intuition, standard security notions do not always imply security against this type of adver-sary, making SO security an important standalone goal. In this paper we study receiver security, where the attacker is allowed to obtain the decryption keys corresponding to some of the ciphertexts. First we study the relation between two existing security definitions, one based on simulation and the other based on indistinguishability, and show that the former is strictly stronger. We continue with feasibility results for both notions which we show can be achieved from (variants of) non-committing encryption schemes. In particular, we show that indistinguishability-based SO security can be achieved from a tweaked variant of non-committing encryption which, in turn, can be instantiated from a variety of basic, well-established, assumptions. We conclude our study by showing that SO security is however strictly weaker than all variants of non-committing encryption that we consider, leaving potentially more efficient constructions as an interesting open problem.
Receiver selective opening (RSO) security considers the security of encryption schemes under the scenario of a single sender and multiple receivers, where an adversary is allowed to adaptively corrupt some receivers’ secret keys. RSO security has been proven to be more secure than indistinguishability-based security notions. A lot of research has focused on RSO security in terms of public-key encryption and identity-based encryption (IBE); however, hierarchical IBE (HIBE), which is a generalization of IBE, is still lacking in the study, and how to obtain such a construction remains an open problem. To address this gap, we initiate a study of RSO security on HIBE in this work. Precisely, we first formalize the definition of simulation-based RSO against identity-chosen-plaintext/ciphertext attacks in the k-challenge setting (SIM-ID-RSO k_kk​ -CPA/CCA) for HIBE. We then present generic SIM-ID-RSO k_kk​ -CCA secure HIBE constructions by introducing the double secret key paradigm. Specifically, we show that a SIM-ID-RSO k_kk​ -CCA secure HIBE scheme can be obtained from an IND-ID-CPA secure HIBE scheme as well as a one-time signature scheme that satisfies strong unforgeability. Through our general construction, we can derive various concrete schemes based on different hard assumptions (e.g., lattice-based and pairing-based SIM-ID-RSO k_kk​ -CCA secure HIBE schemes) according to usage requirements.
Functional encryption (FE) has more fine-grained control to encrypted data than traditional encryption schemes. The well-accepted security of FE is indistinguishability-based security (IND-FE) and simulation-based security (SIMFE), but the security is not sufficient.For example, if an adversary has the ability to access a vector of ciphertexts and can ask to open some information of the messages, such as coins used in the encryption or secret key in multikey setting, whether the privacy of the unopened messages is guaranteed.This is called selective opening attack (SOA).In this paper, we propose a stronger security of FE which is secure against SOA (we call SO-FE) and propose a concrete construction of SO-FE scheme in the standard model.Our scheme is a non-adaptive IND-FE which satisfies selective opening secure in the simulation sense.In addition, the scheme can encrypt messages of any bit length other than bitwise and it is secure against SOA-C and SOAK simultaneously while the two attacks were appeared in different model before.According to the different functionality f, our scheme can specialize as IBE, ABE and even PE schemes secure against SOA.
About three decades ago it was realized that implementing private channels between parties which can be adaptively corrupted requires an encryption scheme that is secure against selective opening attacks. Whether standard (IND-CPA) security implies security against selective opening attacks has been a major open question since. The only known reduction from selective opening to IND-CPA security loses an exponential factor. A polynomial reduction is only known for the very special case where the distribution considered in the selective opening security experiment is a product distribution, i.e., the messages are sampled independently from each other. In this paper we give a reduction whose loss is quantified via the dependence graph (where message dependencies correspond to edges) of the underlying message distribution. In particular, for some concrete distributions including Markov distributions, our reduction is polynomial.