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Simulation-Based Selective Opening Security for Receivers under Chosen-Ciphertext Attacks.

Zhengan Huang, Junzuo Lai, Wenbin Chen, Man Ho Au, Zhen Peng, Jin Li

Published Jan 1, 2018• 0 citations
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Abstract

Security against selective opening attack (SOA) for receivers requires that in a multi-user setting, even if an adversary has access to all ciphertexts, and adaptively corrupts some fraction of the users to obtain the decryption keys corresponding to some of the ciphertexts, the remaining (potentially related) ciphertexts retain their privacy. In this paper, we study simulation-based selective opening security for receivers of public key encryption (PKE) schemes under chosen-ciphertext attacks (RSIM-SO-CCA). Concretely, we first show that some known PKE schemes meet RSIM-SO-CCA security. Then, we introduce the notion of master-key SOA security for identity-based encryption (IBE), and extend the Canetti–Halevi–Katz transformation to show generic PKE constructions achieving RSIM-SO-CCA security. Finally, we show how to construct an IBE scheme achieving master-key SOA security.

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Security against selective opening attack (SOA) for receivers requires that in a multi-user setting, even if an adversary has access to all ciphertexts, and adaptively corrupts some fraction of the users to obtain the decryption keys corresponding to some of the ciphertexts, the remaining (potentially related) ciphertexts retain their privacy. In this paper, we study simulation-based selective opening security for receivers of public key encryption (PKE) schemes under chosen-ciphertext attacks (RSIM-SO-CCA). Concretely, we first show that some known PKE schemes meet RSIM-SO-CCA security. Then, we introduce the notion of master-key SOA security for identity-based encryption (IBE), and extend the Canetti–Halevi–Katz transformation to show generic PKE constructions achieving RSIM-SO-CCA security. Finally, we show how to construct an IBE scheme achieving master-key SOA security.
In a selective-opening, chosen-ciphertext attack (SO-CCA) against a public key encryption scheme (PKE scheme), a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary obtains a vector of challenge ciphertexts, has access to a decryption oracle, adaptively selects to open some of the challenge ciphertexts and sees the corresponding messages together with the random coins. The simulation-based, selective-opening security against chosen-ciphertext attacks (SIM-SO-CCA security) protects the security of the unopened messages in a semantic way, i.e. it requires that the output of the adversary can be simulated by a simulator who sees only the opened messages. In particular, all information that the adversary can get from the unopened messages can also be simulated from the opened messages alone by the simulator. All security proofs of the available PKEs achieving SIM-SO-CCA security are not tight, and the security loss depends either on the number of challenge ciphertexts or on the number of decryption queries. In this work, we present the first PKE scheme which achieves SIM-SO-CCA security with a tight reduction to standard assumptions. This partially solves the open problem proposed by Hofheinz in EuroCrypt 2012.
Receiver selective opening (RSO) attack for public key encryption (PKE) captures a situation where one sender sends messages to multiple receivers, an adversary can corrupt a set of receivers and get their messages and secret keys. Security against RSO attack for a PKE scheme ensures confidentiality of other uncorrupted receivers' ciphertexts. Among all of the RSO security notions, simulation-based RSO security against chosen ciphertext attack (SIM-RSO-CCA security) is the strongest notion. In this paper, we explore constructions of SIM-RSO-CCA secure PKE from various computational assumptions. Toward this goal, we show that a SIM-RSO-CCA secure PKE scheme can be constructed based on an IND-CPA secure PKE scheme and a designated-verifier non-interactive zero-knowledge (DV-NIZK) argument satisfying one-time simulation soundness. Moreover, we give the first construction of DV-NIZK argument satisfying one-time simulation soundness. Consequently, through our generic construction, we obtain the first SIM-RSO-CCA secure PKE scheme under the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) or learning parity with noise (LPN) assumption.
In the situation where there are one sender and multiple receivers, a receiver selective opening (RSO) attack for an identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme considers adversaries that can corrupt some of the receivers and get their user secret keys and plaintexts. Security against RSO attacks for an IBE scheme ensures confidentiality of ciphertexts of uncorrupted receivers. In this paper, we formalize a definition of RSO security against chosen ciphertext attacks (RSO-CCA security) for IBE and propose the first RSO-CCA secure IBE schemes. More specifically, we construct an RSO-CCA secure IBE scheme based on an IND-ID-CPA secure IBE scheme and a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system with unbounded simulation soundness and multi-theorem zero-knowledge. Through our generic construction, we obtain the first pairing-based and lattice-based RSO-CCA secure IBE schemes.
In the situation where there are one sender and multiple receivers, a receiver selective opening (RSO) attack for an identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme considers adversaries that can corrupt some of the receivers and get their user secret keys and plaintexts. Security against RSO attacks for an IBE scheme ensures confidentiality of ciphertexts of uncorrupted receivers. In this paper, we formalize a definition of RSO security against chosen ciphertext attacks (RSO-CCA security) for IBE and propose the first RSO-CCA secure IBE schemes. More specifically, we construct an RSO-CCA secure IBE scheme based on an IND-ID-CPA secure IBE scheme and a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system with unbounded simulation soundness and multi-theorem zero-knowledge. Through our generic construction, we obtain the first pairing-based and lattice-based RSO-CCA secure IBE schemes.
Receiver selective opening (RSO) security considers the security of encryption schemes under the scenario of a single sender and multiple receivers, where an adversary is allowed to adaptively corrupt some receivers’ secret keys. RSO security has been proven to be more secure than indistinguishability-based security notions. A lot of research has focused on RSO security in terms of public-key encryption and identity-based encryption (IBE); however, hierarchical IBE (HIBE), which is a generalization of IBE, is still lacking in the study, and how to obtain such a construction remains an open problem. To address this gap, we initiate a study of RSO security on HIBE in this work. Precisely, we first formalize the definition of simulation-based RSO against identity-chosen-plaintext/ciphertext attacks in the k-challenge setting (SIM-ID-RSO k_kk​ -CPA/CCA) for HIBE. We then present generic SIM-ID-RSO k_kk​ -CCA secure HIBE constructions by introducing the double secret key paradigm. Specifically, we show that a SIM-ID-RSO k_kk​ -CCA secure HIBE scheme can be obtained from an IND-ID-CPA secure HIBE scheme as well as a one-time signature scheme that satisfies strong unforgeability. Through our general construction, we can derive various concrete schemes based on different hard assumptions (e.g., lattice-based and pairing-based SIM-ID-RSO k_kk​ -CCA secure HIBE schemes) according to usage requirements.
In public-key encryption (PKE), ciphertexts received by a receiver may be possibly correlated and the security of a PKE relies on honestly generated system parameters. Security against selective opening attacks (SOA) for PKE guarantees that even when an attacker has broken into a subset of honestly generated ciphertexts and opened them (i.e., seeing plaintexts and random bits), the unopened ciphertexts remain secure. While security against parameter subversion attacks (PSA) for PKE requires that even when the public system parameters are maliciously generated, a PKE scheme should be secure. In this paper, we initiate the study of PKE secure against both SOA and PSA. To capture SOA and PSA simultaneously, we formulate a new security notion called indistinguishability under selective opening attacks and parameter subversion attacks (IND-SO-PSA). Further, we define the lossy trapdoor function and all-but-many lossy trapdoor function in the presence of PSA (LTF-PSA and ABM-LTF-PSA correspondingly) and propose an instantiation with the efficiently-embeddable group (EG). Applying these new primitives, we construct a PKE scheme that is proven to be IND-SO-PSA secure.