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Revisiting the security of quantum bit commitment schemes

Medhioub, Khaireddine

Published Aug 1, 2025• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Bit commitment is one of the cornerstones of both classical and quantum cryptography. In the classical world, security analysis is straightforward because both hiding and binding each admit a single natural interpretation. In the quantum world, however, security notions can be defined in different ways that are not necessarily equivalent. Over three decades, several works have introduced numerous binding notions whose precise statements and mu- tual implications remain scattered across the literature. This thesis clarifies that ambiguity. We study quantum binding notions within the framework of canonical purified quantum bit commitment (QBC) schemes, a class that captures both the theoretical generality and the practical mechanisms of recent constructions. In the statistical setting, we examine six binding notions: strong-binding, honest-binding, sum-binding, collapse-binding, extractor- binding, and arbitrary-binding. We prove that all these definitions except strong-binding are equivalent for the class of canonical purified schemes. In the computational setting, we establish that honest-binding, sum-binding, and collapse-binding are equivalent for the same class of schemes. Moreover, we introduce a quantitative framework based on the work of Ref. [26] to quantify the tradeoff between hiding and binding properties, and we use it to provide a geometric proof of the impossibility theorem of Mayers [21] and Lo & Chau [20], for canonical purified schemes. We next revisit the quantum notion of hiding, which is far less ambiguous than binding. Finally, we survey some technical tools that can be used to construct secure QBC schemes.

DOI
10.71781/10731

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Bit commitment is one of the cornerstones of both classical and quantum cryptography. In the classical world, security analysis is straightforward because both hiding and binding each admit a single natural interpretation. In the quantum world, however, security notions can be defined in different ways that are not necessarily equivalent. Over three decades, several works have introduced numerous binding notions whose precise statements and mu- tual implications remain scattered across the literature. This thesis clarifies that ambiguity. We study quantum binding notions within the framework of canonical purified quantum bit commitment (QBC) schemes, a class that captures both the theoretical generality and the practical mechanisms of recent constructions. In the statistical setting, we examine six binding notions: strong-binding, honest-binding, sum-binding, collapse-binding, extractor- binding, and arbitrary-binding. We prove that all these definitions except strong-binding are equivalent for the class of canonical purified schemes. In the computational setting, we establish that honest-binding, sum-binding, and collapse-binding are equivalent for the same class of schemes. Moreover, we introduce a quantitative framework based on the work of Ref. [26] to quantify the tradeoff between hiding and binding properties, and we use it to provide a geometric proof of the impossibility theorem of Mayers [21] and Lo & Chau [20], for canonical purified schemes. We next revisit the quantum notion of hiding, which is far less ambiguous than binding. Finally, we survey some technical tools that can be used to construct secure QBC schemes.
We provide a non-interactive quantum bit commitment scheme which has statistically-hiding and computationally-binding properties from any quantum one-way function. Our protocol is basically a parallel composition of the previous non-interactive quantum bit commitment schemes (based on quantum one-way permutations, due to Dumais, Mayers and Salvail (EUROCRYPT 2000)) with pairwise independent hash functions. To construct our non-interactive quantum bit commitment scheme from any quantum one-way function, we follow the procedure below: (i) from Dumais-Mayers-Salvail scheme to a weakly-hiding and 1-out-of-2 binding commitment (of a parallel variant); (ii) from the weakly-hiding and 1-out-of-2 binding commitment to a strongly-hiding and 1-out-of-2 binding commitment; (iii) from the strongly-hiding and 1-out-of-2 binding commitment to a normal statistically-hiding commitment. In the classical case, statistically-hiding bit commitment scheme (by Haitner, Nguyen, Ong, Reingold and Vadhan (SIAM J. Comput., Vol.39, 2009)) is also constructible from any one-way function. While the classical statistically-hiding bit commitment has large round complexity, our quantum scheme is non-interactive, which is advantageous over the classical schemes. A main technical contribution is to provide a quantum analogue of the new interactive hashing theorem, due to Haitner and Reingold (CCC 2007). Moreover, the parallel composition enables us to simplify the security analysis drastically.
Bit commitment is a fundamental cryptographic primitive and a cornerstone for numerous two-party cryptographic protocols, including zero-knowledge proofs. However, it has been proven that unconditionally secure bit commitment, both classical and quantum, is impossible. In this work, we demonstrate that imposing a restriction on the committing party to perform only separable operations enables secure quantum bit-commitment schemes. Specifically, we prove that in any perfectly hiding bit-commitment protocol, an honestly committing party limited to separable operations will be detected with high probability if they attempt to alter their commitment. To illustrate our findings, we present an example protocol.
Quantum Bit Commitment (QBC) is a foundational primitive in quantum cryptography, intended to enable secure commitments with strong information-theoretic guarantees. The protocol described in ‘Unconditionally secure multi-party quantum commitment scheme’, [1] published in Quantum information processing, 2018 Springer, uses coherent-state encoding and claims statistical hiding and computational binding. In this work, we identify a fundamental vulnerability in the hiding property of the protocol. Specifically, we demonstrate that an adversarial receiver applies Hadamard transformation to the incoming states, effectively changing the basis to enhance distinguishability between the two received messages. This linear optical strategy enables partial extraction of message without the use of quantum storage or entangled resources. We formally analyze the structure of the protocol and quantify the information leakage by computing the distinguishability between quantum state ensembles associated with different commitments. Our findings indicate that the protocol fails to maintain statistical hiding under general quantum adversarial models, raising concerns about its applicability in settings requiring strong concealment guarantees.
This paper proposes a different approach to pinpoint the causes for which an unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment protocol cannot be realized, beyond the technical details on which the proof of Mayers' no-go theorem is constructed. We have adopted the tools of quantum entropy analysis to investigate the conditions under which the security properties of quantum bit commitment can be circumvented. Our study has revealed that cheating the binding property requires the quantum system acting as the safe to harbor the same amount of uncertainty with respect to both observers (Alice and Bob) as well as the use of entanglement. Our analysis also suggests that the ability to cheat one of the two fundamental properties of bit commitment by any of the two participants depends on how much information is leaked from one side of the system to the other and how much remains hidden from the other participant.
In this paper we show how to convert a statistically binding but computationally concealing quantum bit commitment scheme into a computationally binding but statistically concealing scheme. For a security parameter n, the construction of the statistically concealing scheme requires O(n^2) executions of the statistically binding scheme. As a consequence, statistically concealing but computationally binding quantum bit commitments can be based upon any family of quantum one-way functions. Such a construction is not known to exist in the classical world.
Although Mayers, Lo and Chau successfully showed that unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment (QBC) is impossible, we present a secure QBC protocol which is quite different from the model used in their proofs. If Alice wants to commit a bit b, she first encodes b into a series of classical bit strings of the same length. The requirement is that the modulo 2 sum of all bits in every bit string equals to b. Then Alice uses quantum one-way function to produce quantum states which are corresponding to the encoded classical bit strings and will be sent to Bob as evidence. The quantum one-way function used here is just that was successfully applied in Gottesman and Chuang's quantum digital signatures. When it comes to the unveilingtime, Alice only sends the bit strings to Bob. Finally, Bob generates quantum states form the bit strings by the same quantum one-way function and uses controlled-swap circuit to check whether the quantum states are identical with the evidence.