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arXiv:2501.07351 · Physical Review A

Honest-binding quantum bit commitment from separable operations

Ziad Chaoui, Anna Pappa, Matteo Rosati

Published May 5, 2026• 1 citation
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Bit commitment is a fundamental cryptographic primitive and a cornerstone for numerous two-party cryptographic protocols, including zero-knowledge proofs. However, it has been proven that unconditionally secure bit commitment, both classical and quantum, is impossible. In this work, we demonstrate that imposing a restriction on the committing party to perform only separable operations enables secure quantum bit-commitment schemes. Specifically, we prove that in any perfectly hiding bit-commitment protocol, an honestly committing party limited to separable operations will be detected with high probability if they attempt to alter their commitment. To illustrate our findings, we present an example protocol.

DOI
10.1103/58t8-dj5y

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Bit commitment is a fundamental cryptographic primitive and a cornerstone for numerous two-party cryptographic protocols, including zero-knowledge proofs. However, it has been proven that unconditionally secure bit commitment, both classical and quantum, is impossible. In this work, we demonstrate that imposing a restriction on the committing party to perform only separable operations enables secure quantum bit-commitment schemes. Specifically, we prove that in any perfectly hiding bit-commitment protocol, an honestly committing party limited to separable operations will be detected with high probability if they attempt to alter their commitment. To illustrate our findings, we present an example protocol.
Bit commitment is an essential primitive in quantum cryptography. It is the basic building block of many cryptographic protocols in which it provides security over distrustful parties. This paper proposes a secured quantum two-bit commitment protocol for any two classical bits. The protocol contains two parties - a committer and a receiver - who share both quantum and classical communication channels. The main phases of this protocol are commitment and revealing phases where the concealing and binding conditions are proved in order to accept the commitment message. The proposed framework utilizes different security layers to hide specific quantum states in a superposition alongside trivial one qubit operations. The secured unitary transformations are applied by the two parties to meet the concealing and binding conditions. To verify the success of the proposed protocol, the measured output of the two parties are compared. The protocol operates under the assumption that the two parties might cheat and the possible existence of an eavesdropper.
The commitment of bits between two mutually distrustful parties is a powerful cryptographic primitive with which many cryptographic objectives can be achieved. It is widely believed that unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment is impossible due to quantum entanglement cheating, which is codified in a general impossibility theorem. Gaps in the proof of this impossibility theorem are found. An unconditionally secure bit commitment protocol utilizing anonymous quantum states and the no-clone theorem is presented below with a full security proof.
Bit commitment involves the submission of evidence from one party to another so that the evidence can be used to confirm a later revealed bit value by the first party, while the second party cannot determine the bit value from the evidence alone. It is widely believed that unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment is impossible due to quantum entanglement cheating, which is codified in a general impossibility theorem. In this paper, the scope of this general impossibility proof is analyzed, and gaps are found. Two variants of a bit commitment scheme utilizing anonymous quantum states and decoy states are presented. In the first variant, the exact verifying measurement is independent of the committed bit value, thus the second party can make it before the first party opens, making possible an unconditional security proof based on no-cloning. In the second variant, the impossibility proof fails because quantum entanglement purification of a mixed state does not render the protocol determinate. Whether impossibility holds in this or similar protocols is an open question, although preliminary results already show that the impossibility proof cannot work as it stands.
Abstract Commitment scheme is a fundamental cryptographic primitive that serve as building blocks for many other two-party protocols. In this paper, we propose a novel quantum bit commitment scheme, which is secure and does not require quantum memory. Our scheme processes the quantum information using coherent states and unambiguous state discrimination (USD) measurements, which can be experimentally realized by linear optics and photon detectors. We ensure the unconditionally hiding and binding property by preventing both Alice and Bob from obtaining complete information about the commitment in committing stage, and eliminate the requirement for quantum memory by performing USD measurements and phase shifts immediately after receiving the coherent states.
Unconditionally secure bit commitment and coin flipping are known to be impossible in the classical world. Bit commitment is known to be impossible also in the quantum world. We introduce a related new primitive - {\em quantum bit escrow}. In this primitive Alice commits to a bit bbb to Bob. The commitment is {\em binding} in the sense that if Alice is asked to reveal the bit, Alice can not bias her commitment without having a good probability of being detected cheating. The commitment is {\em sealing} in the sense that if Bob learns information about the encoded bit, then if later on he is asked to prove he was playing honestly, he is detected cheating with a good probability. Rigorously proving the correctness of quantum cryptographic protocols has proved to be a difficult task. We develop techniques to prove quantitative statements about the binding and sealing properties of the quantum bit escrow protocol. A related primitive we construct is a quantum biased coin flipping protocol where no player can control the game, i.e., even an all-powerful cheating player must lose with some constant probability, which stands in sharp contrast to the classical world where such protocols are impossible.
Bit commitment is one of the cornerstones of both classical and quantum cryptography. In the classical world, security analysis is straightforward because both hiding and binding each admit a single natural interpretation. In the quantum world, however, security notions can be defined in different ways that are not necessarily equivalent. Over three decades, several works have introduced numerous binding notions whose precise statements and mu- tual implications remain scattered across the literature. This thesis clarifies that ambiguity. We study quantum binding notions within the framework of canonical purified quantum bit commitment (QBC) schemes, a class that captures both the theoretical generality and the practical mechanisms of recent constructions. In the statistical setting, we examine six binding notions: strong-binding, honest-binding, sum-binding, collapse-binding, extractor- binding, and arbitrary-binding. We prove that all these definitions except strong-binding are equivalent for the class of canonical purified schemes. In the computational setting, we establish that honest-binding, sum-binding, and collapse-binding are equivalent for the same class of schemes. Moreover, we introduce a quantitative framework based on the work of Ref. [26] to quantify the tradeoff between hiding and binding properties, and we use it to provide a geometric proof of the impossibility theorem of Mayers [21] and Lo & Chau [20], for canonical purified schemes. We next revisit the quantum notion of hiding, which is far less ambiguous than binding. Finally, we survey some technical tools that can be used to construct secure QBC schemes.