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Features, not waves!

Gennaro Auletta

Published Jan 1, 2013• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

Gennaro Auletta University of Cassino gennaro.auletta@gmail.com Classically, the main ontological attempts at understanding quantum mechanics focus on the corpuscular behavior of these systems and especially on detection events, since these are the most classical phenomena that we have in such a context (indeed, they also require the presence of a classical apparatus). The main trend has been to consider wave-like aspects as deprived of ontological substrate and as reflecting rather the mathematical abstract formalism of the theory. The few attempts that have been done in order to assign some form of ontological reference to wave-like aspects have tried to interpreted this in terms of classical waves and have been disproved across the last 30 years (see Auletta & Tarozzi, 2004b; Auletta & Torcal, 2011). It is perhaps time to try a different approach, by renouncing any attempt at a classical ontology and by taking seriously into account the non-local aspects of the theory (which are mostly associated with wave-like phenomena). When we consider things in this perspective, we shall discover that all non-local phenomena in quantum mechanics, although different, have something in common: they all rely on non-local interdependencies among possible events or measurement outcomes (see Auletta, 2011). This is true for all interference phenomena for isolated systems, this is true for entangled systems, this is true for the Aharonov-Bohm effect, and so on. What is sad is that we do not have until now a name for denoting this mysterious reality. It is indeed mysterious, since we cannot directly measure it. There is in fact no way to have a direct experimental evidence of it. In most cases we can only reconstruct the interference profile after many experimental runs, a circumstance that has led many scientists to discard any ontological attribution to wave-like phenomena. However, a proposed

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Epilogue

Sudip Patra, Menas C. Kafatos

We like to take stock of the matter now, after we have presented different aspects of quantum-like reality proposal. We started by observing that the objective realist picture of the world as proposed by Newtonian-Hamiltonian framework, and much endorsed by scientists and philosophers from different domains of knowledge, could not stand the test of time. Particularly since the 1920s, it got clarified that the same picture of reality would be an obvious failure in the microphysical realm, the quantum-physical realm. Since the 1920s, the world witnessed the rise of the Copenhagen framework, with various interpretations over time. Most of these interpretations (whether ontological, non-ontological or epistemological) were in contrast to the classical physics ontology (either waves or particles with definite trajectories). Such varied interpretations have largely generated two ideological camps, realist and anti-realist. The realist camp (including diverse frameworks like Bohmian pilot wave theory, Everettian multiverse theory, to David Albert-led wave function realism [ Albert, 2023 ]) attempted to provide a new ontology of the world, whereas the non-realist camp (particularly the original Copenhagen camp) wanted to challenge the very attempt of whether at all an objective picture of microphysical reality is even possible to imagine.

Routledge eBooks•May 26, 2026•0 citations

Mind, Matter and Quantum Mechanics (2nd edition)

G. Mahler

Quantum mechanics is usually defined in terms of some loosely connected axioms and rules. Such a foundation is far from the beauty of, e.g., the `principles' underlying classical mechanics. Motivated, in addition, by notorious interpretation problems, there have been numerous attempts to modify or `complete' quantum mechanics. A first attempt was based on so-called hidden variables; its proponents essentially tried to expel the non-classical nature of quantum mechanics. More recent proposals intend to complete quantum mechanics not within mechanics proper but on a `higher (synthetic) level'; by means of a combination with gravitation theory (R Penrose), with quantum information theory (C M Caves, C A Fuchs) or with psychology and brain science (H P Stapp). I think it is fair to say that in each case the combination is with a subject that, per se , suffers from a very limited understanding that is even more severe than that of quantum mechanics. This was acceptable, though, if it could convincingly be argued that scientific progress desperately needs to join forces. Quantum mechanics of a closed system was a beautiful and well understood theory with its respective state being presented as a point on a deterministic trajectory in Liouville space---not unlike the motion of a classical N -particle system in its 6N -dimensional phase-space. Unfortunately, we need an inside and an outside view, we need an external reference frame, we need an observer. This unavoidable partition is the origin of most of the troubles we have with quantum mechanics. A pragmatic solution is introduced in the form of so-called measurement postulates: one of the various incompatible properties of the system under consideration is supposed to be realized (i.e. to become a fact, to be defined without fundamental dispersion) based on `instantaneous' projections within some externally selected measurement basis. As a result, the theory becomes essentially statistical rather than deterministic; furthermore there is an asymmetry between the observed and the observing. This is the point where consciousness may come in. Complemented by an introduction and several appendices, Henry Stapp's book consists essentially of three parts: theory, implications, and new developments. The theory part gives a very readable account of the Copenhagen interpretation, some aspects of a psychophysical theory, and, eventually, hints towards a quantum foundation of the brain--mind connection. The next part, `implications', summarizes some previous attempts to bridge the gap between the working rules of quantum mechanics and their possible consequences for our understanding of this world (Pauli, Everett, Bohm, Heisenberg). The last section, `new developments', dwells on some ideas about the conscious brain and its possible foundation on quantum mechanics. The book is an interesting and, in part, fascinating contribution to a field that continues to be a companion to `practical' quantum mechanics since its very beginning. It is doubtful whether such types of `quantum ontologies' will ever become (empirically) testable; right now one can hardly expect more than to be offered some consistent `grand picture', which the reader may find more or less acceptable or even rewarding. Many practicing quantum physicists, though, will remain unimpressed. The shift from synthetic ontology to analytic ontology is the foundation of the present work. This means that fundamental wholes are being partitioned into their ontologically subordinate components by means of `events'. The actual event, in turn, is an abrupt change in the Heisenberg state describing the quantum universe. The new state then defines the tendencies associated with the next actual event. To avoid infinite regression in terms of going from one state of tendencies to the next, consciousness is there to give these events a special `feel', to provide a status of `intrinsic actuality'. The brain of an alert human observer is similar in an important way to a quantum detection device: it can amplify small signals to large macroscopic effects. On the other hand, actual events are not postulated to occur exclusively in brains. They are more generally associated with the formation of records. Records are necessarily part of the total state of the universe: it is obvious that the state of the universe cannot undergo a Schrödinger dynamics and at the same time record its own history. `The full universe consists therefore of an exceedingly thin veneer of relatively sluggish, directly observable properties resting on a vast ocean or rapidly fluctuating unobservable ones.' The present ideas also bear on how the world should be seen to develop. While conventional cosmology encounters problems as to how to define the intial conditions, which would enter the governing equations of motion, here `the boundary conditions are set not at some initial time, but gradually by a sequence of acts that imposes a sequence of constraints. After any sequence of acts there remains a collection of possible worlds, some of which will be eliminated by the next act.' Connected with those acts is `meaning': there has always been some speculation about the special significance of local properties in our understanding of the world. One could argue that correlations (even the quantum correlations found, e.g., in the EPR-experiments) were as real as anything else. But also Stapp stresses the special role of locality: the `local observable properties, or properties similar to them are the natural, and perhaps exclusive, carriers of meaning in the quantum universe. From this point of view the quantum universe tends to create meaning.' This sounds like an absolute concept: meaning not with respect to something else, but defined intrinsically---not easy to digest. The role of consciousness in the developing quantum universe requires more attention. `The causal irrelevance of our thoughts within classical physics constitutes a serious deficiency of that theory, construed as a description of reality.' This is taken to be entirely different within quantum mechanics. `The core idea of quantum mechanics is to describe our activities as knowledge-seeking and knowledge-using agents.' `21st century science does not reduce human beings to mechanical automata. Rather it elevates human beings to agents whose free choices can, according to the known laws, actually influence their behaviour.' An example with respect to perception is discussed: `Why, when we look at a triangle, do we experience three lines joined at three points and not some pattern of neuron firings?' The brain `does not convert an actual whole triangle into some jumbled set of particle motions; rather it converts a concatenation of separate external events into the actualization of some single integrated pattern of neural activity that is congruent to the perceived whole triangle.' How convincing is this proposal? It is hard to tell. I think Henry Stapp did a good job, but there are tight limitations to any such endeavour. Quantum mechanics is often strange indeed, but it also gives rise to our classical world around us. For the emergence of classicality jumps and measurement projections (the basic phenomena connected with those fundamental events of choice) are not needed. Therefore, I doubt whether the explanation of the evolution of our world really allows (or requires) that much free choice. On the other hand, most scientist will agree that empirical science was not possible without free will: we could not ask independent questions if this asking was part of a deterministic trajectory. The fact that the result of a quantum measurement is indeterminate (within given probabilities) does certainly not explain free will. How about the type of measurment? The experimentalist will have to assume that he can select the pertinent observable within some limits. But given a certain design the so-called pointer basis (producing stable measurement results) is no longer a matter of free choice. `The main theme of classical physics is that we live in a clocklike universe.' Today it is often assumed that the universe was a big (quantum-) computer or a cellular automaton. Many would be all too happy to leave that rather restrictive picture behind. But where to go? Stapp suggests giving consciousness a prominent role: `The most profound alteration of the fundamental principles was to bring consciousness of human beings into the basic structure of the physical theory.' How far we are able to go in this direction will depend on the amount of concrete research results becoming available to support this view.

Journal of Physics A Mathematical and General•Jun 17, 2004•4 citations

Perspectives in Quantum Physics: Epistemological, Ontological and Pedagogical. An investigation into student and expert perspectives on the physical interpretation of quantum mechanics, with implications for modern physics instruction

Charles Baily

A common learning goal for modern physics instructors is for students to recognize a difference between the experimental uncertainty of classical physics and the fundamental uncertainty of quantum mechanics. Our studies suggest this notoriously difficult task may be frustrated by the intuitively realist perspectives of introductory students, and a lack of ontological flexibility in their conceptions of light and matter. We have developed a framework for understanding and characterizing student perspectives on the physical interpretation of quantum mechanics, and demonstrate the differential impact on student thinking of the myriad ways instructors approach interpretive themes in their introductory courses. Like expert physicists, students interpret quantum phenomena differently, and these interpretations are significantly influenced by their overall stances on questions central to the so-called measurement problem: Is the wave function physically real, or simply a mathematical tool? Is the collapse of the wave function an ad hoc rule, or a physical transition not described by any equation? Does an electron, being a form of matter, exist as a localized particle at all times? These questions, which are of personal and academic interest to our students, are largely only superficially addressed in our introductory courses, often for fear of opening a Pandora's Box of student questions, none of which have easy answers. We show how a transformed modern physics curriculum (recently implemented at the University of Colorado) may positively impact student perspectives on indeterminacy and wave-particle duality, by making questions of classical and quantum reality a central theme of our course, but also by making the beliefs of our students, and not just those of scientists, an explicit topic of discussion.

arXiv:1109.1295•ProQuest LLC eBooks•Sep 6, 2011•0 citations

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•Dec 26, 2019•65 citations

I-S01Wave Function, Measurement, Uncertainty, Entanglement, and the Classical Limit

汉 罗

Current quantum theory is extremely successful at the computational level, but its core objects have long been under multiple competing interpretations: whether the wave function is ontology, knowledge, a statistical tool, or a projection of hidden structure; why measurement changes the result; whether uncertainty is a fuzziness of natural ontology or a readout limitation; whether entanglement implies real action‑at‑a‑distance; and why the classical world emerges from quantum structure. This paper, building on the object rewriting, electron candidate, quantum‑optical background release packets, vacuum lowest state, time‑rate field, and reality‑bridging framework already accomplished in the three‑pillar system of Non‑manifest Selection of Being, invokes only the minimal public interfaces directly relevant to quantum foundational problems, and attempts to provide a unified rewriting of the above five questions. Our core conclusions are threefold. First, the wave function should not be primarily regarded as an a priori matter cloud or a purely cognitive symbol, but should be understood as: the readable complex‑amplitude projection of the joint state of a locally stable structural body and the free‑state background, under a given observational context \mathcal C. Define the object‑background joint state as $$\mathfrak P \otimes \Theta_f,$$ then the minimal object‑position of the wave function is written as $$\Psi_{\mathcal C} = \mathcal R_{\mathcal C}\!\left(\mathfrak P\otimes \Theta_f\right),$$ where \mathcal R_{\mathcal C} denotes the contextual projection operator jointly determined by the apparatus, boundaries, readout directions, and filtering rules. Thus, |\Psi|^2 is no longer "material density," but the realisable weight density of the joint state on a given readout channel. Second, measurement is not "looking" or a mysterious collapse, but the real coupling, channel filtering, and recording‑state freezing among the object, apparatus, and background. If the set of readable channels of the apparatus is \{\Pi_k^{(\mathcal A)}\}, then a measurement corresponds to the structural rewriting $$(\mathfrak P,\mathcal A,\Theta_f) \longrightarrow (\mathfrak P'_k,\mathcal A'_k,\Theta_f')$$ and, in conditionalised readout language, appears as $$\Psi_{\mathcal C} \longmapsto \Psi_{\mathcal C,k}' = \frac{\Pi_k^{(\mathcal A)}\Psi_{\mathcal C}} {\|\Pi_k^{(\mathcal A)}\Psi_{\mathcal C}\|}.$$ The so‑called "collapse" is therefore not an uncaused event, but a conditionalised rewriting on a designated channel after coupling. Third, uncertainty, entanglement, and the classical limit should all be derived from the main line of "joint state + background + finite readout." The minimal action bridge $$\hbar_* = m_e c \ell_e$$ specifies the minimal readout scale in phase space, so the position‑momentum‑type uncertainty relation is written as $$\Delta x\,\Delta p \gtrsim \frac{\hbar_*}{2},$$ whose essence is not the world's ontology being self‑contradictory, but the incompatibility between localisation and directional readout. Entanglement need not be interpreted as controllable action‑at‑a‑distance, but is written as: $$\Psi_{AB}\neq \Psi_A\Psi_B,$$ i.e., the non‑factorisable common background‑channel constraints under joint preparation conditions. The classical limit is not "quantum suddenly failing," but after $$\frac{S}{\hbar_*}\gg 1,$$ accompanied by stable‑island locking, environmental decoherence, and coarse‑grained averaging, the joint‑state projection contracts to near‑classical trajectories and near‑deterministic macroscopic readings. Finally, we give the object‑position of the wave function, the structural formula of measurement, the origin of uncertainty, the non‑superluminal reading of entanglement, the criterion for the classical limit, comparison with reality, and falsifiability conditions. The goal of this paper is not to replace the entire set of quantum mechanical techniques in one article, but first to lock down the deepest main line: if microscopic objects are not points, the vacuum is not emptiness, and propagation depends on the free‑state background, then the wave function, measurement, uncertainty, entanglement, and the classical world should no longer be fragmented into five mutually unrelated problems, but should be uniformly seen as "different representations of the structure‑background joint state under finite readout."

•Jul 25, 2026•0 citations

Protective and state measurement: a review

Gennaro Auletta

In this chapter, I summarize the general way in which the measurement process can be cast (by making use of effects and amplitude operators). Then, I show that there are two main problems with the state measurement: (i) how to avoid the disruptive back action on the state of the measured system during detection and (ii) how to extract complete information from this state. In order to deal with them I first introduce quantum non-demolition (QND) measurement and examine the problem whether the entire probability distribution of the measured observable is not altered by a QND measurement, which would allow repeated QND measurements with different observables to extract the whole information from the measured system. However, I show that this is not the case. Then, I deal with protective measurement as such and show that a reversible measurement is in fact not a measurement. However, by taking advantage of statistical methods (and therefore by renouncing measurement of the state of a single system), we can indeed reconstruct the wave function but only by partially recovering the information contained in the state. Two further prices to pay are to admit the existence of negative quasi-probabilities due to the interference terms and to make use of unsharp observables for guaranteeing informational completeness. Introduction The aim of this chapter is a review of the developments related to the measurement of the state vector and the problems that have been raised in this context. Traditionally, the state vector or the wave function describing quantum systems has been considered as a formal tool for calculating the probabilities associated with certain events like measurement outcomes, but few scholars have tried to attribute to it an ontological status. It is well known how many difficulties are related to an attempt at assigning a kind of reality to the state of quantum systems.

Cambridge University Press eBooks•Nov 30, 2014•1 citation
Gennaro Auletta University of Cassino gennaro.auletta@gmail.com Classically, the main ontological attempts at understanding quantum mechanics focus on the corpuscular behavior of these systems and especially on detection events, since these are the most classical phenomena that we have in such a context (indeed, they also require the presence of a classical apparatus). The main trend has been to consider wave-like aspects as deprived of ontological substrate and as reflecting rather the mathematical abstract formalism of the theory. The few attempts that have been done in order to assign some form of ontological reference to wave-like aspects have tried to interpreted this in terms of classical waves and have been disproved across the last 30 years (see Auletta & Tarozzi, 2004b; Auletta & Torcal, 2011). It is perhaps time to try a different approach, by renouncing any attempt at a classical ontology and by taking seriously into account the non-local aspects of the theory (which are mostly associated with wave-like phenomena). When we consider things in this perspective, we shall discover that all non-local phenomena in quantum mechanics, although different, have something in common: they all rely on non-local interdependencies among possible events or measurement outcomes (see Auletta, 2011). This is true for all interference phenomena for isolated systems, this is true for entangled systems, this is true for the Aharonov-Bohm effect, and so on. What is sad is that we do not have until now a name for denoting this mysterious reality. It is indeed mysterious, since we cannot directly measure it. There is in fact no way to have a direct experimental evidence of it. In most cases we can only reconstruct the interference profile after many experimental runs, a circumstance that has led many scientists to discard any ontological attribution to wave-like phenomena. However, a proposed
We like to take stock of the matter now, after we have presented different aspects of quantum-like reality proposal. We started by observing that the objective realist picture of the world as proposed by Newtonian-Hamiltonian framework, and much endorsed by scientists and philosophers from different domains of knowledge, could not stand the test of time. Particularly since the 1920s, it got clarified that the same picture of reality would be an obvious failure in the microphysical realm, the quantum-physical realm. Since the 1920s, the world witnessed the rise of the Copenhagen framework, with various interpretations over time. Most of these interpretations (whether ontological, non-ontological or epistemological) were in contrast to the classical physics ontology (either waves or particles with definite trajectories). Such varied interpretations have largely generated two ideological camps, realist and anti-realist. The realist camp (including diverse frameworks like Bohmian pilot wave theory, Everettian multiverse theory, to David Albert-led wave function realism [ Albert, 2023 ]) attempted to provide a new ontology of the world, whereas the non-realist camp (particularly the original Copenhagen camp) wanted to challenge the very attempt of whether at all an objective picture of microphysical reality is even possible to imagine.
Quantum mechanics is usually defined in terms of some loosely connected axioms and rules. Such a foundation is far from the beauty of, e.g., the `principles' underlying classical mechanics. Motivated, in addition, by notorious interpretation problems, there have been numerous attempts to modify or `complete' quantum mechanics. A first attempt was based on so-called hidden variables; its proponents essentially tried to expel the non-classical nature of quantum mechanics. More recent proposals intend to complete quantum mechanics not within mechanics proper but on a `higher (synthetic) level'; by means of a combination with gravitation theory (R Penrose), with quantum information theory (C M Caves, C A Fuchs) or with psychology and brain science (H P Stapp). I think it is fair to say that in each case the combination is with a subject that, per se , suffers from a very limited understanding that is even more severe than that of quantum mechanics. This was acceptable, though, if it could convincingly be argued that scientific progress desperately needs to join forces. Quantum mechanics of a closed system was a beautiful and well understood theory with its respective state being presented as a point on a deterministic trajectory in Liouville space---not unlike the motion of a classical N -particle system in its 6N -dimensional phase-space. Unfortunately, we need an inside and an outside view, we need an external reference frame, we need an observer. This unavoidable partition is the origin of most of the troubles we have with quantum mechanics. A pragmatic solution is introduced in the form of so-called measurement postulates: one of the various incompatible properties of the system under consideration is supposed to be realized (i.e. to become a fact, to be defined without fundamental dispersion) based on `instantaneous' projections within some externally selected measurement basis. As a result, the theory becomes essentially statistical rather than deterministic; furthermore there is an asymmetry between the observed and the observing. This is the point where consciousness may come in. Complemented by an introduction and several appendices, Henry Stapp's book consists essentially of three parts: theory, implications, and new developments. The theory part gives a very readable account of the Copenhagen interpretation, some aspects of a psychophysical theory, and, eventually, hints towards a quantum foundation of the brain--mind connection. The next part, `implications', summarizes some previous attempts to bridge the gap between the working rules of quantum mechanics and their possible consequences for our understanding of this world (Pauli, Everett, Bohm, Heisenberg). The last section, `new developments', dwells on some ideas about the conscious brain and its possible foundation on quantum mechanics. The book is an interesting and, in part, fascinating contribution to a field that continues to be a companion to `practical' quantum mechanics since its very beginning. It is doubtful whether such types of `quantum ontologies' will ever become (empirically) testable; right now one can hardly expect more than to be offered some consistent `grand picture', which the reader may find more or less acceptable or even rewarding. Many practicing quantum physicists, though, will remain unimpressed. The shift from synthetic ontology to analytic ontology is the foundation of the present work. This means that fundamental wholes are being partitioned into their ontologically subordinate components by means of `events'. The actual event, in turn, is an abrupt change in the Heisenberg state describing the quantum universe. The new state then defines the tendencies associated with the next actual event. To avoid infinite regression in terms of going from one state of tendencies to the next, consciousness is there to give these events a special `feel', to provide a status of `intrinsic actuality'. The brain of an alert human observer is similar in an important way to a quantum detection device: it can amplify small signals to large macroscopic effects. On the other hand, actual events are not postulated to occur exclusively in brains. They are more generally associated with the formation of records. Records are necessarily part of the total state of the universe: it is obvious that the state of the universe cannot undergo a Schrödinger dynamics and at the same time record its own history. `The full universe consists therefore of an exceedingly thin veneer of relatively sluggish, directly observable properties resting on a vast ocean or rapidly fluctuating unobservable ones.' The present ideas also bear on how the world should be seen to develop. While conventional cosmology encounters problems as to how to define the intial conditions, which would enter the governing equations of motion, here `the boundary conditions are set not at some initial time, but gradually by a sequence of acts that imposes a sequence of constraints. After any sequence of acts there remains a collection of possible worlds, some of which will be eliminated by the next act.' Connected with those acts is `meaning': there has always been some speculation about the special significance of local properties in our understanding of the world. One could argue that correlations (even the quantum correlations found, e.g., in the EPR-experiments) were as real as anything else. But also Stapp stresses the special role of locality: the `local observable properties, or properties similar to them are the natural, and perhaps exclusive, carriers of meaning in the quantum universe. From this point of view the quantum universe tends to create meaning.' This sounds like an absolute concept: meaning not with respect to something else, but defined intrinsically---not easy to digest. The role of consciousness in the developing quantum universe requires more attention. `The causal irrelevance of our thoughts within classical physics constitutes a serious deficiency of that theory, construed as a description of reality.' This is taken to be entirely different within quantum mechanics. `The core idea of quantum mechanics is to describe our activities as knowledge-seeking and knowledge-using agents.' `21st century science does not reduce human beings to mechanical automata. Rather it elevates human beings to agents whose free choices can, according to the known laws, actually influence their behaviour.' An example with respect to perception is discussed: `Why, when we look at a triangle, do we experience three lines joined at three points and not some pattern of neuron firings?' The brain `does not convert an actual whole triangle into some jumbled set of particle motions; rather it converts a concatenation of separate external events into the actualization of some single integrated pattern of neural activity that is congruent to the perceived whole triangle.' How convincing is this proposal? It is hard to tell. I think Henry Stapp did a good job, but there are tight limitations to any such endeavour. Quantum mechanics is often strange indeed, but it also gives rise to our classical world around us. For the emergence of classicality jumps and measurement projections (the basic phenomena connected with those fundamental events of choice) are not needed. Therefore, I doubt whether the explanation of the evolution of our world really allows (or requires) that much free choice. On the other hand, most scientist will agree that empirical science was not possible without free will: we could not ask independent questions if this asking was part of a deterministic trajectory. The fact that the result of a quantum measurement is indeterminate (within given probabilities) does certainly not explain free will. How about the type of measurment? The experimentalist will have to assume that he can select the pertinent observable within some limits. But given a certain design the so-called pointer basis (producing stable measurement results) is no longer a matter of free choice. `The main theme of classical physics is that we live in a clocklike universe.' Today it is often assumed that the universe was a big (quantum-) computer or a cellular automaton. Many would be all too happy to leave that rather restrictive picture behind. But where to go? Stapp suggests giving consciousness a prominent role: `The most profound alteration of the fundamental principles was to bring consciousness of human beings into the basic structure of the physical theory.' How far we are able to go in this direction will depend on the amount of concrete research results becoming available to support this view.
A common learning goal for modern physics instructors is for students to recognize a difference between the experimental uncertainty of classical physics and the fundamental uncertainty of quantum mechanics. Our studies suggest this notoriously difficult task may be frustrated by the intuitively realist perspectives of introductory students, and a lack of ontological flexibility in their conceptions of light and matter. We have developed a framework for understanding and characterizing student perspectives on the physical interpretation of quantum mechanics, and demonstrate the differential impact on student thinking of the myriad ways instructors approach interpretive themes in their introductory courses. Like expert physicists, students interpret quantum phenomena differently, and these interpretations are significantly influenced by their overall stances on questions central to the so-called measurement problem: Is the wave function physically real, or simply a mathematical tool? Is the collapse of the wave function an ad hoc rule, or a physical transition not described by any equation? Does an electron, being a form of matter, exist as a localized particle at all times? These questions, which are of personal and academic interest to our students, are largely only superficially addressed in our introductory courses, often for fear of opening a Pandora's Box of student questions, none of which have easy answers. We show how a transformed modern physics curriculum (recently implemented at the University of Colorado) may positively impact student perspectives on indeterminacy and wave-particle duality, by making questions of classical and quantum reality a central theme of our course, but also by making the beliefs of our students, and not just those of scientists, an explicit topic of discussion.
Abstract The book starts with a description of classical mechanics then discusses the quantum phenomena that require us to give up our commonsense classical intuitions. We consider the physical and conceptual arguments that led to the standard von Neumann-Dirac formulation of quantum mechanics and how the standard theory explains quantum phenomena. This includes a discussion of how the theory’s two dynamical laws work with the standard interpretation of states to explain determinate measurement records, quantum statistics, interference effects, entanglement, decoherence, and quantum nonlocality. A careful understanding of how the standard theory works ultimately leads to the quantum measurement problem. We consider how the measurement problem threatens the logical consistency of the standard theory then turn to a discussion of the main proposals for resolving it. This includes collapse formulations of quantum mechanics like Wigner’s extension of the standard theory and the GRW approach and no-collapse formulations like pure wave mechanics, the various many-worlds theories, and Bohmian mechanics. In discussing alternative formulations of quantum mechanics we pay particular attention to the explanatory role played by each theory’s empirical ontology and associated metaphysical commitments and the conceptual trade-offs between theoretical options.
Current quantum theory is extremely successful at the computational level, but its core objects have long been under multiple competing interpretations: whether the wave function is ontology, knowledge, a statistical tool, or a projection of hidden structure; why measurement changes the result; whether uncertainty is a fuzziness of natural ontology or a readout limitation; whether entanglement implies real action‑at‑a‑distance; and why the classical world emerges from quantum structure. This paper, building on the object rewriting, electron candidate, quantum‑optical background release packets, vacuum lowest state, time‑rate field, and reality‑bridging framework already accomplished in the three‑pillar system of Non‑manifest Selection of Being, invokes only the minimal public interfaces directly relevant to quantum foundational problems, and attempts to provide a unified rewriting of the above five questions. Our core conclusions are threefold. First, the wave function should not be primarily regarded as an a priori matter cloud or a purely cognitive symbol, but should be understood as: the readable complex‑amplitude projection of the joint state of a locally stable structural body and the free‑state background, under a given observational context \mathcal C. Define the object‑background joint state as P⊗Θf,\mathfrak P \otimes \Theta_f,P⊗Θf​, then the minimal object‑position of the wave function is written as ΨC=RC ⁣(P⊗Θf),\Psi_{\mathcal C} = \mathcal R_{\mathcal C}\!\left(\mathfrak P\otimes \Theta_f\right),ΨC​=RC​(P⊗Θf​), where \mathcal R_{\mathcal C} denotes the contextual projection operator jointly determined by the apparatus, boundaries, readout directions, and filtering rules. Thus, |\Psi|^2 is no longer "material density," but the realisable weight density of the joint state on a given readout channel. Second, measurement is not "looking" or a mysterious collapse, but the real coupling, channel filtering, and recording‑state freezing among the object, apparatus, and background. If the set of readable channels of the apparatus is \{\Pi_k^{(\mathcal A)}\}, then a measurement corresponds to the structural rewriting (P,A,Θf)⟶(Pk′,Ak′,Θf′)(\mathfrak P,\mathcal A,\Theta_f) \longrightarrow (\mathfrak P'_k,\mathcal A'_k,\Theta_f')(P,A,Θf​)⟶(Pk′​,Ak′​,Θf′​) and, in conditionalised readout language, appears as ΨC⟼ΨC,k′=Πk(A)ΨC∥Πk(A)ΨC∥.\Psi_{\mathcal C} \longmapsto \Psi_{\mathcal C,k}' = \frac{\Pi_k^{(\mathcal A)}\Psi_{\mathcal C}} {\|\Pi_k^{(\mathcal A)}\Psi_{\mathcal C}\|}.ΨC​⟼ΨC,k′​=∥Πk(A)​ΨC​∥Πk(A)​ΨC​​. The so‑called "collapse" is therefore not an uncaused event, but a conditionalised rewriting on a designated channel after coupling. Third, uncertainty, entanglement, and the classical limit should all be derived from the main line of "joint state + background + finite readout." The minimal action bridge ℏ∗=mecℓe\hbar_* = m_e c \ell_eℏ∗​=me​cℓe​ specifies the minimal readout scale in phase space, so the position‑momentum‑type uncertainty relation is written as Δx Δp≳ℏ∗2,\Delta x\,\Delta p \gtrsim \frac{\hbar_*}{2},ΔxΔp≳2ℏ∗​​, whose essence is not the world's ontology being self‑contradictory, but the incompatibility between localisation and directional readout. Entanglement need not be interpreted as controllable action‑at‑a‑distance, but is written as: ΨAB≠ΨAΨB,\Psi_{AB}\neq \Psi_A\Psi_B,ΨAB​=ΨA​ΨB​, i.e., the non‑factorisable common background‑channel constraints under joint preparation conditions. The classical limit is not "quantum suddenly failing," but after Sℏ∗≫1,\frac{S}{\hbar_*}\gg 1,ℏ∗​S​≫1, accompanied by stable‑island locking, environmental decoherence, and coarse‑grained averaging, the joint‑state projection contracts to near‑classical trajectories and near‑deterministic macroscopic readings. Finally, we give the object‑position of the wave function, the structural formula of measurement, the origin of uncertainty, the non‑superluminal reading of entanglement, the criterion for the classical limit, comparison with reality, and falsifiability conditions. The goal of this paper is not to replace the entire set of quantum mechanical techniques in one article, but first to lock down the deepest main line: if microscopic objects are not points, the vacuum is not emptiness, and propagation depends on the free‑state background, then the wave function, measurement, uncertainty, entanglement, and the classical world should no longer be fragmented into five mutually unrelated problems, but should be uniformly seen as "different representations of the structure‑background joint state under finite readout."
In this chapter, I summarize the general way in which the measurement process can be cast (by making use of effects and amplitude operators). Then, I show that there are two main problems with the state measurement: (i) how to avoid the disruptive back action on the state of the measured system during detection and (ii) how to extract complete information from this state. In order to deal with them I first introduce quantum non-demolition (QND) measurement and examine the problem whether the entire probability distribution of the measured observable is not altered by a QND measurement, which would allow repeated QND measurements with different observables to extract the whole information from the measured system. However, I show that this is not the case. Then, I deal with protective measurement as such and show that a reversible measurement is in fact not a measurement. However, by taking advantage of statistical methods (and therefore by renouncing measurement of the state of a single system), we can indeed reconstruct the wave function but only by partially recovering the information contained in the state. Two further prices to pay are to admit the existence of negative quasi-probabilities due to the interference terms and to make use of unsharp observables for guaranteeing informational completeness. Introduction The aim of this chapter is a review of the developments related to the measurement of the state vector and the problems that have been raised in this context. Traditionally, the state vector or the wave function describing quantum systems has been considered as a formal tool for calculating the probabilities associated with certain events like measurement outcomes, but few scholars have tried to attribute to it an ontological status. It is well known how many difficulties are related to an attempt at assigning a kind of reality to the state of quantum systems.