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Scientia et Fides

The Two Faces of Semi-Physicalism: A Response to Hans Halvorson

Robert Charles Koons, William M. Simpson, Barbara Drossel, George Ellis

Published Oct 31, 2025• 2 citations
Publisher

Abstract

This paper responds to Halvorson’s reflections on hylomorphism by addressing its quantum application (Koons and Simpson) and contextually emergent physics (Ellis and Drossel). It also critiques physicalist interpretations of quantum mechanics and argues for the fundamental nature of thermodynamic phenomena. Koons, Simpson, Ellis and Drossel defend hylomorphism as a framework that challenges dogmatic semi-physicalism. They examine causal pluralism, semantic indeterminacy and the limited validity of quantum mechanics, emphasising the role of micro and macroscopic elements in shaping a consistent worldview.

DOI
10.12775/setf.2025.016

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This paper responds to Halvorson’s reflections on hylomorphism by addressing its quantum application (Koons and Simpson) and contextually emergent physics (Ellis and Drossel). It also critiques physicalist interpretations of quantum mechanics and argues for the fundamental nature of thermodynamic phenomena. Koons, Simpson, Ellis and Drossel defend hylomorphism as a framework that challenges dogmatic semi-physicalism. They examine causal pluralism, semantic indeterminacy and the limited validity of quantum mechanics, emphasising the role of micro and macroscopic elements in shaping a consistent worldview.
In this chapter, I argue that Aristotle’s doctrine of hylomorphism, which conceived the natural world as consisting of substances which are metaphysically composed of matter and form, is ripe for rehabilitation in the light of quantum physics. I begin by discussing Aristotle’s conception of matter and form, as it was understood by Aquinas, and how Aristotle’s doctrine of hylomorphism was ‘physicalised’ and eventually abandoned with the rise of microphysicalism. I argue that the phenomenon of quantum entanglement, and the emergence of irreducibly macroscopic phenomena in finite temperature quantum systems, have given us good reasons to doubt the truth of microphysicalism. In support of my argument, I show how to construct a hylomorphic interpretation of the de Broglie-Bohm theory that posits a single Cosmic Substance. I then show how to construct a hylomorphic interpretation of an alternative ‘contextual’ wave function collapse theory (recently proposed by the physicists Barbara Drossel and George Ellis) which posits a plurality of thermal substances. Both of these neo-Aristotelian ontologies reject the microphysicalist dogma that nature consists solely of some set of microscopic constituents.
Abstract The neo-Aristotelian programme in natural philosophy comprises a family of theoretical frameworks that offer alternatives to quantum fundamentalism , i.e., to the metaphysical thesis that all the fundamental entities and all natural properties are represented explicitly in some model of quantum theory (whether or not supplemented by microphysical hidden variables or microphysically driven collapse mechanisms). I develop a taxonomy of possible Aristotelian interpretations of QM by considering seven choice points for quantum hylomorphism. I consider George Ellis and Barbara Drossel’s Contextual Wave Function Collapse theory, Alexander Pruss’s Traveling Forms model (Pruss 2018, 2023), and William Simpson’s Contextual Bohmian Mechanics, and locate them on this taxonomy. Finally, I take a stand (tentatively) on each of the seven choice points and suggest directions for further research.
Abstract An Aristotelian philosophy of nature rejects the modern prejudice in favor of the microscopic, a rejection that is crucial if we are to penetrate the mysteries of the quantum world. I defend an Aristotelian model by drawing on both quantum chemistry and recent work on the measurement problem. By building on the work of Hans Primas, using the distinction between quantum and classical properties that emerges in quantum chemistry at the thermodynamic or continuum limit, I develop a new version of the Copenhagen interpretation, a version that is realist, holistic, and hylomorphic in character, allowing for the attribution of fundamental causal powers to human observers and their instruments. I conclude with a critique of non-hylomorphic theories of primitive ontology, including Bohmian mechanics, Everettianism, and GRW mass-density.
Great revolutions in the study of nature in the past century have brought forth an onslaught of philosophical complications to the clarity of the classical perspective to which natural science was espoused prior to the twentieth century. The objective, intuitive principles by which we determined the reality of the world were beset by the ontological implications that flowed out of quantum mechanics and relativistic law. Wary of philosophical problems, a great number of the physical sciences lodge themselves in the comfort of empirical dogmatism as its only means of progression. But in light of the success of quantum systems, the ambiguity that buds must be taken into greater consideration. This paper discusses the background, development, objections, and interpretations of quantum mechanics and concurrent ontological premises to argue that such a philosophical tenet is inherent to nature, and, as such, is capable of producing results and predictions consistent with its physical and mathematical counterparts. To do so, the properties of measurement and the premises of causality are treated in terms of their physical terminology and foundations. The frameworks of Carroll, Everett, Heisenberg, Popper, and others analyze established interpretations and abstractions of quantum mechanics; its ties to the metaphysical and ontological descriptions of an existing entity are explored by means of the contrived spacetime allegory, which in principle determines the parameters that bound real systems. It is evident that ontological accounts for physical phenomena are not only viable and admissible but are necessary as our ability to describe the universe surpasses our ability to test and quantify these descriptions. These realizations allow us to better understand our world and move beyond empirical data when it is technologically unattainable, enabling us to build on statistical bases and approach the structure of realism through its essence of ambiguity.
Since its inception, the intricate mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics has empowered physicists to describe and predict specific physical events known as quantum processes. However, this success in probabilistic predictions has been accompanied by a profound challenge in the ontological interpretation of the theory. This interpretative complexity stems from two key aspects. Firstly, quantum mechanics is a fundamental theory that, so far, is not derivable from any more basic scientific theory. Secondly, it delves into a realm of invisible phenomena that often contradicts our intuitive and commonsensical notions of matter and causality. Despite its notorious difficulties of interpretation, the most widely accepted set of views of quantum phenomena has been known as the Copenhagen interpretation since the beginning of quantum mechanics. According to these views, the correct ontological interpretation of quantum mechanics is incompatible with ontological realism in general and with philosophical materialism in particular. Anti-realist and anti-materialist interpretations of quantum matter have survived until today. This paper discusses these perspectives, arguing that materialistic interpretations of quantum mechanics are compatible with its mathematical formalism, while anti-realist and anti-materialist views are based on wrong philosophical assumptions. However, although physicalism provides a better explanation for quantum phenomena than idealism, its downward reductionism prevents it from accounting for more complex forms of matter, such as biological or sociocultural systems. Thus, the paper argues that neither physicalism nor idealism can explain the universe. I propose then a non-reductionistic form of materialism called inclusive materialism. The conclusion is that the acknowledgment of the qualitative irreducibility of ontological emergent levels above the purely physical one does not deny philosophical materialism but enriches it.