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IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security

Evaluating Post-Quantum Cryptography for Resource-Constrained AMI Gateways

Sunwoo Lee, Woo-Hyun Choi, Hyuk Lim†, Seunghyun Yoon

Published Sep 8, 2025• 1 citation
Publisher

Abstract

Quantum computing threatens the security of classical public-key cryptography, prompting the development of post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) standards. Integrating these algorithms into embedded systems such as Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) gateways is challenging due to limited memory and power resources. This work evaluates the feasibility of deploying ML-KEM, ML-DSA, XMSS, and LMS on representative AMI hardware using a QEMU-based emulation testbed. We measure CPU cycles, peak RAM usage, and per-operation energy consumption across three typical gateway profiles. The results show that stateless schemes are compatible with current AMI constraints, while stateful schemes require more careful resource management.

DOI
10.1109/cns66487.2025.11194968

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Quantum computing threatens the security of classical public-key cryptography, prompting the development of post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) standards. Integrating these algorithms into embedded systems such as Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) gateways is challenging due to limited memory and power resources. This work evaluates the feasibility of deploying ML-KEM, ML-DSA, XMSS, and LMS on representative AMI hardware using a QEMU-based emulation testbed. We measure CPU cycles, peak RAM usage, and per-operation energy consumption across three typical gateway profiles. The results show that stateless schemes are compatible with current AMI constraints, while stateful schemes require more careful resource management.
Abstract Quantum computing threatens the security foundations of consumer electronics (CE). Preparing CE systems for the post-quantum transition requires quantitative evidence on the performance of standardized and selected post-quantum cryptography (PQC). This paper presents a cross-platform performance analysis of PQC key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs) and digital signature schemes against classical RSA/ECC baselines. We evaluate execution time and communication and storage overhead on two desktop-class reference platforms (macOS/M4 and Ubuntu/x86-64) and on a Raspberry Pi 4 platform used as a proxy for Linux-based gateway-class CE hubs and gateways. To establish a portable software baseline, the benchmark excludes vendor-specific hardware acceleration such as NEON and AVX. The results show that lattice-based schemes, especially ML-KEM and ML-DSA, provide a favorable measured combination of execution time and object size for gateway-class deployment. By contrast, Classic McEliece imposes large public-key sizes, while SPHINCS+ incurs large signatures despite its conservative hash-based design. Based on these measurements, we provide recommendations for gateway-class CE devices and identify open issues for deeper embedded platforms.
The advent of quantum computing threatens the security of classical public-key cryptographic systems, prompting the transition to post-quantum cryptography (PQC). While PQC has been analyzed in theory, its performance in practical wireless communication environments remains underexplored. This paper presents a detailed implementation and performance evaluation of NIST-selected PQC algorithms in user equipment (UE) to UE communications over 5G networks. Using a full 5G emulation stack (Open5GS and UERANSIM) and PQC-enabled TLS 1.3 via BoringSSL and liboqs, we examine key encapsulation mechanisms and digital signature schemes across realistic network conditions. We evaluate performance based on handshake latency, CPU and memory usage, bandwidth, and retransmission rates, under varying cryptographic configurations and client loads. Our findings show that ML-KEM with ML-DSA offers the best efficiency for latency-sensitive applications, while SPHINCS+ and HQC combinations incur higher computational and transmission overheads, making them unsuitable for security-critical but time-sensitive 5G scenarios.
The migration of Internet of Things (IoT) systems to post-quantum cryptography (PQC) is essential to ensure long-term security against quantum enabled adversaries. However, the large computational, memory, and communication overheads of PQC algorithms pose challenges for resource-constrained IoT environments. In practice, IoT platforms span a wide range of capabilities, from battery-powered sensors to gateway devices, making a one-size-fits-all configuration impractical. This paper presents a new methodology for selecting suitable PQC schemes based on RFC 7228 device classes. We introduce the Efficiency-Adjusted Security for Post-Quantum Cryptography (EAS-PQC) metric that considers security strength, latency, energy consumption, memory footprint, communication overhead, and protocol reliability. Device-class-specific constraints and weighting profiles are incorporated to reflect the operational priorities of Class 0, Class 1, and Class 2 IoT devices. Our evaluation primarily uses performance benchmarks from the PQM4 framework, which are based on ARM Cortex-M4 microcontroller profiles, and performance results from several work on similar embedded platforms. Energy consumption is estimated using a constant active power model derived from Cortex-M4 power characteristics. We evaluate multiple PQC candidates, including ML-KEM and ML-DSA, and the results show a quantitative mapping between IoT device classes and PQC schemes. Specifically, Saber-LightSaber is identified as the most suitable option for Class 0 devices, while ML-DSA-87 combined with ML-KEM-768 achieves the highest overall scores for Class 1 and Class 2 devices. Our findings improve feasibility and efficiency by up to 30–40% compared to static baseline configurations. With these findings, we recommend EAS-PQC as a useful tool for the assessment of post-quantum security in industrial IoT systems.
The rapid advancement of quantum computing poses a critical threat to classical cryptographic algorithms such as RSA and ECC, particularly in Internet of Things (IoT) devices, where secure communication is essential but often constrained by limited computational resources. This paper investigates the feasibility of deploying post-quantum cryptography (PQC) algorithms on resource-constrained devices. In particular, we implement three PQC algorithms - BIKE, CRYSTALS-Kyber, and HQC - on a lightweight IoT platform built with Raspberry Pi devices. Leveraging the Open Quantum Safe (liboqs) library in conjunction with mbedTLS, we develop quantumsecure key exchange protocols, and evaluate their performance in terms of computational overhead, memory usage, and energy consumption for quantum secure communication. Experimental results demonstrate that the integration of PQC algorithms on constrained hardware is practical, reinforcing the urgent need for quantum-resilient cryptographic frameworks in next-generation IoT devices. The implementation of this paper is available at https://iqsec-lab.github.io/PQC-IoT/.
The rapid advancement of quantum computing poses a critical threat to classical cryptographic algorithms such as RSA and ECC, particularly in Internet of Things (IoT) devices, where secure communication is essential but often constrained by limited computational resources. This paper investigates the feasibility of deploying post-quantum cryptography (PQC) algorithms on resource-constrained devices. In particular, we implement three PQC algorithms -- BIKE, CRYSTALS-Kyber, and HQC -- on a lightweight IoT platform built with Raspberry Pi devices. Leveraging the Open Quantum Safe (\texttt{liboqs}) library in conjunction with \texttt{mbedTLS}, we develop quantum-secure key exchange protocols, and evaluate their performance in terms of computational overhead, memory usage, and energy consumption for quantum secure communication. Experimental results demonstrate that the integration of PQC algorithms on constrained hardware is practical, reinforcing the urgent need for quantum-resilient cryptographic frameworks in next-generation IoT devices. The implementation of this paper is available at https://iqsec-lab.github.io/PQC-IoT/.
The rapid advancement of quantum computing poses a critical threat to classical cryptographic algorithms such as RSA and ECC, particularly in Internet of Things (IoT) devices, where secure communication is essential but often constrained by limited computational resources. This paper investigates the feasibility of deploying post-quantum cryptography (PQC) algorithms on resource-constrained devices. In particular, we implement three PQC algorithms - BIKE, CRYSTALS-Kyber, and HQC - on a lightweight IoT platform built with Raspberry Pi devices. Leveraging the Open Quantum Safe (liboqs) library in conjunction with mbedTLS, we develop quantumsecure key exchange protocols, and evaluate their performance in terms of computational overhead, memory usage, and energy consumption for quantum secure communication. Experimental results demonstrate that the integration of PQC algorithms on constrained hardware is practical, reinforcing the urgent need for quantum-resilient cryptographic frameworks in next-generation IoT devices. The implementation of this paper is available at https://iqsec-lab.github.io/PQC-IoT/.