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arXiv:2505.02239 · Scientific Reports

Performance analysis and deployment considerations of post-quantum cryptography for consumer Electronics

Daniel Commey, Benjamin Appiah, Griffith Selorm Klogo, Winful Bagyl-Bac, James Dzisi Gadze, Yousef S. Alsenani, Garth V. Crosby

Published Sep 11, 2026• 16 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Abstract Quantum computing threatens the security foundations of consumer electronics (CE). Preparing CE systems for the post-quantum transition requires quantitative evidence on the performance of standardized and selected post-quantum cryptography (PQC). This paper presents a cross-platform performance analysis of PQC key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs) and digital signature schemes against classical RSA/ECC baselines. We evaluate execution time and communication and storage overhead on two desktop-class reference platforms (macOS/M4 and Ubuntu/x86-64) and on a Raspberry Pi 4 platform used as a proxy for Linux-based gateway-class CE hubs and gateways. To establish a portable software baseline, the benchmark excludes vendor-specific hardware acceleration such as NEON and AVX. The results show that lattice-based schemes, especially ML-KEM and ML-DSA, provide a favorable measured combination of execution time and object size for gateway-class deployment. By contrast, Classic McEliece imposes large public-key sizes, while SPHINCS+ incurs large signatures despite its conservative hash-based design. Based on these measurements, we provide recommendations for gateway-class CE devices and identify open issues for deeper embedded platforms.

DOI
10.1038/s41598-026-62968-4

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Abstract Quantum computing threatens the security foundations of consumer electronics (CE). Preparing CE systems for the post-quantum transition requires quantitative evidence on the performance of standardized and selected post-quantum cryptography (PQC). This paper presents a cross-platform performance analysis of PQC key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs) and digital signature schemes against classical RSA/ECC baselines. We evaluate execution time and communication and storage overhead on two desktop-class reference platforms (macOS/M4 and Ubuntu/x86-64) and on a Raspberry Pi 4 platform used as a proxy for Linux-based gateway-class CE hubs and gateways. To establish a portable software baseline, the benchmark excludes vendor-specific hardware acceleration such as NEON and AVX. The results show that lattice-based schemes, especially ML-KEM and ML-DSA, provide a favorable measured combination of execution time and object size for gateway-class deployment. By contrast, Classic McEliece imposes large public-key sizes, while SPHINCS+ incurs large signatures despite its conservative hash-based design. Based on these measurements, we provide recommendations for gateway-class CE devices and identify open issues for deeper embedded platforms.
This study reviews post-quantum cryptographic algorithms for secure communication, focusing on standardized lattice-based schemes and their practical deployment implications. Classical public-key systems such as RSA and elliptic curve cryptography remain central to secure communication, but their long-term security is threatened by quantum algorithms capable of solving factorization and discrete logarithm problems. The study adopts a hybrid approach combining literature-based review with dataset-driven performance analysis. The empirical evaluation compares ML-KEM and ML-DSA with RSA-4096 and ECDSA-P256 using CPU benchmarking and network simulation metrics. Results indicate that ML-KEM provides substantial computational advantages over RSA-4096, making it suitable for latency-sensitive key establishment. ML-DSA also demonstrates competitive performance, especially in verification, but introduces larger signature sizes than ECDSA-P256. The analysis shows that the main deployment challenge is not computational feasibility but increased communication overhead caused by larger keys, ciphertexts, and signatures. These findings suggest that post-quantum migration requires more than direct algorithm replacement. Effective deployment should involve protocol optimization, crypto-agility, hybrid transition strategies, and context-specific parameter selection. Although the dataset focuses mainly on lattice-based algorithms, the study confirms the practical relevance of standardized post-quantum schemes for future secure communication infrastructure and identifies directions for broader evaluation across additional PQC families, including code-based, hash-based, multivariate approaches, real-world networks, and implementation-level security testing in practice contexts.
The advent of quantum computing threatens the security of classical public-key cryptographic systems, prompting the transition to post-quantum cryptography (PQC). While PQC has been analyzed in theory, its performance in practical wireless communication environments remains underexplored. This paper presents a detailed implementation and performance evaluation of NIST-selected PQC algorithms in user equipment (UE) to UE communications over 5G networks. Using a full 5G emulation stack (Open5GS and UERANSIM) and PQC-enabled TLS 1.3 via BoringSSL and liboqs, we examine key encapsulation mechanisms and digital signature schemes across realistic network conditions. We evaluate performance based on handshake latency, CPU and memory usage, bandwidth, and retransmission rates, under varying cryptographic configurations and client loads. Our findings show that ML-KEM with ML-DSA offers the best efficiency for latency-sensitive applications, while SPHINCS+ and HQC combinations incur higher computational and transmission overheads, making them unsuitable for security-critical but time-sensitive 5G scenarios.
The emergence of large-scale quantum computing presents an imminent threat to contemporary public-key cryptosystems, with quantum algorithms such as Shor’s algorithm capable of efficiently breaking RSA and elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). This vulnerability has catalyzed accelerated standardization efforts for post-quantum cryptography (PQC) by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and global security stakeholders. While theoretical security analysis of these quantum-resistant algorithms has advanced considerably, comprehensive real-world performance benchmarks spanning diverse computing environments—from high-performance cloud infrastructure to severely resource-constrained IoT devices—remain insufficient for informed deployment planning. This paper presents the most extensive cross-platform empirical evaluation to date of NIST-selected PQC algorithms, including CRYSTALS-Kyber and NTRU for key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs), alongside BIKE as a code-based alternative, and CRYSTALS-Dilithium and Falcon for digital signatures. Our systematic benchmarking framework measures computational latency, memory utilization, key sizes, and protocol overhead across multiple security levels (NIST Levels 1, 3, and 5) in three distinct hardware environments and various network conditions. Results demonstrate that contemporary server architectures can implement these algorithms with negligible performance impact (<5% additional latency), making immediate adoption feasible for cloud services. In contrast, resource-constrained devices experience more significant overhead, with computational demands varying by up to 12× between algorithms at equivalent security levels, highlighting the importance of algorithm selection for edge deployments. Beyond standalone algorithm performance, we analyze integration challenges within existing security protocols, revealing that naive implementation of PQC in TLS 1.3 can increase handshake size by up to 7× compared to classical approaches. To address this, we propose and evaluate three optimization strategies that reduce bandwidth requirements by 40–60% without compromising security guarantees. Our investigation further encompasses memory-constrained implementation techniques, side-channel resistance measures, and hybrid classical-quantum approaches for transitional deployments. Based on these comprehensive findings, we present a risk-based migration framework and algorithm selection guidelines tailored to specific use cases, including financial transactions, secure firmware updates, vehicle-to-infrastructure communications, and IoT fleet management. This practical roadmap enables organizations to strategically prioritize systems for quantum-resistant upgrades based on data sensitivity, resource constraints, and technical feasibility. Our results conclusively demonstrate that PQC is deployment-ready for most applications, provided that implementations are carefully optimized for the specific performance characteristics and security requirements of target environments. We also identify several remaining research challenges for the community, including further optimization for ultra-constrained devices, standardization of hybrid schemes, and hardware acceleration opportunities.
The advent of large-scale, fault-tolerant quantum computers threatens the mathematical foundations - namely integer factorization and discrete-logarithm hardness - on which today's public-key cryptography relies could be rendered insecure. This has shifted the need to move to Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) from a theoretical to an engineering priority. This work presents an extensive empirical comparison of the NIST standardized primitives used for key encapsulation (FIPS 203: ML-KEM) and digital signatures (FIPS 204: ML-DSA) with the standardised classical RSA-3072 primitives at similar security levels as defined by the NIST security level. This paper evaluates three fundamental performance metrics: (i) computational latency in CPU clock cycles; (ii) communication cost in bytes; and (iii) memory usage during the cryptographic operation, and combines them into a unified evaluation framework. Additionally, the paper discusses the mathematical principles of the standardized quantum-resistant schemes, namely Module Short Integer Solution (MSIS) and Module Learning With Errors (MLWE) focusing on their security principles. Benchmarking reveals that, despite lattice-based schemes incurring larger public key and signature sizes-up to32×32 \times32×relative to elliptic-curve counterpartsML-KEM-768 decapsulation is approximately108×108 \times108×faster than an RSA-3072 private-key operation, and ML-DSA-65 signing is approximately 19× faster than RSA-3072 signing. To support cryptographic agility during the post-quantum migration period, this paper proposes a modular hybrid architecture validated through a triple-hybrid (ECDH + Kyber + BB84 QKD) demonstration.
The migration of Internet of Things (IoT) systems to post-quantum cryptography (PQC) is essential to ensure long-term security against quantum enabled adversaries. However, the large computational, memory, and communication overheads of PQC algorithms pose challenges for resource-constrained IoT environments. In practice, IoT platforms span a wide range of capabilities, from battery-powered sensors to gateway devices, making a one-size-fits-all configuration impractical. This paper presents a new methodology for selecting suitable PQC schemes based on RFC 7228 device classes. We introduce the Efficiency-Adjusted Security for Post-Quantum Cryptography (EAS-PQC) metric that considers security strength, latency, energy consumption, memory footprint, communication overhead, and protocol reliability. Device-class-specific constraints and weighting profiles are incorporated to reflect the operational priorities of Class 0, Class 1, and Class 2 IoT devices. Our evaluation primarily uses performance benchmarks from the PQM4 framework, which are based on ARM Cortex-M4 microcontroller profiles, and performance results from several work on similar embedded platforms. Energy consumption is estimated using a constant active power model derived from Cortex-M4 power characteristics. We evaluate multiple PQC candidates, including ML-KEM and ML-DSA, and the results show a quantitative mapping between IoT device classes and PQC schemes. Specifically, Saber-LightSaber is identified as the most suitable option for Class 0 devices, while ML-DSA-87 combined with ML-KEM-768 achieves the highest overall scores for Class 1 and Class 2 devices. Our findings improve feasibility and efficiency by up to 30–40% compared to static baseline configurations. With these findings, we recommend EAS-PQC as a useful tool for the assessment of post-quantum security in industrial IoT systems.
The rapid advancement of quantum computing poses a significant threat to the security of classical public-key cryptographic systems, driving the need for the adoption of post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) solutions. Digital signatures are a fundamental security primitive in Internet of Things (IoT) systems, providing authentication, data integrity, and secure firmware update mechanisms. However, deploying PQC digital signature schemes on resource-constrained IoT devices remains a major challenge due to their limited computational power and memory capacity. This paper presents an experimental benchmarking study of post-quantum digital signature schemes on two widely used embedded platforms: the ESP32 and the Raspberry Pi 4. The evaluation is conducted under realistic operating conditions using Universal Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter (UART) and Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT) communication protocols, with all measurements obtained from real hardware implementations. Our results reveal critical trade-offs among execution time, memory footprint, and security level, and offer practical insights to guide the selection of suitable PQC digital signature schemes for deployment in constrained IoT environments.