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Foundations of Physics

Perspectives on the Quantum State

Lucy Mason

Published Aug 28, 2025• 1 citation
Publisher

Abstract

Abstract There are two main styles of interpreting the quantum state: either focusing on the fundamentality of the quantum state (a state or wavefunction realist view), or on how projection operators represent observable properties (an observable-first approach). Rather than being incompatible, I argue that these correspond to taking a 3rd person and 1st person perspective respectively. I further contend that the 1st person perspective - and the observable-first approach that goes with it - is better suited to explain measurement, based on the way that the metrology literature characterises measurement through the quantifiable properties of a system. Finally, I show how the 1st person, observable-first approach can emerge in the world through the process of decoherence, hence showing the compatibility of the two approaches and resolving the need to choose absolutely between them.

DOI
10.1007/s10701-025-00884-9

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Abstract There are two main styles of interpreting the quantum state: either focusing on the fundamentality of the quantum state (a state or wavefunction realist view), or on how projection operators represent observable properties (an observable-first approach). Rather than being incompatible, I argue that these correspond to taking a 3rd person and 1st person perspective respectively. I further contend that the 1st person perspective - and the observable-first approach that goes with it - is better suited to explain measurement, based on the way that the metrology literature characterises measurement through the quantifiable properties of a system. Finally, I show how the 1st person, observable-first approach can emerge in the world through the process of decoherence, hence showing the compatibility of the two approaches and resolving the need to choose absolutely between them.
The problem of measurement taken at face value shows clearly that there is an inconsistency inside the quantum formalism.The phenomenon of decoherence is often presented as a solution to it.A widely debated question is to decide between two different interpretations.The first one is to consider that the decoherence process has the effect to actually project a superposed state into one of its classically interpretable component, hence doing the same job as the reduction postulate.For the second one, decoherence is only a way to show why no macroscopic superposed state can be observed and so, to explain the classical appearance of the macroscopic world, while the quantum entanglement between the system, the apparatus and the environment never disappears.In this case, explaining why only one single definite outcome is observed remains to do.In this paper, we examine arguments for and against both interpretations and defend a position according to which the outcome that is observed is relative to the observer in close parallel to the Everett interpretation.
This paper explores the intricate relationship between the observer, consciousness, and quantum mechanics, attempting to defend the interpretation of the wave function as a representation of consciousness. More precisely, in our framework, a quantum state, represented by a wave function, determines a state of consciousness related to the first-person experiences, www, of the events EEE, detected by senses. Building on Everett’s many-worlds interpretation, we argue that the wave function is not an objective universal entity, but rather one that is inherently associated with the first-person experiences w∈Pw \in Pw∈P of an observer O\mathcal{O}O . The set PPP also includes other observers, O′\mathcal{O}^{\prime}O′, as subsets. We demonstrate that this proposal does not lead to solipsism, because there is no unique hierarchy of observers, as indicated above, but there are many possible hierarchies of observers, such that, e.g., the roles of the first-person observer, O\mathcal{O}O, and the third-person observer, O′\mathcal{O}^{\prime}O′ are interchanged. The corresponding quantum states, ψO\psi_{\mathcal{O}}ψO​ and ψO′\psi_{\mathcal{O}^{\prime}}ψO′​, are elements of the space of all possible quantum states, the Hilbert space, H\mathcal{H}H. It is this larger space that we identify as the objective reality. Thus, our approach overcomes the main obstacle faced by researchers who tried to make sense of quantum mechanics, namely, the wall of solipsism. In this framework, the Everett many-worlds interpretation and the wave function collapse interpretation are not mutually exclusive but instead represent complementary perspectives within the hierarchy of observers, each offering insight into the underlying physics from a different vantage point.
Previous work has shown that the problem of measurement in quantum mechanics is not correctly seen as one of understanding some allegedly univocal process of measurement in nature which corresponds to the projection postulate. The present paper introduces a new perspective by showing that how we are to understand the nature of the change of quantum mechanical state on measurement depends very sensitively on the interpretation of the state function, and by showing how attention to this dependence can greatly sharpen the problems and relations between them. In particular, the problems take a form resembling their traditional formulation only on an inexact value interpretation, according to which the state function attributes inexact values of quantities to systems. On other interpretations we can apply (with various drawbacks) the subensemble idea, according to which a discontinuous change of quantum mechanical description results on measurement simply because we need a new state function to describe a new object.
I take a pragmatist perspective on quantum theory. This is not a view of the world described by quantum theory. In this view quantum theory itself does not describe the physical world, nor our observatons, experiences or opinions of it. Instead, the theory offers reliable advice on when to expect an event of one kind or another, and on how strongly to expect each possible outcome of that event. The actual outcome is a perspectival fact: a fact relative to a physical context of assessment. Measurement outcomes and quantum states are both perspectival. By noticing that each must be relativized to an appropriate physical context one can resolve the measurement problem and the problem of nonlocal action. But if the outcome of a quantum measurement is not an absolute fact, then why shoud the statistics of such outcomes give us any objective reason to accept quantum theory? One can describe extensions of the scenario of Wigner's friend in which a statement expressing the outcome of a quantum measurement would be true relative to one such context but not relative to another. However, physical conditions in our world prevent us from realizing such scenarios. Since the outcome of every actual quantum measurement is certified at what is essentially a single context of assessment, the outcome relative to that context is an objective fact in the only sense that matters for science. We should accept quantum theory because the statistics these outcomes display are just those it leads us to expect.
Abstract—Since the beginning, quantum mechanics has raised major foundational and interpretative problems. Foundational research has been an important factor in the development of quantum cryptography, quantum information theory and, per-haps one day, practical quantum computers. Many believe that, in turn, quantum information theory has bearing on foundational research. This is largely related to the so-called epistemic view of quantum states, which maintains that the state vector represents information on a system and which has led to the suggestion that quantum theory needs no interpretation. I will argue that this and related approaches fail to take into consideration two different explanatory functions of quantum mechanics, that of accounting for classically unexplainable correlations between classical phenomena and that of explaining the microscopic structure of classical objects. The epistemic view provides no answer to what constitutes the main question of interpretation: How can the world be for quantum mechanics to be true? I will then review three different approaches to understanding quan-tum mechanics, namely, Bohmian mechanics, Everett’s relative states, and Cramer’s transactional interpretation. I will show that these approaches answer the above question, as well as other foundational ones. This paper is written from the perspective that different logically consistent interpretations, far from leading to confusion, in fact contribute to increased understanding of the theory. I.
A common assumption in non-relativistic quantum mechanics is that self-adjoint operators mathematically represent properties of quantum systems. Focusing on spin, we argue that a natural view considers observables as determinable properties and their eigenvalues as their corresponding determinates. We provide a taxonomy of the different views that one can hold, once it is accepted that spin can be modelled with the determinable-determinate relation. In particular, we present the two main families of views, dubbed Spin Monism and Pluralism, and we show that the current literature does not take a stance between the two. Then we put forward two arguments in favour of the former. Finally, we present a new account of Spin Monism, that is absent in current literature; such a view is worth discussing, or so we contend, because several compelling considerations support it, and it opens new ways of thinking about the ontology of quantum mechanics.