Previous work has shown that the problem of measurement in quantum mechanics is not correctly seen as one of understanding some allegedly univocal process of measurement in nature which corresponds to the projection postulate. The present paper introduces a new perspective by showing that how we are to understand the nature of the change of quantum mechanical state on measurement depends very sensitively on the interpretation of the state function, and by showing how attention to this dependence can greatly sharpen the problems and relations between them. In particular, the problems take a form resembling their traditional formulation only on an inexact value interpretation, according to which the state function attributes inexact values of quantities to systems. On other interpretations we can apply (with various drawbacks) the subensemble idea, according to which a discontinuous change of quantum mechanical description results on measurement simply because we need a new state function to describe a new object.
Previous work has shown that the problem of measurement in quantum mechanics is not correctly seen as one of understanding some allegedly univocal process of measurement in nature which corresponds to the projection postulate. The present paper introduces a new perspective by showing that how we are to understand the nature of the change of quantum mechanical state on measurement depends very sensitively on the interpretation of the state function, and by showing how attention to this dependence can greatly sharpen the problems and relations between them. In particular, the problems take a form resembling their traditional formulation only on an inexact value interpretation, according to which the state function attributes inexact values of quantities to systems. On other interpretations we can apply (with various drawbacks) the subensemble idea, according to which a discontinuous change of quantum mechanical description results on measurement simply because we need a new state function to describe a new object.
If we take the state function of quantum mechanics to describe belief states, arguments by Stairs and Friedman-Putnam show that the projection postulate may be justified as a kind of minimal change. But if the state function takes on a physical interpretation, it provides no more than what I call a fortuitous approximation of physical measurement processes, that is, an unsystematic form of approximation which should not be taken to correspond to some one univocal “measurement process” in nature. This fact suggests that the projection postulate does not provide a proper locus for interpretive investigation. Readers will also find section 3's analysis of fortuitous approximations of independent interest and presented without the perils of quantum mechanics.
The present paper contains a new attack on the measurement problem. The point of departure is a realist view according to which i) state functions in quantum theory describe physical states of affairs and not information states attributed to observers, and ii) in theses states, some observables are indeterminate and not merely unknown, i.e., value determinism is rejected. Furthermore, quantisation of interaction is accepted as an empirically established fact, independently of any interpretations of quantum theory. From these assumptions it follows that Hermitian operators replacing classical variables may be viewed as representing actions from the environment done on physical systems represented by the state functions upon which the operators operate. Sometimes this influence is followed by a discontinuous, indeterministic and irreversible state change; in other words, the system undergoes a collapse, which is represented by a projection operator. Thus, assuming a realistic view on quantum states and their changes, we have an explanation for the collapse of the wave function. Since the collapse is a discontinuous, random and irreversible state change, the classical form of physical explanation in terms of a mechanism which describes how a system continuously changes its state is impossible. Hence, if we accept quantisation of interaction, we must give up our demand for a ordinary mechanical explanation for the collapse. Neither can we state, in advance, sufficient conditions for the collapse, since it is an indeterministic theory.
Some of the problems connected with the interpretation of quantum mechanics are enumerated, in particular those related to some well known paradoxes and, above all, to the measurement process. We then show how the so called "Physics Laboratory Assumption" introduced in [1], which considers as "observables'' only the self-adjoint operators corresponding to existing measuring instruments, can propose a new perspective on the aforementioned problems and can replace the wavefunction collapse postulate.
[1] Luigi E. Picasso, "On the Concept of State in Quantum Mechanics: Another Way to Decoherence?'' Int. J. Theor. Phys. 62 (2), (2023)
Much of the recent discussion of problematic aspects of quantum-mechanical measurement centers around that feature of quantum theory which is called “the projection postulate.” This is roughly the claim that a change of a certain sort occurs in the state of a physical system when a measurement is made on the system. In this paper an argument for the projection postulate due to von Neumann is considered. Attention is focused on trying to provide an understanding of the notion of “the state of a physical system” which is compatible with the argument von Neumann offers. An attempt is made to formulate the argument in terms of an objectivistic interpretation of probability concepts. It is seen that such an interpretation does not provide a suitable way of understanding the argument. An attempt is made to illustrate the source of this failure in terms of a non-quantum-mechanical example.
According to orthodox quantum mechanics, state vectors change in two incompatible ways: “deterministically” in accordance with Schr0̈dinger's time-dependent equation, and probabilistically if and only if a measurement is made. It is argued here that the problem of measurement arises because the precise, mutually exclusive conditions for these two types of transitions to occur are not specified within orthodox quantum mechanics. Fundamentally, this is due to an inevitable ambiguity in the notion of “measurement” itself. Hence, if the problem of measurement is to be resolved, a new, fully objective version of quantum mechanics needs to be developed which does not incorporate the notion of measurement in its basic postulates at all.
We review the postulates of quantum mechanics with respect to the representation of physical states and measurable quantities, their time evolution, and the interpretation of measurements. We first formulate the postulates in terms of wave functions and differential operators, and then reformulate them in the abstract Hilbert space of state vectors, using Dirac’s notations. Improper states subject to Dirac’s delta normalization are introduced, and the space of physical states is extended to include them. The postulates are rationalized by associating each Hermitian linear operator with a complete orthonormal system of its eigenvectors, where measurement probabilities depend on the projections of these eigenvectors on the system’s state vector. Particularly, wave functions are identified as projections of state vectors on the position operator eigenstates. State vectors representing multidimensional systems are formulated as tensor products of vectors in their subspaces. Finally, we address the general uncertainty relations in simultaneous measurements of different observables.