We construct a quantum public key encryption scheme from oneway functions in the random oracle model. While our construction only has indistinguishability against restricted adversaries, who perform individual attacks and can only make classical queries to the random oracle, it possesses two practical advantages that were not achieved in previous works. First, legitimate participants can discard noisy quantum public keys. Second, the scheme only requires products of single-qubit states, and it does not require quantum computing or quantum memory for legitimate participants. Although the security does not hold against adversaries capable of large-scale quantum computation, we believe that our protocol is well-suited for the near-term stage of the quantum era.
We construct a quantum public key encryption scheme from oneway functions in the random oracle model. While our construction only has indistinguishability against restricted adversaries, who perform individual attacks and can only make classical queries to the random oracle, it possesses two practical advantages that were not achieved in previous works. First, legitimate participants can discard noisy quantum public keys. Second, the scheme only requires products of single-qubit states, and it does not require quantum computing or quantum memory for legitimate participants. Although the security does not hold against adversaries capable of large-scale quantum computation, we believe that our protocol is well-suited for the near-term stage of the quantum era.
Random oracle model is a general security analysis tool for rigorous security proof and effective cryptographic protocol design. In the quantum world, the attempts of constructing a quantum random oracle (QRO) have been made, such as quantum-accessible random oracle for post-quantum cryptography and quantum random oracle for quantum digital signature. As in the classical circumstance, it is crucial and challenging to design and instantiate the QRO model with an appropriate quantum hash function. In this work, we construct a QRO model for quantum public-key encryption against key-collision attack, due to the near-orthogonality property of the QRO. To explore a feasible instantiation procedure in the quantum setting, we distinctively give two instantiation examples of QRO by means of single-qubit rotation and quantum fingerprinting, and compare the numerical results of their performances under the key-collision attack. As a result, we extend the QRO model to the security analysis of quantum public-key encryption beyond quantum digital signature, and immunity from collision-type attacks.
In classical cryptography, one-way functions are necessary for most of cryptography. In the quantum world, however, Kretschmer at {TQC'21} and subsequent works have demonstrated that quantum versions of various primitives in minicrypt, such as signatures and private-key encryption, do not require quantum-computable one-way functions (\textsf{qOWF}s). However, the question of the necessity of \textsf{qOWF}s for primitives in Cryptomania like public-key encryption with classical public keys and ciphertexts (\textsf{qPKE}) has remained open.
We provide a comprehensive picture of the relationship between \textsf{qPKE} and \textsf{qOWF}. First, our main result is a black-box separation between \textsf{qOWF}s and \textsf{qPKE}. In particular, we show that relative to a unitary, real, and self-inverse oracle, there exists a \textsf{qPKE} scheme (with classical keys and ciphertexts), but \textsf{qOWF}s do not exist. Further, our oracles admit a point-function obfuscation construction, thus ruling out black-box construction of \textsf{qOWF} from point function obfuscations.
On the positive side, we construct \textsf{qPKE} from quantum indistinguishability obfuscation for quantum circuits with classical obfuscated descriptions and efficiently verifiable one-way puzzles, which is known to be a potentially weaker assumption than \textsf{qOWF}s, due to an existing black-box separation. Our construction is the quantum analog of the classical construction of \textsf{PKE} from one-way functions and indistinguishability obfuscation in the quantum computation with classical communication (QCCC) setting.
It is an important question to find constructions of quantum cryptographic protocols which rely on weaker computational assumptions than classical protocols. Recently, it has been shown that oblivious transfer and multi-party computation can be constructed from one-way functions, whereas this is impossible in the classical setting in a black-box way. In this work, we study the question of building quantum public-key encryption schemes from one-way functions and even weaker assumptions. Firstly, we revisit the definition of IND-CPA security to this setting. Then, we propose three schemes for quantum public-key encryption from one-way functions, pseudorandom function-like states with proof of deletion and pseudorandom function-like states, respectively.
We construct simulation-secure one-time memories (OTM) in the random oracle model, and present a plausible argument for their security against quantum adversaries with bounded and adaptive depth. Our contributions include: (1) A simple scheme where we use only single-qubit Wiesner states and conjunction obfuscation (constructible from LPN): no complex entanglement or quantum cryptography is required. (2) A new POVM bound where e prove that any measurement achieving (1−ε) success on one basis has conjugate-basis guessing probability at most 2m1+O(ε41). (3) Simultation-secure OTMs in the quantum random oracle model where an adversary can only query the random oracle classically. (4) Adaptive depth security where, via an informal application of a lifting theorem from Arora et al., we conjecture security against adversaries with polynomial quantum circuit depth between random oracle queries.
Security against adaptive, depth-bounded, quantum adversaries captures many realistic attacks on OTMs built from single-qubit states; our work thus paves the way for practical and truly secure one-time programs. Moreover, depth bounded adaptive adversarial models may allow for encoding one-time memories into error corrected memory states, opening the door to implementations of one-time programs which persist for long periods of time.
Quantum public-key encryption [Gottesman; Kawachi et al., Eurocrypt'05] generalizes public-key encryption (PKE) by allowing the public keys to be quantum states. Prior work indicated that quantum PKE can be constructed from assumptions that are potentially weaker than those needed to realize its classical counterpart. In this work, we show that quantum PKE can be constructed from any quantum-secure one-way function. In contrast, classical PKE is believed to require more structured assumptions. Our construction is simple, uses only classical ciphertexts, and satisfies the strong notion of CCA security.
The goal of this work is to provide a general security analysis tool, namely, the quantum random oracle (QRO), for facilitating the security analysis of quantum cryptographic protocols, especially protocols based on quantum one-way function. QRO is used to model quantum one-way function and different queries to QRO are used to model quantum attacks. A typical application of quantum one-way function is the quantum digital signature, whose progress has been hampered by the slow pace of the experimental realization. Alternatively, we use the QRO model to analyze the provable security of a quantum digital signature scheme and elaborate the analysis procedure. The QRO model differs from the prior quantum-accessible random oracle in that it can output quantum states as public keys and give responses to different queries. This tool can be a test bed for the cryptanalysis of more quantum cryptographic protocols based on the quantum one-way function.