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arXiv:2303.01143

A Simple Construction of Quantum Public-Key Encryption from Quantum-Secure One-Way Functions

Khashayar Barooti, Giulio Malavolta, Michael Walter

Published Mar 2, 2023• 5 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Quantum public-key encryption [Gottesman; Kawachi et al., Eurocrypt'05] generalizes public-key encryption (PKE) by allowing the public keys to be quantum states. Prior work indicated that quantum PKE can be constructed from assumptions that are potentially weaker than those needed to realize its classical counterpart. In this work, we show that quantum PKE can be constructed from any quantum-secure one-way function. In contrast, classical PKE is believed to require more structured assumptions. Our construction is simple, uses only classical ciphertexts, and satisfies the strong notion of CCA security.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.2303.01143

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Quantum public-key encryption [Gottesman; Kawachi et al., Eurocrypt'05] generalizes public-key encryption (PKE) by allowing the public keys to be quantum states. Prior work indicated that quantum PKE can be constructed from assumptions that are potentially weaker than those needed to realize its classical counterpart. In this work, we show that quantum PKE can be constructed from any quantum-secure one-way function. In contrast, classical PKE is believed to require more structured assumptions. Our construction is simple, uses only classical ciphertexts, and satisfies the strong notion of CCA security.
There has been a recent interest in proposing quantum protocols whose security relies on weaker computational assumptions than their classical counterparts. Importantly to our work, it has been recently shown that public-key encryption (PKE) from one-way functions (OWF) is possible if we consider quantum public keys. Notice that we do not expect classical PKE from OWF given the impossibility results of Impagliazzo and Rudich (STOC'89). However, the distribution of quantum public keys is a challenging task. Therefore, the main question that motivates our work is if quantum PKE from OWF is possible if we have classical public keys. Such protocols are impossible if ciphertexts are also classical, given the impossibility result of Austrin et al.(CRYPTO'22) of quantum enhanced key-agreement (KA) with classical communication. In this paper, we focus on black-box separation for PKE with classical public key and quantum ciphertext from OWF under the polynomial compatibility conjecture, first introduced in Austrin et al.. More precisely, we show the separation when the decryption algorithm of the PKE does not query the OWF. We prove our result by extending the techniques of Austrin et al. and we show an attack for KA in an extended classical communication model where the last message in the protocol can be a quantum state.
Quantum public-key encryption (PKE), where public-keys and/or ciphertexts can be quantum states, is an important primitive in quantum cryptography. Unlike classical PKE (e.g., RSA or ECC), quantum PKE can leverage quantumsecure cryptographic assumptions or the principles of quantum mechanics for security. It has great potential in providing for secure cryptographic systems under potentially weaker assumptions than is possible classically. In addition, it is of both practical and theoretical interest, opening the door to novel cryptographic systems not possible with classical information alone. While multiple quantum PKE schemes have been proposed, they require a large number of qubits acting coherently, and are not practical on current noisy quantum devices. In this paper, we design a practical quantum PKE scheme, taking into account the constraints of current NISQ devices. Specifically, we design a PKE scheme with quantum-classical public keys and classical ciphertexts, that is noise-resilient and only requires a small number of qubits acting coherently. In addition, our design provides tradeoffs in terms of efficiency and the number of qubits that are required.
In classical cryptography, one-way functions are necessary for most of cryptography. In the quantum world, however, Kretschmer at {TQC'21} and subsequent works have demonstrated that quantum versions of various primitives in minicrypt, such as signatures and private-key encryption, do not require quantum-computable one-way functions (\textsf{qOWF}s). However, the question of the necessity of \textsf{qOWF}s for primitives in Cryptomania like public-key encryption with classical public keys and ciphertexts (\textsf{qPKE}) has remained open. We provide a comprehensive picture of the relationship between \textsf{qPKE} and \textsf{qOWF}. First, our main result is a black-box separation between \textsf{qOWF}s and \textsf{qPKE}. In particular, we show that relative to a unitary, real, and self-inverse oracle, there exists a \textsf{qPKE} scheme (with classical keys and ciphertexts), but \textsf{qOWF}s do not exist. Further, our oracles admit a point-function obfuscation construction, thus ruling out black-box construction of \textsf{qOWF} from point function obfuscations. On the positive side, we construct \textsf{qPKE} from quantum indistinguishability obfuscation for quantum circuits with classical obfuscated descriptions and efficiently verifiable one-way puzzles, which is known to be a potentially weaker assumption than \textsf{qOWF}s, due to an existing black-box separation. Our construction is the quantum analog of the classical construction of \textsf{PKE} from one-way functions and indistinguishability obfuscation in the quantum computation with classical communication (QCCC) setting.
It is an important question to find constructions of quantum cryptographic protocols which rely on weaker computational assumptions than classical protocols. Recently, it has been shown that oblivious transfer and multi-party computation can be constructed from one-way functions, whereas this is impossible in the classical setting in a black-box way. In this work, we study the question of building quantum public-key encryption schemes from one-way functions and even weaker assumptions. Firstly, we revisit the definition of IND-CPA security to this setting. Then, we propose three schemes for quantum public-key encryption from one-way functions, pseudorandom function-like states with proof of deletion and pseudorandom function-like states, respectively.
In this work we study the quantum security of public key encryption schemes (PKE). Boneh and Zhandry (CRYPTO'13) initiated this research area for PKE and symmetric key encryption (SKE), albeit restricted to a classical indistinguishability phase. Gagliardoni et al. (CRYPTO'16) advanced the study of quantum security by giving, for SKE, the first definition with a quantum indistinguishability phase. For PKE, on the other hand, no notion of quantum security with a quantum indistinguishability phase exists. Our main result is a novel quantum security notion (qIND-qCPA) for PKE with a quantum indistinguishability phase, which closes the aforementioned gap. We show a distinguishing attack against code-based schemes and against LWE-based schemes with certain parameters. We also show that the canonical hybrid PKE-SKE encryption construction is qIND-qCPA-secure, even if the underlying PKE scheme by itself is not. Finally, we classify quantum-resistant PKE schemes based on the applicability of our security notion. Our core idea follows the approach of Gagliardoni et al. by using so-called type-2 operators for encrypting the challenge message. At first glance, type-2 operators appear unnatural for PKE, as the canonical way of building them requires both the secret and the public key. However, we identify a class of PKE schemes - which we call recoverable - and show that for this class type-2 operators require merely the public key. Moreover, recoverable schemes allow to realise type-2 operators even if they suffer from decryption failures, which in general thwarts the reversibility mandated by type-2 operators. Our work reveals that many real-world quantum-resistant PKE schemes, including most NIST PQC candidates and the canonical hybrid construction, are indeed recoverable.
We formalize and study the notion of a quantum trapdoor function. This is an efficiently computable unitary that takes as input a "public" quantum state and a classical string xxx, and outputs a quantum state. This map is such that (i) it is hard to invert, in the sense that it is hard to recover xxx given the output state (and many copies of the public state), and (ii) there is a classical trapdoor that allows efficient inversion. We show that a quantum trapdoor function can be constructed from any quantum-secure one-way function. A direct consequence of this result is that, assuming just the existence of quantum-secure one-way functions, there exists a public-key encryption scheme with a (pure) quantum public key.