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European Journal of Physics

Newtonian and quantum (in)determinism: Norton’s dome and cosmic chaos

Michael Berry

Published May 13, 2025• 1 citation
Publisher

Abstract

Abstract In Norton’s dome, a singular solution of the Newton/Hamilton equations represents a particle starting to move without cause. Similar indeterminism occurs for forces that are not the gradient of a potential, i.e. Newtonian but not Hamiltonian. An exactly solvable quantum partial counterpart displays no trace of the Norton phenomenon. A completely different context is chaotic classical motion of gas molecules in a box, whose walls are penetrable because gravity cannot be screened. The gravity of a single electron at the limit of the observable universe renders the motion of the gas molecules unpredictable after a few nanoseconds. But motion is still determined by the initial conditions. However, the much larger perturbation from the gravity of the computers or ‘Laplace’s demon’ calculating the motion of the molecules introduces self-reference, making it impossible to follow the motion and rendering the determinism irrelevant to physics for such chaotic systems. For the quantum gas molecules, perturbation from the distant electron vastly exceeds the energy level separation for the idealised impenetrable box, rendering individual energies physically insignificant. Calculations are not difficult, and the combination of science and philosophy deserves to be introduced to physics students.

DOI
10.1088/1361-6404/add81d

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•Feb 12, 2026•0 citations
Abstract In Norton’s dome, a singular solution of the Newton/Hamilton equations represents a particle starting to move without cause. Similar indeterminism occurs for forces that are not the gradient of a potential, i.e. Newtonian but not Hamiltonian. An exactly solvable quantum partial counterpart displays no trace of the Norton phenomenon. A completely different context is chaotic classical motion of gas molecules in a box, whose walls are penetrable because gravity cannot be screened. The gravity of a single electron at the limit of the observable universe renders the motion of the gas molecules unpredictable after a few nanoseconds. But motion is still determined by the initial conditions. However, the much larger perturbation from the gravity of the computers or ‘Laplace’s demon’ calculating the motion of the molecules introduces self-reference, making it impossible to follow the motion and rendering the determinism irrelevant to physics for such chaotic systems. For the quantum gas molecules, perturbation from the distant electron vastly exceeds the energy level separation for the idealised impenetrable box, rendering individual energies physically insignificant. Calculations are not difficult, and the combination of science and philosophy deserves to be introduced to physics students.
This thesis is a collection of three case studies, investigating various sources of indeterminism and undecidability as they bear upon in principle unpredictability of the behaviour of mechanistic systems in both classical and quantum physics. I begin by examining the sources of indeterminism and acausality in classical physics. Here I discuss the physical significance of an often overlooked and yet important Lipschitz condition, the violation of which underlies the existence of anomalous non-trivial solutions in the Norton-type indeterministic systems. I argue that the singularity arising from the violation of the Lipschitz condition in the systems considered appears to be so fragile as to be easily destroyed by slightly relaxing certain (infinite) idealizations required by these models. In particular, I show that the idealization of an absolutely nondeformable, or infinitely rigid, dome appears to be an essential assumption for anomalous motion to begin; any slightest elastic deformations of the dome due to finite rigidity of the dome destroy the shape of the dome required for indeterminism to obtain. I also consider several modifications of the original Norton's example and show that indeterminism in these cases, too, critically depends on the nature of certain idealizations pertaining to elastic properties of the bodies in these models. As a result, I argue that indeterminism of the Norton-type Lipschitz-indeterministic systems should rather be viewed as an artefact of certain (infinite) idealizations essential for the models, depriving the examples of much of their intended metaphysical import, as, for example, in Norton's antifundamentalist programme. Second, I examine the predictive computational limitations of a classical Laplace's demon. I demonstrate that in situations of self-fulfilling prognoses the class of undecidable propositions about certain future events, in general, is not empty; any Laplace's demon having all the information about the world now will be unable to predict all the future. In order to answer certain questions about the future it needs to resort occasionally to, or to consult with, a demon of a higher order in the computational hierarchy whose computational powers are beyond that of any Turing machine. In computer science such power is attributed to a theoretical device called an Oracle--a device capable of looking through an infinite domain in a finite time. I also discuss the distinction between ontological and epistemological views of determinism, and how adopting Wheeler-Landauer view of physical laws can entangle these aspects on a more fundamental level. Thirdly, I examine a recent proposal from the area of quantum computation purporting to utilize peculiarities of quantum reality to perform hypercomputation. While the current view is that quantum algorithms (such as Shor's) lead to re-description of the complexity space for computational problems, recently it has been argued (by Kieu) that certain novel quantum adiabatic algorithms may even require reconsideration of the whole notion of computability, by being able to break the Turing limit and "compute the non-computable". If implemented, such algorithms could serve as a physical realization of an Oracle needed for a Laplacian demon to accomplish its job. I critically review this latter proposal by exposing the weaknesses of Kieu's quantum adiabatic demon, pointing out its failure to deliver the purported hypercomputation. Regardless of whether the class of hypercomputers is non-empty, Kieu's proposed algorithm is not a member of this distinguished club, and a quantum computer powered Laplace's demon can do no more than its ordinary classical counterpart.
This paper aims to demonstrate how a rigorous definition of determinism can be formulated and applied to a formal axiomatization of a physical theory. Examining an example of Newtonian classical particle mechanics (CPM) formalized in set-theoretical axioms by Patrick Suppes, the paper shows why definitions of determinism based on the temporal development of physical systems—such as those proposed by Suppes (2002) and Montague (1974)—fail to assess determinism correctly. It is argued that, to deliver a meaningful verdict, the definition of determinism cannot be applied to the entire framework of CPM itself, but rather to its particular theories : definitions of specific physical systems that incorporate the force equation. Therefore, the verdict of determinism or indeterminism typically depends on the uniqueness (or non-uniqueness) of solutions to the differential equations governing the system’s behavior. The paper concludes with a demonstration of how a formally correct definition of determinism can be used to show the indeterminism of the theory of Norton’s dome stated within the framework of CPM. Although the example concerns pre-relativistic Newtonian mechanics, the crucial philosophical distinction between frameworks and theories extends beyond this case and suggests that assessing the determinism of any physical theory requires special caution to distinguish it properly from its framework.
Newtonian mechanics focuses on dx and dt units which tend to zero and so presents, it seems, a smoothed over or averaged type of motion. This motion in principle extends to dx and dt values which are almost zero. There is, however, a priori no reason not to expect that such a smooth averaging is at some length scale based on another kind of motion. The question is: What should that “other” kind of motion be? If it is deterministic in x and t, one may reapply the idea of this motion breaking down at yet some smaller scale. Thus it seems one should consider decoupling of x and t because one cannot follow a particle from one x point to another in time within some small length scale as this would be deterministic. The opposite approach seems to be a probabilistic one with t and x decoupled. The external ruler and clock which exist in the Newtonian picture, however, do not disappear simply because a length scale is small. Thus having x positions based on probabilities at some length scale still uses the notion of the probability itself being smoothed over because it contains x which may take on any value. This is not necessarily a problem because the probabilistic behaviour must still appear to be Newtonian on average and so x and t based on the external clock/ruler with infinite resolution need to “appear” again. (For example, an electron has a wavelength and exhibits interference from two slits, but while moving towards the slits, distance = velocity* time with distance and time measured by an external clock. It is a mathematical generalization, however, to expect that d=vt actually fully describes motion (i.e. other than on average) within a wavelength length. If it did there would be no interference pattern. The idea of a smoothed over (or averaged motion) based on probabilistic motion also appears in the classical world, but for many particles. For example, a Maxwell-Boltzmann gas with no potential has uniform density. If one considers a hypothetical box containing many molecules, it is like a Newtonian stationary object with a balance of pressure. In the case of a potential (1-D) one may consider a dx unit (with many molecules) and balance Force(x) density(x) with the difference of pressure to find the density distribution proportional to exp(- V(x)/T). These ideas are completely Newtonian, but they are smoothed over average notions. At a microscopic level molecules undergo probabilistic collisions linked to T (temperature). Thus the microscopic picture is not static - it is only the equilibrium average or big picture which is static. Even in the case of no potential, focusing on a tiny region of space smaller than the interparticle average separation and arguing that density is constant seems to be an average argument which bypasses much of the reality. If x and t may then become probabilistic and -Et+px is a Lorentz invariant, then why should there not be stochasticity linked with E and p? In fact we argue they are == as shown by Maxwell’s solution of a photon from his electromagnetic equations. E and p (energy and momentum) are average values. Their density is given by: .5C1( Electric field dot Electric field + C2 Magnetic field dot Magnetic field) and the Poynting vector for momentum. Both the Electric field and Magnetic field fluctuate as cos(-Et+px) with E and p being average values. At first this was ascribed to wave motion in a medium, but in 1905 Einstein’s photoelectric arguments against energy being spread out seem to suggest a breakdown of deterministic physics describing a wave in a medium. Instead a photon is probabilistic and has a wavefunction of Electric + i Magnetic field. (2)
Mathematically, Newton's laws of motion are cast in the form of differential equations (specifically, equations which relate quantities to their time dependence). One of the simplest examples can be given in the context of that stone-throwing problem which so interested the early Greeks. Newton did fully realize that the heavens could not be separated, or compartmentalized, into isolated pairs of interacting two-body systems. Newton tried to deal with this problem at least for what he deemed to be the simplest circumstance, namely the case in which one two-body force exerts a much larger influence on the primary motion of concern than the others. In order to probe the effect of chaos in the true quantum regime it is necessary to focus upon the motion of electrons. The electronic 'motion' of an electron about a nucleus cannot be cast, in quantum theory, in terms of classical concepts like orbits.
The relation between determinism and predictability is the central issue in the study of 'deterministic chaos'. Much knowledge has been accumulated in the past 10 years about the chaotic dynamics of macroscopic (classical) systems. Our intention is to examine the implications of chaos in the microscopic quantum world – in other words, how to reconcile the correspondence principle with the inherent uncertainties which reflect the wave nature of quantum dynamics. Some rather surprising and counterintuitive results emerge from this effort which bear an intriguing similarity to a phenomenon associated with electric conductivity in disordered solids, namely 'Anderson localisation'. It is very rewarding that these developments do not remain in the lofty realms of abstract theoretical physics. Indeed, recent atomic physics experiments demonstrate clearly that chaos is relevant to the microscopic world. In particular, such experiments emphasise the urgent need to clarify the genuine quantum mechanism which imposes severe limitations on quantum dynamics, and renders it so very different from its classical counterpart.
Traditionally, Newtonian mechanics is recognized as an approximate theory which is said to arise from quantum mechanics (apparently a more detailed theory) in the large energy level limit (correspondence principle). We argue that both quantum mechanics and Newtonian mechanics are both approximate and both complement each other at any energy level. In the Newtonian case, quantum effects are so small that they are not visible, but in the quantum case, Newtonian effects are visible, we argue. We first note that exp(-iEt+ipx), the free particle wavefunction (complex probability) does not exist without the Newtonian expression x=vt. x=vt implies it is possible for dx->0, dt->0, while hbar/p and hbar/E show that there are limitations with respect to interactions. The only way to ascertain x=vt is through measurement and if these measurements have dt=hbar/E and dx=hbar/p uncertainties, one cannot have dx->0, dt->0 resolution. Nevertheless, the quantum free particle does move as x=vt (as long as one respects the uncertainties of dt,dx).The quantum exp(-iEt+ipx) does not exist without the Newtonian x=vt. In a single particle quantum bound state (time-independent), we suggest there are significant approximations. First, a conservation of energy equation exists in Newtonian physics, namely pp/2m + V(x) = E ((1)). This equation does not contain time and does not explicitly show x(t), but that does not mean that such motion does not physically exist. The quantum bound state solution follows from ((1)) which is an equation which does not display full information, even in the classical case, and so this loss of information carries down to the quantum solution. In particular, in the quantum case one solves a time-independent problem and so uses a(p)exp(ipx) + a(-p)exp(-ipx) with a(p)=a(-p) or a(p)= -a(-p). These conditions are equivalent to insisting that the local momentum average at each x (-i W* grad W + i W grad W) is 0. The fact that one is solving a quantum bound state using only energy considerations means that one averages out time which means averaging momentum. Thus, W*(x)W(x) describes a resolution spatial pattern for interaction, but W = W(x) exp(-iEt+ip x) where p=0 at each x. In other words, just because one does not see forward/backward motion in a particular quantum solution (based on energy alone) does not mean that it does not exist and that it cannot be measured, we suggest. For high energy levels, one should be able to measure such motion. The factor exp(-iEt+ipx) is a further approximation of the bound state which may be used if one wishes to describe a particle of mo in a potential V(x) created by a particle of mass M as an M+m+E rest mass system. Thus, one may see that various levels of approximation are used in the same quantum bound state solution. Furthermore, classical and Newtonian mechanics are still linked at any energy level because the quantum average KE (in the nonrelativistic case) must equal the classical kinetic energy. Thus, the notion of x= vrms(x) t is present and if hbar/(m vrms) << dx (where dx <<L with L being the system size), then one again has exp(-ipx+i KE t) and x=vrms(x) within each tiny dx, as an approximation.