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The limits of predictability : indeterminism and undecidability in classical and quantum physics

Alexandre Korolev

Published Jan 1, 2011• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

This thesis is a collection of three case studies, investigating various sources of indeterminism and undecidability as they bear upon in principle unpredictability of the behaviour of mechanistic systems in both classical and quantum physics. I begin by examining the sources of indeterminism and acausality in classical physics. Here I discuss the physical significance of an often overlooked and yet important Lipschitz condition, the violation of which underlies the existence of anomalous non-trivial solutions in the Norton-type indeterministic systems. I argue that the singularity arising from the violation of the Lipschitz condition in the systems considered appears to be so fragile as to be easily destroyed by slightly relaxing certain (infinite) idealizations required by these models. In particular, I show that the idealization of an absolutely nondeformable, or infinitely rigid, dome appears to be an essential assumption for anomalous motion to begin; any slightest elastic deformations of the dome due to finite rigidity of the dome destroy the shape of the dome required for indeterminism to obtain. I also consider several modifications of the original Norton's example and show that indeterminism in these cases, too, critically depends on the nature of certain idealizations pertaining to elastic properties of the bodies in these models. As a result, I argue that indeterminism of the Norton-type Lipschitz-indeterministic systems should rather be viewed as an artefact of certain (infinite) idealizations essential for the models, depriving the examples of much of their intended metaphysical import, as, for example, in Norton's antifundamentalist programme. Second, I examine the predictive computational limitations of a classical Laplace's demon. I demonstrate that in situations of self-fulfilling prognoses the class of undecidable propositions about certain future events, in general, is not empty; any Laplace's demon having all the information about the world now will be unable to predict all the future. In order to answer certain questions about the future it needs to resort occasionally to, or to consult with, a demon of a higher order in the computational hierarchy whose computational powers are beyond that of any Turing machine. In computer science such power is attributed to a theoretical device called an Oracle--a device capable of looking through an infinite domain in a finite time. I also discuss the distinction between ontological and epistemological views of determinism, and how adopting Wheeler-Landauer view of physical laws can entangle these aspects on a more fundamental level. Thirdly, I examine a recent proposal from the area of quantum computation purporting to utilize peculiarities of quantum reality to perform hypercomputation. While the current view is that quantum algorithms (such as Shor's) lead to re-description of the complexity space for computational problems, recently it has been argued (by Kieu) that certain novel quantum adiabatic algorithms may even require reconsideration of the whole notion of computability, by being able to break the Turing limit and "compute the non-computable". If implemented, such algorithms could serve as a physical realization of an Oracle needed for a Laplacian demon to accomplish its job. I critically review this latter proposal by exposing the weaknesses of Kieu's quantum adiabatic demon, pointing out its failure to deliver the purported hypercomputation. Regardless of whether the class of hypercomputers is non-empty, Kieu's proposed algorithm is not a member of this distinguished club, and a quantum computer powered Laplace's demon can do no more than its ordinary classical counterpart.

DOI
10.14288/1.0302406

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This thesis is a collection of three case studies, investigating various sources of indeterminism and undecidability as they bear upon in principle unpredictability of the behaviour of mechanistic systems in both classical and quantum physics. I begin by examining the sources of indeterminism and acausality in classical physics. Here I discuss the physical significance of an often overlooked and yet important Lipschitz condition, the violation of which underlies the existence of anomalous non-trivial solutions in the Norton-type indeterministic systems. I argue that the singularity arising from the violation of the Lipschitz condition in the systems considered appears to be so fragile as to be easily destroyed by slightly relaxing certain (infinite) idealizations required by these models. In particular, I show that the idealization of an absolutely nondeformable, or infinitely rigid, dome appears to be an essential assumption for anomalous motion to begin; any slightest elastic deformations of the dome due to finite rigidity of the dome destroy the shape of the dome required for indeterminism to obtain. I also consider several modifications of the original Norton's example and show that indeterminism in these cases, too, critically depends on the nature of certain idealizations pertaining to elastic properties of the bodies in these models. As a result, I argue that indeterminism of the Norton-type Lipschitz-indeterministic systems should rather be viewed as an artefact of certain (infinite) idealizations essential for the models, depriving the examples of much of their intended metaphysical import, as, for example, in Norton's antifundamentalist programme. Second, I examine the predictive computational limitations of a classical Laplace's demon. I demonstrate that in situations of self-fulfilling prognoses the class of undecidable propositions about certain future events, in general, is not empty; any Laplace's demon having all the information about the world now will be unable to predict all the future. In order to answer certain questions about the future it needs to resort occasionally to, or to consult with, a demon of a higher order in the computational hierarchy whose computational powers are beyond that of any Turing machine. In computer science such power is attributed to a theoretical device called an Oracle--a device capable of looking through an infinite domain in a finite time. I also discuss the distinction between ontological and epistemological views of determinism, and how adopting Wheeler-Landauer view of physical laws can entangle these aspects on a more fundamental level. Thirdly, I examine a recent proposal from the area of quantum computation purporting to utilize peculiarities of quantum reality to perform hypercomputation. While the current view is that quantum algorithms (such as Shor's) lead to re-description of the complexity space for computational problems, recently it has been argued (by Kieu) that certain novel quantum adiabatic algorithms may even require reconsideration of the whole notion of computability, by being able to break the Turing limit and "compute the non-computable". If implemented, such algorithms could serve as a physical realization of an Oracle needed for a Laplacian demon to accomplish its job. I critically review this latter proposal by exposing the weaknesses of Kieu's quantum adiabatic demon, pointing out its failure to deliver the purported hypercomputation. Regardless of whether the class of hypercomputers is non-empty, Kieu's proposed algorithm is not a member of this distinguished club, and a quantum computer powered Laplace's demon can do no more than its ordinary classical counterpart.
Abstract In Norton’s dome, a singular solution of the Newton/Hamilton equations represents a particle starting to move without cause. Similar indeterminism occurs for forces that are not the gradient of a potential, i.e. Newtonian but not Hamiltonian. An exactly solvable quantum partial counterpart displays no trace of the Norton phenomenon. A completely different context is chaotic classical motion of gas molecules in a box, whose walls are penetrable because gravity cannot be screened. The gravity of a single electron at the limit of the observable universe renders the motion of the gas molecules unpredictable after a few nanoseconds. But motion is still determined by the initial conditions. However, the much larger perturbation from the gravity of the computers or ‘Laplace’s demon’ calculating the motion of the molecules introduces self-reference, making it impossible to follow the motion and rendering the determinism irrelevant to physics for such chaotic systems. For the quantum gas molecules, perturbation from the distant electron vastly exceeds the energy level separation for the idealised impenetrable box, rendering individual energies physically insignificant. Calculations are not difficult, and the combination of science and philosophy deserves to be introduced to physics students.
The debate between determinism and indeterminism has shaped physics and philosophy for centuries. Laplace’s demon represented the deterministic ideal; Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle challenged it with irreducible unpredictability. This paper proposes a third position that dissolves the false dichotomy: the range of possible outcomes is determined by pre-existing geometric constraints, but the specific manifestation within that range is ontologically unpredictable. This distinction emerges naturally from the Gradient Indeterminacy framework, where stable quantum states require double saturation of conjugate gradients, forcing coherent oscillation between discrete configurations (e.g., 12 ↔ 13 charge events per cycle). We extend this principle beyond quantum physics via the Underlying Properties Hypothesis (UPH), showing how the same pattern manifests in biological mutation and neural variability. A case study documents an instance where a cybernetic intelligence generated images with text in an unexpected language—not as a bug, but as empirical signature of indeterminacy operating at the informational level. The framework invites a ontological shift: unpredictability is not epistemic limitation but condition of existence across scales.
Classical physics is generally regarded as deterministic, as opposed to quantum mechanics that is considered the first theory to have introduced genuine indeterminism into physics. We challenge this view by arguing that the alleged determinism of classical physics relies on the tacit, metaphysical assumption that there exists an actual value of every physical quantity, with its infinite predetermined digits (which we name principle of infinite precision). Building on recent information-theoretic arguments showing that the principle of infinite precision (which translates into the attribution of a physical meaning to mathematical real numbers) leads to unphysical consequences, we consider possible alternative indeterministic interpretations of classical physics. We also link those to well-known interpretations of quantum mechanics. In particular, we propose a model of classical indeterminism based on finite information quantities (FIQs). Moreover, we discuss the perspectives that an indeterministic physics could open (such as strong emergence), as well as some potential problematic issues. Finally, we make evident that any indeterministic interpretation of physics would have to deal with the problem of explaining how the indeterminate values become determinate, a problem known in the context of quantum mechanics as (part of) the ``quantum measurement problem.'' We discuss some similarities between the classical and the quantum measurement problems, and propose ideas for possible solutions (e.g., ``collapse models'' and ``top-down causation'').
The purpose of this paper is to give a brief survey the implications of the theories of modern physics for the doctrine of determinism. The survey will reveal a curious feature of determinism: in some respects it is fragile, requiring a number of enabling assumptions to give it a fighting chance; but in other respects it is quite robust and very difficult to kill. The survey will also aim to show that, apart from its own intrinsic interest, determinism is an excellent device for probing the foundations of classical, relativistic, and quantum physics. The survey is conducted under three major presuppositions. First, I take a realistic attitude towards scientific theories in that I assume that to give an interpretation of a theory is, at a minimum, to specify what the world would have to be like in order for the theory to be true. But we will see that the demand for a deterministic interpretation of a theory can force us to abandon a naively realistic reading of the theory. Second, I reject the “no laws” view of science and assume that the field equations or laws of motion of the most fundamental theories of current physics represent science’s best guesses as to the form of the basic laws of nature. Third, I take determinism to be an ontological doctrine, a doctrine about the temporal evolution of the world. This ontological doctrine must not be confused with predictability, which is an epistemological doctrine, the failure of which need not entail a failure of determinism. From time to time I will comment on ways in which predictability can fail in a deterministic setting. Finally, my survey will concentrate on the Laplacian variety of determinism according to which the instantaneous state of the world at any time uniquely determines the state at any other time. The plan of the survey is as follows. Section 2 illustrates the fragility of determinism by means of a Zeno type example. Then sections 3 and 4 survey successively the fortunes of determinism in the Newtonian and the special relativistic settings..
On the Limits of “Undecidability”: Quantum Physics, Deconstruction, and Anti-realism Christopher Norris (bio) I Philosophers of science have responded in various ways to the conceptual and interpretative problems thrown up by quantum mechanics. These problems emerged a century ago from Planck’s researches into black-body radiation and have scarcely been resolved—rather, if anything, deepened and complicated—by the intensive debate that has surrounded them since that time.1 For some theorists, the resultant dilemmas (of observer “interference,” wave/particle dualism, quantum superposition, nonlocal causality, superluminal [faster-than-light] propagation, etc.) are such as to entail drastic revisions to our very idea of the physical world as existing and exerting its causal powers quite apart from our current best theories or investigative methods.2 For others again, quantum mechanics just is the best theory currently available, whatever the problems that it happens to create for our normal habits of logical thought or consistent reasoning on the evidence. Thus logic itself may have to be revised—right down to putative “laws of thought” such as noncontradiction and excluded middle—if these turn out to conflict with the results of quantum-mechanical theory or experiment.3 This is the view taken by Hilary Putnam in his writings on quantum logic and also by others, von Neumann among them, for whom the working rule in any such trade-off is to keep the physics as simple as possible even if the result is to complicate logic by introducing values other than those of determinate (bivalent) truth or falsehood.4 Very often it consorts with the argument that if quantum mechanics is right—at any rate on the standard Copenhagen interpretation—then we had best give up any hope of retaining a “classical” Einsteinian ontology, that is to say, a Lorentz-invariant account of space-time coordinates where the speed of light is the limiting value for assignments of position, velocity, and causal propagation.5 Hence Einstein’s famous series of debates with Niels Bohr when he devised a whole range of increasingly elaborate thought-experiments designed to prove that the quantum-mechnical description of reality had to be in some way “incomplete,” or not to have reckoned with some crucial factor that would bring it into line with logical reasoning and a causal-realist ontology. For on Einstein’s view there was simply no room in science for a theory—such as Bohr’s—that involved either the suspension of classical truth/falsehood [End Page 407] values or the idea of some “spooky action-at-a-distance” which contravened both commonsense realism and the requirements of Special Relativity.6 However it is Bohr who is generally thought to have carried the day in these debates. In which case—so it is argued—we are left with a choice between three possible “solutions.” These are (1) the hypothesis that quantum mechanics is “incomplete” or open to an alternative (“hidden-variables”) interpretation;7 (2) the adoption of an alternative (many-valued or non-bivalent) quantum logic that effectively conjures such problems away;8 or (3) the conclusion that realism may have to be abandoned in favour of some radically different ontology or worldview which counts this a price worth paying in order to conserve the predictive power of the standard quantum formalisms.9 On option (3) there is a further choice of interpretative views according to the theorist’s preferred choice between the various models (or possible-world scenarios) currently on offer. Thus the model may be one that embraces nonlocal simultaneous particle interaction, or which gives up space-time covariance (relative to the speed of light) as required by Einstein’s Special Theory. Or again it may be one that somehow envisions—strangest of all—the splitting-off of multiple coexistent but non-interacting “worlds” whenever the wave-packet collapses or whenever an act of measurement is performed upon any such quantum-system whose properties must be thought of as strictly indeterminate until that moment.10 For, according to its partisans, this theory is the most economical—i.e., involves least conflict with the standard quantum formalisms—despite its baroque proliferation of alternative worlds and its well-nigh unthinkable implications when applied...
This paper aims to demonstrate how a rigorous definition of determinism can be formulated and applied to a formal axiomatization of a physical theory. Examining an example of Newtonian classical particle mechanics (CPM) formalized in set-theoretical axioms by Patrick Suppes, the paper shows why definitions of determinism based on the temporal development of physical systems—such as those proposed by Suppes (2002) and Montague (1974)—fail to assess determinism correctly. It is argued that, to deliver a meaningful verdict, the definition of determinism cannot be applied to the entire framework of CPM itself, but rather to its particular theories : definitions of specific physical systems that incorporate the force equation. Therefore, the verdict of determinism or indeterminism typically depends on the uniqueness (or non-uniqueness) of solutions to the differential equations governing the system’s behavior. The paper concludes with a demonstration of how a formally correct definition of determinism can be used to show the indeterminism of the theory of Norton’s dome stated within the framework of CPM. Although the example concerns pre-relativistic Newtonian mechanics, the crucial philosophical distinction between frameworks and theories extends beyond this case and suggests that assessing the determinism of any physical theory requires special caution to distinguish it properly from its framework.