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Journal of Scientific Exploration

Arguments for Recognizing the Future as Non-Probabilistic: Considerations in the Framework of a Hypothesized Precognition Theory

Thorsten Dahmen

Published Mar 31, 2025• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The debate on whether the future is predetermined (fixed) or probabilistic (uncertain) dates back to ancient times but is still ongoing. An essential basis in this paper is the view that a conclusive answer can neither be drawn exclusively from physics nor additionally from philosophical modes of argumentation. It is considered necessary to take a transtemporal process of cognition, which is in parapsychology termed precognition, into account. This brings in the new aspect that predictability no longer needs to be synonymous with computability and the analytic describability of causal event chains, which also has an impact on the meaning of the terms that are used. Furthermore, this allows a superior timeless perspective that invalidates the logic from the present-time perspective and extends the concept of observability and reality. Since both subjects are interrelated and cannot be considered independently of each other, a psychophysical hypothesis about how precognition interacts with the future is an integral part of this proposal, its experimental verification is described. This encompasses explanations of how logical paradoxes, which are often attributed to precognition, do not exist and how intelligible information can be consistently shared between the present and the future in four-dimensional spacetime. The argumentation for a non-probabilistic, fixed future comprises the physical point of view, referencing special relativity theory and quantum theory, but considers the nonphysical aspects of the mind with the same matter-of-factness. A similar conclusion that the future is deterministic is not asserted since this term combines causality and predictability in an inscrutable way by making complex assumptions that are not precisely and uniformly defined. A closer description of the problem reveals that the frequently used keywords “deterministic” and “probabilistic” lose their usual meaning if the frame of reference given here is acknowledged. Therefore, many reservations that consider only a probabilistic future as reasonable might be unnecessary.

DOI
10.31275/20253437

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Background. The author tries to identify the connection between the phenomena of quantum physics and the philosophical concepts of "fate", "free will" and "time". By examining how the probabilistic nature of quantum mechanics challenges classical deterministic views, and bridging the gap between modern physics and age-old philosophical debates, the author seeks to offer a nuanced understanding of these fundamental concepts Methods. The investigation employs a multidisciplinary approach, incorporating scientific theories and discoveries alongside religious and philosophical perspectives. Various viewpoints and schools of thought are considered, spanning both Western scientific frameworks and Eastern philosophical traditions, to provide a comprehensive analysis of the topic. Results. The positions of total determinism and indeterminism are compared, highlighting their respective strengths and limitations. It delves into the parallels between Buddhist philosophy and contemporary quantum theory, suggesting that both share common ground in their understanding of reality. Additionally, the concept of creationism is examined within the context of quantum mechanics. Conclusions. The exploration reveals that the concepts of fate and free will, and their relationship with time, are deeply intertwined with the existence of a hidden quantum reality. This hidden reality, characterized by the inherent uncertainties and probabilistic nature of quantum mechanics, challenges the deterministic worldview upheld by classical physics. The investigation highlights that the interconnectedness of fate and free will with our understanding of time is profoundly influenced by the quantum realm, which introduces complexities such as the "measurement problem." As a result, the deterministic predictability of classical physics is replaced by a framework where probabilities and potentialities govern the behavior of particles. The study concludes that acknowledging the existence of this hidden quantum reality necessitates a re-evaluation of traditional notions of fate, free will, and time, suggesting that these concepts are more fluid and interconnected than previously thought. By bridging the gap between quantum theory and philosophical inquiry, the exploration offers new insights into the nature of reality and human agency, ultimately contributing to a more nuanced understanding of the universe and our place within it.

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Mind, Matter and Quantum Mechanics (2nd edition)

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Quantum mechanics is usually defined in terms of some loosely connected axioms and rules. Such a foundation is far from the beauty of, e.g., the `principles' underlying classical mechanics. Motivated, in addition, by notorious interpretation problems, there have been numerous attempts to modify or `complete' quantum mechanics. A first attempt was based on so-called hidden variables; its proponents essentially tried to expel the non-classical nature of quantum mechanics. More recent proposals intend to complete quantum mechanics not within mechanics proper but on a `higher (synthetic) level'; by means of a combination with gravitation theory (R Penrose), with quantum information theory (C M Caves, C A Fuchs) or with psychology and brain science (H P Stapp). I think it is fair to say that in each case the combination is with a subject that, per se , suffers from a very limited understanding that is even more severe than that of quantum mechanics. This was acceptable, though, if it could convincingly be argued that scientific progress desperately needs to join forces. Quantum mechanics of a closed system was a beautiful and well understood theory with its respective state being presented as a point on a deterministic trajectory in Liouville space---not unlike the motion of a classical N -particle system in its 6N -dimensional phase-space. Unfortunately, we need an inside and an outside view, we need an external reference frame, we need an observer. This unavoidable partition is the origin of most of the troubles we have with quantum mechanics. A pragmatic solution is introduced in the form of so-called measurement postulates: one of the various incompatible properties of the system under consideration is supposed to be realized (i.e. to become a fact, to be defined without fundamental dispersion) based on `instantaneous' projections within some externally selected measurement basis. As a result, the theory becomes essentially statistical rather than deterministic; furthermore there is an asymmetry between the observed and the observing. This is the point where consciousness may come in. Complemented by an introduction and several appendices, Henry Stapp's book consists essentially of three parts: theory, implications, and new developments. The theory part gives a very readable account of the Copenhagen interpretation, some aspects of a psychophysical theory, and, eventually, hints towards a quantum foundation of the brain--mind connection. The next part, `implications', summarizes some previous attempts to bridge the gap between the working rules of quantum mechanics and their possible consequences for our understanding of this world (Pauli, Everett, Bohm, Heisenberg). The last section, `new developments', dwells on some ideas about the conscious brain and its possible foundation on quantum mechanics. The book is an interesting and, in part, fascinating contribution to a field that continues to be a companion to `practical' quantum mechanics since its very beginning. It is doubtful whether such types of `quantum ontologies' will ever become (empirically) testable; right now one can hardly expect more than to be offered some consistent `grand picture', which the reader may find more or less acceptable or even rewarding. Many practicing quantum physicists, though, will remain unimpressed. The shift from synthetic ontology to analytic ontology is the foundation of the present work. This means that fundamental wholes are being partitioned into their ontologically subordinate components by means of `events'. The actual event, in turn, is an abrupt change in the Heisenberg state describing the quantum universe. The new state then defines the tendencies associated with the next actual event. To avoid infinite regression in terms of going from one state of tendencies to the next, consciousness is there to give these events a special `feel', to provide a status of `intrinsic actuality'. The brain of an alert human observer is similar in an important way to a quantum detection device: it can amplify small signals to large macroscopic effects. On the other hand, actual events are not postulated to occur exclusively in brains. They are more generally associated with the formation of records. Records are necessarily part of the total state of the universe: it is obvious that the state of the universe cannot undergo a Schrödinger dynamics and at the same time record its own history. `The full universe consists therefore of an exceedingly thin veneer of relatively sluggish, directly observable properties resting on a vast ocean or rapidly fluctuating unobservable ones.' The present ideas also bear on how the world should be seen to develop. While conventional cosmology encounters problems as to how to define the intial conditions, which would enter the governing equations of motion, here `the boundary conditions are set not at some initial time, but gradually by a sequence of acts that imposes a sequence of constraints. After any sequence of acts there remains a collection of possible worlds, some of which will be eliminated by the next act.' Connected with those acts is `meaning': there has always been some speculation about the special significance of local properties in our understanding of the world. One could argue that correlations (even the quantum correlations found, e.g., in the EPR-experiments) were as real as anything else. But also Stapp stresses the special role of locality: the `local observable properties, or properties similar to them are the natural, and perhaps exclusive, carriers of meaning in the quantum universe. From this point of view the quantum universe tends to create meaning.' This sounds like an absolute concept: meaning not with respect to something else, but defined intrinsically---not easy to digest. The role of consciousness in the developing quantum universe requires more attention. `The causal irrelevance of our thoughts within classical physics constitutes a serious deficiency of that theory, construed as a description of reality.' This is taken to be entirely different within quantum mechanics. `The core idea of quantum mechanics is to describe our activities as knowledge-seeking and knowledge-using agents.' `21st century science does not reduce human beings to mechanical automata. Rather it elevates human beings to agents whose free choices can, according to the known laws, actually influence their behaviour.' An example with respect to perception is discussed: `Why, when we look at a triangle, do we experience three lines joined at three points and not some pattern of neuron firings?' The brain `does not convert an actual whole triangle into some jumbled set of particle motions; rather it converts a concatenation of separate external events into the actualization of some single integrated pattern of neural activity that is congruent to the perceived whole triangle.' How convincing is this proposal? It is hard to tell. I think Henry Stapp did a good job, but there are tight limitations to any such endeavour. Quantum mechanics is often strange indeed, but it also gives rise to our classical world around us. For the emergence of classicality jumps and measurement projections (the basic phenomena connected with those fundamental events of choice) are not needed. Therefore, I doubt whether the explanation of the evolution of our world really allows (or requires) that much free choice. On the other hand, most scientist will agree that empirical science was not possible without free will: we could not ask independent questions if this asking was part of a deterministic trajectory. The fact that the result of a quantum measurement is indeterminate (within given probabilities) does certainly not explain free will. How about the type of measurment? The experimentalist will have to assume that he can select the pertinent observable within some limits. But given a certain design the so-called pointer basis (producing stable measurement results) is no longer a matter of free choice. `The main theme of classical physics is that we live in a clocklike universe.' Today it is often assumed that the universe was a big (quantum-) computer or a cellular automaton. Many would be all too happy to leave that rather restrictive picture behind. But where to go? Stapp suggests giving consciousness a prominent role: `The most profound alteration of the fundamental principles was to bring consciousness of human beings into the basic structure of the physical theory.' How far we are able to go in this direction will depend on the amount of concrete research results becoming available to support this view.

Journal of Physics A Mathematical and General•Jun 17, 2004•4 citations
The debate on whether the future is predetermined (fixed) or probabilistic (uncertain) dates back to ancient times but is still ongoing. An essential basis in this paper is the view that a conclusive answer can neither be drawn exclusively from physics nor additionally from philosophical modes of argumentation. It is considered necessary to take a transtemporal process of cognition, which is in parapsychology termed precognition, into account. This brings in the new aspect that predictability no longer needs to be synonymous with computability and the analytic describability of causal event chains, which also has an impact on the meaning of the terms that are used. Furthermore, this allows a superior timeless perspective that invalidates the logic from the present-time perspective and extends the concept of observability and reality. Since both subjects are interrelated and cannot be considered independently of each other, a psychophysical hypothesis about how precognition interacts with the future is an integral part of this proposal, its experimental verification is described. This encompasses explanations of how logical paradoxes, which are often attributed to precognition, do not exist and how intelligible information can be consistently shared between the present and the future in four-dimensional spacetime. The argumentation for a non-probabilistic, fixed future comprises the physical point of view, referencing special relativity theory and quantum theory, but considers the nonphysical aspects of the mind with the same matter-of-factness. A similar conclusion that the future is deterministic is not asserted since this term combines causality and predictability in an inscrutable way by making complex assumptions that are not precisely and uniformly defined. A closer description of the problem reveals that the frequently used keywords “deterministic” and “probabilistic” lose their usual meaning if the frame of reference given here is acknowledged. Therefore, many reservations that consider only a probabilistic future as reasonable might be unnecessary.
Background. The author tries to identify the connection between the phenomena of quantum physics and the philosophical concepts of "fate", "free will" and "time". By examining how the probabilistic nature of quantum mechanics challenges classical deterministic views, and bridging the gap between modern physics and age-old philosophical debates, the author seeks to offer a nuanced understanding of these fundamental concepts Methods. The investigation employs a multidisciplinary approach, incorporating scientific theories and discoveries alongside religious and philosophical perspectives. Various viewpoints and schools of thought are considered, spanning both Western scientific frameworks and Eastern philosophical traditions, to provide a comprehensive analysis of the topic. Results. The positions of total determinism and indeterminism are compared, highlighting their respective strengths and limitations. It delves into the parallels between Buddhist philosophy and contemporary quantum theory, suggesting that both share common ground in their understanding of reality. Additionally, the concept of creationism is examined within the context of quantum mechanics. Conclusions. The exploration reveals that the concepts of fate and free will, and their relationship with time, are deeply intertwined with the existence of a hidden quantum reality. This hidden reality, characterized by the inherent uncertainties and probabilistic nature of quantum mechanics, challenges the deterministic worldview upheld by classical physics. The investigation highlights that the interconnectedness of fate and free will with our understanding of time is profoundly influenced by the quantum realm, which introduces complexities such as the "measurement problem." As a result, the deterministic predictability of classical physics is replaced by a framework where probabilities and potentialities govern the behavior of particles. The study concludes that acknowledging the existence of this hidden quantum reality necessitates a re-evaluation of traditional notions of fate, free will, and time, suggesting that these concepts are more fluid and interconnected than previously thought. By bridging the gap between quantum theory and philosophical inquiry, the exploration offers new insights into the nature of reality and human agency, ultimately contributing to a more nuanced understanding of the universe and our place within it.
Time and reality are central concepts in both philosophy and physics. While classical mechanics describes the universe as deterministic, where the present emerges from past conditions, quantum theory introduces probabilistic interpretations suggesting inherent uncertainty at microscopic scales. These two perspectives have led to an ongoing debate regarding whether reality is fundamentally deterministic, probabilistic, or a combination of both. The Zia Theory of Temporal Reality (ZTTR) integrates these frameworks by proposing that the present state of reality is determined by accumulated past causes, while the future evolves probabilistically under uncertainty. To formalize this concept, the Zia Unified Continuity Equation (ZUCE) is expressed as a stochastic model where the state of reality represents a combination of initial conditions, integrated causal influences, and stochastic fluctuations represented by a Wiener process. To enhance generality and address limitations of fixed functional assumptions, the uncertainty term is further extended as a generalized function, allowing different forms such as diffusion-like, logarithmic, or nonlinear growth depending on system dynamics. In this framework, deterministic causal accumulation represents the structured continuity of past influences, while the stochastic component reflects uncertainty arising from complexity, interaction, and incomplete knowledge of system variables. This interpretation aligns with developments in statistical mechanics, information theory, and complex systems research. The applicability of the model is illustrated through conceptual and numerical examples drawn from physical processes, biological systems, and learning dynamics. These examples demonstrate that deterministic historical structures and stochastic variations can coexist within a single temporal framework. The Zia Theory of Temporal Reality thus provides a generalized and mathematically consistent perspective on temporal evolution and contributes to interdisciplinary research in physics, complexity science, and artificial intelligence.
The shift from classical deterministic prediction to quantum distributions does not by itself decide whether the real is intrinsically probabilistic. The argument begins with both the force and the limit of Laplace’s ideal: deterministic dynamics can coexist with incomplete knowledge of the initial conditions, and classical physics already employs probability. The uncertainty relation then requires a distinction between preparation uncertainty, measurement error, and disturbance, preventing a single formula from serving as an ontological verdict. Bell inequalities tighten the constraints by excluding a specific family of local explanations without ruling out deterministic nonlocal dynamics. The objectivity of probability therefore arises from the explanations that the distributions rule out, not from turning probability into substance. An unexpected detector pulse then allows us to follow the transition from a physical record to knowledge: the material configuration may persist while the act of discrimination is ephemeral; only recognition under a protocol requires a distinction between trace, singular inscription, passive mark, and symbol. Finally, the laser shows why technical fruitfulness increases a theory’s epistemic weight, even though rival ontologies may share the same formalism. The remaining interpretative openness is not arbitrary: it is bounded by results that any future account must accommodate.
Human cognition is still a puzzling issue in research and its appropriate modeling. It depends on how the brain behaves at that particular instance and identifies and responds to a signal among myriads of noises that are present in the surroundings (called external noise) as well as in the neurons themselves (called internal noise). Thus it is not surprising to assume that the functionality consists of various uncertainties, possibly a mixture of aleatory and epistemic uncertainties. It is also possible that a complicated pathway consisting of both types of uncertainties in continuum play a major role in human cognition. For more than 200 years mathematicians and philosophers have been using probability theory to describe human cognition. Recently in several experiments with human subjects, violation of traditional probability theory has been clearly revealed in plenty of cases. Literature survey clearly suggests that classical probability theory fails to model human cognition beyond a certain limit. While the Bayesian approach may seem to be a promising candidate to this problem, the complete success story of Bayesian methodology is yet to be written. The major problem seems to be the presence of epistemic uncertainty and its effect on cognition at any given time. Moreover the stochasticity in the model arises due to the unknown path or trajectory (definite state of mind at each time point), a person is following. To this end a generalized version of probability theory borrowing ideas from quantum mechanics may be a plausible approach. A superposition state in quantum theory permits a person to be in an indefinite state at each point of time. Such an indefinite state allows all the states to have the potential to be expressed at each moment. Thus a superposition state appears to be able to represent better, the uncertainty, ambiguity or conflict experienced by a person at any moment demonstrating that mental states follow quantum mechanics during perception and cognition of ambiguous figures.
Abstract This article1 presents a two-part proposal aimed at exploring “reality” through unifying perspectives and universally consistent foundations. Both parts are inspired by Erwin Schrödinger’s principle of objectivation, particularly the function of the ‘Subject of Cognizance’ embedded within it, and the (seemingly unresolvable, yet inescapable!) issue of the ‘location’ of the boundary between the ‘observed’ and the ‘observer’ that arises in the interpretation of quantum theory. In the first part, it is argued that different interpretations of quantum theory could be viewed as complementary rather than as alternatives, for each interpretation provides insight into different aspects of reality, and thus, integrating perspectives from multiple quantum interpretations can offer a more holistic understanding of reality than relying on a single interpretation. The plausibility of this argument is explained with a brief reference to the phenomenon of electron double-slit interference. The second part of the proposal asserts that, it is essential to eliminate any discrepancy between the way in which the terms ‘physics’ and ‘reality’ are regarded in scientific inquiry, for developing a universal, all-encompassing and consistent world view of the latter — emphasising that not only the ‘observed’ but also the ‘observer’ (considered here as the measuring instrument or apparatus) and the ‘Subject of Cognizance’ (viewed here as the conscious observer) are integral parts of the whole reality. This assertion is supported by some specific remarks of Richard Feynman and David Bohm.
Quantum mechanics is usually defined in terms of some loosely connected axioms and rules. Such a foundation is far from the beauty of, e.g., the `principles' underlying classical mechanics. Motivated, in addition, by notorious interpretation problems, there have been numerous attempts to modify or `complete' quantum mechanics. A first attempt was based on so-called hidden variables; its proponents essentially tried to expel the non-classical nature of quantum mechanics. More recent proposals intend to complete quantum mechanics not within mechanics proper but on a `higher (synthetic) level'; by means of a combination with gravitation theory (R Penrose), with quantum information theory (C M Caves, C A Fuchs) or with psychology and brain science (H P Stapp). I think it is fair to say that in each case the combination is with a subject that, per se , suffers from a very limited understanding that is even more severe than that of quantum mechanics. This was acceptable, though, if it could convincingly be argued that scientific progress desperately needs to join forces. Quantum mechanics of a closed system was a beautiful and well understood theory with its respective state being presented as a point on a deterministic trajectory in Liouville space---not unlike the motion of a classical N -particle system in its 6N -dimensional phase-space. Unfortunately, we need an inside and an outside view, we need an external reference frame, we need an observer. This unavoidable partition is the origin of most of the troubles we have with quantum mechanics. A pragmatic solution is introduced in the form of so-called measurement postulates: one of the various incompatible properties of the system under consideration is supposed to be realized (i.e. to become a fact, to be defined without fundamental dispersion) based on `instantaneous' projections within some externally selected measurement basis. As a result, the theory becomes essentially statistical rather than deterministic; furthermore there is an asymmetry between the observed and the observing. This is the point where consciousness may come in. Complemented by an introduction and several appendices, Henry Stapp's book consists essentially of three parts: theory, implications, and new developments. The theory part gives a very readable account of the Copenhagen interpretation, some aspects of a psychophysical theory, and, eventually, hints towards a quantum foundation of the brain--mind connection. The next part, `implications', summarizes some previous attempts to bridge the gap between the working rules of quantum mechanics and their possible consequences for our understanding of this world (Pauli, Everett, Bohm, Heisenberg). The last section, `new developments', dwells on some ideas about the conscious brain and its possible foundation on quantum mechanics. The book is an interesting and, in part, fascinating contribution to a field that continues to be a companion to `practical' quantum mechanics since its very beginning. It is doubtful whether such types of `quantum ontologies' will ever become (empirically) testable; right now one can hardly expect more than to be offered some consistent `grand picture', which the reader may find more or less acceptable or even rewarding. Many practicing quantum physicists, though, will remain unimpressed. The shift from synthetic ontology to analytic ontology is the foundation of the present work. This means that fundamental wholes are being partitioned into their ontologically subordinate components by means of `events'. The actual event, in turn, is an abrupt change in the Heisenberg state describing the quantum universe. The new state then defines the tendencies associated with the next actual event. To avoid infinite regression in terms of going from one state of tendencies to the next, consciousness is there to give these events a special `feel', to provide a status of `intrinsic actuality'. The brain of an alert human observer is similar in an important way to a quantum detection device: it can amplify small signals to large macroscopic effects. On the other hand, actual events are not postulated to occur exclusively in brains. They are more generally associated with the formation of records. Records are necessarily part of the total state of the universe: it is obvious that the state of the universe cannot undergo a Schrödinger dynamics and at the same time record its own history. `The full universe consists therefore of an exceedingly thin veneer of relatively sluggish, directly observable properties resting on a vast ocean or rapidly fluctuating unobservable ones.' The present ideas also bear on how the world should be seen to develop. While conventional cosmology encounters problems as to how to define the intial conditions, which would enter the governing equations of motion, here `the boundary conditions are set not at some initial time, but gradually by a sequence of acts that imposes a sequence of constraints. After any sequence of acts there remains a collection of possible worlds, some of which will be eliminated by the next act.' Connected with those acts is `meaning': there has always been some speculation about the special significance of local properties in our understanding of the world. One could argue that correlations (even the quantum correlations found, e.g., in the EPR-experiments) were as real as anything else. But also Stapp stresses the special role of locality: the `local observable properties, or properties similar to them are the natural, and perhaps exclusive, carriers of meaning in the quantum universe. From this point of view the quantum universe tends to create meaning.' This sounds like an absolute concept: meaning not with respect to something else, but defined intrinsically---not easy to digest. The role of consciousness in the developing quantum universe requires more attention. `The causal irrelevance of our thoughts within classical physics constitutes a serious deficiency of that theory, construed as a description of reality.' This is taken to be entirely different within quantum mechanics. `The core idea of quantum mechanics is to describe our activities as knowledge-seeking and knowledge-using agents.' `21st century science does not reduce human beings to mechanical automata. Rather it elevates human beings to agents whose free choices can, according to the known laws, actually influence their behaviour.' An example with respect to perception is discussed: `Why, when we look at a triangle, do we experience three lines joined at three points and not some pattern of neuron firings?' The brain `does not convert an actual whole triangle into some jumbled set of particle motions; rather it converts a concatenation of separate external events into the actualization of some single integrated pattern of neural activity that is congruent to the perceived whole triangle.' How convincing is this proposal? It is hard to tell. I think Henry Stapp did a good job, but there are tight limitations to any such endeavour. Quantum mechanics is often strange indeed, but it also gives rise to our classical world around us. For the emergence of classicality jumps and measurement projections (the basic phenomena connected with those fundamental events of choice) are not needed. Therefore, I doubt whether the explanation of the evolution of our world really allows (or requires) that much free choice. On the other hand, most scientist will agree that empirical science was not possible without free will: we could not ask independent questions if this asking was part of a deterministic trajectory. The fact that the result of a quantum measurement is indeterminate (within given probabilities) does certainly not explain free will. How about the type of measurment? The experimentalist will have to assume that he can select the pertinent observable within some limits. But given a certain design the so-called pointer basis (producing stable measurement results) is no longer a matter of free choice. `The main theme of classical physics is that we live in a clocklike universe.' Today it is often assumed that the universe was a big (quantum-) computer or a cellular automaton. Many would be all too happy to leave that rather restrictive picture behind. But where to go? Stapp suggests giving consciousness a prominent role: `The most profound alteration of the fundamental principles was to bring consciousness of human beings into the basic structure of the physical theory.' How far we are able to go in this direction will depend on the amount of concrete research results becoming available to support this view.