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From Determinism to Probability: Limits, Measurement, and Physical Reality

David Cota

Published Aug 21, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The shift from classical deterministic prediction to quantum distributions does not by itself decide whether the real is intrinsically probabilistic. The argument begins with both the force and the limit of Laplace’s ideal: deterministic dynamics can coexist with incomplete knowledge of the initial conditions, and classical physics already employs probability. The uncertainty relation then requires a distinction between preparation uncertainty, measurement error, and disturbance, preventing a single formula from serving as an ontological verdict. Bell inequalities tighten the constraints by excluding a specific family of local explanations without ruling out deterministic nonlocal dynamics. The objectivity of probability therefore arises from the explanations that the distributions rule out, not from turning probability into substance. An unexpected detector pulse then allows us to follow the transition from a physical record to knowledge: the material configuration may persist while the act of discrimination is ephemeral; only recognition under a protocol requires a distinction between trace, singular inscription, passive mark, and symbol. Finally, the laser shows why technical fruitfulness increases a theory’s epistemic weight, even though rival ontologies may share the same formalism. The remaining interpretative openness is not arbitrary: it is bounded by results that any future account must accommodate.

DOI
10.5281/zenodo.22050709

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Miriam Lipschütz-Yevick

Various physical examples are displayed in which the probability distribution can be traced back to its causal origin. It is argued that probability is never irreducible, but is, in principle, always derivable from a deterministic process which determines its numerical value. It is suggested that deterministic and probabilistic theories are interlocked, each presenting a different aspect of reality, yet that no description of the laws of nature in terms of either of these concepts will ever be ultimate.

American Journal of Physics•Nov 1, 1957•3 citations
The shift from classical deterministic prediction to quantum distributions does not by itself decide whether the real is intrinsically probabilistic. The argument begins with both the force and the limit of Laplace’s ideal: deterministic dynamics can coexist with incomplete knowledge of the initial conditions, and classical physics already employs probability. The uncertainty relation then requires a distinction between preparation uncertainty, measurement error, and disturbance, preventing a single formula from serving as an ontological verdict. Bell inequalities tighten the constraints by excluding a specific family of local explanations without ruling out deterministic nonlocal dynamics. The objectivity of probability therefore arises from the explanations that the distributions rule out, not from turning probability into substance. An unexpected detector pulse then allows us to follow the transition from a physical record to knowledge: the material configuration may persist while the act of discrimination is ephemeral; only recognition under a protocol requires a distinction between trace, singular inscription, passive mark, and symbol. Finally, the laser shows why technical fruitfulness increases a theory’s epistemic weight, even though rival ontologies may share the same formalism. The remaining interpretative openness is not arbitrary: it is bounded by results that any future account must accommodate.
This essay argues that many interpretative paradoxes in quantum mechanics arise from a systematic confusion between regimes of description and regimes of existence. It therefore proposes an operative distinction between the real (material dynamics), the concrete (the mark as a stabilising inscription), and theory (the symbolic organisation of prediction). On this basis, degeneracy is reinterpreted as a limit of individuation defined by the experimental cut: where there is no difference at the level of the mark, formal multiplicity amounts to an excess of description rather than to ontological plurality. Likewise, the density matrix is treated as an epistemic operator appropriate to incomplete knowledge and variability of preparation, thereby avoiding the reification of “mixture” into an entity. Interference and superposition are traced back to the manner in which the calculus organises possibilities prior to their separation by a mark. Entanglement is analysed as epistemic correlation inherited in the absence of present interaction, and is distinguished from dynamical non-separability except in cases of effective coupling. In the context of EPR/Bell, it is argued that the update of the predictive regime following a local mark does not constitute a physical process in the distant system; Bell inequalities constrain certain classical grammars of factorisation without determining a positive ontology of superluminal influences. The paper concludes with a critical comparison of consistent histories, informational approaches, and collapse models in terms of their respective ontological costs.
This essay proposes fundamental ontological clarification within contemporary debates on quantum physics: the rigorous distinction between probability as a regime of prediction and the real as material dynamics. Against the widespread view according to which quantum indeterminacy would imply a vague, unstable, or “merely statistical” reality, the text argues that probability belongs to the epistemic plane of knowledge and anticipation, not to the ontological plane of what exists. Quantum physics does not describe an ontologically fluctuating world, but a world whose symbolic access is structurally limited. On this basis, the essay examines the role of Born’s statistical interpretation, decoherence theory, Bell’s theorems, and the Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph result, showing how these impose formal costs on any ontology that conflates formalism and reality. In critical dialogue with QBist, relational, and agential-realist approaches, the text develops a conception of concretion grounded in the notion of mark: the concrete emerges when a material interaction is irreversibly inscribed in a physical support. Stability, far from meaning fixity, is understood as emergent robustness—movement in regime—sufficient to sustain practices, techniques, and historical continuity. The essay concludes by arguing that quantum physics, rather than dissolving the real, demands a more exacting ontology capable of distinguishing precisely between the real, the concrete, and theory.
This argues that many familiar “paradoxes” in quantum mechanics persist because a category mistake is repeatedly made: symbolic operators of prediction are treated as if they were autonomous constituents of material reality. It distinguishes three regimes—the real (material dynamics), the concrete (empirical inscription as marks), and the symbolic (theoretical formalism)—and shows that the wavefunction belongs to the third: it is a calculational operator whose empirical content is fixed only through specified procedures of preparation and measurement. Probability, correspondingly, is treated as an empirical–operational predicate over outcome frequencies under controlled interaction, not as a physical entity. Canonical experimental constraints (Born statistics, single-quantum interference, decoherence as suppression of accessible coherences, Bell/CHSH violations, and contextuality) are used as anchors that support this stratification without licensing ontological inflation. The conclusion is not an anti-realist denial of structure, but a disciplined limit on what may be ontologised: formal success requires an explicit bridge argument to material inscription; absent such a bridge, reifying the wavefunction confuses the map with the territory.
Quantum mechanics is the study of uncertainty. But what does uncertainty mean within the structure of physical reality? From Newton onward, mathematical physics has largely approached motion by specifying a state, identifying the laws governing its evolution, and determining the subsequent behavior of the system. Fourier extended this program to heat, Maxwell to electromagnetic fields, Navier and Stokes to fluids, Hamilton and Lagrange to variational and canonical mechanics, Einstein to spacetime, and quantum mechanics to the evolution and measurement of the quantum state. Across these theories, increasingly powerful mathematics has described what a physical system may do and how its state may evolve. This work asks a logically prior question: Does everything that is mathematically accessible participate equally in physical realization? We propose that it does not. The central distinction developed in this work is between accessibility, admissibility, participation, and realization. A mathematical representation may contain a large space of possible states, trajectories, modes, or outcomes. Physical realization, however, need not occupy that space uniformly. We propose that relational structure establishes an admissible geometry within the accessible space; that geometry determines which possibilities participate strongly or weakly; and probability subsequently quantifies the residual uncertainty among physically supported realizations. The resulting ordering is: Potentiality → Relations → Structure → Geometry → Admissibility → Participation → Realization → Evolution. Under this interpretation, probability is not abolished. Superposition is not abolished. Quantum mechanics is not rejected. Rather, their physical ordering is reconsidered. Superposition describes what the mathematical representation can contain; relational geometry determines how strongly those possibilities can participate; probability describes the uncertainty remaining within that structured support; and observation records the realization that occurs. The NIST loophole-free two-photon Bell experiment provides the principal empirical test developed in this work. Beginning from the experimentally characterized entangled state—not from subsequently observed outcome counts—we construct a relational geometry and the corresponding outcome-dependent participation and information-cost landscapes. The NIST measurement configurations then become experimental sampling coordinates on a geometry determined independently from the later event records. The resulting analysis identifies several mutually reinforcing features: strong inequality among the participation of mathematically accessible Bell outcomes; a corresponding hierarchy of geometric information cost; concentration of experimental variation into reduced effective dimensions; agreement between predicted geometric support and held-out experimental records; preservation of Bell-inequality violation on the reduced realization geometry; compatibility with no-signalling; and robustness tests against multinomial, temporal, detector, and other alternative explanations. The interpretation is not a restoration of Bell-local hidden variables and does not require superluminal signalling. Bell's theorem continues to exclude the relevant locally factorized descriptions. Instead, the observed correlations are interpreted as local measurements of a common non-separable relational structure. Spatial separation does not imply relational or informational separability. This distinction also reframes the quantum measurement problem. Wave-function collapse need not be regarded as the event that creates the physical structure responsible for an outcome. The framework instead proposes that admissibility constrains participation prior to observation, with measurement revealing a realization from an already structured physical domain. A definitive replacement for the standard measurement postulate will require discriminating predictions beyond those already shared with conventional quantum mechanics. The broader implication concerns the theory of motion itself. Newtonian mechanics, Hamiltonian dynamics, Maxwell's equations, Fourier transport, Navier–Stokes flow, relativity, and quantum mechanics employ very different evolution equations, yet all operate upon structured physical domains. The admissibility framework proposes that their deeper commonality lies not in a single dynamical equation but in an ontological ordering: the laws of motion govern how reality evolves; admissibility governs the structure within which reality can become realized. This has consequences beyond quantum foundations. In engineering and computational physics, enormous mathematical state spaces are routinely explored through CFD, finite-element simulation, optimization, Monte Carlo methods, and digital twins. If physically significant behavior occupies a substantially smaller admissible geometry, computation can be redirected from exhaustive exploration toward the structures in which realizable behavior is concentrated. This provides a theoretical basis for reduced-order physical prediction, targeted simulation, transport localization, and deterministic Physics Intelligence. In AI infrastructure and high-performance computing, the same principle suggests that workloads, thermal transport, energy utilization, routing, scheduling, and hardware states need not be treated as equally relevant points within enormous combinatorial spaces. Identifying admissible low-dimensional structure before exhaustive computation offers a route toward reduced search complexity, improved orchestration, higher computational and energy efficiency, and physics-informed predictive control. In aerospace, energy, advanced manufacturing, climate systems, and data-center infrastructure, the framework similarly motivates identifying the geometry of physically participating transport before expending computational resources resolving the entire mathematically accessible domain. The work therefore proposes a common principle extending from fundamental physics to computational engineering: Mathematical possibility is larger than physical realization. Uncertainty may remain genuine at the level of an individual event without implying an absence of antecedent structure. The results presented here provide empirical evidence consistent with the proposition that physical realization is organized by relational geometry prior to probability, while identifying the further tests required to establish whether this ordering constitutes a fundamental law of quantum and classical motion. The next decisive tests include prospective Bell predictions, multipartite and contextuality experiments, Lorentz-covariant formulation, recovery of the classical limit, and extension to quantum field theory and curved spacetime. Nature need not explore everything mathematics permits. Motion is the realization of what physical structure admits. That description captures the actual architecture of the finished 130-page work: it preserves Bell's theorem rather than attempting to evade it, explicitly separates mathematical accessibility from physical participation, and treats the NIST comparison as evidence for the proposed framework while acknowledging that a distinctive prediction beyond standard quantum mechanics remains necessary for a physical replacement of collapse. Principal Implications What This Means for Bell’s Inequality Bell's theorem remains intact. The present framework does not attempt to restore Bell-local hidden variables, weaken Bell's result, or explain the observed correlations through faster-than-light signalling. Bell establishes that the correlations observed between Alice and Bob cannot be reproduced by the relevant locally factorized description. The question developed here begins after that result: if Bell-local separability fails, what physical structure carries the correlations? The proposed answer is relational geometry. Alice and Bob remain spatially separated and perform local measurements, but their outcomes arise from different interrogations of a common non-separable quantum structure. Spatial separation therefore does not imply informational or relational separability. The correlation need not be interpreted as something transmitted from Alice to Bob at the moment of measurement; it can instead be understood as a property of the joint structure to which both measurements belong. The NIST analysis gives this interpretation a quantitative form. The characterized entangled state determines the relational geometry before the subsequent detector records are used for evaluation. Alice's and Bob's measurement settings sample different regions of that geometry. The resulting Bell outcomes exhibit strongly unequal participation, while Bell violation and no-signalling are preserved. The proposed implication is therefore: Bell violation demonstrates the failure of Bell-local factorization; admissibility proposes a geometry for the non-separable physical structure that remains. This reframes the familiar intuition of "action at a distance." The deeper question may not be how information crosses the distance between Alice and Bob, but why spatial distance should require the relational information defining their joint state to become separable in the first place. What This Means for Wave-Function Collapse The framework does not discard wave-function collapse as an operational rule for updating the quantum state after an observation. It changes the proposed ontological role assigned to collapse. In the conventional collapse-centered picture, the quantum state contains multiple possible outcomes and measurement marks the transition to a definite result. This leaves a foundational question: what physically distinguishes the outcome that becomes real from those that do not? Admissibility inserts a structural stage before observation. The accessible quantum
In a deterministic theory, one can deduce the state of the universe at any one time from the dynamical laws that govern its evolution and its state at any other time.In particular, one can deduce from the conditions that obtained at some early boundary condition for the universe, its state at all subsequent times.It is a piece of well-received philosophical common sense that there is no room in a deterministic theory for objective probabilities.Arguments will be given below that this piece of philosophical common sense is mistaken, and that a probability measure over the space of physically possible trajectories is an indispensable component of any theory -deterministic or otherwise -that can be used as a basis for prediction or receive confirmation from the evidence.Phase space is the central representational space in physics.It is the space within which all of the states pertaining to a system are represented, and it encodes all of the general information that we have about those states.To take an obvious example (less obvious examples will be given below) the fact that a pair of quantities are represented by different dimensions in phase space encodes the fact that they represent separate degrees of freedom.Physically possible histories are represented by trajectories through phase space and in a deterministic theory, when dealing with a closed system, there is (no more than) one trajectory through each point.Since the universe as a whole is the only truly closed system, this means there is one trajectory through each point in the phase space of the universe.Probabilities may be invoked in applications of theory, when the state of a system or the values of external variables are not known with full precision, but they are eliminable given complete knowledge.And they don't appear in the statement of the laws.The laws serve simply to identify the physically allowable trajectories.About Newtonian dynamics, Laplace famously said "given for one instant an intelligence which could comprehend all the forces by which nature is animated and the respective situation of the beings who compose it -an intelligence sufficiently vast to submit these data to analysis -it would embrace in the same formula the movements of the greatest bodies of the universe and those of the lightest atom; for it, nothing would be uncertain and the future, and the past, would be present to its eyes."ii It is a short step from this to the idea that probabilities invoked in classical contexts are subjective rather than objective.If they represent anything, it is facts about our epistemic states, not facts about the world.iii Popper, and Lewis, and other influential figures have endorsed this view, categorically rejecting any role for objective probabilities indeterministic contexts.In Popper's words:
Various physical examples are displayed in which the probability distribution can be traced back to its causal origin. It is argued that probability is never irreducible, but is, in principle, always derivable from a deterministic process which determines its numerical value. It is suggested that deterministic and probabilistic theories are interlocked, each presenting a different aspect of reality, yet that no description of the laws of nature in terms of either of these concepts will ever be ultimate.