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Lecture notes in computer science

Falsifiability, Composability, and Comparability of Game-Based Security Models for Key Exchange Protocols

Chris Brzuska, Cas J. F. Cremers, Håkon Jacobsen, Douglas Stebila, Bogdan Warinschi

Published Jan 1, 2025• 1 citation
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-031-83490-5_9

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In this paper we examine composability properties for the fundamental task of key exchange. Roughly speaking, we show that key exchange protocols secure in the prevalent model of Bellare and Rogaway can be composed with arbitrary protocols that require symmetrically distributed keys. This composition theorem holds if the key exchange protocol satisfies an additional technical requirement that our analysis brings to light: it should be possible to determine which sessions derive equal keys given only the publicly available information. What distinguishes our results from virtually all existing work is that we do not rely, neither directly nor indirectly, on the simulation paradigm. Instead, our security notions and composition theorems exclusively use a game-based formalism.We thus avoid several undesirable consequences of simulation-based security notions and support applicability to a broader class of protocols. In particular, we offer an abstract formalization of game-based security that should be of independent interest in other investigations using game-based formalisms.
This paper presents an identity-based authenticated key exchange protocol in the standard model.Protocol design isinspired by bilinear pairings.Strand space knowledge and Game method in provable security are comprehensively used.Thecorrectness of the protocol is analysed and a strict proof is given.The protocol has good forward security and session keynon-hosting.At the same time,through the explicit authentication,it improves the efficiency of the implementation of the pro-tocol.Compared with the protocol in the random oracle model,the protocol has the same computational and communicationefficiencies.