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JOURNAL OF ELECTRONICS INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY

Universally Composable Group Key Exchange Protocol

Pla Information

Published Jan 1, 2009• 2 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

In this article,a universally composable group key exchange ideal function is proposed and realized using witness indistinguishable proof of knowledge with partially isolated party based on the tamper-proof hardware token.Compared with protocols under the CRS model,the group key exchange protocol can greatly reduce the risk of putting all trusts in one place.The protocol is proved to be AKE secure and resistant to the attacks of adaptive adversaries and malicious insiders.

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International Symposium on Information Science and Engineering•Dec 1, 2010•0 citations
In this article,a universally composable group key exchange ideal function is proposed and realized using witness indistinguishable proof of knowledge with partially isolated party based on the tamper-proof hardware token.Compared with protocols under the CRS model,the group key exchange protocol can greatly reduce the risk of putting all trusts in one place.The protocol is proved to be AKE secure and resistant to the attacks of adaptive adversaries and malicious insiders.
We treat the security of group key exchange (GKE) in the universal composability (UC) framework. Analyzing GKE protocols in the UC framework naturally addresses attacks by malicious insiders. We define an ideal functionality for GKE that captures contributiveness in addition to other desired security goals. We show that an efficient two-round protocol securely realizes the proposed functionality in the random oracle model. As a result, we obtain the most efficient UC-secure contributory GKE protocol known.
A desirable goal for cryptographic protocols is to guarantee security when the protocol is composed with other protocol instances. Universally Composable (UC) security provides this guarantee in a strong sense: A UC-secure protocol maintains its security properties even when composed concurrently with an unbounded number of instances of arbitrary protocols. However, many interesting cryptographic tasks are provably impossible to realize with UC security in the standard, “plain” model of computation. Impossibility holds even if ideally authenticated communication channels are provided. In contrast, it has been demonstrated that general secure computation can be obtained in a number of idealized models. Each one of these models represents a form of trust that is put in some of the system’s components. This survey examines and compares some of these trust models, both from the point of view of their sufficiency for building UC secure protocols, and from the point of view of their practical realizability. We start with the common reference string (CRS) model, and then describe several relaxations and alternatives including the Defective CRS model, the key registration models, the hardware token model, the global and augmented CRS models, and a timing assumption. Finally, we briefly touch upon trust models for obtaining authenticated communication.
Protocols for authenticated key exchange (AKE) allow parties within an insecure network to establish a common session key which can then be used to secure their future communication. It is fair to say that group AKE is currently less well understood than the case of two-party AKE; in particular, attacks by malicious insiders --- a concern specific to the group setting --- have so far been considered only in a relatively "ad-hoc" fashion. The main contribution of this work is to address this deficiency by providing a formal, comprehensive model and definition of security for group AKE which automatically encompasses insider attacks. We do so by defining an appropriate ideal functionality for group AKE within the universal composability (UC) framework. As a side benefit, any protocol secure with respect to our definition is secure even when run concurrently with other protocols, and the key generated by any such protocol may be used securely in any subsequent application.In addition to proposing this definition, we show that the resulting notion of security is strictly stronger than the one proposed by Bresson, et al. (termed "AKE-security"), and that our definition implies all previously-suggested notions of security against insider attacks. We also show a simple technique for converting any AKE-secure protocol into one secure with respect to our definition.
Abstract. It is well known that universally composable multiparty computation cannot, in general, be achieved in the standard model without setup assumptions when the adversary can corrupt an arbitrary number of players. One way to get around this problem is by having a trusted third party generate some global setup such as a common reference string (CRS) or a public key infrastructure (PKI). The recent work of Katz shows that we may instead rely on physical assumptions, and in particular tamper-proof hardware tokens. In this paper, we consider a similar but strictly weaker physical assumption. We assume that a player (Alice) can partially isolate another player (Bob) for a brief portion of the computation and prevent Bob from communicating more than some limited number of bits with the environment. For example, isolation might be achieved by asking Bob to put his functionality on a tamper-proof hardware token and assuming that Alice can prevent this token from communicating to the outside world. Alternatively, Alice may interact with Bob directly but in a special office which she administers and where there are no high-bandwidth communication channels to the outside world. We show that, under standard cryptographic assumptions, such physical setup can be used to UC-realize any two party and multiparty computation in the presence of an active and adaptive adversary corrupting any number of players. We also consider an alternative scenario, in which there are some trusted third parties but