Quantum mechanics has always presented a problem for scientific realists.For it does not seem to offer a coherent picture of the world.I think it does, and that there is a viable quantum mechanical model of reality.But it cannot be constructed, given the continuity constraints that we usually place on realistic models.To be a quantum mechanical realist, one has to be willing to accept that there are two fundamentally different kinds of processes occurring in nature: continuous, but quantum mechanically indeterminate, energy transfer processes and discontinuous, but spatially extended, changes of state.The unwillingness of philosophers to accept that there is such a distinction has caused many of them to doubt the reality of Schrodinger waves, and the processes of their generation and collapse.I am fully aware that I am treading on well-trodden territory, and that the technical difficulties that must be faced by anyone who is not a specialist in the field are immense.Nevertheless, I think there is a fairly clear metaphysical position on these issues derivable from the kind of essentialist realism outlined in the previous chapter, and I ask readers to bear with me.First, realism about Schrodinger waves requires the belief that particles are always transmitted as quantum mechanically indeterminate 1.
Quantum mechanics has always presented a problem for scientific realists.For it does not seem to offer a coherent picture of the world.I think it does, and that there is a viable quantum mechanical model of reality.But it cannot be constructed, given the continuity constraints that we usually place on realistic models.To be a quantum mechanical realist, one has to be willing to accept that there are two fundamentally different kinds of processes occurring in nature: continuous, but quantum mechanically indeterminate, energy transfer processes and discontinuous, but spatially extended, changes of state.The unwillingness of philosophers to accept that there is such a distinction has caused many of them to doubt the reality of Schrodinger waves, and the processes of their generation and collapse.I am fully aware that I am treading on well-trodden territory, and that the technical difficulties that must be faced by anyone who is not a specialist in the field are immense.Nevertheless, I think there is a fairly clear metaphysical position on these issues derivable from the kind of essentialist realism outlined in the previous chapter, and I ask readers to bear with me.First, realism about Schrodinger waves requires the belief that particles are always transmitted as quantum mechanically indeterminate 1.
Quantum mechanics has always presented a problem for scientific realists. For it does not seem to offer a coherent picture of the world. I think it does, and that there is a viable quantum mechanical model of reality. But it cannot be constructed, given the continuity constraints that we usually place on realistic models. To be a quantum mechanical realist, one has to be willing to accept that there are two fundamentally different kinds of processes occurring in nature: continuous, but quantum mechanically indeterminate, energy transfer processes and discontinuous, but spatially extended, changes of state. The unwillingness of philosophers to accept that there is such a distinction has caused many of them to doubt the reality of Schrödinger waves, and the processes of their generation and collapse. I am fully aware that I am treading on well-trodden territory, and that the technical difficulties that must be faced by anyone who is not a specialist in the field are immense. Nevertheless, I think there is a fairly clear metaphysical position on these issues derivable from the kind of essentialist realism outlined in the previous chapter, and I ask readers to bear with me.
This chapter develops metaphysics to include quantum mechanical realism. Quantum mechanics has always been the main obstacle to acceptance of scientific realism, and hence to any metaphysics based on scientific realism. Realism about Schrdinger waves requires the belief that particles are always transmitted as quantum mechanically indeterminate waves, but always act as classically determinate particles on whatever absorbs them. Acceptance of a realistic theory of Schrdinger waves, and of the very rapid or instantaneous changes of state that quantum theory implies, commits one to the view that all transitions from indeterminate to determinate states are temporally irreversible, apparently in contradiction to the widely accepted T-symmetry thesis. Realism about Schrdinger waves already implies a kind of non-locality, because what was spatially distributed before the event of determination suddenly becomes localized in that event. Quantum realism implies that there is a common species of elementary physical causation that is probabilistic, and directed from one determinate state of affairs to another.
Quantum mechanics has seemed to defy all attempts to construe it realistically, but antirealism, like the many‐worlds hypothesis, is even more difficult to accept. In order to give a realist construal of quantum mechanics, we need first to distinguish the objective and rational aspect of reality from the paradigmatic thing‐like aspects of having determinate physical properties: quantum‐mechanical entities may be real in the former sense though not in the latter. Anti‐realist arguments are based on the difficulty of giving an account of quantum‐mechanical collapse and the apparent superluminal velocities involved. Objections to superluminal velocities on the score of the special theory of relativity are found not to be conclusive, and the price—there being some preferred frame of reference—to be acceptable. A sketch of a probabilistic account of quantum‐mechanical collapse is offered, which makes the difference between the macro‐ and the micro‐world a matter of degree rather than kind. If that, or some other, account proved acceptable, we could be quantum‐mechanical realists, though quantum‐mechanical reality would be very different from that of material objects in hardware shops.
Scientific realism has traditionally maintained that our best scientific theories can be regarded as more or less true and as representing the world as it is (more or less). However, one of our very best current theories—quantum mechanics—has famously resisted such a realist construal, threatening to undermine the realist stance altogether. The chapters in this volume carefully examine this tension and the reasons behind it, including the underdetermination generated by the multiplicity of formulations and interpretations of quantum physics, each presenting a different way the world could be. Authors in this volume offer a range of alternative ways forward: some suggest new articulations of realism, limiting our commitments in one way or another; others attempt to articulate a ‘third way’ between traditional forms of realism and antirealism, or are critical of such attempts. Still others argue that quantum theory itself should be reconceptualised, or at least alternative formulations should be considered in the hope of evading the problems faced by realism. And some examine the nature of these issues when moving beyond quantum mechanics to quantum field theory. Taken together they offer an exciting new set of perspectives on one of the most fundamental questions in the philosophy of modern physics: how can one be a realist about quantum theory, and what does this realism amount to?
Scientific realists often say that there should be belief in the approximate truth of ‘our best scientific theories.’ It is hard to hear the phrase ‘our best scientific theories’ without thinking of quantum mechanics and quantum field theories. But as numerous chapters in this collection make clear, it is unclear that some experts even know how to make sense of being a realist about quantum theories. They provide recipes for calculating incredibly precise predictions for observations, but beyond the recipes, they do not seem to offer a clear-cut or unambiguous picture of what physical reality is like at the fundamental level. After giving an overview of the problems that beset any attempt to believe in the truth or approximate truth of quantum theories, Chapter 2 turns to the question of how to protect scientific realism from the ills of the quantum. The aim is to show that it is possible to quarantine the worst of those ills, freeing us to adopt a robustly realistic attitude toward many other extremely successful areas of contemporary science, such as (parts of) geology, microbiology, and chemistry. The quarantine barrier may be imperfect and permeable in places, but is strong enough (the chapter argues) to help the cause of scientific realism.
Despite its successes, quantum mechanics (QM) has remained mysterious to all who have encountered it. Starting with Bohr and progressing into the present, the departure from intuitive, physical reality has widened. The connection between QM and reality is more than just a “philosophical” issue. It reveals that QM is not a correct or complete theory of the physical world and that inescapable internal inconsistencies and incongruities arise when attempts are made to treat it as physical as opposed to a purely mathematical “tool.” Some of these issues are discussed in a review by F. Laloe [Am. J. Phys. 69, 655 (2001)]. In an attempt to provide some physical insight into atomic problems and starting with the same essential physics as Bohr of e moving in the Coulombic field of the proton and the wave equation as modified by Schrodinger, a classical approach is explored that yields a remarkably accurate model and provides insight into physics on the atomic level. The proverbial view, deeply seated in the wave-particle duality notion, that there is no large-scale physical counterpart to the nature of the electron may not be correct. Physical laws and intuition may be restored when dealing with the wave equation and quantummechanical problems. Specifically, a theory of classical quantum mechanics (CQM) is derived from first principles that successfully applies physical laws on all scales. Rather than using the postulated Schrodinger boundary condition “Ψ → 0 as r → ∞,” which leads to a purely mathematical model of the electron, the constraint is based on experimental observation. Using Maxwell’s equations, the classical wave equation is solved with the constraint that the bound (n = 1)state electron cannot radiate energy. By further application of Maxwell’s equations to electromagnetic and gravitational fields at particle production, the Schwarzschild metric is derived from the classical wave equation, which modifies general relativity to include conservation of spacetime in addition to momentum and matter/energy. The result gives a natural relationship among Maxwell’s equations, special relativity, and general relativity. CQM holds over a scale of spacetime of 85 orders of magnitude — it correctly predicts the nature of the universe from the scale of the quarks to that of the cosmos. A review is given by G. Landvogt [Internat. J. Hydrogen Energy 28, 1155 (2003)].