Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

APL Quantum

On probabilities in quantum mechanics

Inge Svein Helland

Published Aug 21, 2024• 10 citations
Publisher

Abstract

This is an attempt to clarify certain concepts related to a debate on the interpretation of quantum mechanics, a debate between Khrennikov on the one hand and Stacey and Schack on the other hand. Central to this debate is the notion of quantum probabilities. I first take up the probability concept in the QBist school, as seen from my point of view, and then give my own arguments for the Born formula for calculating quantum probabilities. In that connection, I also sketch some consequences of my approach toward the foundation and interpretation of quantum theory. I discuss my general views on QBism as a possible alternative interpretation of quantum mechanics before I give some final remarks.

DOI
10.1063/5.0218982

Related papers

On Probabilities in Quantum Mechanics

Inge Svein Helland

This is an attempt to clarify certain concepts related to a debate on the interpretation of quantum mechanics, a debate between Andrei Khrennikov on the one side and Blake Stacey and Rüdiger Schack on the other side. Central to this debate is the notion of quantum probabilities. I first take up the probability concept in the QBist school, and then give my own arguments for the Born formula for calculating quantum probabilities. In that connection I also sketch some consequences of my approach towards the foundation and interpretation of quantum theory. I discuss my general views on QBism as a possible alternative interpretation before I give some final remarks.

Qeios•Mar 5, 2024•1 citation

On probabilities in quantum mechanics

Inge Svein Helland

This is an attempt to clarify certain concepts related to a debate on the interpretation of quantum mechanics, a debate between Andrei Khrennikov on the one side and Blake Stacey and Rüdiger Schack on the other side. Central to this debate is the notion of quantum probabilities. I first take up the probability concept in the QBist school, and then give my own arguments for the Born formula for calculating quantum probabilities. In that connection I also sketch some consequences of my approach towards the foundation and interpretation of quantum theory. I discuss my general views on QBism as a possible alternative interpretation before I give some final remarks.

arXiv:2401.17717•Jan 31, 2024•2 citations

On Probabilities in Quantum Mechanics

Inge Svein Helland

This is an attempt to clarify certain concepts related to a debate on the interpretation of quantum mechanics, a debate between Andrei Khrennikov on the one side and Blake Stacey and R\(\mathrm{\ddot{u}}\)diger Schack on the other side. Central to this debate is the notion of quantum probabilities. I first take up the probability concept in the QBist school, and then refer to my own arguments for the Born formula for calculating quantum probabilities. In that connection, I also sketch some consequences of my approach towards the foundation and interpretation of quantum theory. I discuss my general views on QBism as a possible alternative interpretation before I give some final remarks.

Qeios•Feb 2, 2024•0 citations

Quantum Probabilities Are Objective Degrees of Epistemic Justification

Philipp Berghofer

QBism is currently one of the most widely discussed 'subjective' interpretations of quantum mechanics. Its key move is to say that quantum probabilities are personalist Bayesian probabilities and that the quantum state represents subjective degrees of belief. Even probability-one predictions are considered subjective assignments expressing the agent's highest possible degree of certainty about what they will experience next. For most philosophers and physicists this means that QBism is simply too subjective. Even those who agree with QBism that the wave function should not be reified and that we should look for alternatives to standard Psi-ontic interpretations often argue that QBism must be abandoned because it detaches science from objectivity. The problem is that from the QBist perspective it is hard to see how objectivity could enter science. In this paper, I introduce and motivate an interpretation of quantum mechanics that takes QBism as a starting point, is consistent with all its virtues, but allows objectivity to enter from the get-go. This is the view that quantum probabilities should be understood as objective degrees of epistemic justification.

arXiv:2410.19175•Oct 24, 2024•3 citations

Quantum State Analysis : Probability theory as logic in Quantum mechanics

Anders Månsson

Quantum mechanics is basically a mathematical recipe on how to construct physical models. Historically its origin and main domain of application has been in the microscopic regime, although it strictly seen constitutes a general mathematical framework not limited to this regime. Since it is a statistical theory, the meaning and role of probabilities in it need to be defined and understood in order to gain an understanding of the predictions and validity of quantum mechanics. The interpretational problems of quantum mechanics are also connected with the interpretation of the concept of probability. In this thesis the use of probability theory as extended logic, in particular in the way it was presented by E. T. Jaynes, will be central. With this interpretation of probabilities they become a subjective notion, always dependent on one's state of knowledge or the context in which they are assigned, which has consequences on how things are to be viewed, understood and tackled in quantum mechanics. For instance, the statistical operator or density operator, is usually defined in terms of probabilities and therefore also needs to be updated when the probabilities are updated by acquisition of additional data. Furthermore, it is a context dependent notion, meaning, e.g., that two observers will in general assign different statistical operators to the same phenomenon, which is demonstrated in the papers of the thesis. It is also presented an alternative and conceptually clear approach to the problematic notion of "probabilities of probabilities", which is related to such things as probability distributions on statistical operators. In connection to this, we consider concrete numerical applications of Bayesian quantum state assignment methods to a three-level quantum system, where prior knowledge and various kinds of measurement data are encoded into a statistical operator, which can then be used for deriving probabilities of other measurements. The thesis also offers examples of an alternative quantum state assignment technique, using maximum entropy methods, which in some cases are compared with the Bayesian quantum state assignment methods. Finally, the interesting and important problem whether the statistical operator, or more generally quantum mechanics, gives a complete description of "objective physical reality" is considered. A related concern is here the possibility of finding a "local hidden-variable theory" underlying the quantum mechanical description. There have been attempts to prove that such a theory cannot be constructed, where the most well-known impossibility proof claiming to show this was given by J. S. Bell. In connection to this, the thesis presents an idea for an interpretation or alternative approach to quantum mechanics based on the concept of space-time.

•Jan 1, 2007•0 citations

A Survey of Physical Principles Attempting to Define Quantum Mechanics

Gary Oas, J. Acácio de Barros

Quantum mechanics, one of the most successful theories in the history of science, was created to account for physical systems not describable by classical physics. Though it is consistent with all experiments conducted thus far, many of its core concepts (amplitudes, global phases, etc.) can not be directly accessed and its interpretation is still the subject of intense debate, more than 100 years since it was introduced. So, a fundamental question is why this particular mathematical model is the one that nature chooses, if indeed it is the correct model. In the past two decades there has been a renewed effort to determine what physical or informational principles define quantum mechanics. In this paper, recent attempts at establishing reasonable physical principles are reviewed and their degree of success is tabulated. An alternative approach using joint quasi-probability distributions is shown to provide a common basis of representing most of the proposed principles. It is argued that having a common representation of the principles can provide intuition and guidance to relate current principles or advance new principles. The current state of affairs, along with some alternative views are discussed.

arXiv:1506.05515•Advanced series on mathematical psychology•Nov 24, 2015•9 citations
This is an attempt to clarify certain concepts related to a debate on the interpretation of quantum mechanics, a debate between Khrennikov on the one hand and Stacey and Schack on the other hand. Central to this debate is the notion of quantum probabilities. I first take up the probability concept in the QBist school, as seen from my point of view, and then give my own arguments for the Born formula for calculating quantum probabilities. In that connection, I also sketch some consequences of my approach toward the foundation and interpretation of quantum theory. I discuss my general views on QBism as a possible alternative interpretation of quantum mechanics before I give some final remarks.
This is an attempt to clarify certain concepts related to a debate on the interpretation of quantum mechanics, a debate between Andrei Khrennikov on the one side and Blake Stacey and Rüdiger Schack on the other side. Central to this debate is the notion of quantum probabilities. I first take up the probability concept in the QBist school, and then give my own arguments for the Born formula for calculating quantum probabilities. In that connection I also sketch some consequences of my approach towards the foundation and interpretation of quantum theory. I discuss my general views on QBism as a possible alternative interpretation before I give some final remarks.
This is an attempt to clarify certain concepts related to a debate on the interpretation of quantum mechanics, a debate between Andrei Khrennikov on the one side and Blake Stacey and Rüdiger Schack on the other side. Central to this debate is the notion of quantum probabilities. I first take up the probability concept in the QBist school, and then give my own arguments for the Born formula for calculating quantum probabilities. In that connection I also sketch some consequences of my approach towards the foundation and interpretation of quantum theory. I discuss my general views on QBism as a possible alternative interpretation before I give some final remarks.
This is an attempt to clarify certain concepts related to a debate on the interpretation of quantum mechanics, a debate between Andrei Khrennikov on the one side and Blake Stacey and Ru¨\mathrm{\ddot{u}}u¨diger Schack on the other side. Central to this debate is the notion of quantum probabilities. I first take up the probability concept in the QBist school, and then refer to my own arguments for the Born formula for calculating quantum probabilities. In that connection, I also sketch some consequences of my approach towards the foundation and interpretation of quantum theory. I discuss my general views on QBism as a possible alternative interpretation before I give some final remarks.
QBism is currently one of the most widely discussed 'subjective' interpretations of quantum mechanics. Its key move is to say that quantum probabilities are personalist Bayesian probabilities and that the quantum state represents subjective degrees of belief. Even probability-one predictions are considered subjective assignments expressing the agent's highest possible degree of certainty about what they will experience next. For most philosophers and physicists this means that QBism is simply too subjective. Even those who agree with QBism that the wave function should not be reified and that we should look for alternatives to standard Psi-ontic interpretations often argue that QBism must be abandoned because it detaches science from objectivity. The problem is that from the QBist perspective it is hard to see how objectivity could enter science. In this paper, I introduce and motivate an interpretation of quantum mechanics that takes QBism as a starting point, is consistent with all its virtues, but allows objectivity to enter from the get-go. This is the view that quantum probabilities should be understood as objective degrees of epistemic justification.
Quantum mechanics is basically a mathematical recipe on how to construct physical models. Historically its origin and main domain of application has been in the microscopic regime, although it strictly seen constitutes a general mathematical framework not limited to this regime. Since it is a statistical theory, the meaning and role of probabilities in it need to be defined and understood in order to gain an understanding of the predictions and validity of quantum mechanics. The interpretational problems of quantum mechanics are also connected with the interpretation of the concept of probability. In this thesis the use of probability theory as extended logic, in particular in the way it was presented by E. T. Jaynes, will be central. With this interpretation of probabilities they become a subjective notion, always dependent on one's state of knowledge or the context in which they are assigned, which has consequences on how things are to be viewed, understood and tackled in quantum mechanics. For instance, the statistical operator or density operator, is usually defined in terms of probabilities and therefore also needs to be updated when the probabilities are updated by acquisition of additional data. Furthermore, it is a context dependent notion, meaning, e.g., that two observers will in general assign different statistical operators to the same phenomenon, which is demonstrated in the papers of the thesis. It is also presented an alternative and conceptually clear approach to the problematic notion of "probabilities of probabilities", which is related to such things as probability distributions on statistical operators. In connection to this, we consider concrete numerical applications of Bayesian quantum state assignment methods to a three-level quantum system, where prior knowledge and various kinds of measurement data are encoded into a statistical operator, which can then be used for deriving probabilities of other measurements. The thesis also offers examples of an alternative quantum state assignment technique, using maximum entropy methods, which in some cases are compared with the Bayesian quantum state assignment methods. Finally, the interesting and important problem whether the statistical operator, or more generally quantum mechanics, gives a complete description of "objective physical reality" is considered. A related concern is here the possibility of finding a "local hidden-variable theory" underlying the quantum mechanical description. There have been attempts to prove that such a theory cannot be constructed, where the most well-known impossibility proof claiming to show this was given by J. S. Bell. In connection to this, the thesis presents an idea for an interpretation or alternative approach to quantum mechanics based on the concept of space-time.
Quantum mechanics, one of the most successful theories in the history of science, was created to account for physical systems not describable by classical physics. Though it is consistent with all experiments conducted thus far, many of its core concepts (amplitudes, global phases, etc.) can not be directly accessed and its interpretation is still the subject of intense debate, more than 100 years since it was introduced. So, a fundamental question is why this particular mathematical model is the one that nature chooses, if indeed it is the correct model. In the past two decades there has been a renewed effort to determine what physical or informational principles define quantum mechanics. In this paper, recent attempts at establishing reasonable physical principles are reviewed and their degree of success is tabulated. An alternative approach using joint quasi-probability distributions is shown to provide a common basis of representing most of the proposed principles. It is argued that having a common representation of the principles can provide intuition and guidance to relate current principles or advance new principles. The current state of affairs, along with some alternative views are discussed.