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Philosophies

Quantum Mechanics, Fields, Black Holes, and Ontological Plurality

Gustavo Esteban Romero

Published Jul 4, 2024• 5 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The ontology behind quantum mechanics has been the subject of endless debate since the theory was formulated some 100 years ago. It has been suggested, at one time or another, that the objects described by the theory may be individual particles, waves, fields, ensembles of particles, observers, and minds, among many other possibilities. I maintain that these disagreements are due in part to a lack of precision in the use of the theory’s various semantic designators. In particular, there is some confusion about the role of representation, reference, and denotation in the theory. In this article, I first analyze the role of the semantic apparatus in physical theories in general and then discuss the corresponding ontological implications for quantum mechanics. Subsequently, I consider the extension of the theory to quantum fields and then analyze the semantic changes of the designators with their ontological consequences. In addition to the classical arguments to rule out a particle ontology in the case of non-relativistic quantum field theory, I show how the existence of black holes makes the proposal of a particle ontology in general spacetimes unfeasible. I conclude by proposing a provisional pluralistic ontology of fields and spacetime and discussing some prospects for possible future ontological economies.

DOI
10.3390/philosophies9040097

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The ontology behind quantum mechanics has been the subject of endless debate since the theory was formulated some 100 years ago. It has been suggested, at one time or another, that the objects described by the theory may be individual particles, waves, fields, ensembles of particles, observers, and minds, among many other possibilities. I maintain that these disagreements are due in part to a lack of precision in the use of the theory’s various semantic designators. In particular, there is some confusion about the role of representation, reference, and denotation in the theory. In this article, I first analyze the role of the semantic apparatus in physical theories in general and then discuss the corresponding ontological implications for quantum mechanics. Subsequently, I consider the extension of the theory to quantum fields and then analyze the semantic changes of the designators with their ontological consequences. In addition to the classical arguments to rule out a particle ontology in the case of non-relativistic quantum field theory, I show how the existence of black holes makes the proposal of a particle ontology in general spacetimes unfeasible. I conclude by proposing a provisional pluralistic ontology of fields and spacetime and discussing some prospects for possible future ontological economies.
In this work, we focus on a very specific case study: assuming that quantum theories deal with “particles” of some kind (point particles in orthodox non-relativistic quantum mechanics, field excitations in quantum field theories), what kind of entity can such particles be? One possible answer, the one we shall examine here, is that they are not the usual kind of object found in daily life: individuals. Rather, we follow a suggestion by Erwin Schrödinger, according to which quantum mechanics poses a revolutionary kind of entity: non-individuals. While physics, as a scientific field, is not concerned with whether entities posited by a specific physical theory are individuals or not, answering this question is part of the quest for a better understanding of physical reality. Here lies, in large measure, the relevance of ontology.
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It has been widely thought that the ontology of quantum mechanics is real, physical fields. In this paper, I will present a new argument against the field ontology of quantum mechanics by analyzing one-body systems such as an electron. First, I argue that if the physical entity described by the wave function of an electron is a field, then this field is massive and charged. Next, I argue that if a field is massive and charged, then any two parts of the field in space will have gravitational and electromagnetic interactions, while the existence of such self-interactions for an electron contradicts quantum mechanics and experimental observations. This poses a serious difficulty for the field ontology of quantum mechanics. Third, I argue that a particle ontological interpretation of the wave function may avoid the difficulty by providing a plausible explanation of the non-existence of self-interactions. According to this explanation, the wave function of an electron is a description of the state of the random motion of the electron as a particle, and in particular, the modulus squared of the wave function gives the probability density that the electron appears in every possible position in space. Finally, I answer a major objection to the explanation of the non-existence of self-interactions in terms of particle ontology.
Several recent arguments purport to show that there can be no relativistic, quantum-mechanical theory of localizable particles and, thus, that relativity and quantum mechanics can be reconciled only in the context of quantum field theory. We point out some loopholes in the existing arguments, and we provide two no-go theorems to close these loopholes. However, even with these loopholes closed, it does not yet follow that relativity plus quantum mechanics exclusively requires a field ontology, since relativistic quantum field theory itself might permit an ontology of localizable particles supervenient on the fundamental fields. Thus, we provide another no-go theorem to rule out this possibility. Finally, we allay potential worries about this conclusion by arguing that relativistic quantum field theory can nevertheless explain the possibility of "particle detections," as well as the pragmatic utility of "particle talk."
Quantum theory underpins much of modern physics and its implications draw the attention of industry, academia and public funding agencies. However there are many unsettled conceptual and philosophical problems in the interpretation of quantum mechanics which are a matter of extensive debate. These hotly debated topics include the meaning of the wave function, the nature of the quantum objects, the role of the observer, the non-locality of the quantum world, and the emergence of classicality from the quantum domain. Containing chapters written by eminent researchers from the fields of physics and philosophy, this book provides interdisciplinary, comprehensive and up-to-date perspectives of the problems related to the interpretation of quantum theory. It is ideal for academic researchers in physics and philosophy working on the ontology of quantum mechanics.